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Abstract
Over the past decade, the prevention and control of seasonal and pandemic influenza has grown to be
one of the largest and most visible public health policies. This dissertation considers contemporary
influenza policy as a case study in what I call medical politics, in which a disease that for most people is
rather unremarkable has become the focus of intense (and costly) public health campaigns based on a
shaky scientific basis. The dissertation seeks to explain how this could happen.
The first two chapters show how influenza and its pandemics are marketed through an appeal to
numerous scientific claims. Drawing on governmental marketing materials, statements by officials, and
policy documents, I try to let officials speak for themselves and, as much as possible, refrain from
analysis. Chapter 3 tells the story of the 2009 novel influenza H1N1 outbreak, showing how official
understandings about influenza were called into question by an outbreak far milder than experts had
predicted, and discusses investigations which highlighted the role of industry in shaping influenza policy.
Chapter 4 analyzes official scientific claims regarding influenza, and argues that degree to which
influenza is a serious public health problem is actually unclear. Furthermore, influenza vaccine
effectiveness has been vastly overstated, predictive models of pandemic influenza are demonstrably
flawed, and officials conflate true influenza with influenza-like illness (ILl), an often overlooked but
critical distinction which allows officials to mislead the public into holding false assumptions about the
potential benefits of influenza vaccine. Chapter 5 highlights the centrality of "virus-centric thinking" and
the ethic of "saving lives" in public health practice as important factors that help explain how such a
situation can exist and persist in light of the evidence. Chapter 6 addresses the policy implications of the
dissertation's findings.
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Introduction
Should I get the flu shot?
When people learn that I study influenza, they almost invariably ask me for my opinion on whether they
should get the flu shot.' I can understand why they want advice. On the one hand, there is a clear and
consistent message that we should all get vaccinated. Officials at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) now recommend that everyone six months and above should get a flu shot, 2 and many
supermarkets and major chain stores like CVS, RiteAid, Walgreens, Kroger, and Target have opened flu
shot clinics, making vaccination against influenza as easy as running an errand, plus around $25. Yet
despite this enthusiasm and widespread availability, many people remain hesitant, wondering if it
makes sense for them. Adding to their doubts, the media often carries a story which questions the
benefit of the shot. A great number of Americans also view the influenza vaccine as unsafe. Many feel
they don't need it. A significant portion of healthcare workers decline the shot. Others assert that the
vaccine can actually give you the flu. Some ask me for advice.
Over the years, I have come to appreciate that the most important thing about influenza vaccine may be
the fact that it is voluntary. Unless one is enlisted in the military, influenza vaccine is an option, not an
obligation. And I have always felt uncomfortable instructing people about what they should or should
not do with their bodies. But to tell people that it is their choice and that they must make up their own
mind seems irresponsible, as if I have nothing to offer despite my interest in the topic over the last six
years. I therefore try to help people understand why they might be feeling some hesitancy towards a
product that health officials expend significant time and resources promoting as in their best interest. I
try to explain what has led me to conclude that policies promoting influenza vaccine are inappropriate,
based on questionable calculations of the magnitude to which influenza is a real threat and misleading,
overconfident claims regarding the degree to which vaccines can ameliorate the problem. I try to
explain why it is that well-intentioned public health officials might have it wrong. This dissertation is the
long form of that discussion.
This dissertation presents the study of contemporary influenza policy as a study in what I call medical
politics, in which a disease that for most people is rather unremarkable has become the focus of intense
(and costly) public health campaigns. These campaigns heavily market influenza and its pandemics as
serious public health threats by appealing to a variety of scientific claims. But, as I argue in this
dissertation, the soundness of these policies is called into question by important flaws,
misrepresentations, and inconsistencies in those particular scientific claims. The degree to which
IAt the cost of obvious hypocrisy, I have intentionally chosen to make limited use the familiar terms "flu" and "flu
shot" despite my objection to these phrases, because to explain why these words are objectionable at this point in
the story would add confusion to what is already a morass. As the mathematician Serge Lang observed, "not the
least problem which arises in dealing with a morass is how to avoid becoming part of it." Serge Lang, Challenges
(New York: Springer, 1998), 736.
2 Anthony E Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 59, no. 8 (August 6,
2010): 1-62.
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influenza is a serious public health problem is actually unclear. Furthermore, influenza vaccine
effectiveness has been vastly overstated, and predictive models of pandemic influenza are
demonstrably flawed. Finally, officials conflate true influenza with influenza-like illness (ILI), a seeming
semantic distinction which in reality carries huge ramifications, chief among these the ability for officials
to mislead the public into false assumptions about the potential benefits of influenza vaccine.
Yet with highly trained, professional scientists, how is it that they have not changed their position in the
face of new knowledge? I argue that these misconceptions exist and persist for multiple reasons-in
part because they fit within a set of basic assumptions about the nature of infectious diseases, in part
because the formation, enactment, and the evaluation of policy is carried out by people who have little
incentive to be self-critical, and in part because governmental and academic science has become infused
with industry. I treat the matter of influenza policy as a topic that requires understanding both its
technical and social dimensions.
The view taken in this dissertation is that influenza policy is best seen as a form of advocacy. The CDC's
recommendations that all Americans should get an annual influenza vaccine do not sit idly on the
printed page, awaiting considered acceptance by public health groups, physicians, and the public. They
are, on the contrary, actively marketed. I use the term "marketing" in part because it helps cast a
critical perspective on the practice, but also in part because it is the terminology of the trade, perhaps
most transparently witnessed in the CDC's National Center for Health Marketing.3 As part of these
marketing efforts, national awareness campaigns have arisen, such as the National Influenza Vaccination
Week. Helping propel these initiatives are other marketing vehicles like the National Influenza Vaccine
Summit, an annual event conceived by the CDC and American Medical Association that now draws over
300 participants from across the private and public sector, aiming to align and co-ordinate the national
drive for influenza vaccination.4
Perhaps owing to the fundamental ethic of health marketing that it is to employ "science-based
strategies," 5 campaigns to increase public interest in influenza vaccination draw heavily on statistics
which, the CDC and others assert, demonstrate that influenza is a more serious disease than people
realize. My analysis in this dissertation pays particular attention to the centrality of statistics-in
particular, estimates of the number of dead bodies-in the marketing of influenza and its vaccine. We
must ask why is it that numbers like "36,000 deaths a year" become essential phrases in the literature of
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "What is Health Marketing?", February 2, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthcommunication/ToolsTemplates/WhatsHM.html, (accessed July 14, 2011); U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "National Center for Health Marketing", 2008,
http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/NCHMfs.pdf, (accessed July 14, 2011); Earl Honeycutt and Kenneth Paul, "An
Analysis of Health Marketing Quarterly 1991-2002," Health Marketing Quarterly 21, no. 4 (December 2004): 77-87.
4 According to a recent presentation about the Summit, members include representatives from "Vaccine
Manufacturers, Vaccine Distributors, Federal Agencies, Professional Medical Organizations, Specialty, State,
Nursing Organizations, Public Health , Hospitals, Pharmacists, Community Immunization Providers, Occupational
Health Providers , Business/Employers, Private Health Insurance and Managed Care, Long-term Care , Quality
Improvement Organizations, Consumers, Advocacy Groups." (See Litjen Tan, "What is the National Influenza
Vaccine Summit?", 2011.)
s U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "What is Health Marketing?".
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influenza, mentioned everywhere from CDC posters to scientific papers. Of course at this point in
history it comes as little surprise that numbers drive the way those in public health understand and
order the world. The very origins of public health movement were built on new ways of understanding
and improving the health of populations through numbers. Edwin Chadwick's well known pioneering
Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain of 1842 may be the best
example of this. Tables of vital statistics, showing the rates of birth, death, and disease, across various
groups and geographical subdivisions provided insight into how living conditions were connected to the
spread of infectious diseases. Campaigns to pipe clear water in and excrement out, improving the social
condition of Victorian slums were not-and some argue could not be -justified on moral or civic
responsibility, but rather on the objective evidence of a new economic and technocratic rationality of
disease prevention. In this context, the tabulation of numbers helped guide organizational responses.
By keeping the subjective and personal under check, quantification offers political administrators a way
to achieve the semblance of objectivity and rationality.8 But as the historian Ted Porter notes, it is also
these qualities of quantification that make it especially useful as a tool of persuasion, in which statistics
not only guide the actions of officials but simultaneously help demonstrate the rationality of those
actions. Porter writes that "the appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic officials who
lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right."9
Understanding the how numbers figure into influenza policy and advocacy must necessarily also take
into account aspects which point to a lack of objectivity-where statistics are, upon closer examination,
of dubious validity, as I argue is the case in influenza policy. Here, political scientists Peter Andreas' and
Kelly Greenhill's recent examination of the politics of numbers in illicit trades is especially informative.
Andreas and Greenhill show how officials, non-governmental organizations, and other interested parties
use and manipulate numbers, transforming guesstimates and back-of-the-envelope style, logic defying
statistics into so called hard numbers in order to forward various agendas. 0 In their book, a United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) official who works to fight human
trafficking commented, "I have been at many meetings with international organizations, activists, and
NGOs where people have discussed the 'advocacy value of numbers' and their importance for
'mobilization."' 1' Perhaps such a fate is inevitable. After all, as Greenhill reminds us, "we live in a world
6 Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and SocialJustice in the Age of Chadwick: Britain, 1800-1854 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Andrew Lakoff, "From population to vital system: national security and the changing object of public health," in
Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question, ed. Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, 2008,
38; Peter Washer, Emerging Infectious Diseases and Society (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 25; Hamlin, Public Health
and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick.
8 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers (Princeton University Press, 1996).9 ibid.,8.
10 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime
and Conflict (Cornell Univ Pr, 2010).
" David A. Feingold, "Trafficking in Numbers: the Social Construction of Human Trafficking Data," in Sex, Drugs,
and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill
(Cornell University Press, 2010), 51.
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in which things that are not measured, for all intents and purposes, do not exist."12 While there are few
who doubt the existence of influenza, it is only through statistics that the disease takes on a profile as a
disease deserving of public health attention. This means that even if influenza deaths are notoriously
hard to tabulate with certainty, as they are, values do get attached and are marketed with an air of
certainty.
Perhaps nowhere has this been more true than in the case of pandemic influenza, where conveying the
threat of a pandemic was largely accomplished through the deployment of statistical projections of
future mortality in the next pandemic. Some scholars have highlighted the fact that pandemic influenza
became "securitized," coming under the rubrics of national security,13 and it was only after and through
the enactment of wargames and other forms of "imaginative enactment" that pandemic preparedness
became a national initiative.14 In the anthropologist Andrew Lakoff's analysis, pandemic preparedness is
a distinct form of collective security that bears resemblance to, but differs from past articulations of
nation-state and public health (population) security. Pandemic preparedness therefore does not fit into
the well established categories and ways of thinking that define public health rationality, which have
been focused on clearly defined, quantifiable assessments of risk. By contrast, Lakoff argues, preparing
for a pandemic defies rational, objective quantification, and thus likens it to the sort of existential
threats of modernity described by the notable sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens.15 While
Beck and Giddens focused on those threats created by the growth in knowledge and technology of the
modern era, Lakoff and others such as sociologist Frank Furedi suggest that the contours of the response
to non-technological threats like pandemic influenza or biological terrorism are much the same. Furedi
emphasizes how risk management has turned from a probabilistic activity (focused on determining the
frequency and impact of potential hazards) to something "possibilistic," in which the mere possibility
and absence of hard knowledge leads to overreaction and a drive to prepare for worst-case scenarios.' 6
While I agree with Furedi in the role that possibilistic risk assessment has played in the environmental
and terrorism debates, and agree with Lakoff that imaginative enactment was an important historical
element in the adoption of pandemic preparedness policy, my reading of pandemic preparedness finds
more continuity between the marketing of seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza. The primary
promoters of what has come to be known as "pandemic preparedness" are many of the same
individuals and organizations, and, far from an "unknowable," remote-but-still-possible disaster,
pandemic influenza was cast, using statistical projections and language such as "not if, but when," as a
guaranteed disaster. Thus the great variability in statistical estimates of the next pandemic's death
1 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: the Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in Sex, Drugs, and Body
Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Cornell
University Press, 2010), 132.
1 Washer, Emerging Infectious Diseases and Society; Lakoff, "From population to vital system: national security
and the changing object of public health."
1 Lakoff, "From population to vital system: national security and the changing object of public health."
1s Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, 1st ed. (Stanford
University Press, 1991); Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992).
16 Frank Furedi, "Precautionary culture and the rise of possibilistic risk assessment," Erasmus Law Review 2, no. 2(2009): 197-220.
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toll-from 2 million to 1 billion-is not the point. The point is that even the lowest figures-the "best
case scenarios"-were massive numbers, and indicated that a catastrophe was imminent.17
The role numbers play in defining diseases and casting them as plainly in need of intervention is hardly
unique to influenza. Central to the thesis on "disease mongering," is the view that in the effort to sell
drugs, pharmaceutical companies simultaneously sell disorders by creating the impression among the
public and doctors that the disorders are far more prevalent in the general population than people
realize, thereby enlarging their potential market.'8 Conditions such as "Restless Leg Syndrome" (RLS),
"Female Sexual Dysfunction" (FSD), and "Erectile Dysfunction" (ED) are a few of many recent examples
of conditions that, like influenza, sophisticated marketing campaigns are helping convince the public and
doctors are relatively common, serious disorders.1 9 This is not to say that there is no physiological basis
to these conditions-that they are somehow pure fictions and those who attest to suffering from them
are in actuality not suffering. Rather, the disease mongering critique holds that relatively rare and little-
known (yet very real) forms of suffering are made to seem like larger problems than they really are by
widening the boundaries of diagnosis definitions and reaching wide audiences through public awareness
campaigns.m By giving them names, generating statistics to show how common the disorder is, and
showing what they can result in if left untreated, they not only gain attention, but can be brought within
the purview of professional medicine as a problem in need of treatment.
Despite the similarities with the story of influenza, to my knowledge none of the critics of disease
mongering have been critical of the marketing of influenza. One reason for this may be the fact that for
most observers, there is a certain objectivity about influenza that is lacking for many of the conditions
that have come under the disease mongering umbrella. With influenza, there is a virus that enters and
infects the body, causing a disease with a well understood and predictable clinical course. As the
historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg has argued, such mechanistic certainty about how a pathogen
causes malfunction helps make a disease's status as a specific entity unproblematic.2 The same cannot
17 Commenting on the huge variation in expert predictions of the next pandemic, the risk communication
specialists Peter Sandman and Jody Lanard wrote in 2004 that "either way it's a big number." See Peter M.
Sandman and Jody Lanard, "Pandemic Influenza Risk Communication: The Teachable Moment", December 4, 2004,
http://www.psandman.com/col/pandemic.htm, (accessed July 15, 2011).
1 Lynn Payer, Disease-Mongers: How Doctors, Drug Companies, and Insurers Are Making You Feel Sick (John Wiley
& Sons Inc, 1992); David Healy, The Antidepressant Era (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999); Ray
Moynihan and Alan Cassels, Selling Sickness: How the World's Biggest Pharmaceutical Companies are Turning Us
All into Patients, 1st ed. (Nation Books, 2005).
19 Steven Woloshin and Lisa M. Schwartz, "Giving Legs to Restless Legs: A Case Study of How the Media Helps Make
People Sick," PLoS Medicine 3, no. 4 (2006): e170; Joel Lexchin, "Bigger and Better: How Pfizer Redefined Erectile
Dysfunction," PLoS Medicine 3, no. 4 (2006): e132; Ray Moynihan and Barbara Mintzes, Sex, Lies, and
Pharmaceuticals: How Drug Companies Plan to Profit from Female Sexual Dysfunction (Greystone Books, 2010).
2 Ray Moynihan and David Henry, "The Fight against Disease Mongering: Generating Knowledge for Action," PLoS
Medicine 3, no. 4 (2006): e191.
2 Rosenberg argues that modern conceptions of distinct disease entities are distinguished by our ability to tie
them to specific material malfunction. Although this conception of disease emerged several decades prior to the
rise of germ theory in the mid-nineteenth century, contagious epidemic diseases have provided powerful
reassurance of the legitimacy of the mechanism-oriented way of thinking. Charles E Rosenberg, "The tyranny of
diagnosis: specific entities and individual experience," The Milbank Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2002): 237-260.
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be said of female sexual dysfunction, erectile dysfunction, shyness, boredom, and unhappiness. For
these conditions, it is precisely the lack of certainty regarding a mechanism of pathogenesis that makes
placing them into distinct disease categories-and drawing lines between "normal" and "diseased"-
highly debatable and contested. Looking at it through the framework articulated by the anthropologist
Joe Dumit, influenza fits within a more twentieth century view of the body-of "inherent health" (with
occasional attacks from outside invaders like bacteria and viruses)-not the newer, still emerging, and
controversial conception of bodies as "inherently sick," always in need of medication to regulate a state
of "normalcy."22
This is not to say that influenza is the sole "hard" disease for which great efforts are made to generate
concern among a broad population. As Jeremy Greene has shown, the pharmaceutical company Merck
worked in the 1950s and 1960s to redefine the threshold for declaring a person as "hypertensive,"
thereby enlarging the market for their diuretic medication, Diuril. Greene's analysis shows that even for
conditions that can be measured in standardized ways, huge efforts may still be necessary to alter
physicians' clinical decision making.2 ' But here, too, like in the disease mongering thesis,
pharmaceutical companies' desire for profit is the primary driver of the story. The case of influenza-in
which government scientists generate and market the statistics-forces us to think about how and why
this occurs when profit does not appear to be a fully satisfactory answer.
* * *
Studying the marketing of disease provokes fundamental, more searching questions about the selection
of risks. Even if influenza kills tens of thousands of Americans each year, as the CDC argues, it does not
automatically follow that this merits a policy response. For which hazards (and of what magnitude) do
we wish the state to intervene? What kinds of risks should individuals attempt to avoid? Which should
they accept? Who is to decide?
In the 1970s, Ivan Illich radically challenged the medicalization of pain and death, arguing that "Pain has
ceased to be conceived as a 'natural' or 'metaphysical' evil. ... Medical civilization teaches that suffering
is unnecessary, because pain can be technically eliminated."24 Although Illich's work was seen by many
as polemical, the basic question he raises about intervention is important. When should public monies
be spent on public health programs to control influenza? In many ways, the marketing of influenza is a
large and concerted effort among government officials, vaccine manufacturers and others to convince
the public that influenza should be taken seriously-something it seems the public would otherwise
largely not be inclined to do. The marketing of influenza is then, as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky
might argue, a struggle over defining what is "normal" and therefore not in need of intervention, and
what crosses that line.
Joseph Dumit, "Drugs for Life," Molecular Interventions 2, no. 3 (June 1, 2002): 124 -127.
Jeremy A. Greene, "Releasing the Flood Waters: Diuril and the Reshaping of Hypertension," Bulletin of the
History of Medicine 79, no. 4 (2005): 749-794.
24 Ivan Illich, Medical nemesis: the expropriation of health (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975), 94-95.
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In their discussion of the selection of risk, Douglas and Wildavsky observe that modern society may be
no different than primitive societies in that we try to determine a cause for every misfortune, "as if
there were no such thing as natural death, no purely physical facts, no regular accident rates, no normal
incidence of disease." 25 The rise of statistics and statistical knowledge theoretically could have given rise
to a society in which some misfortunes would not require any deep explanation, for they were
predictable and expected. Such was the defining feature of modern societies according to philosopher
Lucien Levy-Brhl-to not ask.26 But as Douglas and Wildavsky explain, "the idea of normality changes
with new knowledge."2 New technologies reconfigure social responsibilities, redefining what is normal
and acceptable.
In relation to environmental and technological hazards, for which the most important characteristic may
be that they emanate from the very technologies human societies have deployed,28 discussions of
"acceptable risk" are not new.29 Yet there has been by comparison far less discussion over what level of
illness and death is acceptable for the risks posed by infectious diseases-particularly from diseases
deemed vaccine preventable.0 Understanding why this is the case is of central concern to me in this
dissertation.
My argument is that the act of conceiving of influenza as a "vaccine preventable disease" has radically
altered the way public health officials think about, describe, and respond to influenza. Vaccines were an
incredibly powerful expression of the triumph of the germ theory, which posited a clear relationship
between single organisms, single diseases, and single cures. The introduction of a vaccine promised to
interrupt the ability of the germ to cause disease. With a vaccine, influenza is no longer just one of the
many diseases out there in the world, but qualified for the special category of "vaccine preventable
diseases," in turn leading public health officials to have little doubt that the correct way to manage
influenza was through vaccination. In this way, as historian Harriet Ritvo has shown, the category
helped bring order to the specialists' world.31 The existence of influenza vaccine helps to simultaneously
define influenza as a problem and present its solution: vaccination. All that is left is convincing the
public to do what's right.
But, as communication theorist Geoffrey Bowker and sociologist Susan Leigh Star have shown in their
study of classification, ordering the world into categories may be carried out in sincerity, but can
2s Mary Douglas and Aaron B Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental
Dangers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 32.
2 L6vy-Bruhl, cited in Ibid.
27 Ibid., 35.
2 Beck, Risk Society.
29 Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
3 One interesting exception to this is a recent editorial by the bioethicist Arthur Caplan, who challenged the
desirability of eradicating all infectious disease, in particular polio. Caplan argued that given the costs of
eradication programs, seeking "elimination or control rather than eradication" may, all things considered, be a
more ethical approach. See Arthur L Caplan, "Is disease eradication ethical?," Lancet 373, no. 9682 (June 27,
2009): 2192-2193.
31 Harriet Ritvo, The Platypus and the Mermaid: And Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination (Harvard
University Press, 1998).
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nonetheless bring about unintended consequences, sometimes detrimental and damaging. The
theoretical simplicity of the virus-centric model, in which vaccination fits like a key in a lock to solve the
influenza problem, is also its Achilles heel. I argue that so many of the problems in the scientific
positions underpinning influenza policy-from flawed risk assessment to misleading, overly optimistic
assessments of vaccine effectiveness-go uncorrected because thinking about infectious diseases has
become "virus centric."
Are these experts, then, trapped in a "paradigm," in the Kuhnian sense, in which empirical anomalies
and other problems in current theories simply cannot fit within the current framework of "normal
science" and are therefore effectively invisible to current researchers?33 I do not think so, for many of
the problems in influenza science are known, and the contradictions are contradictions that arise within
the current paradigm, not without. That influenza vaccines have failed to lower elderly mortality34 is not
a conclusion incompatible with the current paradigm; it is simply unfortunate information that is given
little consideration in policy.
A different answer to the question of how expert systems can systematically err was offered by Lynn
Eden in her study of nuclear damage. 3s Eden asks how the United States' best experts on nuclear
damage failed to predict the effects of nuclear fires, despite ample evidence that the impact of fire
would be far more devastating than the blast itself. Eden suggests it was not that they did not or could
not comprehend damage from fire. Rather, she highlights the role of path dependence, and
organizational "lock-in," in which early choices and decisions regarding where to allocate resources led
to bureaucracies and organizational cultures that reinforced those choices. Predicting blast damage got
early recognition and resources, while predicting fire damage did not. As time went on, the lack of
organizational capacity to predict fire damage was taken as proof of the impossibility of predicting fire
damage, and consequently it was ignored.
It is worth mentioning that this dissertation does take a position about the accuracy of scientific claims.
While debates have and will continue to exist over whether and to what degree academics can
3 Geoffrey C Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, Inside
technology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999). Also see Ian Hacking, "Biopower and the avalanche of printed
numbers," Humanities in Society 5, no. 3/4 (1982): 279-295.
3 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
3 See Lone Simonsen et al., "Impact of Influenza Vaccination on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population,"
Arch Intern Med 165, no. 3 (February 14, 2005): 265-272; Lisa A Jackson et al., "Evidence of bias in estimates of
influenza vaccine effectiveness in seniors," International Journal of Epidemiology 35, no. 2 (April 2006): 337-44;
Lisa A Jackson et al., "Functional status is a confounder of the association of influenza vaccine and risk of all cause
mortality in seniors," International Journal of Epidemiology 35, no. 2 (April 2006): 345-352; Tom Jefferson et al.,
"Vaccines for preventing influenza in the elderly," in Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, ed. The Cochrane
Collaboration and Tom Jefferson (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2010),
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/14651858.CD004876.pub3; Dean T. Eurich et al., "Mortality Reduction with
Influenza Vaccine in Patients with Pneumonia Outside 'Flu' Season: Pleiotropic Benefits or Residual Confounding?,"
Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 178, no. 5 (September 1, 2008): 527-533. For a more detailed discussion of these
papers, see Chapter 4.
3s Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation, Cornell studies
in security affairs (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004).
3 Ibid., 285-6.
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acceptably engage themselves as "activists" (visible in the climate change debate), it is good to see that
I am not the first. The historian Allan Brandt's detailed analysis of the ways in which knowledge of the
harms of tobacco were manipulated and hidden by industry-as well as his expert testimony in tobacco
litigation-is a good example of scholarship that "takes a side."37 Another is John Abraham's study of
,"corporate bias" in drug development and regulation.38 In the case studies he considered, Abraham
showed that contested knowledge had little to do with "a clash of plural rationalities" or other
contrasting value systems. 39 Rather, "it is often possible to demonstrate that some scientists' claims are
more consistent and truthful than others." 40 I agree. What all of these works demonstrate is that
expertise can be wrong, distorted by the effects of industrial influence, leading to errors both as the
result of conscious decisions (e.g. in deliberate attempts to mislead the public regarding the health
hazards of tobacco) and unconscious, unintentional, or more structural processes (as in the unconscious
transformation of norms which affects what scientists say and do, as Sheldon Krimsky has described 4 1).
But are conflicts of interest sufficient to understand influenza? Without any doubt, industry has had and
continues to have a serious interest in influenza policy. Also without doubt are connections between
those who set policy and those who stand to profit from pharmaceutical interventions. Yet in my study,
industrial interests are not at center stage-in part because much of the story of conflicts of interest has
already been told by investigative journalists,42 but also in part because I do not think it is the full story.
As important as it is to understand the influence of industry in shaping scientific research and policy
agendas-the ubiquity of the term "public-private partnerships" in public health discussions today is for
me the most symbolic of way in which the ethos of science has changed in the last decades43 -it is
equally important to develop an explanation for how inconsistent and inaccurate claims can be
defended and maintained among experts who it would appear have no financial.motive to endorse
problematic science.
Layout of the dissertation
The chapters in this dissertation build on one another. The first two chapters set the stage, showing
how influenza (Chapter 1) and its pandemics (Chapter 2) are marketed. Drawing on governmental
marketing materials, statements by officials, and policy documents, I try to let officials speak for
3 Allan Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined America,
1st ed. (Basic Books, 2009).
3 John Abraham, Science, Politics And The Pharmaceutical Industry: Controversy And Bias In Drug Regulation, 1st
ed. (Routledge, 1995).
3 Schwarz & Thompson, quoted in Ibid., 250.
4I Ibid. Or in Lynn Eden's words: "Because a controversy, or even potential controversy, has not been resolved
does not mean that some understandings are not better than others." Eden, Whole World on Fire, 7.
Sheldon Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research?
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).
42 Deborah Cohen and Philip Carter, "WHO and the pandemic flu 'conspiracies'," BMJ 340, no. jun03_4 (June 6,
2010): c2912; Deborah Cohen and Philip Carter, "Questioning the timeline of H1N1 flu vaccination contracts,"
Nature 466, no. 7304 (July 15, 2010): 315; Fiona Godlee, "Conflicts of interest and pandemic flu," BMJ 340, no.
jun03_4 (June 6, 2010): c2947; Helen Epstein, "Flu Warning: Beware the Drug Companies!," The New York Review
of Books, May 12, 2011, http://www. nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/12/flu-warning-beware-drug-
companies/, (accessed June 17, 2011).
43 Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest.
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themselves and, as much as possible, refrain from analysis. Today's widespread availability of influenza
vaccine, impressive size of the influenza vaccine industry, and government stockpiles of influenza
vaccines and antivirals did not grow out of a response to popular demand. It is instead the culmination
of a long term marketing strategy fueled largely by public health officials and pharmaceutical
manufacturers aimed at increasing the number of people that get an annual influenza vaccine and
efforts to put "pandemic preparedness" on the national health policy agenda. This discourse is
saturated with mortality and other burden of disease statistics. Officials use these statistics-such as
the number of people said to die of influenza each year-not to simply convey information, but instead
to persuade, legitimate funding, and increase influenza vaccination rates.
During interviews with CDC officials in October 2010, I had the opportunity to enquire about the
agency's many promotional posters and other materials which emphasize the seriousness of influenza.
"Is this information or is this advocacy?" I asked, referring to a CDC poster44 that states "flu is a serious
contagious disease" despite the fact that the vast majority of people who contract the disease recover in
a few days, even without seeking medical attention. The CDC's director of media relations responded:
"This is advocacy. I mean, at the end of the day, this is advocacy, because it gets back to, we do want
people to get a flu shot. We do have a point of view, as an agency. We do think the best you can do is
to get a flu shot. That is your best protection."45
The contrast between informing and advocating is important. When officials engage in advocacy, what
they convey is shaped not only by what they know, but by what they want to occur. An educated public
that understands the risks and benefits and makes its own decision about the best way to deal with the
disease is not the objective of advocacy; advocacy instead seeks to persuade people into getting the
shot. Thus information about influenza is not static, but changes in response to officials' attempts to
modulate popular demand for vaccine. This is what occurred in 2004, when manufacturing problems at
one influenza vaccine production facility led to an unexpected shortfall of 50 million doses of vaccine.
The disease officials had until then relentlessly described as "serious" was swiftly downgraded to "an
annoying illness." 46
Chapter 1 suggests that officials approach influenza as an orchestrated marketing campaign that has as
its goal the increase of vaccination rates. I argue that this campaign in part exists because ordinary
people do not find influenza important enough to take action on their own. For most people, it is a
benign illness-uncomfortable and undesirable, surely, but self-limiting and transient. Our bodies
recover, and we get on with our lives. And for the elderly, who suffer the bulk of influenza-related
deaths, often following complications with pneumonia, even then it can be more blessing than curse. As
the first Surgeon General's Healthy People national framework for improving America's health
44 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Says 'Take 3' Steps to Fight The Flu", January 12, 2010,
www.cdc.gov/flu/freeresources/2009-10/pdf/hlnl take3.pdf, (accessed July 21, 2010).
4s Glen Nowak, interview by Peter Doshi, October 27, 2010, pt. 42'35.
46 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Public Service Announcement for 2004-05 Flu Season: There
are other steps you can take to fight the flu", October 22, 2004,
http://web.archive.org/web/20041025002301/http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/0405psa2.pdf, (accessed July 13,
2010).
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acknowledged nearly thirty years ago, "pneumonia has been called the 'old man's friend' for the
painless ending of life it may provide." 47 That perspective, however, has markedly changed, as
campaigns frame all influenza-related deaths as unnecessary, avoidable, and tragic.
Chapter 2 explores the marketing of influenza in its pandemic form. In the early 1990s, only a small
group of public health officials (most at CDC) felt pandemic preparedness was a worthwhile effort. But
by 2005, almost every country around the world had a preparedness plan. This chapter explores how
consensus in the scientific and non-scientific communities formed around the notion of an influenza
pandemic as a disastrous, inevitable event that public health agencies could respond to with
"preparedness"-prior, of course, to the outbreak of H1N1 in April, 2009.48 To understand the evolution
of the pandemic influenza concept and its relation to public policy, one must look not only at how public
health officials understood a pandemic, but how they made the rest of us understand the meaning of
pandemic.
An important first element of the scientific consensus underpinning policy was that a pandemic was a
distinct event. Officials starting in the 1990s advanced the idea of a pandemic as an unusually severe
form of influenza, something with consequences demanding special attention. With the backdrop of
"emerging infectious diseases" rhetoric, pandemics were conceived as devastating events with
unpredictable timing. Similar to seasonal influenza, a key component of defining and conveying the
danger of pandemics came through risk assessment. But because pandemic preparedness was about
preparing for an event that had not yet occurred, officials looked to the past for lessons. Often
discussed and considered was the catastrophic 1918 pandemic. Also often discussed as relevant to
pandemic preparedness was the SARS epidemic of 2003 as well as avian influenza H5N1, an epizootic
occurring since 1997. By contrast, the far less deadly influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968 received
little attention. Chapter 2 discusses how this selective use of the past was linked with the policy
imperative of supporting the expansive federal funding of pandemic preparedness.
Pandemic risk assessment also made heavy use of statistical models. Starting in the 1990s, morbidity
and mortality, as well as economic, models gained currency both within the scientific literature and in
the popular press. These predictions of future disease impact helped bolster the rationale for
preparedness, and shaped the nature of response planning, as projected statistics of pandemic influenza
caused death and hospitalization were incorporated as fundamental planning assumptions. In the
2000s, as pandemic preparedness moved from a personal interest among a small group of public health
officials into a broad national and global concern, models proliferated. Non-profit institutions,
development banks, and a host of other non-traditional public health actors published their mortality
estimates, all of which pointed to the profound impact of a future pandemic. Although these mortality
estimates were highly incompatible with each other, with some reports even internally inconsistent,
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Healthy People: The Surgeon General's Report On Health
Promotion And Disease Prevention (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 7-13,
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBGK.pdf, (accessed July 13, 2011).
48 Debate and discussion about influenza and pandemics was radically altered by the "2009 influenza pandemic" of
H1N1, so chapter 2 will examine the time period before the pandemic while chapter 3 will address the pandemic
itself.
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contradictions did not cause controversy-if anything, they only underlined the urgency of
preparedness.
Then, on June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization declared that the first influenza pandemic in
over 40 years had begun. The story of "the 2009 influenza pandemic"-or "HI1N1," as it became
popularly known in the US-is recounted in Chapter 3. It is a story about how all predictions were off.
The H1N1 outbreak seems to have passed, killing far fewer than even the lowest of the low-range
mortality estimates had predicted. HIN1 did not leave behind a world devastated by disease, but rather
a world full of confusion and accusation. In the early months of the outbreak, huge uncertainty, much
visible to the public, existed over whether H1N1 even qualified as a pandemic. Six months after the
WHO declared it to be one, the Council of Europe began hearings into the WHO's handling of the
pandemic, questioned WHO's ties to industry, and the degree to which its policy decisions had been
truly independent and evidence-based. Other investigations-notably, those by the British medical
journal BMJ and the publicly funded UK television station Channe/4-brought to light more troubling
facts: that many countries had entered into multi-million dollar vaccine contracts required countries to
automatically purchase vaccine upon a WHO declaration of a pandemic; that advisors to the WHO had
largely unknown financial ties to the drug and vaccine industry; and that the identities of the 16-
member advisory board which recommended the WHO Secretary-General declare a pandemic were
secret.
Chapter 4 treats the gap between expectation and reality that the H1N1 outbreak of 2009 brought into
focus as the tip of large iceberg. In this chapter, I present evidence to argue that the entire public health
effort against influenza is built upon a series of fundamental misconceptions about the problem of
influenza, its pandemics, and the vaccine. Influenza policy has for years been focused upon fighting
upper respiratory tract infections caused by influenza virus, not "influenza-like illness," a far more
common syndrome caused only in small part by influenza viruses. As a result, influenza policy-fixated
as it is on influenza vaccines-at best only addresses the minority contributor to the illness most people
suffer from and call the "flu." But even for true influenza, I show that officials' descriptions of vaccine
effectiveness are not well grounded. In addition, I show that death estimates-typically produced
through statistical models-are wide ranging, inconsistent, based on spurious assumptions and lack
methods of validation. Statistics about and descriptions of the disease are routinely conveyed to the
public in ways that mislead.
Information about pandemics has been similarly problematic. Descriptions of pandemics as invariably
catastrophic events that are distinct from seasonal influenza runs contrary to a historical record which is
mixed, including a deadly pandemic in 1918 that swept the world and other pandemics with similar
mortality rates compared to non-pandemic seasons.
While Chapter 4 documents that much of the scientific consensus about influenza is fundamentally
misconceived, Chapter 5 refocuses the attention of the dissertation on an explanation of how and why
this occurs. Scrutiny over HIN1 revealed the degree to which policy advisors are connected to the
pharmaceutical industry, but the story is not as simple as commercial interests trumping sound policy
decisions. Many (if not most) public health officials have no financial relationship with the
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pharmaceutical industry, yet still strongly agree that the H1N1 outbreak was a pandemic, and heavily
promote statistics about influenza mortality burden and vaccine effectiveness which I argue are flawed.
To develop a more complete understanding of the dynamics of public health policy, it is imperative to
explore the reasons why official bodies endorse and perpetuate problematic science.
During my trip to the CDC in Atlanta in October 2010, I used my invited talk to the Influenza Division as
an opportunity to directly challenge officials by critiquing official policy documents. I showed two slides
documenting what I believed were important contradictions in official US influenza policy-the CDC's
influenza recommendations (Prevention and Control of Influenza) and the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan.
The CDC recommendations cite a publication which concludes that the popular influenza antiviral
Tamiflu reduced the rate of pneumonia by 50 per cent. This conclusion made its way into the HHS's
pandemic plan, indicating that a "Critical [planning] assumption" was that "Treatment with a
neuraminidase inhibitor (oseltamivir [Tamiflu*] or zanamivir [Relenza*]) will be effective in decreasing
risk of pneumonia, will decrease hospitalization by about half (as shown for interpandemic influenza),
and will also decrease mortality." 49 However, the same guidance document later states that "There are
no data on the effectiveness of neuraminidase inhibitors in preventing either serious morbidity (e.g.,
requirement for intensive care) or mortality..."50 1 displayed the two quotes side by side on the
projector, paused, and waited for a response (Figure 0.1).
A senior medical officer from the Epidemiology and Prevention Branch told me that I had it wrong: it
may be inconsistent to people with less familiarity with the data, or to those without the right
credentials, he said-but to him, an epidemiologist with a background in clinical medicine, there was no
contradiction. I struggled to understand how the HHS's first statement describing an assumption about
decreasing mortality was consistent with the second statement about no data regarding the prevention
of mortality. Nobody else in the audience spoke up to agree, disagree, or clarify the matter-and I
returned home more convinced than ever that it is essential to gain a deeper understanding of the social
dynamics of policy in order to understand how people who I view as intelligent and well-intentioned can
passionately argue that these logical inconsistencies are unproblematic.
Chapter 5 presents my answer to this question. I argue that the simplicity of conceiving influenza as an
infectious disease caused by a single pathogen (influenza virus) and preventable with a single
intervention (the vaccine) dulls critical sensibility. Public health experts' labeling of influenza as a
"vaccine preventable disease," or VPD as it is often abbreviated, enables them to defend the rationality
basis of the entire policy-from surveillance policies and vaccination policies to pandemic preparedness,
and attach more certainty about the natural world than has ever been supported by the empirical
evidence. Thinking of influenza as a VPD has pushed responses in a "one disease - one cause - one
drug" (or in this case vaccine) framework, which has become so commonplace and ingrained in expert
thinking that it prevents most experts from addressing fundamental gaps in their effort.
49 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan", November 2005, D-20,
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/H HSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf, (accessed June 9, 2009).
so Ibid., S7-12.
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The final chapter of this dissertation refocuses the discussion back to matters of policy, and offers
thoughts on how the status quo might change for the better. Rather than treating policy as a static set
of directives and practices, I argue, following some notable theories in political science, that science
policies need to "learn and adapt" over time, incorporating new information and learning from past
performance. Influenza policy at present shows little sign of such learning and adaptation. It also lacks
important safeguards for ensuring the integrity of scientific conclusions, such as independent
evaluation.
Because this dissertation argues that many of the problems with influenza policy are fundamentally
social rather than technical in nature, I suggest that public health practitioners need to carefully re-
examine some of their basic assumptions about how and when to intervene. At the same time, I argue
that some structural changes should be given serious consideration. At present, infectious disease
policy, like influenza policy, places the responsibility for risk assessment, risk management, and risk
communication about influenza (and many infectious diseases) with the same group of people: the CDC.
This produces structural disincentives for rigorous review and learning, and a virtual knowledge
monopoly arises that prevents independent and rigorous assessment of scientific evidence and policy.
By establishing and maintaining a "clear conceptual distinction" between these activities, as the
National Research Council famously advocated,51 policy stands of chance of being informed by and
tested against higher quality assessments of the scientific and technical knowledge base.
[ENDS]
si Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Research Council, Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press,
1983).
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HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (2005)
HHS: "Critical assumptions.
Treatment with a neuraminidase
inhibitor (oseltamivir [Tamiflu@] or
zanamivir [Relenza@]) will be
effective in decreasing risk of
pneumonia, will decrease
hospitalization by abovt half {as
shown for interpandemic influenza),
and will also decrease mortality."
(p.D-20)
HS: "There are no data on the
effectiveness of neuraminidase
inhibitors in preventing either serious
morbidity (e.g., requirement for
intensive care) or mortality (see July
2005 recommendations of the AHIC
[ACIP?) .... "(p.S7-1 2)
- ACIP 2005: "One study assessing
oseltamivir treatment primarily
among adults reported a reduction
in complications, necessitating
antibiotic therapy compared with
placebo [Kaiser 2003]."
ACIP Influenza Rec. (2008)
I V INTAi~~7
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"In a study that combined
data from 10 clinical trials,
the risk for pneumonia among
those participants with
laboratory-confirmed
influenza receiving oseltamivir
was approximately 50%
lower than among those
persons receiving a placebo
and 34% lower among
patients at risk for
complications (p<0.05 for
both comparisons) [Kaiser,
2003]."V
Figure 0.1. Slides I presented during a talk giving to CDC Influenza (October 2010).
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Marketing Death to Save Lives
Chapter 1 Marketing Death to Save Lives
Since the 1960s, federal health officials have recommended that the elderly and other "high risk"
populations get an annual influenza vaccination, but in 2003 the mission to vaccinate carried added
urgency. In January, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) scientists had published a new
study in the Journal of the American Medical Association concluding that influenza was killing nearly
double the number of Americans each year than had previously been estimated.'
"Using new and improved statistical models, CDC scientists estimate that an average of 36,000 people
(up from 20,000 in previous estimates) die from influenza-related complications each year in the United
States," the agency wrote in a press release. CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding commented: "These data
indicate that the magnitude of the problem is larger than we once thought. ... it is crucial that we
continue to get the message out regarding the importance of high risk people getting their flu shots
each and every year." 2
To raise awareness of the new study, the CDC had also called a press conference to coincide with the
JAMA publication. 3 "Today, we are going to talk about an article in this week's Journal of American
Medical Association," the CDC told an audience of media outlets including the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, Reuters, and the Associated Press. Dr. Keiji Fukuda, co-author of the JAMA article and
leading influenza expert at the CDC explained that while 36,000 annual deaths was just the average, that
number could go up to 50,000 to 70,000 during bad years. "Now I think that some of the bottom-line
points that we hope that you take home," Fukuda said, "is that influenza and other respiratory viruses
such as RSV [respiratory syncytial virus] really have been under-appreciated health problems, and a lot
of people tend to think of them as causes of things like colds, but, really, I think these figures show you
that they're really major causes of serious illnesses and death in the United States."
The message that officials wished to convey was two-fold: first, influenza was a more important threat
to the public health than people realized-the mortality figures demonstrated as much-and second,
we must do something about it. "One major step is that we need to increase the use of influenza
vaccine in those groups of people who are at risk of developing serious complications from influenza,"
Fukuda said. Towards that end, officials had already broadened influenza vaccine recommendations to
include all people 50 years and older, a recommendation Fukuda emphasized at the telebriefing. By
2004, around 188 million Americans belonged to age or risk groups recommended to get the shot (see
Table 1.1. Expansion of influenza vaccination recommendations, 1960 to present).
1 William W Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United
States," JAMA 289, no. 2 (January 8, 2003): 179-86.
2 In this dissertation, I have used the prefix "Dr." to denote those individuals with MD degrees, which has the effect
of not identifying the degree qualifications of Ph.D. holders. This is to help put emphasis on those who can be
expected, by and large, to have a more hands-on experience in clinical medicine. U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, "Press Release: CDC Finds Annual Flu Deaths Higher Than Previously Estimated", January 7, 2003,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r030107.htm, (accessed July 15, 2010).
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Telebriefing Transcript: Increase in Influenza-Related
Deaths in the United States", January 7, 2003, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/t030107.htm, (accessed July
15, 2010).
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Echoing the same messages delivered in an editorial accompanying the CDC's new analysis, David
Morens, an NIH scientist and historian of influenza, emphasized the need to strengthen vaccination
efforts: "Annual influenza vaccination is and must remain among the most important public health
priorities." 4 Morens called on health care professionals-a group that has historically not been
especially enthusiastic about influenza vaccine'- to endorse the vaccine. "Active and organized
approaches to prevention strategies (eg, patient calls and mailings) may also help to optimize patient
vaccination rates."
Promotional efforts, however, were hitting bumps. Glen Nowak, then the associate director of
communications at the CDC's National Immunization Program, recalled that in November,
"manufacturers were telling us that they weren't receiving a lot of orders for vaccine for use in
November or even December. It really did look like we needed to do something to encourage people to
get a flu shot."6 Around the same time, however, news about an especially early flu season was being
tracked by The Denver Post, news that the CDC would leverage in its efforts to encourage vaccination.
Although influenza cases had first been detected in mid-November the prior year, this year Colorado
health officials were reporting significant outbreaks on the large student campus of University of
Colorado. This was soon followed by Texas and Georgia, where state health departments began to
report their own influenza outbreaks.8 The CDC called another press conference.
"We're very concerned that the flu season has had an earlier onset than we've seen in many years, and
we are seeing some parts of the country that are having very high levels of widespread flu infection ...
we're here today ... to sound the alarm," Director Gerberding told reporters in the audience.
The point is that people need to get their flu shot. This is the time for Americans to
really step up to the plate and get vaccinated against influenza, especially because this
could be a worse-than-usual flu season ... In this country, where we have over 114,000
hospitalizations usually from influenza, we have 36,000 people die from the
complications of influenza. So this is very serious.9
From worse-than-usual to worst-in-decades
Active promotion of vaccine may have seemed necessary to officials that day in mid-November. But ten
days later, on November 27, four children in Colorado were reported to have died of influenza, and the
4 David M Morens, "Influenza-related mortality: considerations for practice and public health," JAMA: The Journal
of the American Medical Association 289, no. 2 (January 8, 2003): 227-229.
s William D. King et al., "BRIEF REPORT: Influenza Vaccination and Health Care Workers in the United States,"
Journal of General Internal Medicine 21, no. 2 (February 2006): 181-184; Scott A Harper et al., "Prevention and
control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR.
Recommendations and Reports 54, no. 8 (July 29, 2005): 9.
6 "Analysis: Balancing science and common sense in public health" (National Public Radio, December 23, 2003).
7 "Flu lands first punch of season with 32 cases in Colorado," The Denver Post, November 5, 2003; "Flu bug strikes
early in Colorado At least 70 cases reported at CU," The Denver Post, November 16, 2003.
8 David Wahlberg, "Flu's early appearance worries CDC director," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, November 18,
2003.
9 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC News Conference Transcript: Update on Current Influenza
Season", November 17, 2003, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/t031117.htm, (accessed June 30, 2011).
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story gained immediate national attention.10 Dr. Gregory Poland, director of the Mayo Clinic Vaccine
Research Group in Rochester, Minnesota and a frequent influenza expert appearing in the media, told
Robert Bazell of NBC Nightly News, "my own prediction, unfortunately, is that somewhere in the
neighborhood of 50 to 70,000 people who are with us today will not be here in the succeeding months.
And that will be somebody's mother, somebody's grandfather, somebody's child, because they
neglected to do the one thing they should do, and that is get a flu shot this year." The chairman of
medicine at New York University and member of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, Dr. Martin
Blaser, agreed:
What makes flu bad is that it infects millions of people, tens of millions of people. Some
of those people are going to be compromised by age and by disease. They're going to be
at higher risk of dying. But all those other millions and millions of normal people, they
are also at risk of dying, a much lower risk. But when you add up the numbers, that-
that's where you get these unfortunate children and-and unfortunate adults also,
who--who are perfectly normal, and a few days later, they're dead."
While the CDC had just months prior pleaded with journalists to help get out the message that influenza
vaccine was the right response to a dangerous disease that Americans needed to take seriously, such
prodding was no longer necessary. Demand for vaccine would soon rise sharply across the US, as if
Americans had heeded the call of these experts and were now convinced of their particular vulnerability
to the disease.
"The airwaves were flooded with images of the children who died in Colorado," a NPR reporter for All
Things Considered recalled. "People lined up for flu shots around the country. Within days, spot
shortages of vaccine developed. Those, too, fed the sense of urgency about getting one of those elusive
shots."12
Efforts to encourage vaccination may have been too successful. The media, with its heavy coverage of
the Colorado children who died and the subsequent spotlight on vaccine shortages, had convinced
people of the seriousness of influenza. But demand had now outstripped supply, and public health
officials decided to change their approach. Contrasting her call to action a month prior, encouraging the
public to get vaccinated, now the CDC Director's message was one of restraint:
We don't have scientific evidence or epidemiologic evidence to suggest that this year's
influenza outbreak is worse than it has been in in the past or that the strain is more
virulent than strains that we've dealt with before. It's just simply too early in the course
of the outbreak to say for sure how this will compare overall, but obviously the early
start and the early widespread activity has given us a great deal of concern, and
10 Associated Press, "Four Children Die Of Flu in Colorado," New York Times, November 27, 2003.
1 "Interview: Dr. Martin Blaser, Infectious Diseases Society of America, discusses flu outbreaks," CNBC: News With
Brian Williams, December 3, 2003.
12 "Analysis: Balancing science and common sense in public health."
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obviously, it's concerned a lot of people, and that's why there's been such an interest in
getting the vaccination this year. ...
We wish we had more vaccine, but there are many steps that we can take besides
vaccination that will be able to have an impact on the scope and magnitude of the
problem.
Gerberding asked people to stay calm and not overwhelm the healthcare system. Influenza, she
explained, was just "an annoying illness":
... it's important to remember that for healthy people, for the vast majority of us,
influenza is an annoying illness, it's certainly not fun, but it's something that we will
recover from with common sense self care. It's not necessary to go to the emergency
room or to visit a physician simply because you have the flu. The treatment is good old-
fashioned rest, fluids and the over-the-counter medications that we typically use to
treat symptoms.14
Two footed drivers
By the end of the 2003-04 flu season, it became clear that Gregory Poland's expert prediction of the
"worst flu season we've had in several decades" 5 was off by several decades. In a summary report, the
CDC noted: "Preliminary data from national influenza surveillance systems indicate that the current
season was more severe than the previous three seasons but was within the range expected for a typical
A (H3N2) season,"' 6 the last one of which was in 1999. Newspaper headline writers conveyed that
message in mixed ways. Some cast it as indicative of a severe season (Washington Post headline: "Past
Season's Flu Worst in 4 Years"), while others were more dispassionate (Atlanta Journal-Constitution:
"CDC: U.S. flu season typical").'
The public's response to the 2003 season-from indifference to obsession-mirrored officials' attempts
to alarm first and then calm later. Numerous pre-influenza season messages had emphasized the
"serious" nature of the disease, evidenced so clearly with the CDC's new mortality statistics. But by mid-
season and in the face of intense demand for vaccine and a frustrated public, the CDC downgraded the
threat of influenza from "serious" to "annoying," suggesting that panic was unnecessary. Home rest
would do.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Media Relations -Telebriefing Transcript", December 11,
2003, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/t031211.htm, (accessed July 13, 2010).
14 Ibid.
1s Associated Press, "Mayo Clinic specialist predicts worst flu season in 30 years", November 25, 2003.
16,"Update: influenza activity--United States, 2003-04 season," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 53,
no. 13 (April 9, 2004): 284-287. In separate testimony to the United States Senate, CDC Deputy Director Dr.
Stephen Ostroff made a similar comment, saying the season ended up "on par" with other recent H3N2 virus
dominant seasons. See Stephen Ostroff, "Testimony to the Special Committee on Aging, US Senate", September
28, 2004, 16, http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t040928.html, (accessed July 11, 2011).
17 Glen Nowak, "Planning for the 2004-05 Influenza Vaccination Season: A Communication Situation Analysis [PDF
Part 2]", April 15, 2004, http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/36/2004_flu-nowakO2.pdf, (accessed
August 20, 2008).
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Dr. Michael Osterholm, former state epidemiologist of Minnesota and now director of the Center for
Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, called public health experts "the
classic two-footed drivers. We have one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake.""' One
emphasizes threats while the other calms fears, a practice that can quickly lead to public confusion and
skepticism. The year 2003 may have been turbulent, but it paled in comparison to the drama of 2004.
The 2004 flu crisis: 50 million vaccine doses disappear overnight
On October 5, 2004, British drug regulators forced Chiron Corporation's Liverpool based vaccine
production facility to halt its influenza vaccine production-then in full swing to manufacture millions of
vaccine doses for the upcoming 2004-2005 influenza season. But unacceptable levels of bacterial
contamination had been discovered in some lots of vaccine. With immediate effect, the company was
prohibited from releasing any batches of its influenza vaccine to market.1 9 The news hit the US without
warning. Even the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-the US agency responsible for ensuring the
safety and efficacy of drugs-was caught by surprise, and had no prior knowledge of the UK action until
it became public.
Until October 5, Chiron had much to look forward to. Business was good for the Sunnyvale, CA based
company. By 2004, it had become the world's second largest supplier of influenza vaccine.20 Influenza
vaccine sales had nearly quintupled between 2001 and 2003.21 And in two short years, it had doubled
its supply to the US market. On October 4, the day before the shutdown, US officials were still expecting
Chiron's UK plant to produce between 46 and 48 million doses of influenza vaccine, but the British shut
down action meant Americans would face a season with only half of the expected supply.
The vaccine shortage could not have come at a worse moment for President Bush. October was the
height of the presidential campaign season, and as reports surfaced of anxious Americans once again
overwhelming health clinics across the country, democratic challenger John Kerry took full advantage of
the moment. "George Bush and the Republicans are so busy kowtowing to drug companies, so busy
giving them billions, helping them price gouge, pumping up their profits, so busy selling us out, they
can't even get vaccines to keep pregnant woman safe from the flu," Kerry said in a radio advertisement.
"Four more years? They haven't earned it."22 Kerry argued that the loss of vaccines was clear evidence
of Bush's incompetency: "If you can't get flu vaccines to Americans, what kind of health care program
are you running? It's a serious demonstration of the failure of leadership."
18 "Analysis: Balancing science and common sense in public health."
19 The Nation's Flu Shot Shortage: Where Are We Today and How Prepared are We for Tomorrow? (U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2004), 85, http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bi n/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=750558468062+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve, (accessed May 24, 2010).
2 Doug Pinnell, "Chiron Vaccines Presentation National Influenza Summit Meeting", April 29, 2004.
2 SEC Form 10-Kfor CHIRON CORP. Annual Report., Form 10-K, March 3, 2004,
http://biz.yahoo.com/e/040303/chir1o-k.html, (accessed June 30, 2011).
2 Bennett Roth, "Candidates trade shots over flu vaccine dilemma," Houston Chronicle, October 20, 2004,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/politics/285639 7.html, (accessed June 30, 2011).
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President Bush and HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson defended themselves by focusing on what went
right: "Simply put," Thompson declared, "the nation is better prepared to meet the challenges of this flu
season because of the unprecedented steps taken in the last three years under President Bush."23
Partisan politics was not limited to the presidential contenders crisscrossing the country. In
Washington, the House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing on November 17 to
investigate the vaccine shortage. Emotions were running high. Representative Henry Waxman,
democrat, of California:
Since the vaccine shortage began, senior administration officials, including Acting FDA
Commissioner Lester Crawford, have been reassuring the public that the FDA made no
mistakes and did everything possible to protect the vaccine supply.
Today we will evaluate those claims.
On October 13th, Chairman Davis and I asked FDA to provide copies of documents
relating to its oversight of the Chiron vaccine plant in Liverpool, England. ... We have
now received and reviewed over 1,000 pages of documents. ... The documents show
that FDA failed to provide effective oversight. Expert scientists at FDA knew about
serious problems at the Liverpool facility in June 2003, but there was not sufficient
leadership at the agency to ensure that they were fixed. ...
The Chiron plant in Liverpool was not an ordinary FDA-regulated facility. It is a facility
with a history of contamination problems that makes half the supply of the U.S. flu
vaccine. The plant should have received the highest priority from the Food and Drug
Administration. ...
What we are witnessing is the dismantling of FDA's enforcement and oversight
capabilities. ... there is no better example of what is wrong at the FDA than its failures
at the Chiron facility24
Waxman placed heavy emphasis on the FDA's June 2003 inspection of the Liverpool plant. "If FDA had
ensured that the problems identified in June 2003 were fixed, this year's flu crisis might never have
happened."2 s
But Republicans-and in particular the House committee chairman Tom Davis-urged for understanding
and restraint. "Everyone's goal this year, MHRA [UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency], Chiron's, the FDA, is to get Chiron up and running so that they can produce flu vaccine next
year." "There is no question that had the FDA gone in early or the MHRA gone in earlier and alerted
them, we might have been able to avert this. But that was not part of their protocols at the time," Davis
2 Stephen Smith, "United States finds flu vaccine it hopes to buy abroad," The Boston Globe, October 29, 2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/10/29/usfindsfluvaccine_it_hopes-to-buyabroad/.
2 The Nation's Flu Shot Shortage: Where Are We Today and How Prepared are Wefor Tomorrow?, 9,128.
25 Ibid., 129.
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said. In his questioning of the FDA commissioner Lester Crawford, Davis underscored that FDA had done
nothing wrong and the flu vaccine crisis occurred despite everything being done according to protocol.
The FDA's June 2003 finding of high levels of bacterial contamination had nothing to do with the British
shut down order in October of 2004.
Chairman TOM DAVIS. FDA's routine protocol, as I understand it, is to inspect foreign
manufacturers once every 2 years?
Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.
Chairman TOM DAVIS. The last routine inspection of Chiron's Liverpool facility, then,
was June 2003. FDA informed the committee it accepted Chiron's response plan to
correct the issues that were raised in June 2003 and, therefore, the file was closed on
September 3, 2003, is that correct?
Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct.
Chairman TOM DAVIS. If these steps were following standard FDA protocol, would there
be a reason for FDA to go back to Chiron's Liverpool facilities prior to the 2-years time to
reinspect?
Mr. CRAWFORD. No, we don't do that.
Chairman TOM DAVIS. So you were following protocol.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.26
Questions considered by the committee were far ranging. How had the US's vaccine supply come to
depend on a factory in a foreign country? Why were there only two companies making injectable
influenza vaccine? What were CDC and FDA doing to get more vaccine this year? Could foreign vaccine
be imported on an emergency or experimental use basis? And, most of all, how could this problem be
avoided in the future?
While democrats and republicans may have disagreed about who was to blame, there was no
disagreement over the importance of influenza vaccine. "I would submit that this is not Rogaine,"
Waxman declared, "this is a product that is essential to the health of millions of Americans to avert the
flu and the consequences for those who are at risk."
Federal agencies assured lawmakers that they were doing everything they could to address the crisis.
CDC, Director Gerberding told the Committee, was using 20 times more dollars for influenza than it did
just two years before. CDC had gained the collaboration of Aventis Pasteur, the remaining major
manufacturer, to access proprietary distribution information in an attempt to re-distribute vaccine to
those most in need. And in addition, prior to the October announcement, CDC had already purchased
millions of extra courses of antivirals and vaccines for the national stockpile. Finally, Gerberding
26 Ibid., 208-9.
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stressed that vaccine is not the only way to fight influenza: "Vaccine is the most important component
of prevention, but there are other steps that we have to focus on this year as well, including ...
respiratory hygiene, hand hygiene, and, of course, antivirals."27
Vaccines, however, remains the focus of intense public attention as medical experts predicted a public
health "catastrophe." 28 The CDC even created an unprecedented ethics panel to consider how to most
ethically distribute the limited vaccine supply.
"My call to our fellow Americans is if you're healthy, if you're younger, don't get a flu shot this year. Help
us prioritize those who need to get the flu shot, the elderly and the young," President Bush asked
millions of Americans tuning into the presidential debates. Health officials across the US repeated the
same message: if you're healthy and not at high risk of complications from influenza, "please step
aside." 29
From shortage to surplus
By late January 2005, state officials in more than half of the country had dropped all restrictions on who
could receive vaccine. What began as a shortage of 50 million "essential" doses turned into a discussion
of surplus and possible wastage. In the period of three months, the public reaction to influenza vaccine
had once again swung from one extreme to the other. Back in October, CDC had done what it could to
reassure the public by rationing vaccine to those most in need and offering calming messages. "Take a
deep breath; this is not an emergency," Director Gerberding had told the press. "We will work through
this as we have with other shortages in the past." 30 In a public service announcement aired nationwide,
the CDC once again assured Americans that influenza was not that worrisome, asking people to embrace
influenza as an annoying but not serious disease: "keep in mind, most people with flu will have an
annoying illness but will recover just fine.""3 But by February, with vaccine surpluses on the horizon, the
CDC looked for ways to use up remaining vaccine. It entered into an arrangement to have Sanofi
Pasteur market government-purchased vaccine to public and private providers. Still, around 4.5
million vaccines went unused.
Unused vaccine is not a new problem to influenza vaccination campaigns. Most years, millions of
vaccines go unused, and officials bemoan the fact that so many people do not get vaccinated despite
their recommendations. In 2004-05, even if Chiron's vaccine had not been condemned, the expected
27 Ibid., 139.
2 Sabin Russell, "Doctors warn of flu shot 'disaster' / Organization urges Bush to call summit," San Francisco
Chronicle, October 19, 2004.
29 "TOMMY THOMPSON HOLDS A NEWS CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FLU - NEWS CONFERENCE" (Political
Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House, October 21, 2004); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "Public Service Announcement for 2004-05 Flu Season."
Jeanne Whalen, Betsy McKay, and Sarah Boseley, "U.S. Flu Vaccines Face Rationing As Plant Is Shut --- British
Regulators Suspend Production at Chiron Unit; Europe, Asia to Feel Effects," Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2004.
31 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Public Service Announcement for 2004-05 Flu Season."
Julie L Gerberding, "US Influenza Supply and Preparations for the Future", February 10, 2005, 11.
3 "Lessons from flu season (Editorial)," Times-Picayune, March 24, 2005.
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100 million vaccines would have been insufficient to vaccinate the 188 million34 Americans CDC
recommended should be vaccinated.
Unused vaccine may not be much of a problem if vaccines could be stored and used at a later date when
demand rebounds. But unlike other vaccines, influenza vaccines get reformulated and manufactured
anew on an annual basis in response to constant changes in the strains of influenza virus circulating in
the wild. Influenza is not a single virus, but a set of viruses which get classified according to their type
(A, B, or C), subtype (e.g. H3N2, indicating the particular hemagluttinin (H) and neuraminidase (N)
proteins on the virus's surface), and region and year of discovery. Influenza viruses have survived and
remained able to infect human populations for centuries in part by perpetually escaping the defenses of
the human immune system through slight point mutations in the genes encoding for its surface
hemagluttinin and neuraminidase proteins.
Deciding which strains of influenza the annual vaccine should aim to protect against is a decision that
must be taken months in advance of the winter season due to the lengthy manufacturing and licensing
process. While most influenza vaccines are trivalent, containing three strains of influenza-one type
A/H3N2 strain, one A/H1N1, and one influenza B strain (which are not divided into subtypes)-there is
still no guarantee that these strains will match those in actual circulation. Once the decision to
manufacture is made, however, the strains chosen cannot be changed mid-course, and any unused
doses will expire unused. In 2000, 8 million doses were discarded. The following year, 10 million. Then
13 million. And in the 2003-04 season, four million doses went unused despite the public's initial
anxiety and run on vaccines after heavy media coverage of the Colorado children deaths.
Unlike childhood vaccinations such as those for polio, measles, or whooping cough-all of which have
very high rates of uptake in the United States-influenza vaccines have, historically, been considered
"adult" vaccines, and were targeted towards the elderly, the group disproportionately affected by
influenza's complications. That influenza vaccine is administered annually to adults, rather than once
during childhood, raises an entirely different set of questions about how vaccines end up in people's
bodies. Where children are often vaccinated at healthy child checkups at the doctor's office (with a
well-functioning financing system to ensure even those who cannot afford vaccines receive them), and
schools in addition monitor students' vaccination status, adults have been more difficult to target. Even
when vaccines are available, financial barriers do not exist, and adult patients make regular doctor visits,
former directors of the CDC's National Immunization Program explain: "Well child care is a major part of
pediatric practice; 'well adult care' is not as big a part of the work of most clinicians caring for adults." 35
Furthermore, even the logic behind vaccination has been somewhat different for influenza as compared
to other vaccines. Childhood vaccinations are administered in large part to gain a society-wide effect
called herd immunity, preventing epidemics because a sufficient proportion of the community is
3 Testimony of CDC Director Julie Gerberding in "The Perplexing Shift from Shortage to Surplus: Managing This
Season's Flu Shot Supply and Preparing for the Future, Committee on Government Reform, US House of
Representatives" (U.S. Government Printing Office, February 10, 2005), 20.
3s Alan R Hinman and Walter A Orenstein, "Adult immunization: what can we learn from the childhood
immunization program?," Clinical Infectious Diseases 44, no. 12 (June 15, 2007): 1533.
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vaccinated to effectively stop the efficient spread of infectious disease. While individual protection from
disease is of course part of the purpose of all vaccines, for most of influenza vaccine's history (and with
few exceptions such as the now terminated program of universal vaccination of schoolchildren in
Japan 36), individual protection has been the primary goal of vaccination, which is why those with a
higher than average risk of complications from influenza such as the elderly population, are targeted in
vaccination campaigns. All of these factors, plus the fact that influenza vaccination is voluntary (with a
few notable exceptions such as the military which has mandated influenza vaccine for all active duty
personnel since 194037), have led to a situation where despite federal guidelines suggesting that the
majority of Americans "should" get the shot, in reality most do not (Table 1.2).
Influenza: "acceptable" threat or "serious" disease?
Influenza experts and officials in part attribute the public's overall lukewarm response to influenza
vaccines to people's "acceptance" of the disease. As the outspoken Michael Osterholm of the University
of Minnesota wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine:
During a typical year in the United States, 30,000 to 50,000 persons die as a result of
influenzavirus infection, and the global death toll is about 20 to 30 times as high as the
toll in this country. We usually accept this outcome as part of the cycle of life. Only
when a vaccine shortage occurs or young children die suddenly does the public demand
that someone step forward to change the course of the epidemic.38
Dr. Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and one of the
world's most celebrated infectious disease experts, concurs:
Seasonal influenza is a relatively predictable annual event resulting in -36,000 deaths
and 200,000 hospitalizations in the United States and a global burden of -500,000
deaths every year. One of the challenges of seasonal influenza, like so many global
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, is that there is a consistent disease burden
from year to year. Thus, the world has accepted this disease burden, and a general
assumption exists that there is little that can be done about it.39
The general public may accept influenza as a normal part of the ups and downs of life-an unpleasant
experience to be sure, but a temporary one. Most people do not actively seek vaccine to prevent
influenza, nor medical attention when they come down with influenza-like symptoms. But every now
and then-like in 2003 and then again in 2004-people, that is, healthy people, rush to vaccines with an
3 Thomas A. Reichert et al., "The Japanese Experience with Vaccinating Schoolchildren against Influenza," N EnglJ
Med 344, no. 12 (March 22, 2001): 889-896.
37 "2009 National Influenza Vaccine Summit: June 29--July 1, 2009 Meeting Summary", 2009, 16,
http://www.preventinfluenza.org/NIVS_2009/summitminutes.pdf, (accessed March 31, 2010).
Michael T Osterholm, "Preparing for the next pandemic," The New England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 18 (May
5, 2005): 1839.
39 Anthony S. Fauci, "Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Science and Countermeasures," The Journal
of Infectious Diseases 194, no. 2 (November 1, 2006): S73-S76.
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intensity that overwhelms the system. During a CDC teleconference, a CNN reporter asked Director
Gerberding for an explanation.
MS. FALCO: Hi, Dr. Gerberding, thanks for taking our questions. I have two questions.
why do we need to have the fear, or the idea of a shortage to get folks to get their flu
shots? ...
DR. GERBERDING: The reason why people are not motivated to get a flu shot under
ordinary circumstances is complex. I don't think we have a full answer. I wish we did.
But certainly flu is something that for most people is such a benign illness. Many people
don't appreciate that it can result in hospitalization, various complications. For about
36,000 people every year, death.
I think as a society, we drastically underestimate how important flu is to our health and
the health status of our families, and we're used to it, and it just doesn't seem like such
an important health issue, until you step back and really think about the big picture and
look at from a population perspective.4
Officials and others who study influenza often appeal to this "population perspective." Nationally, the
agency has estimated that 200,000 hospitalizations and 36,000 deaths can be attributed to influenza
each year. To put that number in perspective, 36,000 deaths is only a few thousand less than the
average 40,000 that are killed in car accidents. For officials like Gerberding, "the big picture" means
focusing on these statistics, not the "benign illness" most people experience. Officials argue that the
statistics are prima facie evidence that influenza is a serious threat to the public health-and they wish
more Americans would see it their way. The CDC website therefore tries to rid the public of the
perception that influenza is benign despite its acknowledgement that for most people, it indeed is a
benign illness:
Influenza (often called the flu) is not just a bad cold. It's a serious illness that can lead to
pneumonia and even death.4 '
Health officials are however far from the only people who stress the statistics of influenza and portray it
as a serious illness or major public health threat. The CDC's JAMA publication which computed
estimates of deaths and hospitalizations from influenza is the second most cited article on the topic of
influenza in all the scientific literature.42 Many of these scientific publications which cite the CDC's
statistics often do so in the opening lines of their paper. "Influenza is an annual major public health
threat. In the United States, influenza epidemics usually occur during the winter months between
4* U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Media Relations - Telebriefing Transcript - November 10,
2005," CDC.gov, November 10, 2005, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/t051110.htm, (accessed May 20,
2009).
41 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Take Charge of Your Diabetes: 11. Vaccinations", May 21,
2011, http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/tcyd/vaccin.htm, (accessed June 30, 2011).
42 As of June 26, 2011, the CDC's paper (Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory
syncytial virus in the United States.") was cited 1,051 times according to IS/ Web of Knowledge.
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November and April and are responsible for an average of 36,000 excess deaths per year," declares a
highly cited paper on the use of antiviral agents to contain a pandemic of influenza.4 3 Similarly, in paper
calling for the mandatory vaccination of healthcare workers, Gregory Poland and colleagues begin their
paper by stressing how many people are killed by influenza each year, citing the CDC's paper.44
By themselves, most statistics are just numbers, and numbers without context can be meaningless. But
when people use disease statistics, they often do so to persuade others that the topic is important or
motivate readers to behave in a certain way. Efforts to encourage donations for cancer research often
stress that cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States. Awareness campaigns for
breast cancer have been driven by comparisons between the number of breast cancer deaths and the
combined total of men who died in World War I, World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars.45
Appeals for more organ donors often stress the statistics of how many people die each year because of
a shortage of suitable donors.
Because statistics are numbers, they are especially useful in the art of persuasion because numbers have
the tendency to be trusted as neutral and objective.46 "The most useful numbers to select for raising
awareness among lay audiences are those that demonstrate the large magnitude or seriousness of the
problem, and that are likely to be easily understood by lay audiences," says a textbook on the use of
data in public health.47 Is influenza a serious disease? The CDC attempts to convince the public it is by
stressing the numbers. For the 2003-04 season, CDC created a poster to help dispel the "myths" about
influenza (Figure 1.1).
MYTH: "The flu isn't a serious disease."
FACTS: Influenza (flu) is a serious disease of the nose, throat, and lungs, and it can lead
to pneumonia. Each year about 200,000 people in the U.S. are hospitalized and about
36,000 people die because of the flu. Most who die are 65 years and older. But small
children less than 2 years old are as likely as those over 65 to have to go to the hospital
because of the flu. 4 8
In the world of influenza, leveraging death statistics is a key practice in the attempt to motivate ever
increasing numbers of the public to demand influenza vaccine. "We estimate that 36,000 Americans die
each year from the flu, and this is just during an average flu year," Dr. Stephen Ostroff, deputy director
of the National Center for Infectious Diseases at CDC, told a congressional hearing. "Far too many of
43 Ira M Longini et al., "Containing pandemic influenza with antiviral agents," American Journal of Epidemiology
159, no. 7 (April 1, 2004): 623-33.
44 Gregory A Poland, Pritish Tosh, and Robert M Jacobson, "Requiring influenza vaccination for health care workers:
seven truths we must accept," Vaccine 23, no. 17-18 (March 18, 2005): 2251-5.
4s David E. Nelson, Bradford W. Hesse, and Robert T. Croyle, Making Data Talk: Communicating Public Health Data
to the Public, Policy Makers, and the Press (Oxford University Press, 2009), 286.
46 Porter, Trust in Numbers.
47 Nelson, Hesse, and Croyle, Making Data Talk, 278.
48 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Flu Vaccine Facts & Myths", 2007.
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these hospitalizations and deaths are avoidable, even those that occur among our oldest citizens. The
keys to prevention when it comes to flu are vaccination, vaccination, and vaccination."49
The logic of the influenza vaccine campaign is therefore straightforward: with a life-saving vaccine and a
disease that kills tens of thousands each year, there is an imperative to vaccinate and thereby save lives.
"Influenza remains the most important cause of vaccine- preventable deaths in the United States,"
according to the CDC statisticians who published the 36,000 deaths statistic.50 In the elderly population,
which accounts for 90% of the 36,000 estimate, vaccination is "very effective in preventing severe
illness, secondary complications, and death," a scientist from the National Institutes of Health informed
a Senate special committee on aging.51
The evolution of influenza vaccine policy
The emphasis that many influenza vaccine policy planners place on what remains to be achieved-the
need to increase vaccination coverage and fill gaps between current and target levels-obscures an
appreciation of how much has already been achieved in increasing influenza vaccine production and
consumption over the 1980s and 1990s.
When influenza vaccine was first introduced on a population basis in the U.S., its target was the military,
not civilians. World War I had taught military planners to expect higher levels of respiratory illness
where soldiers lived and operated in close proximity of each other. The military's response, starting in
1940, was to vaccinate.s2 But influenza vaccine policy did not reach the general public until the
experience of the 1957 "Asian flu," when concern over a novel influenza virus causing epidemics in East
Asia prompted Congress to appropriate $110,000 for "public information and educational purposes," a
campaign which employed press releases, press conferences, and exploited the media in order to
encourage use of the vaccine "as the only preventive measure available."53 The policy decisions of 1957,
however, amounted to little more than an ad-hoc response to a single epidemic. It was not until 1963-
6454 that a federal policy on influenza vaccination in the general population was drafted and kept up to
date on an annual basis, under the leadership of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP). (ACIP still drafts U.S. influenza vaccine policy today.) But through the sixties and seventies,
levels of vaccination remained low despite the presence of a federal policy.
From early on, ACIP considered influenza a largely intractable disease and not amenable to significant
reduction. The virus constantly mutates, thereby evading any attempt of the human body to produce
49 Combating the Flu: Keeping Seniors Alive (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 3.
50 William W. Thompson et al., "Are estimates of influenza-associated deaths in the US really just PR?," BMJ Rapid
Response (January 18, 2006), http://www.bmj.com/content/331/7529/1412.extract/reply#bmj_el_126308,
(accessed June 30, 2011).
si Pamela McInnes, "NIH's Biomedical Research Response to Influenza", September 28, 2004, 10.
52 Herschel E. Griffin, "Influenza control in the Armed Forces," Public Health Reports 73, no. 2 (February 1958): 145.
s3 J. Stewart Hunter, "Public information and education," Public Health Reports 73, no. 2 (February 1958): 149-150.
s4 W W Williams et al., "Immunization policies and vaccine coverage among adults. The risk for missed
opportunities," Annals of Internal Medicine 108, no. 4 (April 1988): 616-625; Joel Kavet, "Vaccine utilization: trends
in the implementation of public policy in the USA," in Influenza: Virus, Vaccines, and Strategy: Proceedings of a
Working Group on Pandemic Influenza, Rougemont, 26-28 January 1976, ed. Philip Selby (London: Published for
Sandoz Institute for Health and Socio-Economic Studies by Academic Press, 1976), 297.
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long-lasting immunity after infection. And vaccines, which had to be constantly reformulated in a never-
ending game of catch-up, could do no better. Unlike vaccines for other well-known infectious disease
such as polio or measles, influenza "vaccines are among the least satisfactory immunizing agents in
general use today," the ACIP pessimistically wrote in 1970.ss Federal policymakers therefore aimed not
to eliminate or eradicate influenza, but rather ameliorate its more harmful effects which tend to occur
most commonly in the elderly and chronically ill.
Older and chronically ill individuals in the population are essentially the only ones who
have any risk of serious complications or fatality from influenza. Therefore, annual
vaccination has been recommended for them while not being recommended for the
entire population.56
Public responses to influenza vaccine reflected the lack of enthusiasm at the federal-level. Among the
65-plus elderly population that officials recommended get vaccinated, only 15-20% in fact did during the
late 1960s and early 1970s. A survey of 5,000 Medicare recipients conducted by the Food and Drug
Administration in 1974 found 80% were unaware of the federal guidelines suggesting they get
vaccinated. Forty percent of those not receiving the vaccine felt they did not need one.57
Three years later, in 1976, vaccination levels surged as the country mounted a nationwide campaign to
vaccinate all Americans in anticipation of an epidemic of "swine flu." The program was however halted
prematurely amidst concern that the program was harming more than it helped: the predicted epidemic
failed to materialize and news of elderly deaths and a debilitating neurological condition following
vaccination were widely reported by the media. The result helped foster a general distrust among
certain populations in subsequent influenza vaccination campaigns. 58
Nevertheless, federal efforts continued to expand over the next years and decades. In 1979, the
Surgeon General published Healthy People: The Surgeon General's Report On Health Promotion And
Disease Prevention, and named influenza as one of its many health priorities. "In 1977 influenza and
pneumonia together constituted the fourth leading cause of death among older people," the report
declared.
It may be true that for some of the elderly who are in late stages of physical and mental
deterioration, death from these acute infections may not be untimely. Pneumonia has
been called the "old man's friend" for the painless ending of life it may provide.
But many deaths occur in older people otherwise healthy and with much yet to live for.
They can be prevented.
Ss Kavet, "Vaccine utilization: trends in the implementation of public policy in the USA," 298.
56 Ibid.
s7 Francis A. Ennis et al., "Acceptance of vaccination by the elderly," in Influenza: Virus, Vaccines, and Strategy:
Proceedings of a Working Group on Pandemic Influenza, Rougemont, 26-28 January 1976, ed. Philip Selby (London:
Published for Sandoz Institute for Health and Socio-Economic Studies by Academic Press, 1976), 313,315.
58 Morens, "Influenza-related mortality."
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For all high-risk individuals, annual vaccination against influenza is recommended-and
those over age 65 should therefore seek the advice of public health authorities and
personal physicians.59
In 1984, ACIP guidelines expanded upon this recommendation. In addition to the long standing
recommendation for elderly and others at high risk to get an annual influenza vaccine, the 1984
recommendations included new language advising physicians in addition to "administer vaccine to any
persons in their practices who wish to reduce their chances of acquiring influenza infection."60 "The
'highest risk' group consisted of persons most likely to be seeing physicians regularly - i.e., persons who
could be immunized during office visits," Dr. Steve Schoenbaum, who had worked on the new
recommendations under the leadership of CDC influenza head Alan Kendal, recently recalled.
We went a step further and recommended that the medical personnel caring for them,
physicians, office nurses, and hospital workers, be immunized since they would be most
exposed to influenza at a time that they most needed to be healthy and help others. I
confess that there was not, at that time, any evidence, just "common sense", to support
the recommendation for health care workers, and such evidence only developed later."
Federal policy, which a decade earlier had been described as "no more than a statement of policy,"
was becoming increasingly aggressive. Schoenbaum said that "the objective was to assure that people
who needed it got into the habit of annual influenza immunization." In October 1987, the ACIP warned:
"Unless vigorous measures are used to control influenza in the 1987 to 1988 season, mortality due to
this disease may increase because the proportion of elderly persons in the United States is rising, and
age and its associated chronic diseases are risk factors for severe influenza illness."63 In 1990, a much
larger and comprehensive Healthy People 2000 was launched, pegging a national goal of reducing
"epidemic-related pneumonia and influenza deaths among people aged 65 and older to no more than
7.3 per 100,000" Americans, and raising vaccination levels in the noninstitutionalized elderly population
to 60%.64 In 1993, Medicare began to pay for influenza vaccine, removing financial barriers to
vaccination for the elderly. 65 Vaccine coverage in turn increased substantially. In the 1987-88 season,
only 28% of seniors were vaccinated. By 1996, the proportion had more than doubled and around 60%
of all American seniors were getting the vaccine (Table 1.2).
59 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Healthy People: The Surgeon General's Report On Health
Promotion And Disease Prevention, 7-13.
6 U.S. Centers for Disease Control, "Recommendation of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP)
Prevention and Control of Influenza," MMWR 33, no. 19 (May 18, 1984): 253-60,265-6.
61 Steve Schoenbaum, "Envy of Pump Handle Removers and Eventual Gratification", July 9, 2010,
http://scienceblogs.com/bookclub/2010/07/envy_of -pumphandleremoversa.php, (accessed October 5, 2010).
6 Kavet, "Vaccine utilization: trends in the implementation of public policy in the USA," 305.
63 U.S. Centers for Disease Control, "Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee
Prevention and Control of Influenza," MMWR 36, no. 24 (June 26, 1987): 373-80,385-7.
64 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Public Health Service, Healthy People 2000: National Health
Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 514, 521.
65 Peng-Jun Lu et al., "Influenza Vaccination Trends Among Adults 65 Years or Older in the United States, 1989-
2002," Arch Intern Med 165, no. 16 (September 12, 2005): 1849-1856.
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But subsequent years would show that vaccine consumption among many of the so-called
noninstitutionalized elderly had begun to level off.66 in addition, despite annual influenza vaccination
levels reaching historical highs, manufacturers were leaving the business. The phenomenon was not
limited to influenza vaccine, but followed trends in the overall vaccine market: from 26 companies that
manufactured vaccines for the US in 1967, by 2005 there were just five. Analysts have pointed to a
variety of reasons for the decline, including a smaller market compared to drugs (due to a lower price
often capped by a virtual monopsony purchaser such as Medicare, and limited to far fewer doses over a
lifetime), plus high fixed, sunk costs, and the ever present concern over maintaining manufacturing
standards within regulations. 67 Even for the influenza vaccine market, excitement over the large
number of individuals recommended to get the vaccine annually was dampened by the risks of
production and lack of guaranteed purchase. In 1994, five manufacturers supplied influenza vaccine to
the U.S. market. When a decade later British regulators temporarily suspended Chiron's license to
manufacture influenza vaccine, Americans were left with just one other supplier of injectable vaccine.68
As one congressman noted, "you would think normally the old adage of supply and demand would work
in this environment. Obviously, the normal forces are not at work here."69
Persuading Americans into action
In November 2000, the HHS released the next Healthy People 2010 objectives. For influenza, the new
target was especially ambitious: vaccinating 90% of all Americans aged 65 years and above. But
meeting these goals would require significant changes to the status quo. On the demand side, many of
the financial barriers to vaccination had now been solved. A 1999 Medicare survey shows that those not
getting vaccinated had other reasons including not thinking the vaccine was necessary and concerns
71about its safety. Convincing these people to get vaccinated would mean changing their beliefs, not
simply improving access. On the supply side, the problems were no less daunting, with many barriers in
communication between the many public and private stakeholders.
The National Influenza Vaccine Summit emerged as a way to address these issues. It is a policy and
advocacy forum, co-founded by the American Medical Association and CDC, and committed to the
Healthy People goals. The Summit works to create "united influenza vaccination goals," and get all
stakeholders "on the same page" by creating common understanding, clarifying various stakeholders'
goals, and increasing communication.72 Its first meeting was held in March 2001 following delays in
66 Ibid.
67 Michelle M Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, "Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine Shortage," JAMA 294
(October 12, 2005): 1817-1820.
6 The Nation's Flu Shot Shortage: Where Are We Today and How Prepared are We for Tomorrow?, 226.
69 Ibid.
70 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy People 2010: Understanding and Improving Health, 2nd
ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 14-45,
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2010/Document/pdf/uih/2010uih.pdf.
71 "Reasons reported by Medicare beneficiaries for not receiving influenza and pneumococcal vaccinations--United
States, 1996," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48, no. 39 (October 8, 1999): 886-890.
72 Tan, "What is the National Influenza Vaccine Summit?".
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influenza vaccine production and distribution in the previous season,73 and brought together 30 public
and private stakeholders from 15 organizations.74 Its success is readily apparent. By 2010, the numbers
attending had risen to nearly 300 participants from more than 120 organizations.75
For a number of years, the Summit has featured presentations by CDC specialists who have focused on
shaping public messages about influenza and the vaccine. At the fourth annual summit on the morning
of Wednesday, April 14, 2004, Glen Nowak, Associate Director of Health Communications at the
National Immunization Program, spoke to the audience about the CDC's plans for the upcoming season.
Nowak, a former University of Georgia professor of advertising with expertise in social marketing and
health communications, spoke about the relationship between media, perceptions, and the public's
interest in getting vaccinated. Following the 2003 season in which major news coverage of a few
influenza-associated deaths in children in Colorado led to a rush on vaccines around the country, the
CDC undertook a communications study. Nowak came to the conference to explain what he found-
and what lessons could be learned.
In what he calls the "Seven-Step Recipe for Generating Interest in, and Demand for, Flu (or any other)
Vaccination," Nowak explains how messages in the media can drastically influence the public's behavior
(Figure 1.2). Step 3 of the Recipe states: "Medical experts and public health authorities publicly (e.g., via
media) state concern and alarm (and predict dire outcomes)- and urge influenza vaccination." When
this happens along with initial cases being associated with severe illness (like the pediatric influenza
deaths in Colorado), this results in "significant media interest and attention," Nowak notes. A graph in
Nowak's presentation shows how media stories carrying the message that this "could be a bad/serious
season" jumped when Dr. Poland predicted the worst season in decades. "Some component of success
(i.e., higher demand for influenza vaccine) stems from media stories and information that create
motivating (i.e., high) levels of concern and anxiety about influenza," he explained.
Maintaining the media's interest in influenza can however be a challenge, according to the CDC's
findings. But interest can be generated by "continued reports (e.g., from health officials and media) that
influenza is causing severe illness and/or affecting lots of people helping foster the perception that
many people are susceptible to a bad case of influenza" (Recipe Step 5).
Raymond A. Strikas, "The National Influenza Vaccine Summit: Update", February 7, 2006, 2, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/36/nvac slides.pdf, (accessed July 13, 2011).
7 "2007 National Influenza Vaccine Summit April 19--20, 2007 Atlanta, Georgia Minutes of Meeting", 2007,
http://www.preventinfluenza.org/summits/2007/meetingminutes0 7 .pdf, (accessed July 21, 1010).
7s Litjen Tan, "Update from the 2010 National Influenza Vaccine Summit meeting" (presented at the The National
Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), Washington, DC, June 2, 2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/meetings/pastmeetings/summit_update_060210.ppt, (accessed July 13, 2010).
76 "Executive Leadership & Expert Bios", June 10, 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/media/subtopic/sme/nowak.htm,
(accessed July 13, 2010).
7 Glen Nowak, "Planning for the 2004-05 Influenza Vaccination Season: A Communication Situation Analysis [PDF
Part 1]", April 15, 2004, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/36/2004_flu nowak.pdf, (accessed
August 20, 2008); Nowak, "Planning for the 2004-05 Influenza Vaccination Season: A Communication Situation
Analysis [PDF Part 2]."
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Nowak envisions three broad groups in which the population can be conceptually divided: those who
routinely get vaccinated against influenza, those who only sometimes do, and those who choose not to,
even when recommended. Because convincing those who are already convinced would be a waste of
resources, and attempting to convince those already steadfastly against vaccination may be a losing
battle, Nowak puts emphasis on the middle group-those who are undecided. It is here, he asserts, that
messaging may change behavior. For this population segment, "interest is often contingent on
perceptions of severity of the strain, likelihood they or someone they know will contract it." Nowak
however cautions that "Inducing worry, raised anxiety, and concern in people brings forth a number of
issues and presents many dilemmas for health care professionals."
Attendance at NIVS meetings is extremely diverse, and includes individuals involved in national, state,
and local public health practice and policy making, hospitals, medical organizations, pharmacists, nursing
organizations, private health insurance and managed care organizations, select consumers and advocacy
groups, vaccine and drug manufacturers and distributors, and the news media. What unites the group is
their common desire to increasing influenza vaccine supply and demand.
Attendance is by invitation only, and while some of the more recent conferences have included
reporters from various media outlets as well as public relations firms, the conference itself receives
scant media attention. One notable exception came in October, 2004, when the wire service United
Press International published an article critical of the CDC's presentation. Titled "'Dire' CDC warnings
hiked flu shot demand," the UPI article highlighted Nowak's "Seven-Step Recipe" questioning the
government's approach. Nowak defended his slides. "Nowak ... told UPI ... that he was analyzing
factors that increased demand during the [previous] 2003-2004 flu season, not coaching scare tactics to
increase demand for flu vaccine."
As the UPI is a wire service (and not a newspaper), it is up to other media outlets to put the UPI story in
print. But none did, despite the hundreds of articles being written about influenza during the time.79 As
Nowak's presentation makes clear, the media has been far more active in promoting many of what he
calls "Facts we deem important,,,80 such as the CDC's 36,000 estimated death statistic, than critiquing
the CDC's methods.
Factors that increase demand
Knowing what messages are effective at motivating behavior is a key ingredient in any communications
campaign. With so many other issues competing for the attention of the American public, convincing
people that they need to get influenza vaccine is a challenge officials have struggled with for years. "It's
7 Mark Benjamin, "'Dire' CDC warnings hiked flu shot demand," United Press International, October 15, 2004,
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20041015-112212-3043r.htm, (accessed April 6, 2005).
79 Nowak, "Planning for the 2004-05 Influenza Vaccination Season: A Communication Situation Analysis [PDF Part
1]," 16-23.
80 Glen Nowak, "Communicating in Changing and Difficult Communication Environments: Some Things I've Learned
Regarding Influenza Immunization", May 10, 2005, 17, http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/infectious-
disease/summit_2005_nowak.pdf, (accessed July 22, 2010).
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a lot harder to create a motivating level of concern and anxiety when a) influenza isn't yet present and
b) disease severity and impact are in line with expectations," Nowak notes.
In 2002, a series of focus-group based interviews were conducted by the CDC's Office of Health
Communications "to assess the understanding, appeal, and potential impact of influenza immunization
messages and materials on physicians and Hispanic and African American senior citizens," populations
which have historically lower influenza vaccination rates.81 In order to better understand how to tailor
health risk messages to specific audiences, participants in the focus groups were shown a variety of
visual poster-like materials (Figure 1.3), similar to what is done in social marketing research.82 One of
the items tested on audiences was the "20,000 deaths" statistic. (The CDC's official estimate was
revised upward to 36,000 later, in January 2003.)
The study found that among African Americans, the "Statistic of 20,000 deaths is credible and specific-
lends a sense of urgency." For Hispanics, "The statement '20,000 deaths' seemed to be more eye
catching and motivating than '114,000 hospitalized."' As one participant said, "We're all trying to
escape death." A more detailed report remarked: "The number 20,000 attracted people's attention.
Most were shocked...." Under "Key Strengths" of the "20,000 deaths" message, the authors wrote:
"20,000 deaths was compelling, frightening." They twice mentioned that the 20,000 deaths statistic
"should be part of the headline." 3
While the population surveyed in the focus group study was elderly senior citizens, its findings are being
applied to far wider audiences. Indeed, the 36,000 mortality statistic became a central element of the
CDC's strategy to market influenza vaccine. New promotional materials for the 2010-11 season, for
example, claim: "Reason enough to get VACCINATED! Flu-related complications lead to about 36,000
DEATHS and 200,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS each year in the U.S." (Figure 1.4).
"Get the facts. Get vaccinated," the poster demands, as if "the facts"-or in this case, statistical
estimates-speak for themselves, and inevitably will lead all readers to the conclusion that vaccination is
in everyone's best interest. But on occasion, "the facts" are used for opposite effect. During the vaccine
shortage of 2004, the Director of the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases urged people
to consider the facts. "Yesterday, Dr. Fauci reiterated the need for healthy residents to step aside,
noting that of the 36,000 people who die of influenza each year, about 31,000 of them are elderly and
the rest are infants or young children."84
1 Kari Sapsis and Alan Janssen, Influenza and Pneumococcal Immunization: A Qualitative Assessment of the Beliefs
of Physicians and Older Hispanic and African Americans (Office of Health Communications, National Immunization
Program, CDC, December 2002), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/spec-grps/downloads/flubeliefs-pres.rtf, (accessed
July 3, 2010).
8 Deborah C. Glik, "Risk Communication for Public Health Emergencies," Annual Review of Public Health 28, no. 1
(April 2007): 33-54.
8 Office of Health Communications, National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Influenza and Pneumococcal Immunization: A Qualitative Assessment of the Beliefs of Physicians and Older
Hispanic and African Americans (Office of Health Communications, National Immunization Program, CDC, May
2003), 21, http://www.health.gov/communication/db/FileDownload.asp?ID=1 71, (accessed July 3, 2010).
34 Karen A Davis, "Officials say more flu shots on way," The Providence Journal, October 24, 2004.
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Fauci was highlighting the fact that we are not all at equal risk of death from influenza. The young
adults age group featured in the many promotional CDC materials actually have an exceedingly low risk
of death or hospitalization from influenza. Most of the time, however, this detail goes unmentioned-
except in cases where officials are aiming to reduce demand.
"Grassroots" campaigns
Motivating people to vaccinate through prominent exposure to death statistics is not the only way in
which influenza vaccine is being marketed and CDC is by no means the vaccine's sole marketer. The
"Vote & Vax" projectss received nearly $750,000 from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation8 6 to offer
influenza vaccinations to voters making their way to polling stations (Figure 1.5). In 2008,
CVS/pharmacy and MinuteClinic delivered more than one million vaccines through its "Flu Shots Made
Simple" marketing campaign. 7 A collaboration between the National Women's Health Resource Center
and The Association of Women's Health, Obstetric, and Neonatal Nurses created the "Flu-Free and a
Mom-to-Be" program, sponsored by influenza vaccine manufacturer CSL Biotherapies, which aims
"create a sense of urgency surrounding influenza vaccination among pregnant women" and increase
vaccination coverage rates. 88
Sanofi Pasteur, a prominent influenza vaccine manufacturer, launched a major influenza vaccine
marketing initiative with the American Lung Association called "Faces of Influenza" (Figure 1.6). As the
name implies, the campaign aims to "put a 'face' on influenza illness and help Americans understand the
need for annual vaccination." Using celebrities such as former Olympian figure skater Kristi Yamaguchi,
comedian and View talk show host Joy Behar, as well as some "not-so-famous Americans," the campaign
presents collages of faces and vignettes with which viewers might relate. Company documents describe
it as a "Grassroots Regional Campaign," including a "proven, creative, and 'media sexy' consumer
campaign" with a "Grassroots Toolkit" including "communication templates-newsletter article, Web
article, patient and consumer letter, physician letter, elected official, health official, school, office on
,,89aging. Sanofi Pasteur has also funded Families Fighting Flu, a campaign to raise childhood influenza
vaccination rates, led by a group of parents whose children died from influenza.
Experts know best
Underlying many of the promotional efforts for influenza vaccine is the assumption that the public is not
rational; it is scientifically illiterate. The public holds on to "beliefs" while scientists evaluate evidence.
There is the expectation that if the general public only knew what experts knew, then people would
8s Vote & Vax, "Vote & Vax", 2011, http://www.voteandvax.org/Home.aspx, (accessed June 30, 2011).
86 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "Vote & Vax 2008", January 15, 2008,
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/votevax2008info.pdf, (accessed July 23, 2010).
87 Donna L Haugland, "MinuteClinic & CVS Pharmacy", June 29, 2009,
http://www.preventinfluenza.org/NIVS_2009/Special%20-%202%20-%20Haugland.pdf, (accessed October 7,
2009).
88 "2009 National Influenza Vaccine Summit: June 29--July 1, 2009 Meeting Summary," 22-23.
89 Sanofi Pasteur, "Influenza Vaccine Production and Immunization Update", November 2007,
http://www.ndflu.com/Vaccine/sanofi%20pasteur%20FIu%20summit% 20presentation% 20 11-2 6-0 7.ppt, (accessed
June 26, 2010).
Page 46
Marketing Death to Save Lives
behave rationally. If the public knew what experts know, it would make the same decisions regarding
vaccination-that is, vaccinate.
Since the mid to late 1960s, researchers began to note a number of divergences between how experts
and non-experts-usually different groups among the general/lay public-thought about various types
of natural hazards and technological risks like floods, industrial chemicals, and nuclear energy. Why, for
example, did people choose to live in floodplains when the likelihood of flooding was so great that it
would seem to not in their best interest? Or why did people report fear and opposition to nuclear
power plants in excess of driving a car, despite experts' calculation that the risk of automobile accidents
far outweighed the likely harm from a nuclear reactor?
Partial answers to these questions came slowly, over a number of years, and from a variety of fields.
One of the earliest answers came from the American electrical engineer Chauncey Starr, who in a 1969
paper in Science, suggested that the key factor to understanding risk preferences was voluntariness.90
Starr suggested that the public is willing to take larger risks when the activity in question is a voluntary
one. This theory offered one explanation for why smoking and automobiles, despite the high levels of
risk of death associated with them, were not perceived as risky as nuclear power: the installation,
operation, and management of nuclear power was involuntary, something people had little individual
control over, in contrast to smoking and driving.
Many have since refined Starr's contention that voluntariness is the key factor. Slovic identified a far
larger list of major factors: familiarity (versus unfamiliarity), control (or lack of control), catastrophic
potential (i.e. thinking about the worst case scenario, no matter how small the likelihood), equity (i.e.
are all people taking on the risk at equal levels?), and levels of knowledge (about the risk). All of these
influence the magnitude of concern people had about various risks.9' Slovic's so-called psychmetric
paradigm attempts to study individuals and quantify their perception of risk. By approaching the issue
as one of risk perception, there is the assumption that hazards exist out there in the world and pose
some finite risk. At times, this risk may be more or less well understood, but expert opinion can
determine a best estimate and a margin of error. Nevertheless, through interviews or surveys,
investigators could determine people's perception of that risk, and attempt to understand why risk
perception differed from quantitative expert analyses of risk. At its best, the psychometric promised to
offer a laundry list of factors which might be able to predict risk taking/aversion patterns based on the
type of risk.
But while the qualities of any risk such as equity, control, and familiarity may indeed have something to
do with the perception of risk, the psychometric paradigm employed a research methodology that was
arguably too narrow. Psychometric research took the individual as its unit of analysis, and attempted to
compare how individuals felt about risk A versus risk B. If the perceived level of risk was different, one
or more of the psychometric factors could then be used to help explain why this was the case. Some
have argued that this methodology misses an essential aspect of life: that we do not live in bubbles, but
are instead members of society, operating under certain assumptions, with our own worldviews,
90 Chauncey Starr, "Social Benefit versus Technological Risk," Science 165, no. 3899 (1969): 1232 -1238.
91 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, Risk, society, and policy series (London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).
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obligations, commitments, and desires. The anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron
Wildavsky offered a new conceptualization of risk in their cultural theory of risk, and attempted to shift
the central question of risk acceptability from 'how much risk is acceptable to you?' to 'what kind of
society do you want to live in?' 92 They argued, in line with Emile Durkheim, for a functionalist
framework, suggesting that to understand individual behavior, perception, and preferences, we had to
look beyond the individual and ask how individual action fit within the larger whole (culture, society).
Understanding risk, then, required not only taking note of individual behavior, but thinking about the
moral and ethical norms and factors that affected the coherence of larger society.
These cultural theories of risk argued that risks are subjective values-not numbers out there that
experts calculate and about which lay people merely have more or less accurate understandings. For
example, Douglas and Wildavsky argued that a death (to take a favorite unit of analysis among the
quantitative theorists) could not, a priori, be assigned any particular value. It rather must be understood
within a wider context: most societies, for example, distinguish and react differently to honorable
deaths versus dishonorable deaths. Understanding risk, then, was not a matter of gauging the public's
rationality or irrationality, but rather understanding the ethical and moral cultural milieu within which
people exist.
Some scholars even provided semi-detailed typologies to understand public reaction to potential
hazards. Wildavsky and Dake, for example, argue that cultural biases in the form of "worldviews" best
predict how people will react to a specific hazard. Members of each worldview-hierarchy,
individualism, and egalitarianism-embody different core values, such as patriotism, law & order, or
strict ethical standards. 93
Most research on risk has however done little to change common beliefs about the source of divergence
between expert and lay rationality, and belief that there is a true dichotomy between informed,
objective, rational thinking and uninformed, irrational, and subjective thinking.94 The conviction that the
thoughts and beliefs of experts are ruled by this calm and objective rationality while decisions among
non-experts are largely ruled by an imprecise, faulty, emotional and subjective mechanism, remains
strong (Figure 1.7).
In Making Data Talk, a guide written by CDC employees about how to communicate scientific
information to the general public, it is noted that "most scientists are strong believers in the 'rational
decision-making' model ... people make decisions based on careful weighing of information from sources
they deem as credible (i.e., scientists). ... [By contrast, lay] people use many heuristics (shortcuts), often
92 Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture.
9 Aaron Wildavsky and Karl Dake, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus 119, no. 4
(October 1, 1990): 41-60.
94 Today this dichotomy shows up in the emerging field of neuroeconomics, where one theory holds that the brain
should be conceptualized as the site of "the site of conflict between an impetuous limbic system at perpetual odds
with its deliberate and provident overseer in the prefrontal cortex." See Natasha Dow SchUll and Caitlin Zaloom,
"The shortsighted brain: Neuroeconomics and the governance of choice in time," Social Studies of Science 41, no. 4
(March 2011): 515-538.
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relying on faulty reasoning and intuition when making decisions, rather than carefully weighing
evidence." 95
At the 2005 National Influenza Vaccine Summit, one breakout group was tasked with "Increasing
influenza vaccine demand" by addressing the "lack of knowledge, indifference and/or frustration in the
public, priority persons and HCPs [health care providers]":
Although there are annual media campaigns coupled with efforts of public health and
medical organizations, only about a third of priority persons and about 30 million in the
general public receive a vaccination each year. Clearly, the demand for vaccine by the
U.S. public is lacking. The following are three obstacles to increasing public demand for
influenza vaccinations. First, there are misunderstandings (myths) regarding the
severity of influenza and its complications, vaccine safety; ands [sic] vaccine
effectiveness. 96
The opinion that experts know best is also evident in the way much of the press reports on influenza. In
a national poll, Consumer Reports asked Americans about their intention to get an influenza vaccine.
Many reported that they were not seeking influenza vaccine, and the magazine ranked the most
common reasons given in an article titled "12 top excuses for skipping the flu shot are exposed."97
Forty-five percent of those people said that they didn't get sick. Consumer Reports called this an
"lexcuse.".
Excuse: You don't get sick (45 percent)
Reality: Just because you haven't had the flu in the past doesn't mean you won't get it
this year. And just one bout of the disease may have you running for the flu shot next
year. Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that each year
the flu sends some 225,000 people to the hospital, and causes the death of 35,000.98
Apparently for Consumer Reports, the public is not suitably concerned. It needs a "reality check."
Do experts agree?
Juxtaposing "excuses" with "reality" creates the impression that experts armed with statistics and facts
know what is true and what is right, and the rest of us have only lay conceptions of the world which
amount to little more than uninformed "excuses" and false "myths." But this expert-vs-lay framework is
hard to reconcile with the fact that on average, no more than 40% of healthcare workers get annual
influenza vaccinations. Since 1984, federal officials have advised that healthcare workers annually
95 Nelson, Hesse, and Croyle, Making Data Talk, 15.
96 "Agenda. National Influenza Vaccine Summit", May 31, 2005, http://webt1.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/infectious-disease/summit 2005_.agenda.pdf, (accessed November 6, 2005).
97 Consumer Reports, "12 top excuses for skipping the flu shot are exposed", November 2008,
http://www.consumerreports.org/health/healthy-living/health-safety/getting-the-flu-shot-this-year/12-top-
excuses-exposed/getting-the-flu-shot-this-year-no-excuses-for-skipping-the-flu-shot.htm, (accessed June 30,
2011).
98 Ibid.
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receive an influenza vaccination, but for almost thirty years, the majority do not.99 Healthcare workers,
who by the very nature of their job are exposed to the sick, would presumably have firsthand
experience of the damage that influenza inflicts. For these people, the 200,000 hospitalizations and
36,000 deaths statistics that officials cite should be more than statistics. It is their job. It is their reality.
Yet the majority of these individuals do not end up vaccinated.
Understanding why this is the case has been the subject of numerous studies, and there is no single
answer. Some do not get vaccinated simply because they dislike injections. Others lack the time, find
the vaccine inaccessible, do not realize vaccine was available, or simply forget. But for other healthcare
workers, the calculus of risk and benefit does not weigh in the favor of vaccination: some are concerned
about side effects. Others do not believe they will get influenza, and some simply feel the vaccine is
unnecessary. 00 Several surveys have shown differences in vaccination rates by race and occupational
category: e.g. whites healthcare workers tend to get the vaccine more often than minority healthcare
workers;' 0' and employees in health-diagnosing professions (doctors, nurses) and administrators tend to
be more vaccinated than health aides.'0 2 Yet across almost all categories, regardless of educational
attainment and geographic region, rates have stayed below 50%.103
Health officials have responded to this gap-between what they recommend and what healthcare
workers actually do-by targeting healthcare workers in campaigns similar to those targeted at the
public. The CDC once suggested some "friendly competition" for pizza as a way to increase vaccination
rates:
Healthcare workers owe it to their patients, their families, and to themselves to be
vaccinated. No excuses. ... Monitoring and reporting vaccination rates could be used to
create friendly competition between various units in the facility. You could even provide
an incentive to the unit with the highest vaccination rate. If workers won't be vaccinated
to protect themselves and their patients, they might do it for a pizza.' 4
99 Poland, Tosh, and Jacobson, "Requiring influenza vaccination for health care workers."
100 Sherri L LaVela et al., "Attitudes and practices regarding influenza vaccination among healthcare workers
providing services to individuals with spinal cord injuries and disorders," Infection Control and Hospital
Epidemiology: The Official Journal of the Society of Hospital Epidemiologists of America 25, no. 11 (November
2004): 933-940; Paula L. Sullivan, "Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare Workers: Should it be Mandatory?," OJIN:
The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 15, no. 1 (November 2, 2009),
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicas/OJIN/TableofContents/Voll
52010/No1Jan2OlO/Articles-Previous-Topic/Mandatory-Influenza-Vaccination-in-Healthcare-Workers.aspx,
(accessed August 9, 2010).
101 Frances J Walker et al., "Influenza vaccination of healthcare workers in the United States, 1989-2002," Infection
Control and Hospital Epidemiology: The Official Journal of the Society of Hospital Epidemiologists of America 27, no.
3 (March 2006): 257-265; Mary Patricia Nowalk et al., "Self-reported influenza vaccination rates among health care
workers in a large health system," American Journal of Infection Control 36, no. 8 (October 2008): 574-581.
102 King et al., "BRIEF REPORT."
103 Ibid.
104 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Final Script from 'Immunization Update 2004' Satellite
Broadcast", August 19, 2004.
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But officials have remained unsuccessful. "Health care workers have demonstrated, over almost 25
years that they are unwilling to comply with voluntary influenza immunization programs utilizing a
variety of education and incentive programs," Gregory Poland and colleagues wrote in 2005. "We
suggest that an annual influenza immunization should be required for every health care worker with
direct patient contact, unless a medical contraindication or religious objection exists, or an informed
declination is signed by the health care worker."105 While some back such calls for mandatory
vaccination,106 other doctors caution that making influenza vaccination mandatory could alienate staff,
damage morale, violate individual freedom to work and earn a living-in other words, be hugely
counter-productive. 0 7 After the British medical journal BMJ hosted a debate on the matter, one doctor
responded that mandatory vaccination did not amount to a violation of individual rights-indeed, he
argued, allowing healthcare workers to go unvaccinated amounted to a violation of the patient's right to
a safe environment. Invoking the British philosopher and proponent of the "greatest-happiness"
conception of utilitarianism, he wrote, "John Stuart Mills [sic] would support, not oppose, a mandatory
programme." 08
Over the past few years, some private health systems and some states have experimented with
mandating influenza vaccination as a way to increase vaccine uptake.109 Since 2010, the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)," 0 the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA),"' the
Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA),u 2 and Association for Professionals in Infection Control
and Epidemiology (APIC)" 3 have all called for the adoption of mandatory influenza vaccination policies
for healthcare workers. It remains to see whether such recommendations will be enacted, as
mandatory systems have so far been unpopular among the people the mandate targets. Where they
105 Poland, Tosh, and Jacobson, "Requiring influenza vaccination for health care workers," 2251.
106 Charles M Helms and Philip M Polgreen, "Should influenza immunisation be mandatory for healthcare workers?
Yes," BMJ 337, no. oct28_3 (October 28, 2008): a2142.
107 David Isaacs and Julie Leask, "Should influenza immunisation be mandatory for healthcare workers? No," BMJ
337, no. oct28 3 (October 28, 2008): a2140-a2140.
S. B Lambert, "Patient care drives mandatory vaccination," BMJ 337, no. nov19 1 (November 2008): a2588-
a2588.
109 Sullivan, "Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare Workers: Should it be Mandatory?".
110 H. H. Bernstein, J. R. Starke, and Committee on Infectious Diseases, "Recommendation for Mandatory Influenza
Immunization of All Health Care Personnel," Pediatrics 126, no. 4 (September 2010): 809-815.
Thomas R. Talbot et al., "Revised SHEA Position Paper: Influenza Vaccination of Healthcare Personnel," Infection
Control and Hospital Epidemiology 31, no. 10 (October 2010): 987-995.
12 Infectious Diseases Society of America, "Nation's Leading Infectious Diseases Experts Call for Mandatory Flu
Vaccine for All Healthcare Personnel: Vaccination Should Be Requirement for Continued Employment for
Healthcare Personnel, Epidemiologists and Infectious Disease Physicians Say", August 31, 2010,
http://www.idsociety.org/Content.aspx?id=169 80, (accessed April 18, 2011).
113 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, "APIC Position Paper: Influenza Vaccination
Should Be a Condition of Employment for Healthcare Personnel, Unless Medically Contraindicated", January 27,
2011,
http://www.apic.org/Content/NavigationMenu/GovernmentAdvocacy/PublicPolicyLibrary/APIC_1 nfluenza_Immuni
zationofHCP_12711.PDF, (accessed April 18, 2011).
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have been introduced, nurse and other healthcare workers associations have publicly opposed the
policy. 14
* * *
Through a combination of successful marketing, a cooperative media, financial incentives, laws,
regulations, pricing negotiations, liability reform, and the overall alignment and cooperation between
governmental and private sector interests through collaborative vehicles such as the National Influenza
Vaccine Summit, more Americans are receiving an annual influenza vaccination than ever before in the
vaccine's seventy year history. But, as those involved in policymaking know, this is less the result of
supply meeting demand, but instead the result of years of effort creating demand. One CDC official
from the National Immunization Program explained the vision in congressional testimony in 2004:
I believe the best way to increase the production of vaccine is to increase the demand of
vaccine, but it has to be done in a way that is orchestrated such that we do not outstrip
the production by expanding our recommendations and thereby, pushing too much
demand at one time ... ultimately we would like to weave influenza vaccination much
more closely into the fabric of society."'
Unlike other diseases such as AIDS or cancer, for most of the American public, influenza remains an
unremarkable disease; flus are like colds, a short lived and relatively inconsequential "fact of life." To be
sure, there are occasional moments of panic when vaccine demand outstrips supply, but the disease
soon fades into the background of everyday life. We do not talk about influenza "survivors" the way we
celebrate those who have beat cancer. There are no "influenza walks" the way people march to raise
funds for AIDS. The disease is not a major concern. It is something few would do anything about on
their own volition. But for a few months each year, increasingly sophisticated and elaborate campaigns
aim to combat these "myths" and convince the public otherwise. Influenza is a serious disease, we are
told, and death statistics are repeated to reinforce the point. Vaccines promise to save lives. Who in
their right mind would object?
[ENDS]
14 PRNewswire, "Nurses Outraged by Virginia Mason Medical Center's Mandatory Flu Vaccination Policy",
September 21, 2004, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nurses-outraged-by-virginia-mason-medical-
centers-mandatory-flu-vaccination-policy-73858217.html, (accessed June 30, 2011); Delithia Ricks, "LI nurses to
rally against mandatory swine flu vaccines", September 21, 2009, http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/i-
nurses-to-rally-against-mandatory-swine-flu-vaccines-1.1465858, (accessed June 30, 2011).
115 Combating the Flu: Keeping Seniors Alive, 34.
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Table 1.1. Expansion of influenza vaccination recommendations, 1960 to present
Population 0 N
W 00 0 0 0 0 W-4
Recommendations by age
Adults 65 years X X X X X X X X X
Adults 50 year$ X X X X X X
Children 6 to 23 months X X X X X
Children 6 to 59months X X X X
Children 6 months to 18 years, if feasible X X X
Children6m nonths to l8 years X X
Everyone 6 months X
Recommendations by condition/occupation
Pregnant women (2nd and 3rd trimester) X X X X X X
Pregnant women (all trimesters) X X X X X
Healthcare workers X X X X X X X X
Household contacts of high risk groups X X X X X X
Household contacts and out of home X X X X X
caregivers of children 0-23 months
Household contacts and outof home X X X X
caregivers of children 0-59 months
Sources: ACIP,116 Osterholm,m7 and Layton et al. 118
116 U.S. Centers for Disease Control, "Recommendation of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP)
Prevention and Control of Influenza"; Scott A Harper et al., "Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 53, no. 6
(May 28, 2004): 1-40; Harper et al., "Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)"; Nicole M Smith et al., "Prevention and Control of Influenza:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and
Reports 55, no. 10 (July 28, 2006): 1-42; Anthony E Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza.
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2007," MMWR.
Recommendations and Reports 56, no. 6 (July 13, 2007): 1-54; Anthony E Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of
influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008," MMWR.
Recommendations and Reports 57, no. 7 (August 8, 2008): 1-60.
1 Michael T Osterholm, "Influenza Vaccine Efficacy and Effectiveness: A Comprehensive Review", May 10, 2011,
5, http://www.preventinfluenza.org/NIVS_2011/2-osterholmvaccineefficacy.pdf, (accessed May 18, 2011).
118 Christine Layton, Tara Robinson, and Amanda Honeycutt, "Influenza Vaccine Demand: The Chicken And The
Egg", October 2005, http://aspe.hhs.gov/pic/fullreports/06/8476-4.doc, (accessed June 20, 2011).
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Table 1.2. Influenza vaccination rates among selected populations, USA 1972-2011
Year Doses Number of Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of
produced Americans elderly 265 adults 50-64 adults 18-49
(millions) recommended to years old years old years old
get influenza vaccinated vaccinated (%) vaccinated
vaccine (millions) (%) (%)
197Z-197i
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977
1977-1978
1978-1979
1979-1980
1980-1981
1981-1982
1982-1983
1983-1984
1984-1985
1985-1986-
1986-1987
1987-1988
1988-1989
1989-1990
1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
15.7
23.1
32.3
71.5
77.2
77.9
87.7
95
86.9
61
88.5
120.9
140.6
135.9
114 million
IN
17
22
21
38
23
22
19
20
21
21
22
23
24
25
28
31
37
42
48
52
55
58
62
63
63
63
65
65
63.1
65.7
65.5
64.6
59.7
64.3
66.7
66.9
66.7
188
218
-270
31.9
33.1
34.1
34.6
32.2
34
36.8
35.9
23
33.2
36.2
39.4
40.7
14.3
15.5
16.4
17.1
15.0
16.3
16.9
17.9
10.7
15.5
17.8
19.9
22.9
seasonal
vaccines;
117 million
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HINI
vaccines
2010-2011 171 (est)- "300 63.6 41;2 24.5
Note: Blank spaces in this table are due to the inability to locate statistics for many years. Because
vaccine production and distribution figures are proprietary, definitive numbers are difficult to obtain. A
variety of sources, primarily referenced to CDC material, were referenced to compile this table."'
Sources of error in this table include: error in the representativeness of survey data used to generate
estimates of the proportion of target populations who received influenza vaccine; error in categorization
of vaccination rates to the correct season because of variation in timing of CDC National Health
Interview Survey in response to question about receipt of vaccine "during the past 12 months;",2 0 error
in estimating numbers of Americans recommended for vaccination due to difficulty in obtaining
population estimates of some target populations (e.g. healthcare workers); use of data from multiple
survey sources (e.g. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, National Health Interview Survey, and
potentially the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey).
119 Personal correspondence with Litjen Tam, June 27, 2011, and Simonsen et al., "Impact of Influenza Vaccination
on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population," 267; Osterholm, "Influenza Vaccine Efficacy and Effectiveness:
A Comprehensive Review," 25; Tan, "Update from the 2010 National Influenza Vaccine Summit meeting," 8; Fauci,
"Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness," S74; U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "2009
H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Doses Allocated, Ordered, and Shipped By Project Area", March 4, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/hn1flu/vaccination/vaccinesupply.htm, (accessed June 30, 2011); U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, "Vaccination coverage estimates from the National Health Interview Survey: United
States, 2008", July 2009, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/vaccine_coverage/vaccine coverage.pdf,
(accessed June 30, 2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Early Release of Selected Estimates
Based on Data From the 2010 National Health Interview Survey", June 22, 2011, fig. 4.1a,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/earlyrelease20llO6.pdf, (accessed June 26, 2011); Gerberding,
"US Influenza Supply and Preparations for the Future," 20; Smith et al., "Prevention and Control of Influenza"; U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Prevention and control of influenza: Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 45, no. 5 (May 3,
1996): 1-24.
120 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Early Release of Selected Estimates Based on Data From the
2010 National Health Interview Survey."
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m U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Flu Vaccine: Facts & Myths", September 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/flugalery/2007-08/pdf/ffactmyth_8xll.pdf, (accessed May 17, 2009).
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Figure 1.2. CDC's "Seven-Step Recipe" (2004)122
m Nowak, "Planning for the 2004-05 Influenza Vaccination Season: A Communication Situation Analysis [PDF Part
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Figure 1.3. Test messages shown to CDC focus group participants (2003)1
123 Office of Health Communications, National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Influenza and Pneumococcal Immunization, 73,74,80,82.
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Figure 1.4. CDC Promotional material for the 2010-11 influenza season. The poster states: "Reason enough to get
VACCINATED! Flu-related complications lead to about 36,000 DEATHS and 200,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS each year in the U.S."
Source: CDC 24
124 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Reason enough to get VACCINATED!", July 21, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/freeresources/2009-10/pdf/flu_ad_24-64_sneezing.pdf, (accessed September 25, 2010).
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Figure 1.5. "Why should I get a flu shot?" from the website of the Vote & Vax Project125
us Vote & Vax, "Why You Need a Flu shot and Where to Get One", 2008,
http://www.voteandvax.org/GetAFluShot.aspx, (accessed July 16, 2011).
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Faces of Influenza Grassroots Toolkit
Media outreach materials:
- Press release templates
- General awareness
- Clinic announcement
- Educational event announcement
- "Outbreak" alert
- Letter-to-the-editor and Op-Ed
- Various extend the season announcements
- Disease backgrounderfor media outlets
- Influenza talking points and Q&A
- Copies of the TV and radio PSA for distribution to local
media
sano4 pasteur
MKT13556 -.
Figure 1.6. Sanofi Pasteur's "Faces of Influenza Grassroots Toolkit" (2007)126
126 Sanofi Pasteur, "Influenza Vaccine Production and Immunization Update," 23.
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What Keeps Vaccination Rates Low?
- Confusion on groups recommended for vaccination
- People don't self4dentfy as "high-risk'
- Misconception among healthy adults
I'm healthy - I don't need to get vaccinated'
- Old -flu is just a bad cold' myth prevails
- Misbelief that "1 can get the flu from the vaccine"
$ ^maw" UNG AmocAnIOW
Figure 1.7. American Lung Association presentation from the 2010 National Influenza Vaccine Summit127
127 Stacey Mortenson, "Healthy Adults: Engaging a 'Hard to Reach' Population on Influenza & Annual Vaccination",
May 19, 2010, 2, http://www.preventinfluenza.org/NIVS_2010/4_Mortenson.pdf, (accessed September 25, 2010).
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Chapter 2 Pandemic Influenza: Marketing Catastrophe
A World Unprepared
Writing in the magazine Science in late 2004, experts from the World Health Organization- (WHO) asked
readers to ponder a horrifying scenario.
Twenty per cent of the world's population falls ill. One in every hundred of those ill is
hospitalized (if enough beds are available). Seven million deaths occur in a few months
and 28 million are hospitalized. This is how the next influenza pandemic might look,
according to optimistic estimates. Estimates from other models are far more
frightening, but even this best-case scenario is cause for considerable concern.1
Centered at the top of the page was a simple bar chart of projected deaths among highly industrialized
nations-topping the list was the United States, with a projected 1.8 million deaths. The article was a
plea for swift and sweeping action towards the production of pandemic influenza vaccines. Calling
vaccines "the best line of defense against the high morbidity and mortality invariably associated with
influenza pandemics," WHO scientists Klaus St6hr and Marja Esveld said that the hurdles to
development are no longer technical, but "political and economic in nature." Public health had not risen
to the challenge of past pandemics, they warned, as no significant level of vaccines was available in any
past influenza pandemic. But with proper preparation, public health might be able to do something
about the next influenza pandemic.
If the traditional enemy was complacency and a lack of political will, by 2005, the tide was turning.
Discussion about the threat of pandemic influenza-and the need for "preparedness"-was not
confined to specialist circles, but moving into the larger society. From the front page of major American
newspapers to congressional briefings in Washington, D.C. and daytime talk shows like Oprah, by the
end of 2005, there were few who had not heard about the coming influenza pandemic. Media coverage
was nearly constant, filled with updates about one particular avian influenza virus-subtype H5N1-that
was devastating poultry flocks, and most importantly, at times infecting humans. By mid 2005, over 108
human infections with H5N1 had been recorded by the World Health Organization, mostly in the Far
East. Half of the time, those infected with H5N1 died.2
* * *
"Death rates approaching this order or magnitude are unprecedented for any epidemic disease," Dr.
Tara O'Toole, CEO of the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Biosecurity, told congressional staffers at a
Washington, D.C. briefing on pandemic influenza. Dr. Gregory Poland, the influenza specialist from the
Klaus St6hr and Marja Esveld, "Public health. Will vaccines be available for the next influenza pandemic?," Science
(New York, N. Y) 306, no. 5705 (December 24, 2004): 2195-2196.
2 World Health Organization, "Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1)
Reported to WHO", June 28, 2005,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/country/cases-table_2005_06_28/en/index.html, (accessed July
10, 2011).
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Mayo Clinic who had a year earlier (incorrectly) predicted the worst flu season in several decades, also
attended the meeting as an expert: "I want to emphasize the certainty that a pandemic will occur...
When this happens, time will be described, for those left living, as before and after the pandemic. The
key to our survival, in my opinion, and to the continuity of government," is vaccination. "And we do not
have a licensed or approved vaccine," 3 Poland added. A Washington Post reporter in attendance at the
meeting described the tense atmosphere of the meeting, noting that the experts' "dire warnings proved
gripping enough to silence the usual back-of-the-room chatter." 4
The congressional briefing followed months of increased reporting of the deadly avian influenza virus.
In May, the international science journal Nature ran a special issue on avian influenza. Senior staff
reporter Declan Butler wrote that, "The past week has seen the release of worrying data on the risk of a
human pandemic, alongside almost daily news of further cases of avian flu."5 The article mentioned that
the virus was mutating, that cases were increasing, and antiviral resistance had even been detected.
The virus had also been found in migratory birds-not just poultry flocks-raising the possibility of
additional and rapid spread across the world. A separate Nature news report explained:
Trouble is brewing in the East. A highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza is endemic in
southeast Asia. Many millions of chickens have been culled, but there is a persistent
reservoir in domesticated ducks and wild birds. The H5N1 virus isn't going to go away.
And each time it emerges, people can be infected. ... The stage is set for the emergence
of a fresh human influenza pandemic.
The story of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1-or H5N1 as it is usually abbreviated-does not
begin in 2005 but nearly a decade earlier. On May 9, 1997, a previously healthy 3 year old boy from
Hong Kong came down with fever, sore throat and cough-all typical symptoms of influenza. He was
treated with salicylates6 (likely a form of aspirin), but the symptoms persisted, and on May 21, the boy
died. Analysis of a specimen taken from his trachea days earlier revealed infection with an influenza "A"
virus, but of a subtype of influenza A virus that the original lab could not determine. In 1997, influenza A
subtypes H3N2 and H1N1 were expected to circulate,7 but the boy was not infected with either of these.
The specimen was forwarded to more sophisticated labs, and by August, three international
laboratories-at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States, the National
Influenza Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands, and the National Institute for Medical Research in
London-had all independently come to the same conclusion: the virus was an avian influenza virus,
3 Dana Milbank, "Capitol Hill Flu Briefing Was No Trick, and No Treat," The Washington Post, October 13, 2005.
4 Ibid.
s Declan Butler, "Flu bulletins," Nature 435 (May 26, 2005): 391.
6 R Snacken et al., "The next influenza pandemic: lessons from Hong Kong, 1997," Emerging Infectious Diseases 5,
no. 2 (April 1999): 195-203.
World Health Organization, "1997 - Influenza vaccine for 1997-1998 season", February 20, 1997,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/1997_02_20/en/index.html, (accessed July 10, 2011).
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type A subtype H5N1. 8 Researchers reported their results in the CDC's weekly publication, Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR).
"A strain of influenza virus that previously was known to infect only birds has been associated with
infection and illness in humans in Hong Kong," they wrote. The event was noteworthy because the
boy's infection challenged the prevailing wisdom that avian influenza viruses were just that-avian-and
therefore of concern to bird populations, but unable to infect humans. Just a few months earlier, an
article on pandemic influenza in the British medical journal Lancet had said as much: "human cells do
not have receptors for avian influenza viruses, so it seems there would have to be an intermediate host
that would allow coinfecting avian and human influenza viruses to swap or reassert their genes." 9 But if
the May 1997 event by itself was just suggestive evidence that the prevailing wisdom was wrong, by the
year's end, researchers would identify an additional six cases of confirmed avian influenza H5N1
infection in humans, beginning to set off alarms among the infectious diseases community.10
"Infection with this influenza strain that is new to humans prompts consideration about whether this
virus has the potential to spread globally and cause a pandemic," the MMWR report noted." Conscious
of this potential of the virus to spread, nearly 1.5 million chickens' 2 were culled under the direction of
Margaret Chan, then director of health in Hong Kong. (When Chan was appointed Director-General of
the World Health Organization years later, the WHO recalled her handling of avian influenza as among
her greatest accomplishments. 3 ) In the end, 18 cases and 6 deaths were recorded as caused by the
new virus, all in Hong Kong. But the virus resurfaced in late 2002, and by 2003, was seen to be
spreading-first China, then Thailand and Vietnam,' 4 until by late 2004, 44 human cases and 32 deaths
had been reported, worldwide. 5 Public health experts at the international, national, and local level
warned of the danger, and aimed to mobilize political will to address it.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Isolation of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses from humans--
Hong Kong, May-December 1997," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 46, no. 50 (December 19,
1997): 1204-1207.
9 D Bonn, "Spared an influenza pandemic for another year?," Lancet 349, no. 9044 (January 4, 1997): 36.
10 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Isolation of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses from humans--
Hong Kong, May-December 1997."
"Ibid.
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Complete curriculum vitae of Dr Margaret Chan",
2006, http://margaretchan.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/jl/default.htm, (accessed May 4, 2009).
1 World Health Organization, "Dr Margaret Chan to be WHO's next Director-General", November 9, 2006,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2006/pr66/en/index.html, (accessed July 10, 2011).
14 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Avian Influenza A Virus Infections of Humans", May 23, 2008,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm, (accessed July 10, 2011).
1s World Health Organization, "Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) since
28 January 2004", October 25, 2004,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/country/cases-table_2004_10_25/en/index.html, (accessed July
10, 2011).
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"A time for advocacy and action"
Advocacy for what came to be known as "pandemic preparedness" was marked by an insistence on the
enormity of the threat and a warning that the world was far from being ready to respond. Nature's
special issue on avian influenza in May 2005, the journal criticized governments for their lack of will:
Each human case [of H5N1] that occurs in Asia is potentially a global threat. ... National
governments' performance is half-hearted, incomplete and far too slow. International
organizations are working with their hands tied behind their backs, for beaureaucratic
and diplomatic reasons. In short, the level of current efforts is not commensurate with
the threat we face.
Appealing to international organizations that might be able to do something about stopping avian
influenza H5N1 from ever becoming a human pandemic disease by controlling its spread among animals,
the Nature editors declared that politics was blocking prudent public health, echoing the WHO Influenza
scientists' view from five months earlier. The international effort that had emerged to deal with the
threat of pandemic influenza "is shaky and far from united or sure in its purpose. Its efforts are grossly
underfunded, and undermined at every turn by conflicts between global public health, sovereignty and
the stakes of trade and economics. ... Above all, greater top-level political oversight of the campaign is
needed. The time for diplomacy and denial is over. It is time for advocacy and action," Nature
concluded.
Following its own advice, the UK-based journal had joined forces with the influential American policy
magazine Foreign Affairs, which was also publishing its own a special issue on pandemic influenza the
following month. The two journals were also joined by the Royal Institution World Science Assembly, a
private institution in the United Kingdom chaired by the former president of the US National Science
Foundation, Rita Colwell. RiSci, as it was called, wanted to help bring together top scientists, politicians,
and industry representatives in a common cause to tackle the threat of pandemic influenza. It aimed to
convince countries of the need for self-preparedness, and to do so in a unified way."
James Hoge, the editor of Foreign Affairs, described the motivation behind their joint effort: "It was our
feeling at Foreign Affairs, at Nature magazine, and at the Royal Institution World Science Assembly
[RiSci] that a catalytic push was needed in addition to coverage that might help inform the public to a
problem out there that needs to be addressed."' 8 To that effect, Foreign Affairs had placed an
illustration of the Grim Reaper on the special issue's table of contents, hooded and holding a chicken in
his hand with the caption: "Scientists have long forecast the appearance of an influenza virus capable of
killing unimaginable numbers of people-and avian flu has shown signs of becoming that disease."
The Foreign Affairs issue, like that of Nature, was meant "as a call to action," and included articles by
Laurie Garrett, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations (the publisher of
16 " On a wing and a prayer," Nature 435, no. 7041 (May 26, 2005): 385.
17 Council of Foreign Relations, "The Threat of Global Pandemics", June 16, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/technology-
and-foreign-policy/threat-global-pandemics/p8198, (accessed September 1, 2010).
18 Ibid.
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Foreign Affairs), but better known to those in infectious disease circles as the author of The Coming
Plague, one of a handful of books that helped popularize the concept of emerging infectious diseases, as
well as Michael Osterholm, the former state epidemiologist of Minnesota who had become associate
director of the Department of Homeland Security's National Center for Food Protection and Defense.
Garrett put the spotlight on a world out of balance: "In a world where most of the wealth is
concentrated in less than a dozen nations representing a distinct minority of the total population, the
capacity to respond to global threats is, to put it politely, severely imbalanced." Garrett argued that this
imbalance would, in the aftermath of a pandemic, lead to political and diplomatic crisis: "The
international community would look to the United States, Canada, Japan, and Europe for answers,
vaccines, cures, cash, and hope. How these wealthy governments responded, and how radically the
death rates differed along worldwide fault lines of poverty, would resonate for years thereafter."19
If it was the world's disjointed mixture of rich and poor nations that would ultimately divide us in the
aftermath of a pandemic, Michael Osterholm suggested that the world's interconnectedness might even
bring even the richest nations to a grinding halt. "What would happen if the pandemic begins tonight?"
Osterholm asked rhetorically, painting a grim portrait of a chaotic, desperate world struggling to survive:
... the decision would likely be made to close most international and even some state or
provincial borders-without any predetermined criteria for how or when those borders
might be reopened. Border security would be made a priority, especially to protect
supplies of pandemic-specific vaccines from nearby desperate countries. Military
leaders would have to develop strategies to defend the country and also protect against
domestic insurgency with armed forces that would likely be compromised by the
disease. Even in unaffected countries, fear, panic, and chaos would spread as
international media reported the daily advance of the disease around the world.
In short order, the global economy would shut down. ... The private and public sectors
would have to develop emergency plans to sustain critical domestic supply chains and
manufacturing and agricultural production and distribution. The labor force would be
severely affected when it was most needed. Over the course of the year, up to 50
percent of affected populations could become ill; as many as five percent could die. The
disease would hit senior management as hard as the rest of the work force. There
would be major shortages in al countries of a wide range of commodities including food,
soap, paper, light bulbs, gasoline, parts for repairing military equipment and municipal
water pumps, and medicines, including vaccines unrelated to the pandemic. Many
industries not critical to survival-electronics, automobile, and clothing, for example-
would suffer or even close. Activities that require close human contact-school, seeing
movies in theaters, or eating at restaurants-would be avoided, maybe even banned.20
While Osterholm argued that a pandemic was inevitable, he urged leaders to act with "decisiveness and
purpose," to mitigate its effects by preparing. "The cost of failing to invest: a global economy that
19 ibid.
20 Ibid.
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remains in a shambles for several years."" And if that was not enough to motivate leaders to act,
Osterholm warned, "Someday, after the next pandemic has come and gone, a commission much like the
9/11 Commission will be charged with determining how well government, business, and public health
leaders prepared the world for the catastrophe when they had clear warning. What will be the verdict?"
Vaccines-too little, too late
Criticism of the government for not doing enough to prepare for pandemic influenza was broad based.
Beyond the specialist medical and public policy circles, mainstream US newspapers repeated the same
core argument: we are unprepared for a threat of unprecedented proportions. "World Not Set to Deal
With Flu: Strategy for Pandemic Needed, Experts Say," reported the Washington Post.22 (One of the
experts quoted was the outspoken Michael Osterholm.)
A particular problem routinely focused on was the lack of an effective vaccine. "Here we go again. With
flu season approaching-and an even bigger bird-flu threat brewing-this country's creaking vaccine
system is falling apart," the San Francisco Chronicle editorialized in June 2005 after influenza vaccine
manufacturer Chiron again announced that it would not meet production targets by around 30 million
doses." "Last year was a good time to make repairs. ... But nothing changed." And now, they wrote,
"there is another unknown in the picture," referring to H5N1, "meaning a powerful new disease may
come our way. ... The old methods and lax public-health planning argue no. It's time to fix an ailing
system before the flu bug arrives."
Complaints of a "creaky," antiquated and fragile vaccine production process based on technology now
decades old was central to the argument that government must do something to protect the public.
"Today we're using a human vaccine with one slight change to it, and an important change, but it's
basically the same basic vaccine we used in the 1950s, 1960s, a vaccine that was common when we used
a slide rule as the state of the art for mathematical calculations, and today we use the computer,"2 4
Osterholm explained at the 2005 Council on Foreign Relations discussion panel. At its fastest, the
production cycle takes six months from the initial isolation of a wild influenza virus to initial vials of
vaccine.2 Even under the best circumstances, most assumed that a vaccine would never arrive in time
to prevent worldwide spread of a novel virus.
And even if the production timeline could be shortened, other problems remained. One in particular,
was the lack of capacity to produce enough vaccines for the presumed global demand. In 2005, the
worldwide market for influenza vaccines had grown to around 300 million doses per year, the largest it
had ever been, but still far short of the roughly 6 billion inhabitants of the world which the World Health
21 Ibid.
2 David Brown, "World Not Set To Deal With Flu: Strategy for Pandemic Needed, Experts Say," The Washington
Post, July 31, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/30/AR2005073001429.html, (accessed July 10, 2011).
23 "Flu vaccines need a shot," San Francisco Chronicle, June 17, 2005, http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-06-
17/opinion/17379408_1_vaccine-doses-vaccine-supply-flu, (accessed July 10, 2011).
Council of Foreign Relations, "The Threat of Global Pandemics."
2s John Treanor, "Weathering the Influenza Vaccine Crisis," N EnglJ Med 351, no. 20 (November 11, 2004): 2037-
2040; W. Wayt Gibbs and Christine Soares, "Preparing for a Pandemic," Scientific American, November 2005, 58.
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Organization assumed would all want to obtain vaccine. Furthermore, "unlike seasonal influenza
epidemics caused by viruses that mutate in small but important ways from year to year ... pandemic
influenza is caused by a virus that is dramatically different from those that have circulated
previously..."26 This-and studies on candidate H5N1 vaccines-led many researchers to assume that
not one, but two doses, of vaccine would be needed in order to elicit a sufficient immune response. The
challenge of meeting such a hypothetical demand was enormous.
From inaction to action
Throughout 2005, medical journals, leaders in public health, and the mainstream press repeatedly
chastised political leaders for the inadequacy of their response to the threat of pandemic influenza and
attempted to raise concern among the broader American public. By mid-to-late 2005, those efforts
were bearing fruit, as pandemic influenza came to occupy a firm spot on the political agenda. Politicians
now were part of the community advocating the need for immediate action.
On October 4, thirty-two Democratic senators co-authored a letter to President Bush explaining their
"grave concern that the national is dangerously unprepared for the serious threat of avian influenza." 27
But concern about pandemic influenza was not limited to one political party. On the same day, Bush
himself held a press conference where he emphasized the avian influenza threat, discussed the difficult
decisions that would have to be made during a pandemic, and raised the issue of whether the military
might be helpful in responding to a pandemic virus. According to Bush, the military was "able to plan
and move. So that's why I put it on the table. I think it's an important debate for Congress to have." 28
Months earlier, he had signed Executive Order 13375 which amended the Public Health Service Act and
added "influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential
to cause, a pandemic" to the list of quarantinable diseases. 29
It is not surprising that isolation and quarantine were put on the pandemic influenza agenda. They were
some of the many techniques employed to address the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak in 2003. Indeed, as part of the classic repertoire of public health interventions, many credit
the quick end of SARS to the successful use of isolation, quarantine, and reporting.30 Others, however,
challenge the role quarantine played in stopping SARS, and question its ethical basis.3' Many think
26 Anthony S Fauci, "Pandemic influenza threat and preparedness," Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, no. 1 (January
2006): 73.
27 Gardiner Harris, "Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington," The New York Times, October 5, 2005.
2 George Bush, "Transcript of President Bush's Press Conference", October 4, 2005,
http://www.washi ngtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/04/AR2005100400584_pf.htm1, (accessed
August 27, 2010).
29 George Bush, "Executive Order 13375 of April 1, 2005: Amendment to Executive Order 13295 Relating to
Certain Influenza Viruses and Quarantinable Communicable Diseases," Federal Register 70, no. 64 (April 5,
2005): 17299.
30 Washer, Emerging Infectious Diseases and Society, 106; Matthew K Wynia, "Ethics and public health
emergencies: restrictions on liberty," American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 2 (February 2007): 2.
31 Richard Schabas, "Severe acute respiratory syndrome: Did quarantine help?" 15, no. 4 (2004): 204-204; George J.
Annas, "Terrorism, Torture and other Post 9/11 Epidemics: Must We Sacrifice Human Rights in the Name of
Security?" (presented at the First Biennial Seminar on Human Rights and Bioethics, Fundagio Lusco-Americana,
Lisboa, June 2, 2005), http://www.ensp.unl.pt/dispositivos-de-apoio/cdi/cdi/sector-de-
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Americans would be unlikely to even comply with quarantine, arguing that it is fundamentally
incompatible with the American ethic of "rugged individualism."32 Regardless of its potential efficacy,
however, influenza is a disease known to spread rapidly and quarantine has historically never stopped
an epidemic of influenza. Consequently, the best that experts in public health could hope for was for
quarantine to help slow spread of the disease, thereby mitigating its overall impact.33
Bush discussed other ways in which he was addressing the threat:
... during my meetings at the United Nations, not only did I speak about it publicly, I
spoke about it privately to as many leaders as I could find, about the need for there to
be awareness, one, of the issue and two, reporting -- rapid reporting to WHO, so that
we can deal with a potential pandemic. The reporting needs to be not only on the birds
that have fallen ill, but also on tracing the capacity of the virus to go from bird to person
to person. That's when it gets dangerous: when it goes bird, person, person.
"Thirdly, the development of a vaccine. I've spent time with Tony Fauci on the subject," Bush said,
referring to the director of the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and one of the
world's most respected public health officials. "So one of the issues is how do we encourage the
manufacturing capacity of the country, and maybe the world .... I take this issue very seriously ... The
people of the country ought to rest assured that we're doing everything we can." 34
Bush was also enlisting the support of nations abroad. In early October, the State Department hosted
more than 80 countries and eight international organizations for the inaugural conference of the
International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (IPAPI), aimed not only to rally political
leadership to address the pandemic threat, but to also establish a framework for the "increased
coordination and harmonization of preparedness, prevention, response, and containment activities
among nations" including achieving the rapid sharing of virus samples and epidemiological
information.3 s
At home and abroad, Michael Leavitt, Bush's new secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), was
also speaking out about the threat, trying to reassure the public that the White House was taking it
seriously. "Mr. Leavitt acknowledged in an interview that the United States was not prepared for a
pandemic flu outbreak," the New York Times noted prior to Leavitt's in-person visit to those southeast
Asian countries suffering the most cases of H5N1, but the U.S. had already purchased "millions of
courses" of antiviral treatment and was funding vaccine research that would ideally speed the creation
publicacoes/precario/publicacoesemcoedicao/conteudos-livros-pl/livro-1/02%20Annas.pdf, (accessed July 26,
2011); Wynia, "Ethics and public health emergencies."
3 Mark A. Rothstein, "Are traditional public health strategies consistent with contemporary American values,"
Temple Law Review 77 (2004): 190.
3 Howard Markel et al., "Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919
Influenza Pandemic," Journal of the American Medical Association 298, no. 6 (2007): 644 -654; U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan."
3 Bush, "Transcript of President Bush's Press Conference."
3s U.S. Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza", November 2005, 12.
36 Harris, "Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington."
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of new vaccines against the disease. Leavitt indicated the Bush administration would soon release a
comprehensive plan to combat pandemic influenza, including a request to Congress for funding in the
range of $6 billion to $10 billion.
That promise was fulfilled on November 1, when President Bush unveiled the "National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza" along with a request to congress for $7.1 billion. The National Strategy, authored
by the National Security Council, outlined three pillars of Preparedness and Communication,
Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Containment, and was meant to provide broad "strategic
advice" to federal agencies and departments. In a letter introducing the 17-page document, President
Bush wrote that, "While your government will do much to prepare for a pandemic, individual action and
individual responsibility are necessary for the success of any measures."38 To help manage the enormity
of the task, a "one stop" website was launched, www.PandemicFlu.gov.
The next day, the Department of Health and Human Services released its own Pandemic Influenza
Plan-a detailed, nearly 400-page document including ten appendices and 11 supplements covering
everything from planning assumptions, legal authorities, antiviral and vaccine distribution to surveillance
and laboratory diagnostic procedures. 39
At the international level, the United Nations accelerated its efforts to improve the global response to
pandemic influenza with the creation of a new position. In late September, 2005, the UN announced Dr.
David Nabarro to be its first Senior UN System Influenza Coordinator-better known as the "flu czar" in
the press.4 Operating with an initial budget of $2 million, Nabarro's office would help coordinate
efforts among UN agencies such as WHO and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), but also
include non-UN organizations such as the World Bank, the World Organization for Animal Health,
development banks, and NGOs like the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies. 41 In his inaugural speech, Nabarro stressed the urgency of the work: "I am certain that there
will be another influenza pandemic sometime." The UN press release announcing Nabarro's
appointment continued:
Health experts agreed that the long period of time since the last serious flu epidemic,
which had killed tens of millions of people in 1918-1919, meant the world was overdue
for another epidemic.
He [Nabarro] said the likelihood of the bird flu virus jumping into the human population
was generally thought by health officials to be high. "I'm not sure whether 'almost
certain' is the impression I'd like to have conveyed to you, but it does seem very likely
3 Ibid.
3 U.S. Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza."
39 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan."
40 "U.N. Flu Czar Warns of Coming Flu Pandemic," ABC News Online, September 29, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=1170432, (accessed September 9, 2010).
41 United Nations, "Press conference by UN System Senior Coordinator for avian, human influenza", September 29,
2005, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/050929_Nabarro.doc.htm, (accessed September 2, 2010).
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and it would be extremely wrong for me as a public health person to be ignoring this
threat.".
He [Nabarro] said that the number of deaths that would result from any pandemic
would depend on where the outbreak occurred, the speed with which health and
Government officials discovered the outbreak, the response initiatives and the quality of
these initiatives. Countries with limited health-care systems that could not care for
many ill people and that did not openly transfer information from the local to the
national levels would affect the final number of deaths. "I'm not, at the moment, at
liberty to give you a prediction on numbers, but I just want to stress, that, let's say, the
range of deaths could be anything from 5 to 150 million."4 2
Nabarro said that the world's efforts to prepare would determine whether the final death tally was
closer to the "5" or the "150" in that range. His predictions of mass casualties was reported worldwide.
The following week, fears of an impending catastrophic influenza pandemic would surge with front page
stories in the New York Times, 43 Boston Globe,4 4 Son Francisco Chronicle,'4 5 and Atlanta Journal-
Constitution,46 describing new research-simultaneously being published in Nature and Science 48-into
the great 1918 "Spanish flu" pandemic influenza virus, and linking it to avian influenza. The New York
Times story began, "The 1918 influenza virus, the cause of one of history's most deadly epidemics, has
been reconstructed and found to be a bird flu that jumped directly to humans, two teams of federal and
university scientists announced yesterday."
"This is huge, huge, huge," Professor John Oxford, an influenza virologist, commented about the
research. "It's a huge breakthrough." 49 The research-carried out by groups from the Armed Forces
Institute of Pathology, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and the CDC-involved recovering influenza
virus from a frozen corpse found in Alaska. It was the culmination of more than a decade of research.
Previously, only parts of the virus's genome were known, painstakingly recovered from pieces of
deceased American soldiers' lung tissue that had been preserved in an Army pathology warehouse. But
the October 6, 2005 publication reported the contents of the final three segments of the 1918 influenza
virus genome. Immediately, some claimed that "the researchers may have inadvertently handed
terrorists a potential weapon."5 0 But it was the researcher's conclusion that the 1918 virus was bird-like
42 Ibid.
43 Gina Kolata, "Experts unlock clues to spread of 1918 flu virus," New York Times, October 6, 2005, Late Edition -
Final edition.
44 Scott Allen, "Scientists re-create 1918 flu pandemic virus," The Boston Globe, October 6, 2005, 3rd edition, sec.
National/Foreign.
4s Sabin Russell, "Deadliest flu bug given new life in U.S. laboratory / Some applaud scientific feat, but others decry
move as reckless," San Francisco Chronicle, October 6, 2005.
46 M.A.J McKenna, "Deadly 1918 flu reborn for study," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 6, 2005.
4 Jeffery K. Taubenberger et al., "Characterization of the 1918 influenza virus polymerase genes," Nature 437, no.
7060 (October 6, 2005): 889-893.
48 Terrence M Tumpey et al., "Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus,"Science 310, no. 5745 (October 7, 2005): 77-80.
49 Kolata, "Experts unlock clues to spread of 1918 flu virus."
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that sent long-lasting reverberations through the press, which had been covering outbreaks of the highly
lethal avian influenza H5N1. The same day's Washington Post:
The strain of avian influenza virus that has led to the deaths of 140 million birds and 60
people in Asia in the past two years appears to be slowly acquiring genetic changes
typical of the "Spanish flu" virus that killed 50 million people nearly a century ago,
researchers said yesterday.
How far "bird flu" virus has traveled down the evolutionary path to becoming a
pandemic virus is unknown. Nor is it certain that the much-feared strain, designated as
influenza A/H5N1, will ever acquire all the genetic features necessary for rapid,
worldwide spread.
Nevertheless, the similarities between the Spanish flu virus of 1918 and the H5N1 strain
slowly spreading through Asia provide unusually concrete evidence of how dangerous
the newer virus is. At least four of its eight genes now contain mutations seen in the
deadly strain that circled the globe during and after World War 1.
"These H5N1 viruses might be acquiring the ability to adapt to humans, increasing their
pandemic risk ... there is a suggestion there may be some parallel evolution going on,"
said Jeffery K. Taubenberger, a molecular pathologist at the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology in Rockville.si
The British medical journal Lancet carried a similar message in an editorial:
Some of the ten aminoacid [sic] changes in the polymerase proteins that differentiate
the 1918 virus sequence from avian virus sequences have been found in the H5N1 strain
that has caused the deaths of 60 human beings so far. So, the fear that the H5N1 virus
might adapt further to facilitate human infection and human-to-human transmission,
that it might be the precursor of a new influenza pandemic, is no longer far-fetched
speculation.s2
"Without these measures," the Lancet concluded, referring to its call for strong national and regional
leadership, transparency, and research, "what is already looking like an inevitable influenza pandemic
may be as deadly as that which struck in 1918." (Half a year later, Nature published on its website two
letters5 3 critical of the conclusion that the reconstructed 1918 virus was avian in origin: "We do not
believe that this conclusion, which has been widely disseminated in the popular press and in scientific
si David Brown, "Changes Cited in Bird Flu Virus," The Washington Post, October 6, 2005,
http://www.washi ngtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/05/AR2005100501098_pff.html, (accessed
September 10, 2010).
S2 The Lancet, "A threatening influenza pandemic," The Lancet 366, no. 9494 (October 15, 2005): 1331.
s3 Janis Antonovics, Michael E Hood, and Christi Howell Baker, "Molecular virology: was the 1918 flu avian in
origin?," Nature 440, no. 7088 (April 27, 2006): E9; discussion E9-10; Mark J Gibbs and Adrian J Gibbs, "Molecular
virology: was the 1918 pandemic caused by a bird flu?," Nature 440, no. 7088 (April 27, 2006): E8; discussion E9-
10.
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journals, is supported by their phylogenetic evidence," Janis Antonovics and colleagues from the
University of Virginia wrote in one of the letters. Their criticism, highlighting the lack of certainty over
the virus's true origins, however did not get similar press attention.)
The intense media coverage of avian and pandemic influenza in late 2005 seems to have had an effect
on the larger society as well. "As the potential for an influenza pandemic has galvanized the medical
community and the public into action, physicians and patients alike have been heartened by the
availability of effective antiviral drugs," 54 a doctor wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine. In the
public discussion of pandemic influenza, Tamiflu was always the drug of choice. Two classes of antiviral
drugs existed to treat influenza infections-neuraminidase inhibitors (which included Tamiflu) and
adamantanes. Adamantanes, however, were generally thought to be ineffective against avian influenza
H5N1 because of viral resistance, and additionally had well known central nervous system toxicities
associated with their use.55 Attention fell to neuraminidase inhibitors, and among these, Tamiflu ruled
the market, likely because of its ease of administration and storage.56 (Tamiflu can be taken orally while
its competitor, Relenza, must be inhaled through a special device.) In 2003, oseltamivir was added to
the United States' Strategic National Stockpile.5 7 But while the government was stockpiling Tamiflu for
use during a pandemic, citizens were taking action into their own hands. According to another report in
New England Journal of Medicine, "So much oseltamivir (Tamiflu) has been prescribed - presumably for
personal stockpiling in case of an avian influenza pandemic, given that the human influenza season has
not yet begun - that at the end of October, the drug's manufacturer stopped shipping it to the United
States."5 8 In fact, in an analysis published a few years later, it turned out that Tamiflu prescriptions
peaked in October/November 2005, before the influenza virus was circulating that year, but coinciding
exactly with intense media coverage of pandemic and avian influenza.59 Experts feared the public,
acting on its own, would improperly use the drug, possibly leading to viruses resistant to the
60 ' ermedication. Such fears strengthened the perceived importance of the drug as well as the sense of
vulnerability to the threat of pandemic influenza.
s4 Anne Moscona, "Oseltamivir Resistance - Disabling Our Influenza Defenses," The New England Journal of
Medicine 353, no. 25 (December 22, 2005): 2633-2636.
ss U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "DRAFT Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan",
August 2004, Annex 1, page 15,
http://web.archive.org/web/20041016003906/http://www.dhhs.gov/nvpo/pandemicplan/finalpandemiccore.pdf,
(accessed July 5, 2010).
s6 Tom Jefferson et al., "Possible harms of oseltamivir--a call for urgent action," Lancet 374, no. 9698 (October 17,
2009): 1312-1313.
s7 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "DRAFT Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan,"
4.
s8 Allan S. Brett and Abigail Zuger, "The Run on Tamiflu - Should Physicians Prescribe on Demand?," New England
Journal of Medicine 353, no. 25 (December 22, 2005): 2636-2637.
59 Justin R Ortiz et al., "Oseltamivir prescribing in pharmacy-benefits database, United States, 2004-2005,"
Emerging Infectious Diseases 14, no. 8 (August 2008): 1280-1283.
60 Marc Lipsitch et al., "Antiviral Resistance and the Control of Pandemic Influenza," PLoS Med 4, no. 1 (January 23,
2007): e15.
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Agreement all around
A remarkable feature of the intense interest in H5N1 and pandemic influenza that had gathered by late
2005 was the degree of agreement and interest among a broad range of sectors. Political leaders,
doctors, emergency responders, historians, virologists, business leaders, journalists, think tanks,
consulting companies, and concerned citizens on the internet were all fundamentally in agreement that
pandemic influenza posed a major, global threat. Some saw it as a threat to the public's health. Others
characterized it as a threat to national security. Still others saw the grave implications for diplomacy
and international relations. That pandemic influenza was a major threat was not debated; the only
question was how best to prepare.
The momentum that existed in late 2005 was all the more remarkable because the broad and highly
publicized interest was unprecedented. For years, members of the public health community had been
arguing for the need to prepare. "Historical records suggest that another pandemic of influenza is
overdue," the renowned avian influenza virologist Robert Webster wrote in 1994.61 But only until
human cases of avian influenza H5N1 became widely known and publicized did political will develop to
put substantial public funding behind the effort. For those in the influenza community, H5N1 was
evidence of a conclusion that had been reached long before this particular virus surfaced and began to
infect humans: that the next influenza pandemic was, to quote the FDA and CDC in a joint paper
delivered in 1995, "an event considered by most experts to be inevitable."62 Indeed, the National
Institutes of Health held an international conference, "Pandemic Influenza: Confronting a Re-emergent
Threat" in December 1995 in Bethesda, Maryland, to gather experts in an attempt come up with ideas
for how reduce morbidity, mortality, and social disruption in the event of a pandemic. At the meeting,
members of the U.S. Federal Working Group on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Emergency
Response circulated a draft pandemic preparedness plan, a joint effort between the CDC, FDA, as well as
the U.S. military. Meetings in conjunction with the plan were held with a vast range of actors at the
international, national, state, and local level-medical, volunteer, and trade organizations; national
advisory committees, consumer groups, the World Health Organization, and foreign ministries or
departments of health. "Extensive input from the pharmaceutical industry has also been actively
solicited to address and overcome a series of problems that emerged during the 1976 swine influenza
,,631 hmvaccination program. In a theme familiar to the discussion of avian influenza in 2005, University of
Michigan professor of epidemiology Dr. Arnold Monto and colleagues from the NIH wrote in 1997 that,
"The scope of action requires international cooperation among government agencies, international
organizations, and the vaccine and pharmaceutical companies."
While this group of influenza experts that convened in Bethesda, Maryland in late 1995 was convinced
of the threat of pandemic influenza, the broader public health community took time to win over. A
nationwide survey conducted by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists in 1995, for
6 R G Webster, "While awaiting the next pandemic of influenza," BMJ 309, no. 6963 (November 5, 1994): 1179-
1180.
6 P A Patriarca and N J Cox, "Influenza pandemic preparedness plan for the United States," The Journal of
Infectious Diseases 176 Suppl 1 (August 1997): S4.
63 Ibid.
Page 75
Pandemic Influenza: Marketing Catastrophe
instance, found that most state and local public health agencies had no plan for managing an influenza
pandemic, and only 59% of states even perceived a need to develop one." To forward the goal of
comprehensive pandemic preparedness, formal funding mechanisms were developed within CDC.
Meetings between CDC and state and local health departments were held, and creation of a draft
document, "Pandemic Influenza, a Planning Guide for States and Local Officials." It was hoped that by
sharing the planning guide with state and local health departments, these officials would come to
understand the need for preparedness, and begin to take concrete steps in that direction, including
"marketing the plan to appropriate partners to obtain the necessary support for implementing the
plan..."65 With some seed money, six sites around the country pilot tested the draft guidelines. Using
the lessons learned from that experience, in 1999, four states were initially selected to receive funding
to produce their own state level pandemic influenza plans. In 2000, a second wave of states was chosen
to do the same.
In Europe, planning for pandemics was progressing apace. In 1997, less than two years after the US
began first circulating its draft pandemic plan, Britain's health department published its own.66 At the
World Health Organization in Geneva, an international meeting was convened in February 1999 to
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of influenza surveillance at WHO. Here, the WHO released a
draft copy of its first "Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan" to participants of the meeting.67 The
WHO plan had been drafted in collaboration with the European Scientific Group on Influenza (ESWI), 6' a
"multidisciplinary group of key opinion leaders"69 founded in 1992, to promote the study of influenza.
ESWI is a group supported by industry, "but has strict scientific independence," an ESWI influenza
bulletin explained in 1999, listing sponsorship from Chiron Vaccines, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, Glaxo
Wellcome, Medeva Pharma Ltd, Pasteur Merieux MSD, SmithKline Beecham Biologicals and Solvay
Pharmaceuticals. 70
The themes of ESWI were similar to those in American influenza circles, a perhaps unsurprising fact
given the many professional connections between the American and European influenza communities.
In a 1999 paper, ESWI members Rene Snacken (Belgium), Lars Haaheim (Norway), John Wood (UK) and
American ESWI advisor Alan Kendal (formerly of the Influenza Branch at CDC) asked, "One year after
concerns were raised in Hong Kong about another influenza pandemic, are we really much further along
in establishing the most effective early warning systems and developing the ability to deal with a true
6 Kathleen Gensheimer, "Influenza pandemic planning: review of a collaborative state and national process,"
International Congress Series 1219 (October 2001): 734.
65 Ibid.
6 R T White, "When the next influenza pandemic comes," BMJ 315, no. 7102 (July 26, 1997): 204.
6 Daniel Lavanchy, "World Health Organization, 50 years of influenza surveillance: a challenge for the 21st century
Meeting 17-19 February 1999, WHO, Geneva," Vaccine 20 Suppl 2 (May 15, 2002): S1.
6 R Snacken, "Pandemic planning," Vaccine 20 Suppl 2 (May 15, 2002): S88.
69 European Scientific Working group on Influenza, "About ESWI", 2010, http://www.eswi.org/who-are-we/about-
eswi, (accessed May 10, 2010).
70 European Scientific Working group on Influenza, "Influenza: information and news on influenza", November
1999, 8, http://www.eswi.org/modulefiles/publications/pdfs/no-11-april-19 99 .pdf, (accessed October 5, 2010).
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pandemic?" The authors were pessimistic. "Without increased urgency about this matter, the next
pandemic will find most of the world unprepared.""
The lessons of 1976
Despite the pleas of those in the influenza community in both the US and Europe, there was a significant
but still an unbalanced approach to pandemic preparedness during the 1990s. While many in the public
health sector were becoming convinced of the threat, there remained a serious lack of interest from the
political sector which, it could be expected, would ultimately have to appropriate money for any major
changes to take place. But since the events of 1976, politicians were wary of predictions from their
scientific advisors, especially those about epidemics of influenza. In 1976, at the behest of the CDC, the
US had embarked on its most ambitious vaccination program ever, aiming to vaccinate the entire
population against swine flu over a period of just a few months in response to a disease that was
predicted might appear sometime that winter, but was acknowledged may not appear.
The story of 1976 begins with a death. A young Army recruit, in training during a cold January winter,
refused hospitalization after a bout of respiratory illness and went on an overnight hike. He died. Many
others had been sick on the Fort Dix, New Jersey Army training center, with a large number of soldiers
reporting respiratory illness, but a laboratory investigation revealed that Fort Dix was not simply
suffering from the Victoria strain of influenza virus (a well-known virus that had been circulating for
some years). With support from the CDC, it was determined that other cases of influenza were being
caused by a new, significantly different swine-origin virus-and most worryingly, the new virus was
isolated from a culture taken from the dead man.
The CDC response was swift. More detailed investigations were undertaken leading to the conclusion
that the new virus had achieved limited human to human spread within the Fort Dix site, but not
elsewhere. The reason for the virus's disappearance, as sudden as its arrival, was unknown, but
suggested the possibility that the virus might re-emerge in the following winter. As the CDC debated the
best way to react, it could not dismiss the possibility-however small-that unless precautions were
taken, the nation would experience a brutal epidemic of influenza later that year. The virus that killed
the young man at Fort Dix was not just a new strain of familiar virus, but an antigenically shifted
influenza virus, differing in both of its (hemagglutinin and neuraminidase) surface proteins, and a similar
virus had not circulated for decades, leading to the assessment that "the entire U.S. population under
the age of 50 is probably susceptible to this new virus."73 Furthermore, as Neustadt and Fineberg noted
in their detailed study of the vaccination campaign, "in 1976, it was assumed by leading experts that
pandemics follow antigenic shifts as night from day."74 Most alarmingly, perhaps, was the swine-like
nature of the virus. In 1976, it was widely believed that the great 1918 pandemic was caused by a swine
virus, and while most thought it less than probable, the possibility of a repeat 1918 experience was not
taken lightly.
71 Snacken et al., "The next influenza pandemic," 201.
7 Richard E Neustadt and Harvey V Fineberg, The epidemic that never was: policy-making and the swine flu scare,
1st ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 17-22.
73 Memorandum dated March 18, 1976, from Assistant Secretary for Health to Secretary of Health, in Ibid., 198.
74bid., 18.
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The CDC held a series of meetings to discuss possible responses. If swift action were taken, the CDC
reasoned, vaccine production and administration in the general population might just be accomplishable
before the virus returned. On the other hand, if the virus did not return, the CDC would be accused of
crying wolf. "There was nothing in this for CDC except trouble," one CDC officer recalled.7 s
A 1977 report of the General Accounting Office summarized:
Faced with the possibility of an epidemic that could cost many lives and billions of
dollars and offered a chance to prevent it, the Department Of Health, Education, and
Welfare planned, and the Congress approved, the $135 million swine flu program. The
decision to proceed with the program was based primarily on scientific evidence that an
epidemic could scourge the Nation and that the health care system could carryout the
mass immunizations.76
The anticipated epidemic, however, never materialized. In fact, not a single additional case of the swine
flu virus was found during the following influenza season. Nonetheless, around 45 million Americans
were vaccinated before the program was prematurely terminated after highly publicized cases of death
and a debilitating neurological condition called Guillain-Barre syndrome occurred following vaccination.
The episode-referred to by critics as the "Swine Flu Fiasco" (the title of a December 1976 article in the
New York Times7 )-has been the subject of numerous histories. 1976 was an election year, and in the
early days of the new Carter presidency, the incoming secretary of Health and Human Services Joseph
Califano commissioned two Harvard professors, Richard Neustadt, a political scientist, and Harvey
Fineberg, a doctor and expert in public health policy, to study the experience for lessons to be learned.
In their report, the authors highlighted an important sociological dimension to the response. Public
health authorities' robust response to the 1976 H1N1 virus was in part driven by a professional desire to
show the world the importance of public health and power of preventative medicine. Health officials
had not delivered vaccines in time for the 1957 "Asian flu" pandemic, but early detection of the 1976
virus offered public health a valuable chance to redeem itself.78 Neustadt and Fineberg's report faulted
specialists, however, for their "overconfidence ... in theories spun from meager evidence," and
"insufficient questioning of scientific logic."79
Nonetheless, the accused have defended their decisions. Reflecting on the swine flu vaccination
program which cost him his job as director of the CDC, Dr. David Sencer said he had made the right
choices, and regretted how the media came to portray the effort as one of politics, "rather than a public
health response to a possible catastrophe."
7s Ibid., 24.
U.S. General Accounting Office, The Swine Flu Program: An Unprecedented Venture In Preventive Medicine,
Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, June 27, 1977, i.
77 Harry Schwartz, "Swine Flu Fiasco," New York Times, December 21, 1976.
Neustadt and Fineberg, The epidemic that never was, 20.
79Ibid., 12.
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When lives are at stake, it is better to err on the side of overreaction than
underreaction. Because of the unpredictability of influenza, responsible public health
leaders must be willing to take risks on behalf of the public. This requires personal
courage and a reasonable level of understanding by the politicians to whom these public
health leaders are accountable. All policy decisions entail risks and benefits: risks or
benefits to the decision maker; risks or benefits to those affected by the decision. In
1976, the federal government wisely opted to put protection of the public first.80
The dramatic end to the United States' most highly publicized and largest vaccination program cast a
chilling effect on the relationship between health officials, politicians, and the public. Those in
government felt misled. The public became skeptical and suspicious. Consequently, public health lost
credibility amongst its two more important constituencies. No matter what health officials might have
felt about the science of pandemics and the inevitability of a pandemic in the years following 1976, it
would take years for the scars from the swine flu program to heal.
But a number of events in the early 1990s set the stage for a renewed interest in influenza.
The new world of "emerging infectious diseases"
The swine flu affair of 1976 was, in a sense, anachronistic. It occurred near the end of an era of
continuous triumphs in medicine leading to the impression the end of infectious diseases was in sight.
Historical plagues like cholera, typhus, malaria, and yellow fever, were becoming less and less of a
problem. Health, itself, was being reconceptualized. In 1978, the Declaration of Alma Ata emphasized
primary health care and "health for all." Alma Ata changed the goal of international health from one of
simply preventing the transmission of disease between states to a redefined role in which eliminating
the inequalities in health status of people around the world became "common concern to all
countries."81 The old emphasis which international health regulations placed on stopping inter-state
transmission of infectious disease was losing relevancy as infectious disease itself appeared on its way
out. In perhaps the most symbolic moment, the WHO-led global campaign to eradicate smallpox ended
in a declared victory in 1980. For the first time in history, modern medicine could claim the complete
conquest of a disease. (Samples of the virus were, however, purposely kept for research purposes by
the US and Russian governments. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the location and
distribution of those samples remains a topic of considerable concern.83)
80 David J Sencer and J Donald Millar, "Reflections on the 1976 swine flu vaccination program," Emerging Infectious
Diseases 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 29-33.
8 International Conference on Primary Health Care, "Declaration of Alma-Ata", September 12, 1978,
http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declarationalmaata.pdf, (accessed October 7, 2010).
82 The second time came just months ago, with the declared worldwide eradication of rinderpest in cattle. See
Anders Kelto, "The Eradication of Rinderpest", June 28, 2011, http://www.theworld.org/2011/06/eradication-
rinderpest/, (accessed July 17, 2011).
83 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Breaking the Deadlock Over Destruction of the Smallpox Virus Stocks," Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science (January 2011): 110110114218037.
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By the late 1980s, however, the euphoria that once celebrated the "end of infectious diseases" had
dissipated. New problems arose, one after another, as diseases began to appear in unexpected ways. 4
AIDS was seen as incontrovertible proof of the devastation of novel infectious diseases-an
uncontrollable epidemic that threatened the entire world. Cholera, long out of the public's
consciousness, reappeared in 1991 in South America. Then, in 1994, an outbreak of plague-a disease
many associated with the fourteenth century Black Death in Europe-occurred in Surat, India.85 Just
one year later, an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in the Democratic Republic of Congo occurred-
but unlike previous outbreaks of Ebola, the 1995 outbreak was highly publicized.
The massive attention paid to these outbreaks helped heighten concerns over the developed world's
vulnerability to infectious disease from other (usually poor) countries.8 6 Concurrent with these events, a
new concept called "emerging infectious diseases" was gaining momentum following the publication of
a 1992 report by the United States' Institute of Medicine (IOM), entitled Emerging infections: microbial
threats to health in the United States. If the message of Alma Ata was one of interlinked responsibility,
the message of the outbreaks of the 1980s and 1990s and the IOM report was of interlinked risk: what
happened thousands of miles away was only a plane ride away from becoming a domestic terror.7
Those urging more attention to the problem of pandemic influenza understood the importance of the
IOM report. "The current change in approach has much to do with the recognition of the global danger
of emerging and reemerging microbial pathogens. In the report of the Institute of Medicine, influenza,
especially in its pandemic manifestation, was prominently used as a case requiring much more attention
than it has received in the past,"8 8 the influenza epidemiologist Arnold Monto wrote in 1997. The IOM
report "defines influenza virus as the prototype emerging infection,"89 another influenza researcher
explained.
Politicians were also responding to the changing sensitivities towards emerging threats. The release of
toxic sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995-wounding many and killing five-helped establish
"bioterrorism" on national security agendas across the world. If it happened there, it was argued, it
could happen anywhere.90 While influenza had been singled out as a prototype infection, a fear that
84 Bruce Jay Plotkin, "Mission possible: the future of the international health regulations," Temple International
and Comparative Law Journal 10 (1996): 503; David P. Fidler, "Germs, governance, and global public health in the
wake of SARS," The Journal of Clinical Investigation 113, no. 6 (March 2004): 800.
8s Philippe Calain, "Exploring the international arena of global public health surveillance," Health Policy and
Planning 22, no. 1 (December 2006): 4.
8 Plotkin, "Mission possible," 503-4; N Tomes, "The making of a germ panic, then and now," American Journal of
Public Health 90, no. 2 (February 2000): 191-198.
Nicholas B King, "The scale politics of emerging diseases," Osiris 19 (2004): 62-76.
8 Arnold S. Monto, Dominick A. lacuzio, and John R. La Montagne, "Pandemic Influenza-Confronting a Reemergent
Threat," The Journal of Infectious Diseases 176, no. 1 (August 1997): 51.
8 9 W. Paul Glezen, "Emerging infections: pandemic influenza," Epidemiologic Reviews 18, no. 1 (1996): 64.
90 Sarin is a toxic chemical, not biological agent. There is significant evidence that the group responsible for the
sarin attacks, Aum Shinrikyo, had also attempted and failed to weaponize anthrax, leading many to challenge the
degree to which terrorists can effectively deploy bioweapons. See U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating
Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism", October 20, 1999, 2,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00050t.pdf, (accessed July 10, 2011).
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modern societies were especially vulnerable to new (emerging) and old (reemerging) infectious
diseases, whether naturally occurring or deployed by terrorists, fueled a growing, more broad-based
effort to achieve "preparedness."
"Most of us believe our public health system has adequate resources to provide the network needed to
protect us from the dangers of epidemics and terrorism," Senator Lauch Faircloth of North Carolina
declared, opening a special Senate hearing on "Preparedness for Epidemics and Bioterrorism," on June
2, 1998. "This is simply not true. ... For those who feel we should just ignore the public health folks and
let law enforcement or the military take charge, I suggest you think again. The first sign of a deadly new
epidemic of serious terrorist attack is not going to be announced on the evening news. We're not going
to see a battleship pull up to our shores and offload a microbe army. It will simply start with a large
number of people falling ill and going to the doctor or emergency rooms in the area." 9' Michael
Osterholm, who testified on behalf of the American Society for Microbiology as an expert witness
arguing for sweeping reform, concurred: "... several expert committees, including one convened by the
Institute of Medicine, have concluded that the ability of the U.S. public health system and allied health
professionals to deal with emerging disease is in serious jeopardy." 92
Disease Diplomacy
If the US public health system was in serious jeopardy, the global situation was no more reassuring.
Historically, an international governance mechanism maintained by the WHO and known as the
International Health Regulations (IHR) coordinated states' behavior, aiming to limit the spread of disease
while inflicting the least damage to trade and commerce. But by the mid 1990s, the IHR were under fire.
International law scholar David Fidler wrote at the time that "most experts agree ... that the IHR have
failed badly because states routinely ignore the duties of notification and of limited response to disease
outbreaks in other states." 93 Indeed, when plague surfaced in Surat, India in 1994, the Indian
government first attempted (unsuccessfully) to hide the epidemic, in contravention to their obligations
under the IHR.94 As the epidemic grew in proportions, so, too, did fear. Dozens died and hundreds of
thousands fled the city, despite regular pronouncements that plague is readily treatable with
antibiotics.9
Even when the threat was plague, an old disease and against which the IHR were originally created, the
IHR were doing little to reduce the impact of epidemics. Of non-compliance, health law scholar
Lawrence Gostin wrote, "it is in a country's self-interest to overlook WHO recommendations and
91 Preparedness for Epidemics and Bioterrorism (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 2.
9 Ibid., 36.
93 David P. Fidler, "Mission impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases," Temple International and
Comparative Law Journal 10 (1996): 495.
94 Simon Carvalho and Mark Zacher, "The International Health Regulations in Historical Perspective", July 28, 1999,
13.
95 John F. Burns, "Thousands Flee Indian City in Deadly Plague Outbreak," The New York Times, September 24,
1994; Manas Dasgupta, "Fear of 'plague' Haunts Surat," The Hindu, August 25, 2006; D T Dennis, "Plague in India,"
BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 309, no. 6959 (October 8, 1994): 893-894.
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regulations. Rule compliance may risk national prestige, travel, trade, and tourism."9" But the impact of
non-compliance was changing in nature. While disease notification remained, according to the IHR, the
onus of states, new technologies such as the Internet were by the mid 1990s, making it ever more
difficult to hide epidemics. A WHO report in 1995 noted that, "in this age of wide media coverage,
nothing can be hidden."97 Aware of this explosion in information, the WHO in 1997 began to data mine
the news and Internet looking for signs of outbreaks of disease.98 It designed the Global Public Health
Intelligence Network (GPHIN), a tool to search websites, news wires, bulletin boards, and other
electronic media for real-time coverage of events and potential early warning signs of disease outbreaks
and other public health threats. Such a capability meant that the WHO's reliance on governments to
voluntarily notify them of outbreaks was lessened.
Technical advantage, however, had its limits. The WHO remained frustrated by the lack of any formal
mechanism for incorporating such information into their advisory process. The IHR required States to
report disease outbreaks happening on their territories to the WHO; no formal mechanisms permitted
the WHO to act on intelligence gathering done on its own. As such, the value of non-States sources was
diminished.
The IHR was also proving inadequate in another fundamental way: it failed to limit states from imposing
excessive measure on world traffic and trade. If states did not abide by the Regulations and imposed
trade or travel restricting measures in excess of what was perceived to be warranted, the IHR was failing
in fulfilling its core mission to limit the spread of disease while imparting the least possible disruption to
world traffic.
For all these reasons, WHO in 1995 called for a radical revision of the IHR. 99 Simultaneously noting the
necessity of international health regulations and the failure of the then current IHR (passed in 1981),100
WHO argued that the successful control of infectious disease was no longer possible by simply reacting
to diseases that had already broken out. Effective control of infectious diseases required a more
forward-looking approach capable of preempting outbreaks, finding and containing diseases before they
erupted into cross-border epidemics. And WHO saw itself as central to this effort: "Public health
emergencies require a measured and evidence-based response from a credible third party," the
96 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Ronald Bayer, and Amy L. Fairchild, "Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats," Journal of the American
Medical Association 290, no. 24 (December 2003): 3236; L. 0. Gostin, "International Infectious Disease Law:
Revision of the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations," Journal of the American Medical
Association 291, no. 21 (June 2004): 2626.
97 Quoted in David P. Fidler, "From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New
International Health Regulations," Chinese Journal of international Law 4, no. 2 (September 2005): 346.
98 David P. Fidler, SARS: Governance and the Globalization of Disease (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 67.
99 World Health Assembly, "Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations", May 12, 1995.
100 Obijiofor Aginam, "Globalization of Infectious Diseases, International Law and the World Health Organization:
Opportunities for Synergy in Global Governance of Epidemics," New England Journal of International and
Comparative Law 11, no. 1 (2004): 67.
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Organization wrote, "and under its United Nations constitution WHO is well placed to perform this
function."101 But without revision of the IHR, the WHO was limited in its ability to take a proactive role.
In 2003, however, acting without legal justification, WHO displayed its ability to act as conductor in the
global response to an novel emerging infection-SARS. On March 12, 2003, the WHO issued "a global
alert about cases of atypical pneumonia," 10 2 its first such alert in 10 years. The report, based on
information gained from unofficial channels, described the WHO's effort to confirm a suspected
outbreak of severe pneumonia in several areas in Southeast Asia. Later, it was revealed that much of
this information came from private doctors in China and media reports-sources of information that the
WHO had no legal basis for using.103 Furthermore, it is unclear on what legal basis the WHO was initially
involving itself in a disorder not subject to the three notifiable diseases of the IHR (cholera, plague, and
yellow fever).0  While the WHO had involved itself in initiatives on diseases not on the IHR list (e.g.
polio), the role WHO assumed during SARS was one of facilitating multilateral coordination-a
cornerstone of IHR's purpose. Perhaps most surprising was the WHO's decision to declare travel
advisories for Toronto, Beijing, and Shanxi Province (China). Nothing in the then-current IHR nor the
WHO constitution granted WHO such a mandate, 105 and "such geographically specific travel advisories
were historically unprecedented." 06
Confrontation ensued, and governments protested. Toronto officials were especially vocal and opposed
to the WHO decision. And while other governments such as the United States showed support of the
Canadian opposition in WHO meetings the next year, 108 dissent was limited and ultimately ineffective, as
WHO remained largely in charge of the SARS response. Focus instead remained on fighting SARS and
bringing an end to the epidemic. As timing would have it, the US Institute of Medicine had just
completed another study'0 9 on the threat of infectious disease outbreaks, a successor to its 1992
landmark report Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States, which had
predicted outbreaks like SARS. The SARS outbreak seemed to be proof of the IOM panel's effort, and
experts seized the moment. "National borders offer little impediment to such threats," declared IOM
101 World Health Organization, "Global Crises - Global Solutions: Managing public health emergencies of
international concern through the revised International Health Regulations", 2002, 3,
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/WHOCDSCSRGAR_2002.4.pdf, (accessed July 10, 2011).
102 World Health Organization, "WHO issues a global alert about cases of atypical pneumonia", March 12, 2003,
http://www.who.int/csr/sarsarchive/2003_03_12/en/, (accessed July 10, 2011).
103 Fidler, "Germs, governance, and global public health in the wake of SARS," 801.
4 Later, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution that urged Member States to report SARS cases to
WHO. See World Health Assembly, "Revision of the International Health Regulations (Provisional agenda item
14.16)", May 17, 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/WHA56-48.pdf, (accessed July 10, 2011).
10s Fidler, "Germs, governance, and global public health in the wake of SARS," 801.
106 Gostin, Bayer, and Fairchild, "Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome," 3231.
107 National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, "Learning from SARS: Renewal ofPublic Health in
Canada", October 2003, 35, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/sars-sras/pdf/sars-e.pdf, (accessed July 10,
2011); Allison Dunfield, "WHO Warning Sparks Outrage," The Globe and Mail, April 23, 2003; Allison Dunfield and
Oliver Moore, "WHO Travel Warning Draws Fiery Response," The Globe and Mail, April 23, 2003.
108 Stephanie Nebehay, "U.S. Urges WHO to Go Softly on Travel Alerts," Reuters Health E-Line, January 22, 2004.
109 Mark S. Smolinski, Margaret A. Hamburg, and Joshua Lederberg, eds., Microbial threats to health: emergence,
detection, and response (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003), xiii.
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panel co-chair Margaret Hamburg (now director of the Food and Drug Administration). "One nation's
problem soon can become every nation's problem."" 0 CDC Director Julie Gerberding emphasized the
same points, appealing to what historian Nicholas King has called a "scalar narrative," describing the
way in which single and limited disease outbreak events in remote areas of the world were made into
pressing concerns demanding international attention and intervention."' "We must recognize these are
global problems that require global solutions,"" 2 Gerberding told a Senate committee hearing. "The
emergence of SARS, a previously unrecognized microbial threat, has provided a strong reminder of the
threat posed by emerging infectious diseases."" 3
The WHO's leadership and the rapid control of SARS have led many academics to describe the WHO's
handling of the disease as a major success, a "tipping point", and proof of a fundamental shift past
national sovereignty and into a "post-Westphalian" system of public health." When the epidemic was
declared over, little less than six months had passed before a new revamped draft of the prospective
IHR was released. Though the revision process had started nine years earlier, by 2004, the necessity of
revising the IHR was being increasingly justified on modern threats, seen as the proof of the very reason
the IHR was in need of overhaul. As WHO Director-General Dr. LEE Jong-wook stated in an address to
the international working group on the revised IHR, "Experience in recent years, especially with SARS
and avian influenza, has taught Member States and WHO a great deal about how to work together to
prevent and contain outbreaks. The revisions in the Regulations reflect that experience.""' The next
May, a radically new IHR was passed by the fifty-eight World Health Assembly in Geneva.
A growing concern
The SARS epidemic also revealed to policymakers the degree to which the effect of epidemics needed to
be thought of not simply in terms of the number of people sick or killed, but events gauged by their
social, political, and economic cost as well. The SARS outbreak is only known to have infected 8,096
people globally, but the response to it "temporarily transfixed the world and did extraordinary economic
damage in Canada, China, Hong Kong, and other countries,""16 the NIH's Anthony Fauci noted (with over
$18 billion in losses, according to the Asian Development Bank".). Nonetheless, SARS was hailed as the
triumph of a new public health concept. Fauci, continued:
110 Alicia Ault, "US unready for bioterror, disease outbreak - report," Reuters Health E-Line, March 18, 2003.
i King, "The scale politics of emerging diseases."
12 USA Today. 19 March 2003. PAGE D5. "Global problems require global solutions"
113 Julie L. Gerberding, "Testimony: Statement by Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., M.P.H. Director Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, HHS on CDC Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) before the The
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions United States Senate", April 7, 2003,
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t030407.html, (accessed July 10, 2011).
114 Fidler, "From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security," 343, 354; Fidler, SARS, 106.
us Jong-Wook Lee, "Intergovernmental Working Group on Revision of the International Health Regulations",
November 1, 2004, http://www.who.int/dg/lee/speeches/2004/ihrworkinggroup/en/index.html, (accessed July
10, 2011).
11 Anthony S Fauci, "Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases: the perpetual challenge," Academic Medicine
80, no. 12 (December 2005): 1079-1085.
11 Asian Development Bank, "Assessing the Impact and Cost of SARS in Developing Asia," in Asian Development
Outlook 2003 Update, 2003, 75, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2003/update/sars.pdf.
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SARS taught us an important lesson. Academic scientists, public health officials, and
pharmaceutical companies acted together in a way that was unprecedented, leading to
the development of promising vaccine candidates in record time. The new microbe was
identified in March 2003 and was rapidly sequenced; a vaccine was developed by the
following March. In December 2004, a clinical trial of the SARS vaccine began. This likely
was the fastest time frame in the history of biomedical research from the identification
of a previously unknown microbe to the beginning of a clinical trial. Such rapid progress
could not have occurred 30 to 40 years ago. 118
Though no influenza pandemic had occurred in the decade since the IOM's 1992 Emerging Infectious
report highlighting the danger of emerging infectious diseases, events over the decade-concerns over
bioterrorism, followed by the experience of SARS, and the discovery of a new and extremely deadly
avian influenza virusH5N1-resulted in a substantial and growing diversity of stakeholders interested in
responding to a future pandemic of influenza.
Then, in late August, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf of Mexico coast. In New Orleans, a
majority of the city was submerged by water after the levee system failed. Tens of thousands of people
were displaced, thousands went "missing," and over a thousand lost their life. Many more, and
overwhelmingly poor and black, were left in the city, unable to leave. Federal agencies such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency were the subject of investigations after coming under severe
criticism for failure to anticipate and respond to the crisis. Furthermore, top Bush administration
officials, including the President and Vice President, had been on vacation during the early days of the
crisis, despite-it was later learned-being briefed that the New Orleans' levee system might fail." 9
Katrina carried many messages, but one of them was that natural disasters were real, that they can
affect the United States, and that they can be extremely costly-in human lives, in economic dollars, and
(as the Bush administration was forced to learn) politically. No more than a couple of months had
passed before links would be made connecting Katrina to influenza: "Health officials have warned for
years that a virulent bird flu could kill millions of people, but few in Washington have seemed alarmed.
After a closed-door briefing last week, however, fear of an outbreak swept official Washington, which
was still reeling from the poor response to Hurricane Katrina," the New York Times wrote.120 By
proactively responding to the next impending threat-avian influenza-the Bush administration hoped
to turn around its image. m "Pandemic preparedness" soon became a household term as media
coverage grew nearly 10-fold.m
Fauci, "Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases."
119 "New Orleans in Peril," The New York Times, August 31, 2005, sec. Opinion,
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/opinion/31wedl.html, (accessed July 27, 2011); Roger Simon, "A heck of a
job," U.S. News & World Report, September 12, 2005,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/050912/12simon.htm, (accessed July 26, 2011).
Harris, "Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington."
121 Bernard Wysocki Jr., "U.S. Sees Need to Better Prepare Against Avian Flu," Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2005.
m Trust for America's Health, "Covering the Pandemic Flu Threat: tracking articles and some key events: 1997 to
2005", May 2006, http://heathyamericans.org/reports/flumedia/CoveringReport.pdf, (accessed October 7, 2010).
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Preparing for the Inevitable Disaster
The ubiquity of the word "pandemic" today obscures the way in which its meaning crystallized in the
mid 2000s amidst concern over H5N1, and rapidly became a shorthand to represent a rare but inevitable
catastrophic outbreak of influenza. In 1976, when US health officials feared what today we would call a
"pandemic" of influenza, a term often used to describe the threat was simply a possible "epidemic." In
a leaflet distributed by the US Public Health Service in 1976, it wrote:
With the vast majority of Americans being susceptible to swine flu, it is possible that
there could be an epidemic this winter. No one can say for sure. However, if an
epidemic were to break out, millions of people could get sick. 2 1
In 2006, by contrast, officials had come to describe "epidemics" of influenza as important but to be
expected, part of the year in and year out impact of the virus. "Pandemics" on the other hand, the CDC
explained in a document Pandemic Flu: Key Facts, are exceptional:
An influenza pandemic is a global outbreak of disease that occurs when a new influenza
A virus appears or "emerges" in the human population, causes serious illness, and then
spreads easily from person to person worldwide. Pandemics are different from seasonal
outbreaks or "epidemics" of influenza. Seasonal outbreaks are caused by subtypes of
influenza viruses that already circulate among people, whereas pandemic outbreaks are
caused by new subtypes, by subtypes that have never circulated among people, or by
subtypes that have not circulated among people for a long time. Past influenza
pandemics have led to high levels of illness, death, social disruption, and economic
loss.2 4
In a planning document, the CDC noted that "without mitigating interventions, even a less severe
pandemic would likely result in dramatic increases in the number of hospitalizations and deaths." 25
Pandemic preparedness therefore was fundamentally predicated upon the assertion that an influenza
pandemic presented a rare but qualitatively different threat than influenza in its seasonal form.
Some scholars have characterized the policy challenge of responding to such threats as the conundrum
of preparing for "low probability-high consequence" events-events, Dr. Harvey Fineberg (today
president of the Institute of Medicine) explains,
that are relatively unlikely, but that would have catastrophic consequences should they
occur. When you have such an event in prospect, the naysayer who argues that you are
over-reacting is more likely to be right than wrong. It is just like the person who says,
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Swine Flu Program: An Unprecedented Venture In Preventive Medicine, 89.
12 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Pandemic Flu Questions and Answers", January 17, 2006, 1,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/pdf/pandemicfluQandA.pdf, (accessed November 27, 2010).
us U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States - Early Targeted Layered use of Non-
Pharmaceutical interventions", February 2007, 7,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/communitymitigation.pdf.
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"Don't buy insurance for your house this year; it's not going to burn down." At the end
of the year, for most of us in most years, that would have been an economical decision,
but its wisdom can be judged only in retrospect. In prospect, it's foolhardy not to have
the insurance. This is a fundamental challenge for policy-makers in the face of many
threats of this type, including natural pandemic threats.12
It is not clear, however, whether the insurance analogy is valid. Not all houses burn down, and the value
of insurance will only be realized "if" a fire occurs. Fire may be a threat, but its occurrence is not a
foregone conclusion. It may or may not occur. Pandemics were not described as "low probability-high
consequence" events, but "high probability-high consequence" events, inevitable disasters for which
preparedness was essential (Table 2.1). As the HHS wrote in its "fact sheet," Pandemic Flu Basics, "The
threat of aflu pandemic is real. The Centersfor Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other leading
public health experts agree that it is not a question of IF a pandemic will occur, but WHEN it will occur" 27
(italics in the original). Certainty about a catastrophic pandemic is also evident in a speech by WHO
Director-General Dr. Lee Jong-wook speech in 2005:
There is no outbreak of human pandemic influenza anywhere in the world today.
However, the signs are clear that it is coming. The 1918 pandemic resulted from a
changed avian flu virus. Since its appearance in Hong Kong in 1997, highly pathogenic
H5N1 avian flu has spread to 15 countries in Asia, and Europe.
It is only a matter of time before an avian flu virus - most likely H5N1 - acquires the
ability to be transmitted from human to human, sparking the outbreak of human
pandemic influenza.
We don't know when this will happen. But we do know that it will happen.
This is the time to build global consensus. This is the time for every country to prepare
their national action plan - and act on it.'
At an international meeting held at the WHO headquarters in Geneva and jointly conveyed by the WHO,
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health (OlE), and the
World Bank, Dr. LEE Jong-wook described the grave and certain danger of pandemics: "If we are
unprepared, the next pandemic will cause incalculable human misery. Both directly from the loss of
human life, and indirectly through its widespread impact on security. No society would be exempt. No
economy would be left unscathed."129 A report produced by this meeting concluded, "Much was at
stake, from the documented enormous consequences for agriculture and the livelihoods of millions of
Harvey V Fineberg, "Swine flu of 1976: lessons from the past," Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87, no.
6 (June 2009): 414-415.
127 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "IV. Fact Sheet: Pandemic Flu Basics", November 29, 2007,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/takethelead/factsheetbasics.pdf, (accessed October 12, 2010).
1 Jong-Wook Lee, "Meeting on avian influenza and pandemic human influenza", November 7, 2005,
http://www.who.int/dg/lee/speeches/2005/flupandemicgeneva/en/, (accessed July 10, 2011).
129 ibid.
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small farmers to the most pressing concern of all: mounting evidence that another influenza pandemic
may be imminent. That prospect was described by participants variously as inevitable, in the cards, on
the doorstep or, simply, expected by nearly everyone."130
Assessing the risk of a pandemic
The rhetoric over avian influenza reflected a simultaneous certainty and uncertainty. Certainty that a
massively destructive and costly infectious disease outbreak was imminent, but uncertainty of the exact
details. While "not if, but when" remained the dominant mantra, when, really, would the predicted
pandemic actually occur? And how many, exactly, would die? How many would get sick and require
hospitalization? Would H5N1 ultimately be the virus to cause the next pandemic-or would it be
something else? How fast would the virus sweep the world, and where would it emerge? Unlike
seasonal influenza, where statistics such as 36,000 deaths per year were employed to convey the notion
of a substantial and predictable threat, many important aspects of pandemic influenza were
unpredictable.
Decision making around preparing for pandemic influenza thus necessarily had to occur in an
environment of substantial uncertainty. Extrapolating the threat of a future pandemic by looking at past
pandemics was frequently done, but nonetheless fraught with difficulties given the rarity of past
pandemics-just three in the past century. Influenza virus was discovered in 1933, and there had only
been two pandemics since then-in 1957 and 1968-and only one more pandemic-in 1918-for which
substantial detailed records existed. Pandemics before 1918 remained largely in the realm of
speculation. These three data points-the pandemics of "Spanish flu" in 1918, "Asian Flu" in 1957, and
"Hong Kong flu" in 1968-were mostly all experts could learn from.
The extreme variability in mortality impact of the three pandemics made any straightforward
forecasting of future pandemic mortality nearly impossible. What the three pandemics could
unambiguously demonstrate was that pandemics are periodic, recurring events. It would only be a
matter of time before another was to come. What the three pandemics taken together could not
demonstrate was a consistent severity impact. Learning from the past nonetheless often took the form
of conveying estimates of how many people had lost their lives in pandemics of the past. Despite three
pandemics, the latter two of which occurred during the era of modern virology, learning from the past in
practice meant giving major consideration to what happened during the severe 1918 "Spanish flu," with
far less attention given to the less severe pandemics of 1957 and 1968. As the early 1999 WHO
pandemic plan explained:
Influenza viruses are unique in their ability to cause sudden, pervasive illness in all age
groups on a global scale. Three such "pandemics" have occurred in this century, one of
which -- the infamous 'Spanish flu' of 1918- was responsible for more than 20 million
deaths worldwide, primarily in young adults. Although mortality rates associated with
the more recent pandemics of 1957 (A/Asia [H2N2]) and 1968 (A/Hong Kong [H3N2])
1 World Health Organization, "Avian influenza and human pandemic influenza: Summary report", 2005, 2,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2005/avian_influenza/summaryreportNov_2005_meeting.pdf,
(accessed October 12, 2010).
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were reduced in part by antibiotic therapy for secondary bacterial infections and more
aggressive supportive care, both were associated with high rates of morbidity and social
disruption.m'
This tendency-to emphasize the mortality of 1918 over details about the most recent and far less
deadly pandemics in 1957 and 1968-became more pronounced by the mid-2000s. The 2005 pandemic
plan, for example, states:
In the century past, we have experienced influenza pandemics three times: as recently
as 1968 and 1957 and what has been called the Great Influenza in 1918, a pandemic
that killed 40-50 million people worldwide. At some point in our nation's future another
virus will emerge with the potential to create a global disease outbreak.'
[ ...]I
An influenza pandemic has the potential to cause more death and illness than any other
public health threat. If a pandemic influenza virus with similar virulence to the 1918
strain emerged today, in the absence of intervention, it is estimated that 1.9 million
Americans could die and almost 10 million could be hospitalized over the course of the
pandemic, which may evolve over a year or more. Although the timing, nature and
severity of the next pandemic cannot be predicted with any certainty, preparedness
planning is imperative to lessen the impact of a pandemic. 33
As in the concern over swine flu in 1976, in 2005 all attention was directed to the specter of a 1918-like
outbreak. 4 "I have thought through the scenarios of what an avian flu outbreak could mean,"
President Bush remarked at an October 4, 2005 press conference. "I tried to get a better handle on
what the decision-making process would be by reading Mr. Barry's book on the influenza outbreak in
1918. I would recommend it." This small endorsement of John Barry's The Great Influenza did not just
help put a detailed, 500-page history of the horrors that was 1918 on the New York Times bestseller list.
It helped sow confusion about the differences between avian influenza (a disease of birds) and
pandemic influenza (a disease of humans).13s The top of the CDC Pandemic Influenza homepage asked,
"How are Pandemic, Avian and Seasonal Flu different?" attempting to educate readers unsure of the
136difference. But "1918" had already become synonymous with "pandemic" and images of "1918
m National Vaccine Program Office, "Pandemic Influenza: A Planning Guide for State and Local Officials (Draft
2.1)", 1999, http://web.archive.org/web/20030624173906/http://www.cdc.gov/od/nvpo/pubs/pandemicflu.htm,
(accessed September 1, 2010).
m U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 1.
133 Ibid., 4.
1 Sander L Gilman, "Moral panic and pandemics," The Lancet 375, no. 9729 (June 2010): 1866-1867.
13s Luc Bonneux and Wim Van Damme, "An iatrogenic pandemic of panic," BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 332, no.
7544 (April 1, 2006): 786-788.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Pandemic Influenza: Worldwide Preparedness", December 7,
2005, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/, (accessed December 17, 2005).
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Influenza: the Mother of All Pandemics," 37 as one article put it, flooded popular culture. One series of
images, in particular, taken at a crowded emergency hospital at Camp Funston, Fort Riley, Kansas, and
filled with influenza victims, was extremely commonplace. A recent historical article noted that the
1918 pandemic was "the first to be widely photographed."13 " The 1918 influenza was, most probably,
also the most widely photographed pandemic of the twentieth century. One historian of the 1918
pandemic noted in reference to the far less severe 1968 pandemic that "few people who lived through it
even knew it occurred.' 39
Further preferential treatment towards the 1918 pandemic
over other pandemics is visible in the CDC's online
storybook on pandemic influenza. On the 9 0th anniversary
of the 1918 pandemic, the CDC launched a Pandemic
Influenza Storybook, an online storybook with personal
vignettes of experience of past pandemics meant to be used
as a training tool, "'translating' the staggering morbidity and
mortality rates from these pandemics into individual events
that impacted families for decades"' 0 (Figure 2.1). But of
"these pandemics," it was 1918 that received almost all the
attention. The CDC's effort began in 2006 and gathered 45
personal stories of the distant 1918 pandemic, but only five
from the more recent 1957 pandemic. "CDC is actively
seeking 1968 stories," the CDC wrote in 2008. (As of July
2011, there are still no stories from 1968.)
The statistical side of the argument Figure 2.1. CDC's Pandemic Influenza Storybook,
Although by 2005, highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, launched in 2008, available on the HHS websitehttp://www.pandemicflu.gov/storybook/ (Photo
the Great Influenza of 1918, and SARS had become firmly credit: CDC)
established as the major reference points in promotional
materials on pandemic preparedness, policy planners and other decision makers required a more
concrete set of assumptions with which to work. "Central to preparedness planning is an estimate of
how deadly the next pandemic is likely to be," the WHO declared in December 2004.14' The need for
such quantitative estimates was realized early on at CDC, where CDC influenza scientists Dr. Keiji Fukuda
(who would go on to become the WHO's top influenza chief) and Nancy Cox (who would become
37 Jeffery K Taubenberger and David M Morens, "1918 Influenza: the mother of all pandemics," Emerging
Infectious Diseases 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 15-22.
m Julian A. Navarro, "Influenza in 1918: An Epidemic in Images" 125, no. 3 (2010): 9.
139 John M. Barry, "Lessons from the 1918 Flu," Time, October 9, 2005.
140 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "During 90th Anniversary Year, Pandemic Influenza Storybook
Stirs Memories and Learning", August 22, 2008, http://www.cdc.gov/news/2008/08/panflustorybook.html,
(accessed October 15, 2010).
1 World Health Organization, "Estimating the impact of the next influenza pandemic: enhancing preparedness",
December 8, 2004, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/preparedness2004_12_08/en/, (accessed June 30,
2009).
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director of the CDC's Influenza Division) approached one of the CDC's few health economists in the late
1990s, Martin Meltzer, to help produce a model with estimates of the impact of a future pandemic.
Meltzer recounted that experience during an interview in Atlanta.
"Keiji and Nancy Cox, who is still the division director, basically came to me and said we work on this
idea of pandemic influenza. And I said 'OK, what's that?' and so they explained it to me." 142 A national
pandemic plan existed at the time, but the three felt it to be severely lacking-a short 40 page
document "with a lot of blank space," Meltzer said, and too little detail to motivate bureaucracies and
other relevant constituencies to get ready.
At first when they talked to me they said, look-we need to get people's attention and
saying you know having 40 pages with a lot of blank space in it isn't adequate for any
response. We will be caught with our pants down. ... they were really concerned that
we were not adequately prepared. So the first thing you need is a set of education
materials, and one of the ways that they wanted, and what they wanted from me, and I
provided, was just an estimate saying What if it were to occur? What might we expect in
cases, hospitalizations, and deaths?
As Meltzer came up to speed with the evidence on influenza, he hesitated in producing a model based
on a 1918 like scenario. "1918 is so exceptional," he told me. "So what is a more moderate, but clearly
identifiable risk? For example, with 68. With 68 there's a lot more data." Meltzer, Fukuda, and Cox
thus settled on estimates based on a 1968-like scenario.
They were quite happy because literally they said 'it sounds good. Quite frankly, if you
can produce anything that looks reasonable, it will be a step forward from what we
don't have.' Again, if you've seen that 40 page plan, there was very, very little in there
that talked about, that you could take to a policymaker and say 'this is why we're
worried.' It was very, very abstract.
The result was published in late 1999 in the CDC journal Emerging Infectious Diseases, a complex
statistical model that provided health planners with a range of estimates for deaths, hospitalizations,
outpatient visits, and numbers of people simply "ill" (but not seeking care).143 Using various
assumptions-percentage of the population infected, number of "high risk" patients, hospital capacity,
etc.-the authors compared computed pandemic impact estimates against estimates of the economic
cost (of sickness and of a vaccine of varying degrees of effectiveness). They hoped to give decision
makers a tool to help simplify the weighing of a highly complex list of pros and cons associated with
various response measures. Meltzer, Cox, and Fukuda concluded: "we estimated 89,000 to 207,000
deaths; 314,000 to 734,000 hospitalizations; 18 to 42 million outpatient visits; and 20 to 47 million
additional illnesses" could possibly occur. To "assist state and local level planners in preparing for the
1 Interview of Martin Meltzer (CDC), October 27, 2010.
1 Martin 1. Meltzer, Nancy J. Cox, and Keiji Fukuda, "Modeling the economic impact of pandemic influenza in the
United States: Implications for setting priorities for intervention (Background paper)", April 30, 1999,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no5/melt_back.htm, (accessed June 13, 2010).
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next influenza pandemic by providing estimates of potential impact specific to their locality," the CDC
144
packaged the new model into software, FluAid, available for free download on its website.
Adoption was not instantaneous, but after avian influenza and SARS, interest was rising. At a WHO
conference in March 2004, Meltzer presented the results of his model projected onto a global
population: 2 to 7.4 million in a 1968-like outbreak.145 The WHO soon updated its pandemic
preparedness homepage. Under the subheading "Consequences of an influenza pandemic," the WHO
had since at least 2003 stated:
Epidemiological models project that in industrialized countries alone, the next pandemic
is likely to result in 57-132 million outpatient visits and 1.0-2.3 million hospitalizations,
and 280 000-650 000 deaths over less than 2 years. 146
The updated June 2004 text stated:
Although health care has improved in the last decades, epidemiological models from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, USA project that today a pandemic
is likely to result in 2 to 7.4 million deaths globally. In high income countries alone,
accounting for 15% of the worlds [sic] population, models project a demand for 134-233
million outpatient visits and 1.5-5.2 million hospital admissions.147
The global figures-which stayed on the WHO's website until 2009-were computed to be based on a
1968-like scenario, following the Meltzer model. Other constituencies, however, apparently felt the
numbers weren't big enough. The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had cited
Meltzer's Emerging Infectious Diseases paper in its 2004 Draft Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Plan.14 8 But by the time HHS published the plan in 2005, it included estimates of deaths,
hospitalizations and illness for not only a "Moderate (1958/68-like)" but also a "Severe (1918-like)"
scenario.149 For deaths, the projected range was between 209,000 and 1,903,000 Americans. The 2005
HHS Pandemic Plan stated:
Pandemic planning is based on the following assumptions about pandemic disease: ...
The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic
virus. Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe scenarios. Because
44 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "FluAid 2.0", July 25, 2000,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/tools/fluaid/index.htm, (accessed July 17, 2011).
145 Sandman and Lanard, "Pandemic Influenza Risk Communication: The Teachable Moment."
14 World Health Organization, "Pandemic preparedness", June 14, 2004,
http://web.archive.org/web/20040614041903/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/,
(accessed July 17, 2011).
4 World Health Organization, "Pandemic preparedness", June 26, 2004,
http://web.archive.org/web/20040626092138/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/,
(accessed July 17, 2011).
148 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "DRAFT Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan,"
15.
149 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 18.
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the virulence of the influenza virus that causes the next pandemic cannot be predicted,
two scenarios are presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic experience.150
Meltzer recalled for me what happened:
The 1918 was actually-and I'll tell you this, and I could even lose my job over it, and I
know you've got the recorders on and all that-1918 scenario was never my idea. It
was prompted to me by some colleagues who came from HHS and said, you know, 'we
need to get the politicians more moving on this idea of planning and preparing, and we
need to give them, you know, an upper estimate, you know, a worst-case scenario', and
I said, you know, I'm not... I never thought that my colleagues here on the whole really
supported the idea of worst-case scenarios and scaring them, but I got pushed and
prodded, and in fact, they had sat down with that, because even in the original version,
everything can be changed. So they just went in and they said 'OK, we're gonna do this,'
and I thought, 'oh no...' so I had to get involved, and I said, if you're gonna put in 1918,
because you cannot tell me the probability of 1918 reoccurring versus 68-and they are
vastly different-I said, you at least have to have two scenarios side by side. You at least
have to give them a range.151
In 2006, Meltzer produced a guide that showed how to use the FluAid modeling software to compute
both 1968-like and 1918-like estimates.152 However Meltzer's hesitation about the 1918-like scenario
seems to come across in the guide's disclaimer, featured prominently on the cover page:
150 Ibid.
1 Interview of Martin Meltzer (CDC), October 27, 2010. Meltzer's statement that he could lose his job by telling
me the history of how official estimates were increased to include 1918-like pandemic projections is troubling. In
2008, the Union of Concerned Scientists conducted a survey to gauge the degree to which scientists working in the
federal government felt able to speak freely with the media and public about their research. They rated the CDC's
written policies as "excellent" but suggested that interviews with CDC employees revealed a different reality.
Their report stated, "The CDC's official information and communications policies are excellent, with provisions that
allow scientists to state their personal views and review press releases describing their research. Yet in many cases
practice diverges from policy. Survey respondents generally did not agree that they are allowed to speak freely to
the media, and most doubted that they could state their personal views without fear of retaliation." See Union of
Concerned Scientists, "Freedom to Speak? A Report Card on Federal Agency Media Policies", 2008, 2,
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/Freedom-to-Speak.pdf, (accessed August 2, 2011).
1s2 Martin 1. Meltzer, "Using FluAid and FluSurge to estimate the potential impact of the next influenza pandemic
upon Locale Y: Basic Instructions and Template of Draft Report", March 22, 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/pdf/pandemic-impact-estimate-instructions.pdf, (accessed July 17, 2011). In at
least one case, another national authority-Japan-based its national pandemic planning based on 1957-like and
1918-like hospitalization and mortality estimates (530,000 to 2 million hospitalized; 170,000 to 640,000 deaths)
developed using CDC's FluAid 2.0 software. Conference of relevant ministries and agencies on pandemic influenza
and avian influenza (Japan), "Shingata Infuruenza Koudou Keikaku [Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action
Plan]", February 2009, 3, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ful/kettei/090217keikaku.pdf, (accessed July 27, 2011).
In Canada, the national pandemic influenza plan suggested that local governments may want to use Meltzer's
model to project the impact of the next influenza pandemic. Public Health Agency of Canada, The Canadian
pandemic influenza plan for the health sector (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006), H-5,
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/pdf-e/cpip-eng.pdf, (accessed July 27, 2011).
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The numbers contained in this report should be treated as illustrations of what could
happen (with unknown probability of actual occurrence). The numbers in this report,
therefore, are intended solely as a guide to help public health officials and policymakers
plan and prepare for the next influenza pandemic. 153
Projections, everywhere
As concerns over H5N1 mounted, statistics forecasting the possible impact of the next influenza
pandemic proliferated-and usually with plenty of attention in the press. Writing in Foreign Affairs,
Michael Osterholm estimated 180-360 million deaths worldwide if H5N1 were to turn pandemic, citing
"recent clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory evidence."154 National Geographic, in its article "The
Next Killer Flu," took Osterholm's projection and declared in text placed inside a large red circle that
nearly filled the physical page: "Today 180-360 million could die."155
Estimates served multiple purposes. Taken literally, projections of future mortality helped the public
imagine what the future might hold, underscoring the urgency and magnitude of the threat. But
mortality projections also served a more practical purpose, providing decision makers with "a useful and
plausible planning target,"156 according to WHO. How many ventilators would be needed? How many
hospital beds? What proportion of hospital staff could be relied upon to be healthy enough to serve
these patients? "Even in the best case scenarios of the next pandemic, 2 to 7 million people would die
and tens of millions would require medical attention. If the next pandemic virus is a very virulent strain,
deaths could be dramatically higher," the WHO wrote in late 2004, urging all Member States to ramp up
their preparedness.157
In an article published in The Lancet, researchers from Harvard University estimated that if a 1918-like
pandemic were to re-emerge, it would kill 62 million people globally.158 This estimate, derived by
considering the relationship between per-capita income and the likelihood of dying, projected that the
vast majority (96%) of these deaths would occur in developing nations. The US, with 4.5% of the world's
population, would only account for less than 1% of total deaths, or 383,881. The Washington Post
wrote that such an outbreak could double global mortality if it were to occur in a single year.159
London's Sunday Times noted that "A new pandemic might not mimic precisely the course of the 1918
1s3 Italics in the original. Meltzer, "Using FluAid and FluSurge to estimate the potential impact of the next influenza
pandemic upon Locale Y: Basic Instructions and Template of Draft Report."
is4 Michael T Osterholm, "Preparing for the Next Pandemic," Foreign Affairs, August 2005, 26.
1ss Tim Appenzeller, "Tracking the Next Killer Flu," National Geographic, October 2005, 25.
1s6 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza", October 14, 2005,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemiclOthings/en/, (accessed June 9, 2009).
157 World Health Organization, "Estimating the impact of the next influenza pandemic."
158 Christopher JL Murray et al., "Estimation of potential global pandemic influenza mortality on the basis of vital
registry data from the 1918-20 pandemic: a quantitative analysis," The Lancet 368, no. 9554 (December 2006):
2211-2218.
159 David Brown, "World Death Toll Of a Flu Pandemic Would Be 62 Million," The Washington Post, December 22,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/21/AR 20061 22101466_pf.html,
(accessed July 10, 2011).
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flu, but it is the best model there iS.,160 In a separate projection of 1918-like pandemic mortality, a
researcher from the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine in Washington,
D.C., derived estimates over three times as severe-over 71 million Americans sick and 1,278,089
dead.61
Estimating future mortality was not limited to specialist circles. Trust for America's Health (TFAH), the
Washington based non-profit, produced its own projections of influenza morbidity and mortality,
published in its report, A Killer Flu? which carried the headline "Scientific Experts Estimate that
'Inevitable' Major Epidemic of New Influenza Virus Strain Could Result in Millions of Deaths if Preventive
Actions Are Not Taken."162 Using the CDC's FluAid software, TFAH calculated state-by-state estimates of
pandemic mortality for all 50 states. Across the nation, 180,478 deaths could occur in a "mild" 1968-like
pandemic, the report noted; 541,433 deaths in a "mid-level" pandemic, and 1,082,866 deaths in a
"more severe," 1918-like pandemic. The report, which also contained a state-by-state breakdown of the
gap in capacity to treat the projected sick with the anti-influenza drug Tamiflu, was produced prior to
the release of the 2005 HHS pandemic plan, and was submitted during testimony to the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform investigating The Next Flu Pandemic: Evaluating
U.S. Readiness. 63 TFAH's projections were reported widely; USA Today even reproduced its state-by-
state table listing numbers dead, hospitalized, and sickened.
Estimates of future pandemic mortality varied widely, even when they sought to assess events of similar
severity. While the US official planning estimate posited 1.9 million US deaths in a "1918-like" scenario,
the Lancet paper estimated such a pandemic would kill less than 400,000-closer to officials' low-end
"1958/68-like" estimate of 209,000. But variability was neither secreti1s nor problematic. It simply
reinforced the bottom line: pandemics may be unknowable in detail, but could be counted on to be
catastrophic, far more deadly and destructive than an ordinary influenza season. "... [W]e can assume,
however, that they [the next pandemic] will be of greater magnitude than even the most severe
epidemic of 'ordinary' flu," a UK Department of Health guide to "Explaining pandemic flu" declared in
2005.166 Pandemics simply are, in the words of the editors of Scientific American, "the 'big ones." 67 As
Nigel Hawkes, "New flu pandemic 'would kill 62 million': Poor would suffer most in outbreak Figures based on
study of 1918 deaths," The Times, December 22, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article126391 7 .ece, (accessed July 10, 2011).
161 John F Brundage, "Cases and deaths during influenza pandemics in the United States," American Journal of
Preventive Medicine 31, no. 3 (September 2006): 254.
162 Trust for America's Health, "A Killer Flu?", June 2005, http://healthyamericans.org/reports/flu/Flu2005.pdf,
(accessed October 14, 2005).
1 Shelley Hearne, "Written Testimony of Shelley Hearne, DrPH, Executive Director Trust for America's Health,
Submitted to U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, The Next Flu Pandemic:
Evaluating U.S. Readiness", June 30, 2005, http://healthyamericans.org/policy/testimony/Hearne063005.pdf,
(accessed October 16, 2010).
1 Steve Sternberg, "Officials race to head off a bird flu pandemic," USA Today, October 10, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-10-10-avian-flu-cover-x.htm, (accessed July 10, 2011).
165 Michael James, "How Many People Could Bird Flu Kill?", September 30, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=1173856, (accessed September 2, 2010).
166 UK Department of Health, "Explaining pandemic flu: A guide from the Chief Medical Officer (October 2005
edition)", October 19, 2005, 12,
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the HHS bluntly put it, "Uncertainty about the magnitude of the next pandemic mandates planning for a
severe pandemic such as occurred in 1918." 16 Or as the CDC's health economist Martin Meltzer himself
is quoted as saying: "The point isn't the exact number. The point is: Imagine a lot of people ill in a very
short space of time. More than you've ever seen."1
69
Statistical projections thus served a dual function. On the one hand, governments employed them as
concrete planning assumptions to guide their planning in anticipation for a pandemic. On the other,
projections of the future dead were leveraged in the effort to convince politicians and other
policymakers, state health departments, hospital administrators, and many more to commit greater
resources towards pandemic preparedness. Whether the next pandemic would kill between 2 and 7.4
million, the range of the WHO's self-described "relatively conservative estimate,"o70 or 180 million to
360 million, as Michael Osterholm warned, the numbers symbolized the imperative to prepare for a
disaster.
The Promise and the Problem
First, there was evidence of a new strain with man-to-man transmission. Second, always
before when a new strain was found there was a subsequent pandemic. And third, for
the first time, there was both the knowledge and the time to provide for mass
immunization. So he [an advisor] said, "If we believe in preventive medicine we have no
choice." I asked the committee to sleep on it and let us phone them the next day to
make sure they still felt the same way, which we did-and they did.
David Sencer, CDC Director (1966-77), recalling the events of 1976.171
We are the first generation ever to have an opportunity to prepare in advance of a
pandemic. Government alone can't prepare the nation for a pandemic. This is a shared
responsibility and the challenge requires leadership from those most trusted and
respected in their communities.
HHS Secretary Leavitt, 2007172
The promise of pandemic preparedness was that when knowledge that a pandemic would happen was
responded to with concrete investments and planning, the impact of the next pandemic could be
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4121751?dc
Service=GET_FlILE&dID=15246&Rendition=Web, (accessed June 28, 2009).
1 Gibbs and Soares, "Preparing for a Pandemic."
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 5.
169 Martin Meltzer, quoted in Helen Branswell, "Avian Flu Presentation", September 19, 2005,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Avian%20Flu%20Presentation%20Branswell%20(amended%20for%20p
osting).ppt, (accessed July 4, 2009).
170 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza."
171 Neustadt and Fineberg, The epidemic that never was, 28-29.
12 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Convenes America's Leaders to Help Americans Prepare
for Pandemic Flu", May 24, 2007, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/05/20070524a.html, (accessed July
10, 2011).
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reduced. The rationale was simple, but the task large, complex, and costly. Whether the next pandemic
virus were to be the feared H5N1 or something else, improvements in surveillance promised to decrease
the time to detection of a novel strain with high transmissibility among humans. The WHO even posited
that finding a pandemic virus early in its evolution might allow for an extra-ordinary response-strict
quarantine of the infected area and massive use of antiviral medications-to extinguish a nascent
pandemic threat before it had time to spread worldwide. 73 But even if it did spread, the movement of
the virus might be stopped through so-called "non-pharmaceutical interventions" like social distancing.
By closing schools or suspending the right of public assembly, planners hoped to slow the spread of the
disease while buying valuable time to move forward with vaccine production.' 4 Those infected could
be treated with influenza antivirals, and weeks-long prophylactic use of antivirals was hoped to reduce
or at least delay new infections of the pandemic virus. Nations around the world bought huge quantities
of antivirals, particularly the drug Tamiflu, and stored them in national stockpiles.
Vaccines were perhaps highest on the pandemic preparedness agenda. Anticipating near global
demand for vaccines once a pandemic began, nations around the world entered into contracts with
vaccine manufacturers to guarantee priority delivery of the first pandemic influenza vaccines.
Commentators worried that in the event of a pandemic, nations that under ordinary circumstances were
friendly allies, might nationalize their vaccine supply, blocking export. The US responded by investing in
manufacturers' capacity to produce vaccines on US soil. The possibility that H5N1 may turn into the
next pandemic virus similarly led the National Institutes of Health to subsidize research into H5N1
influenza vaccine candidates. At least 13 million doses (out of a target of 20 million doses) of so-called
"pre-pandemic" vaccines were put into the US Strategic National Stockpile for use among high-priority
groups in the earliest days of a possible H5N1 pandemic. 7 5
The degree of progress that had been made in the weeks and months following President Bush's
announcement of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was unprecedented. Never before had
so much money been spent in support of measures to promote 'preparedness' for a future pandemic.
Across party lines and across national governments, and propelled by fears of avian influenza H5N1, by
late 2005, political will had aligned squarely behind the types of preparedness activities that health
experts had been advocating for years.
But no sooner did support coalesce to deal with the threat of H5N1 and pandemic influenza than did
health authorities begin to worry about a new threat: fatigue.76 In late 2007, one newspaper noted "a
m World Health Organization, "WHO Interim Protocol: Rapid operations.to contain the initial emergence of
pandemic influenza", October 2007,
http://www.who.int/entity/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/RapidContProtOctl5.pdf, (accessed May 17,
2011).
m U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance."
17s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Implementation Plan Two Year Summary", 2008,
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federa/summaryprogress2008.html, (accessed July 18, 2011).
176 Crawford Kilian, "Combat fatigue already?", April 26, 2006,
http://crofsblogs.typepad.com/h5n1/2006/04/combat-fatigue_.htm, (accessed July 10, 2011); Simeon Bennett
and Jason Gale, "'Flu Fatigue' Poses Public Health Threat, WHO Says (Updatel)," Bloomberg, September 15, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=atoOdQTLVEO, (accessed July 10, 2011).
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growing cynicism about a virus that has been in the headlines for almost four years without starting a
pandemic."17 Human infections of H5N1 had risen to 115 cases in 2006, up from 98 the year before.
But in 2007, there were only 88 infections, and the next year saw even further declines, to 44. 17 Dr.
Takeshi Kasai, an influenza advisor in the WHO regional office in Manila, said "I have observed 'avian
influenza fatigue' or apathy among the people ... They think they have already done enough, and that is
our worry in the WHO." 17 9 The political mood had also shifted. The financial crisis that began in late
2008 led officials to scrutinize every aspect of their budgets. Did pandemic preparedness really deserve
the funding it had so far achieved? Most public health experts believed it did. Kasai said that the risk
that H5N1 would turn pandemic remained unchanged. Keiji Fukuda, no longer at CDC, but now head of
the WHO's global influenza program, agreed: "If we begin to withdraw our attention and move our
attention to something else which is completely different, then we really stand to lose a lot of the work
which has been built up over the past four years. To do this over and over again is truly ... it's like being
Sisyphus."180
Not all critics were willing to heed the caution of influenza specialists. Questioning the right-or
wrong-headedness of pandemic preparedness also came from the inside the medical community. In
an "Editor's Choice" article, one editor of the British medical journal BMJ opined:
Somewhere, I imagine, there's a small group of people proud to be counted among the
Friends of Avian Flu, or FAF for short. I suspect they have a catchy mission statement,
such as "Keeping the nightmare alive," and lapel badges of vaguely bird-like shape.
Their challenge is to keep bird flu forever in the public eye. This should be getting
harder, as influenza H5N1 is proving particularly resistant to undergoing the killer
mutation that would allow efficient human to human transmission of the virus. Ten
years after the strain first appeared in humans, it has killed just 191 people. This is
despite the most propitious of circumstances: millions of people and poultry living in
very close proximity in South East Asia. Although these deaths are a tragedy for the
victims and their families, it's as well to remember that a similar number of people die
on the roads world wide every 84 minutes.
The article triggered an immediate flurry of angry responses to the BMJ website. Peter Sandman, risk
communication specialist and deputy editor of Michael Osterholm's CIDRAP Business Source journal, and
177 Mark Henderson, "Dealing with flu fatigue," The Times, November 24, 2007,
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/lifeandstyle/women/body-andsoul/article2929775.ece, (accessed July 10,
2011).
World Health Organization, "Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1)
Reported to WHO", August 31, 2010,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/country/casestable_2010_08_31/en/index.html, (accessed July
10, 2011).
179 Stella Gonzales, "WHO Warns Against 'Bird Flu Fatigue"', October 8, 2008,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44170, (accessed July 10, 2011).
180 Helen Branswell, "'Flu fatigue' sets in among scientists after global spread of virus slows," The Globe and Mail,
January 1, 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/article963723.ece, (accessed July 10, 2011).
1 Tony Delamothe, "FAFfing about," BMJ 334, no. 7608 (June 2007),
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/bmj.39259.443646.47, (accessed July 10, 2011).
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a strong proponent of pandemic preparedness, was so angered by the article that he penned an
editorial. "Whenever my commitment to pandemic preparedness starts to flag, I read something
wrongheaded by an opponent of preparedness," 82 Sandman wrote at the top of his article. David
Fedson, a prominent influenza vaccine researcher, was equally dismissive of the BMJ's "reckless and
deeply uninformed" article, accusing the editor of being representative of a "cultural inability to
'envision the worst'."
Although the central arguments of proponents of pandemic preparedness remained unchanged-the
world was unprepared, the risk was high, a pandemic was overdue-cynicism and skepticism was setting
in. One WHO advisor declared, "The biggest threat that we have now is 'flu fatigue'." 84
[ENDS]
Peter M. Sandman, "Read 'FAFfing About' if you need some motivation," CIDRAP Business Source, July 17, 2007,
http://www.psandman.com/CIDRAP/CIDRAP16.htm, (accessed July 10, 2011).
1 David S. Fedson, "Envisioning the worst," BMJ Rapid Response (July 3, 2007),
http://www.bmj.com/content/334/7608/0.1.extract/reply#bmj_el_170 9 27, (accessed July 10, 2011).
184 Dr. Julie Hall, deputy regional adviser on communicable disease surveillance and response, WHO Western
Pacific Region, quoted in Bennett and Gale, "'Flu Fatigue' Poses Public Health Threat, WHO Says (Updatel)."
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Table 2.1. Explaining pandemic influenza. Pandernic influenza was described as a threat of high consequence and high
probability.
Year
2009
Quotation
"What we say about pandemic flu is not if, but when."
2008 "When it comes to flu pandemics, scientists say the question is not
if, but when."
2008 "Influenza scientists repeat like a mantra that when it comes to flu
pandemics, the question is not if, but when."
2007 "The director of Britain's new centre for avian flu research said
yesterday that it was a question of 'not if but when' the disease
would cause a pandemic."
2007 "A growing number of scientists are using the term 'not if, but when'
in referring to the likelihood of another influenza pandemic that
could kill thousands (maybe millions) worldwide."
2006 "At the very start of 'Pandemic', tonight's feature-length helping of
Horizon (BBC2 9.00pm), the commentary states baldly, arrestingly,
that what we are about to witness is 'the true story of the next
pandemic'. As this statement segues directly into terrifying
suggestions as to the scale of the disaster facing humanity at any
moment, you may feel - and hope - that it is going too far to present
such a gloomy hypothesis as the truth. By the end, after listening to
expert after expert stating that this is a 'not if but when' scenario,
you will probably be working out how to order six months'
household supplies and get hold of enough anti-viral drugs to
protect your loved ones."
2006 "According to Capt. Bernita Bush, public information officer with the
Clay County Department of Public Safety the flu kills around 36,000
people nationwide every year. The victims, she said, are usually the
sick, frail and elderly In the case of a pandemic, she said thousands
of people not usually affected by the flu could die. Bush, like Chilson,
agreesthat it is not if, but when a flu outbreak of this kind will arrive
in the United States"
2006 "States have a spotty record in preparing for bird flu and it is matter
18s Amy Zipkin, "On the discovery trail," The New York Times, October 11, 2009.
186 "Could influenza epidemic happen again?," The Hamilton Spectator, September 17, 2008.
187 Helen Branswell, "Medical reporter," The Canadian Press, September 15, 2008.
188 Melanie Reid, "Bird flu pandemic is inevitable, expert says after new outbreak," The Times, May 25, 2007.
189 It's coming," Topeka Capital-Journal, March 31, 2007.
190 Karl French, "Pandemic," Financial Times, November 7, 2006.
191 Patti Levine-Brown, "Flu preparedness is key, officials say Clay officials had a summit to discuss readiness in case
of a pandemic," The Florida Times-Union, July 19, 2006.
192 Lara Jakes Jordan, "Many states are unprepared for bird flu, federal doctor says," Deseret Morning News, May
19, 2006.
Citation
John C. Martin, chief
executive, Gilead
Sciences (inventor of
influenza antiviral
Tamiflu)'85
Hamilton Spectator
(Canada)1 6
Canadian Press
(Canada) 87
The Times (UK)188
Topeka Capital-Journal8
Financial Times (UK)' 90
Florida Times-Union191
Associated Press192
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of 'not if, but when' the deadly virus reaches the United States, the
Homeland Security Department's top doctor said Thursday."
2006 "Hurricane season is a month away. The arrival of a pandemic flu
that may kill hundreds of thousands across the nation is talked
about in terms of 'not if, but when.' The threat of terrorism,
including radiologic bombs, isn't only the stuff of nightmares."
2006 "The fear is that the deadly strain could trigger a pandemic to rival
the 1918 Spanish flu, which killed tens of millions of people
worldwide. A substantial number of scientists and health experts say
the question is not if but when."
2006 "It is important not to panic. While experts believe that the only
question about a global pandemic is not if but when, avian flu has
killed fewer than 100 people worldwide as of Friday, none from
human-to-human transmission. Researchers are furiously working
on a preventive vaccine. But at the same time, states across the
country- Maryland included- have been warned: It's time to get
very busy preparing to protect ourselves."
2005 "Well, we've been ringing that bell for quite awhile. It's kind of like
with Hurricane Katrina. That you saw it on the radar screen. And
people for years and years before that, had been warning about
these levees. And the same thing is happening here with health
officials. ... We've been watching or concerned about a pandemic.
We know it's a question, really, only of not if but when. And so the
key issue is, just like those levees, if you don't strengthen them,
we're going to have a terrible disaster, and we could be doing
better."
2005 "Well, you know, I was reading Time magazine from this week [Oct
9,2005197] and it said, 'The World Health Organization declared in
September once again that as far as influenza pandemic is
concerned, the question is not if, butwhen. Not whether millions
would die, but how many millions."'
2005 "Margaret Chan, chief of influenza pandemic preparedness at the
World Health Organization, no longer talks about if it is going to
happen: 'The only question is: When? I don't think anybody has the
answer to it. We have to be on the lookout for it any time, any day."'
Providence Journal 93
Washington Post 94
Baltimore Sun195
Dr. Shelley Hearne,
executive director, Trust
For America's Health196
Katie Couric (NBC
News)198
Toronto Star (Canada) 99
193 Amanda Milkovits, "Local officials are frontline disaster defense," The Providence Journal, April 27, 2006.
194 Susan Levine, "D.C. Plans Summit on Pandemic Response; Meeting April 28 Is Part of Effort to Coordinate
Business,School, Religious Groups," The Washington Post, March 21, 2006.
195 "EDITORIAL: On our own," The Baltimore Sun, March 5, 2006.
196 Stated during a TV appearance on "The Situation With Tucker Carlson for October 12, 2005" (MSNBC, October
11, 2005).
197 Christine Gorman, "Avian Flu: How Scared Should We Be?," Time, October 9, 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1115685,00.html, (accessed July 10, 2011).
198 " Interview: Dr. Sue Bailey, former assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, discussespossibility of Avian
flu pandemic," Today (NBC, October 10, 2005).
199 Lynda Hurst, "Deadly flu: 'The only question is when'; 'Canada prepared to respond' Avian's arrival called
inevitable Experts fear global pandemic Not if, but when for outbreak of disease: Experts Avian flu virus is possible
candidate for global infection," The Toronto Star, August 27, 2005.
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2002 "Most experts believe that it is not a question of whether there will
be another severe influenza pandemic but when."
2005 "Pandemic influenza is an uncommon type of influenza A that
causes greater morbidity and mortality than seasonal influenza. An
influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza A virus (a
'pandemic influenza virus') emerges in the human population,
causes serious illness, and then spreads easily from person to person
worldwide."
"When a pandemic virus strain emerges, 25% to 35% of the
population could develop clinical disease, and a substantial fraction
of these individuals could die."
2004 "Although the impact of influenza on morbidity and mortality in a
normal epidemic year is substantial, much more serious influenza
pandemics also can occur."
2005 "Influenza pandemics are associated with high morbidity, excess
mortality, and social and economic disruption."
2007 "Mortality due to pandemic influenza is expected to be much higher
than in inter-pandemic years, when an average of 12j000 influenza-
related deaths are estimated to occur in England and Wales each
year."
Professor Sir Liam
Donaldson, Chief Medical
Officer for England
(UK) 200
US Department of Health
and Human Services201
NIAID Director Anthony
Fauci, in congressional
testimony 202
WHO Director-General
LEE Jong-Wook 203
Pandemic Fly: A national
framework for
responding to an
influenza pandemic
(UK)204
200 Quote appears on the cover of UK Department of Health, "Explaining pandemic flu."
201 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 16, 1-12.
202 Anthony S. Fauci, "Testimony: Statement by Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on The NIH
Biomedical Research Response to Influenza before the The Committee on Energy and Commerce United States
House of Representatives", November 18, 2004, http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t041118.html, (accessed July 10,
2011).
203 World Health Organization, Avian influenza: assessing the pandemic threat, January 2005, 3,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/H5N1-9reduit.pdf.
204 UK Department of Health, "Pandemic flu: a national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic",
November 22, 2007, 26,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prodconsum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_080745.
pdf, (accessed June 16, 2011).
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Chapter 3 2009 H1N1 Influenza: scare, skepticism, and accusation
Influenza is said to be so unpredictable that there is a saying common among those that have spent
their career studying the disease: if you've seen one season, you've seen one season. And so perhaps in
retrospect, there should be little surprise that "the first influenza pandemic in four decades,"1 as the
World Health Organization (WHO) calls it, was not detected in southern China, but southern California;
caused not by the dreaded avian H5N1 virus, but a swine influenza virus; and its first victims were not
left dead, ravaged by a killer virus, but alive and well.
Scare
"On April 17, 2009, CDC determined that two cases of febrile respiratory illness occurring in children
who resided in adjacent counties in southern California were caused by infection with a swine influenza
A (H1N1) virus," the CDC wrote in its first public notice of the new virus.
Although this is not a new subtype of influenza A in humans, concern exists that this
new strain of swine influenza A (HIN1) is substantially different from human influenza A
(H1N1) viruses, that a large proportion of the population might be susceptible to
infection, and that the seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 strain might not provide
protection. The lack of known exposure to pigs in the two cases increases the possibility
that human-to-human transmission of this new influenza virus has occurred.2
By the time of the report-published online early in the MMWR-the two children had already
recovered. The first, a 10-year old boy living in San Diego County, had developed a fever, cough and
vomiting on March 30. By the time CDC came to hear about the case, he was well again. The second, a
9 year old girl, had also recovered from her cough and fever. But without a known exposure to pigs,
investigators could not rule out the possibility that the children might have been infected with a virus
capable of human to human transmission-and that they had transmitted the infection on to others. In
addition, the boy had recently traveled to Texas, and so the CDC, working with state and local health
departments in California and Texas, called on clinicians to enhance surveillance.
Responding to the April 21 dispatch, the European CDC (ECDC, the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control) informed its readers that while the event was "of concern," the risk of
pandemic was small. While the virus could trigger a pandemic, "it is noticeable that both the children's
illnesses were mild and essentially self-limiting, neither required specific therapy or hospitalisation.
Indeed the viruses only came to light because the children were taken to clinics taking part in a clinical
study and a surveillance exercise." The fact that the infections were caused by a swine influenza virus
was itself not all that alarming. Swine influenza infections were seen every year in the US. Indeed, one
review paper from 2007 cataloged 50 apparent human infections with swine influenza virus, of which
1 Margaret Chan, "Experts begin their assessment of the response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic", April 12,
2010, http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2010/ihr_20100412/en/index.html, (accessed April 12, 2010).
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in Two Children --- Southern
California, March--April 2009," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 58, no. Dispatch (April 21, 2009): 1-
3.
Page 103
2009 H1N1 Influenza: scare, skepticism, and accusation
several had no known exposure to pigs. 3 The ECDC concluded that "these mild US cases ... are not
reflecting the emergence of a pandemic strain..." and cautioned that while the enhanced surveillance
might turn up additional cases, "if this happens it should not be misinterpreted as a change in that
conclusion."
The ECDC's April 23 prediction was partially correct: hours later, the CDC called a press briefing and
announced that enhanced surveillance had turned up five additional cases. "The good news is that all
seven of these patients have recovered. One of them required hospitalization but has been discharged.
And so far this is not looking like very, very severe influenza. Seven patients all recovered," explained
Anne Schuchat, director of CDC's National Center for Influenza and Respiratory Diseases.s The CDC
emphasized that it was moving quickly and aggressively to gain a better understanding of the situation,
including preparation of a vaccine seed strain should the need for a vaccine arise, and working with a
variety of partners at the local, state, and international level. It stressed that because surveillance
activities were being enhanced, "we're likely to find more cases. So that's not going to be surprising."
The CDC promised to post situational updates to its website at 3pm each day, but cautioned journalists
dialed into the teleconference, "We don't think this is time for major concern around the country..."
But the CDC's thinking was about to undergo a major shift. "On the 23rd, we held a press briefing about
additional cases in the United States, again not really knowing whether this was a big deal or a small
deal but just wanting people to be on the alert and to look for unusual influenza viruses," recalled Rear
Admiral Anne Schuchat, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. 6 "It
was at that point, on the 23rd, when Mexico, Canada and CDC were able to connect the idea that the
virus in Canada from Mexico was the same as the virus that we were testing in the US."
Reports of increased respiratory disease in Mexico had been publicly discussed in infectious disease
circles, but until April 23 when the results of detailed laboratory testing results performed in Canada
were known, no firm connection between these outbreaks and the new "swine flu" virus that had
sickened a handful of individuals in California and Texas had been made. Signaling the increase in
concern, the April 24 press briefing was led by the acting director of the CDC. "Today, Mexico's Minister
of Health confirmed that they have cases of swine influenza in people and that they believe some of the
3 Kendall P. Myers, Christopher W. Olsen, and Gregory C. Gray, "Cases of Swine Influenza in Humans: A Review of
the Literature," Clinical Infectious Diseases 44, no. 8 (April 15, 2007): 1084-1088.
4 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, "Swine Influenza A(H1N1) Infection in Two Children in
Southern California, March-April 2009", April 23, 2009,
http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/sciadvice/Lists/E CDC%/20Reviews/ECDCDispForm.aspx?List=512ff74f-
77d4-4ad8-b6d6-
bf0f23083f30&ID=556& RootFolder=%2Fen%2Factivities%2Fsciadvice%2FLists%2FE CDC%20Reviews, (accessed July
11, 2011).
s U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Briefing on Public Health Investigation of Human Cases of
Swine Influenza", April 23, 2009, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090423.htm, (accessed July 11,
2011).
6 Testimony of Anne Schuchat to Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies, April 28, 2009, Hearing on Public Health Response to Swine Flu (Washington, DC, 2009),
http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/CommPlayer/commFlashPlayer.cfm?fn=appropsAO42809&st=1000, (accessed
April 30, 2009).
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people who were infected died from swine influenza," Richard Besser said. "We hear from the public
and from others about their concern, and we are worried, as well."' CDC indicated plans to send teams
to Mexico to assist authorities there. "It's really critically important we learn more about what's going
on in Mexico because reports from Mexico are raising concerns about much more severe disease,"
Besser said.
From Geneva, the World Health Organization issued its first public notice regarding the emerging
outbreak on April 24: seven confirmed and nine suspected cases of swine influenza H1N1 in the United
States-but more alarmingly, influenza-like illness activity in Mexico's capital, with more than 800 cases
of pneumonia and around 60 deaths.8 The next day, WHO's director-general Margaret Chan, declared:
"the Director-General has determined that the current events constitute a public health emergency of
international concern, under the Regulations,"9 a decision arrived at under consultation with an
Emergency Committee rapidly assembled under provisions of the International Health Regulations
News about the problem in Mexico was racing around the world: unusually severe cases of pneumonia
in previously healthy young adults, a seemingly prolonged influenza season, and outbreaks of
unidentified etiology.'0 Mexico's epidemic also seemed larger than anybody had at first realized. In its
second global update, on April 26, WHO reported "suspect clinical cases" of influenza in 19 of Mexico's
32 states." The Mexican government declared a suspension of all schools nationwide. Images of
Mexicans wearing bright blue surgical face masks saturated the international media. In the capital of
Mexico City, where President Calder6n had just published an order conferring "emergency powers" to
the government, two New York Times reporters wrote of "flooded government health hot lines" and
"jittery residents," one telling the Times, "I know all of us will die one day, but I want to last out the
week." The army had been called in to distribute four million masks.
Across the border, America's outbreak was also growing-from California and Texas to Kansas, then
Ohio. In New York City, officials reported on April 25 that 100 students missed school because of a "flu-
like symptoms" 3 -and attention was growing. On April 26, John Brennan, assistant to the president for
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts April 24, 2009", April 24, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090424.htm, (accessed July 15, 2011).
8 World Health Organization, "Influenza-like illness in the United States and Mexico", April 24, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_24/en/index.html, (accessed July 12, 2011).
9 Margaret Chan, "Swine influenza", April 25, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090425/en/index.html, (accessed May 28,
2009).
10 Jon Cohen, "Exclusive: Interview With Head of Mexico's Top Swine Flu Lab," ScienceInsider, May 1, 2009,
http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/05/exclusive-inter.html, (accessed July 12, 2011).
1 World Health Organization, "Swine flu illness in the United States and Mexico - update 2", April 26, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_.26/en/index.html, (accessed August 12, 2009).
1 Marc Lacey and Elisabeth Malkin, "Mexico Takes Powers to Isolate Cases of Swine Flu," The New York Times,
April 26, 2009, sec. International / Americas,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/world/americas/26mexico.html, (accessed July 12, 2011).
1 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, "Health Department Testing Finds Probable Cases of
Swine Influenza in Students at a Non-Public School in Queens", April 25, 2009,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/pr2009/prOl5-09.shtml, (accessed July 12, 2011).
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homeland security and counterterrorism, joined CDC director Besser and the secretary of homeland
security Janet Napolitano in a press briefing held at the White House: "President Obama is very
concerned about the recent cases of swine flu that have been identified in the United States, as well as
the outbreak in Mexico," Brennan said. "The President's thoughts are with those who have been
affected by this illness...."14 By the end of the day, swine flu was formally declared a "public health
emergency" by the Department of Health and Human Services.15
As the outbreak spread across the US, the mystery only deepened as to why Mexico's epidemic seemed
severe in contrast to the infections in the US where all cases had recovered, and only one required
hospitalization. "I expect as we continue to look for cases, we are going to see a broader spectrum of
disease," Besser remarked at the national press briefing. "What we know about this virus is it looks to
be the same virus as is causing the situation in Mexico. And given the reports out of Mexico, I would
expect that over time we're going to see more severe disease in this country." At the CDC's daily press
briefing in Atlanta, held just a few hours later, Schuchat repeated the message: "I think we really need to
prepare for the idea that we will have additional cases, additional affected states and I do fear that we
will have deaths here."' 6
As testing ability increased, confirmed cases of the new "swine flu"-which officials would soon
encourage be called "H1N1" in recognition of its viral subtype and out of fear of causing needless harm
to the pork industry-began to appear in other countries. On April 27, WHO had received reports of six
cases in Canada (and no deaths), with one case in Spain (no deaths).17 WHO raised its official pandemic
phase alert from Phase 3 to Phase 4. "The change to a higher phase of pandemic alert indicates that the
likelihood of a pandemic has increased, but not that a pandemic is inevitable," Dr Chan said.' By the
next day, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Israel were added to WHO's growing list of countries
with confirmed infection. The following morning, the United States reported its first death-a Mexican
toddler visiting relatives in Texas.' 9 And on the same day, WHO added Germany and Austria to the list
'4 Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing On Swine Influenza, 4/26/09", April 26, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/Press-Briefing-On-Swine-Influenza-4/26/09/, (accessed July 12,
2011).
1s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Declares Public Health Emergency for Swine Flu", April 26,
2009, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/04/20090426a.html/nation, (accessed July 12, 2011); Donald G.
McNeil Jr, "U.S. Declares Public Health Emergency Over Swine Flu," The New York Times, April 27, 2009, sec.
World, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/world/27flu.html, (accessed May 1, 2009).
16 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts April 26, 2009", April 26, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090426.htm, (accessed July 12, 2011).
17 World Health Organization, "Swine influenza - update 3", April 27, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_04_27/en/index.htmi, (accessed July 12, 2011).
18 Margaret Chan, "Swine influenza", April 27, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090427/en/index.html, (accessed July 12,
2011).
19 The City of Houston, "HDHHS ADVISORY ON SWINE FLU DEATH", April 29, 2009,
http://www.houstontx.gov/health/NewsReleases/swineflunewsbrief.htm, (accessed July 12, 2011).
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of affected countries, and announced the outbreak had reached Phase 5,2 signaling that a pandemic
was "imminent."21
In a televised press conference, Margaret Chan emphasized the unknowns-that "new diseases are, by
definition, poorly understood. Influenza viruses are notorious for their rapid mutation and
unpredictable behavior," but promised to get answers in due course.
The biggest question, right now, is this: how severe will the pandemic be, especially now
at the start? It is possible that the full clinical spectrum of this disease goes from mild
illness to severe disease. ... From past experience, we also know that influenza may
cause mild disease in affluent countries, but more severe disease, with higher mortality,
in developing countries.
Chan declared that "Above all, this is an opportunity for global solidarity as we look for responses and
solutions that benefit all countries, all of humanity. After all, it really is all of humanity that is under
threat during a pandemic." She urged countries to "ramp up preparedness and response"; the Phase 5
alert was "a signal to governments, to ministries of health and other ministries, to the pharmaceutical
industry and the business community that certain actions should now be undertaken with increased
urgency, and at an accelerated pace."
In the US, the response to the new virus had already taken on increased urgency. In his third prime time
address to the nation, President Obama announced a request to Congress for $1.5 billion in emergency
funding "to support our ability to monitor and track this virus and to build our supply of antiviral drugs
and other equipment." Schools with confirmed or suspected cases of the new influenza were suggested
to "strongly consider temporarily closing."23 The Obama administration's proactive stance against the
new virus was to be somewhat expected: as the Democratic US senator from Illinois, Obama together
with Senator Lugar had in an editorial in the New York Times in 2005 called on the international
community "to take decicive action to prevent a pandemic." 24
As authorities proceeded to take the steps necessary to prepare new influenza vaccines against the
novel H1N1 strain,25 public forums both on- and off-line were bursting with commentary on swine flu.
2 Margaret Chan, "Influenza A(H1N1)", April 29, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_20090429/en/index.html, (accessed July 12,
2011).
2 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: a WHO guidance document, April
2009, 25, http://www.who.int/entity/csr/disease/influenza/PIPGuidance09.pdf, (accessed July 3, 2009).
2 Chan, "Influenza A(H1N1)."
2 Office of the Press Secretary, "News Conference by the President, 4/29/2009", April 29, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/News-Conference-by-the-President-4/29/2009/, (accessed July 12,
2011).
24 Barack Obama and Richard Lugar, "Grounding a Pandemic," The New York Times, June 6, 2005, sec. Opinion,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/06/opinion/06obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print, (accessed October 20,
2010).
25 Declan Butler, "The virus grower," Nature (May 14, 2009),
http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/news.2009.482.
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John Barry, author of the bestselling book in the 1918 pandemic, argued for the urgency of
manufacturing a vaccine. "Even if this virus were to peter out soon," Barry wrote in an April 27 op-ed in
the New York Times, "there is a strong possibility it would only go underground, quietly continuing to
infect some people while becoming better adapted to humans, and then explode around the world."26
Barry explained that "all four of the well-known pandemics seem to have come in waves," and by
implication, the new swine flu could follow in that pattern. A vaccine was thus essential, and discussions
of vaccine rationing began to appear in the press.2 As Barry explained:
In all four instances, the gap between the time the virus was first recognized and a
second, more dangerous wave swelled was about six months. It will take a minimum of
four months to produce vaccine in any volume, possibly longer, and much longer than
that to produce enough vaccine to protect most Americans. The race has begun.28
Comparisons with the 1918 pandemic were all but inevitable given that by the time of the 2009 HiN1
outbreak, the deadly "Spanish flu" pandemic had become the preeminent historical anchor for
"pandemic preparedness." On an early morning CNN broadcast, Dr. Martin Blaser was interviewed to
comment on Barry's recent warning. Blaser, chairman of New York University's Department of
Medicine, past president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, and former CDC Epidemic
Intelligence Officer, added his voice to those emphasizing the extraordinary risk posed by the new virus.
CNN HOST: When Dr. Margaret Chan of WHO says 'all humanity is under threat', put this
in perspective for us. What really, Dr. Blaser, is the risk here, in this country?
BLASER: She's right. This is a pandemic. It's all over the world. Right now, it's early and
it's mild, so everybody's at risk. But right now the risk is low.
CNN: But her warning that this could be serious, serious trouble. Is that any more to the
developing world or to the developed world, or is it really into everybody?
BLASER: It's really everybody, because in this one, we're all combined. It's traveling
from person to person. All people are at risk.
CNN: People are trying to game out what this virus is going to do. And John Barry, who
wrote a fabulous book on the 1918 flu pandemic called 'The Great Influenza', thinks this
is just the opening act of a very long play. That this virus is probably going to go away for
a little while, go to ground, hide in the background. And then maybe next winter or
early next year come back with a vengeance. What do you think?
BLASER: I think that's the most likely scenario because of, because influenza is very
influenced by the season and in 1918 it came. There was a little bump in the early
2 John M. Barry, "Where Will the Swine Flu Go Next?," The New York Times, April 28, 2009, sec. Opinion,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/opinion/28barry.html?_r=1, (accessed July 12, 2011).
2 National Public Radio, "WHO Boosts Flu Alert Level To Phase 5", April 29, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=103593687, (accessed July 12, 2011).
28 Barry, "Where Will the Swine Flu Go Next?'.
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summer. It went underground and then it did come back with a vengeance. And that
would be predictable here. And I think we have to think of this more, as one of our
secretaries said, as a marathon, and not as a sprint.29
In numerical terms, the "cause for deep concern" that Obama had spoken of had, by April 29, been
confirmed to have infected 91 individuals across ten US states with one death. In its daily update, the
CDC warned that "as it continues to spread, more cases, more hospitalizations and more deaths are
expected in the coming days and weeks." 30 And while the move garnered praise from circles long
interested in pandemic preparedness ("That is excellent risk communication," the risk communications
specialist Peter Sandman commented in Nature 3 ), an alternative yet tenuous narrative surfaced in the
sea of opinion, one that suggested "swine flu" may not be a disaster.
"Based on history and what we know about the flu virus, the threat is not as bad as it may seem," the
well-respected influenza virologist Peter Palese explained in an op-ed "Why Swine Flu Isn't So Scary."32
Palese pointed out that the virus lacked an important protein that was present in both the 1918 virus
and highly lethal avian influenza H5N1, and therefore "doesn't have what it takes to become a major
killer." Joining Palese, noted influenza virologist Richard Webby was quoted as saying, "This virus
doesn't have anywhere near the capacity to kill like the 1918 virus."33 Nancy Cox, the CDC's top
influenza virologist, seemed to agree, echoing the message in a May 1 press briefing: "we do not see the
markers for virulence that we're seeing in the 1918 virus."34
There was also an alternate and perhaps reassuring explanation for the seemingly bleak situation in
Mexico where the proportion of infected people who died appeared alarmingly high. (Of more than 150
confirmed cases, nine deaths were recorded by May 1,3s with many more cases and deaths suspected
but still awaiting laboratory confirmation.) According to CDC's director of global migration and
quarantine, Dr. Martin Cetron, "We may just be looking at the tip of the iceberg, which would give you a
skewed initial estimate of the case fatality rate." If Cetron was right, huge numbers of Mexicans with
mild H1N1 infections were going undetected, which would suggest that although the outbreak was
29 "W.H.O. Warns of imminent Pandemic; NYC Building Collapsed; GOP Response to Obama 100 Days News
Conference Remarks; The China Factor: How Much Do We Owe?; Obama Lays Out Challenges Ahead," American
Morning (CNN, A pril 30, 2009).
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "H1N1 Flu Daily Update: April 29, 2009", April 29, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/updates/042909.htm, (accessed July 12, 2011).
3 Peter M. Sandman, "Pandemics: good hygiene is not enough," Nature 459, no. 7245 (May 21, 2009): 323.
3 Peter Palese, "Why Swine Flu Isn't So Scary," wsj.com, May 2, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124122223484879119.html, (accessed May 12, 2009).
3 Karen Kaplan and Alan Zarembo, "Scientists see this flu strain as relatively mild," The Los Angeles Times, April 30,
2009, sec. Map: Swine flu's spread, http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-sci-swine-reality30-
2009apr30,0,119808,full.story, (accessed May 1, 2009).
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts May 1, 2009", May 1, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090501.htm, (accessed July 12, 2011).
3s World Health Organization, "Influenza A(H1N1) - update 8.1", May 1, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_Ola/en/index.html, (accessed July 12, 2011).
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large, the virus was far less deadly than feared." Cetron's hypothesis could explain the disparity
between the frightening picture in Mexico and more reassuring one in the US-the result of
"ascertainment bias." But only time and more detailed investigations would tell whether Cetron was
right.
And while virologists were in agreement that the new H1N1 virus did not represent a repeat of the 1918
scenario, they all urged caution. "We know that there's a great deal that we do not yet understand
about the virulence of the 1918 virus or other influenza viruses that have a more severe clinical picture
in humans. So we're continuing to learn," said Cox.37 Even Peter Palese, who had penned the reassuring
editorial, seemed willing to rethink his position if events changed. "If this virus keep [sic} going through
our summer," Palese said, "I would be very concerned."38
Continued spread, and blame
Time and time again, epidemics of infectious diseases have had the ability to cause not only physical
suffering but also evoke a variety of moral and social judgments. H1N1 proved to be no exception. The
virus did keep going, continuing to spread through the summer. By the end of the first week of May, the
only two continents which had not reported confirmed cases were Antarctica and Africa, and nations
around the world were taking tough actions.
In China, authorities were placing thousands of passengers arriving from 'affected areas' under
quarantine. One of these passengers was Dr. Jonathan Metzl, a psychiatrist by training and director of
the Program in Culture, Health, and Medicine at the University of Michigan. Metzl criticized the
response in a story he recounted for the Los Angeles Times. After touching down in Shanghai, he had
had no fever and no recent history of contact with pigs, cleared the passenger screening and was let
enter China. The next evening, while still symptom-free, Chinese authorities informed him that a
passenger "three rows in front and five seats across" from him had tested positive for HINI; given 30
minutes to pack his belongings, he was transported in the middle of the night to a hotel-based
quarantine where he and other passengers would stay for seven days under medical observation. "We
couldn't leave our rooms, so we passed much of the time standing in our doorways, talking across the
empty corridors about the mice, the heat, the food, the missed opportunities, and especially the
isolation." 39
Japan had also activated its pandemic response plan immediately following early declarations by the US
and WHO. From late April, in accordance with its pandemic planning, flights into Japan were restricted
to certain airports, and all passengers arriving from affected areas (such as the US) underwent screening
before being allowed entry to Japan. Those with confirmed novel influenza virus infection would be
mandatorily quarantined. But unlike China, few people were quarantined, and the initial cases in the
36 Donald G. McNeil Jr, "Flu Outbreak Raises a Set of Questions," The New York Times, April 27, 2009, sec. Health,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/health/27questions.html, (accessed April 29, 2009).
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts May 1, 2009."
3 Kaplan and Zarembo, "Scientists see this flu strain as relatively mild."
39 Jonathan M. Metzl, "China's ill-considered response to the HIN1 virus," Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/jul/12/opinion/oe-metzl12, (accessed July 12, 2011).
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community largely occurred among Japanese students in the western Osaka and Hyogo prefectures.
There, more than 4,000 schools were shut down in mid-May-one of the so-called "non-pharmaceutical
interventions" designed to slow the spread of infection and thousands of children were put on
prophylactic antivirals like Tamiflu. Despite the fact that only a handful of H1N1 cases had been
reported (with no deaths) and the infection was, on the whole, mild in Japan as it was in much of the
rest of the world, the Japan Times reported that those infected and their families were subjected to "an
onslaught of hostility." "Many schools have been under attack, receiving anonymous phone calls and e-
mail criticizing them and their students for 'bringing the new flu virus into the community.' 40 In
Toyooka city, the board of education received threatening emails. "Don't take the students on school
trips. If we find someone catching the virus in Disneyland, we will blame you," one email stated.
By contrast to the West where those first infected were often happy to tell reporters of their experience
with the illness-such as lain and Dawn Askham, the UK's first two confirmed cases, whose story
appeared in The Guardian along with their wedding photo prior to their honeymoon in MexiCo41in
Japan, the real names of those infected was kept private in order to help protect their safety. During
SARS, although no Japanese contracted the illness, many Japanese felt vulnerable as it spread in
neighboring Asian countries. 42 Japanese travelers returning from trips to Beijing "were met with slurs,"
recalled a Japanese psychiatrist who worked for the Japanese Embassy in Beijing at the time. He told of
cases where children were teased, called names like "Mr. SARS," and had rocks thrown at them. 43
In Egypt, authorities leveraged the concept of the H1N1 influenza virus as a "swine flu" in which pigs
were said to put the Egyptian human population at risk to justify and carry out mass culling of Egyptian
pigs, largely kept by the Zabaleen, a small Christian group of garbage collectors. Although the WHO
refuted the idea that one could get the H1N1 swine flu through contact with pigs or pork products, it did
not stop Egypt from culling the pigs. It only changed the justification to one of "public hygiene." The
decision to rid the country of pigs (a stigmatized animal considered unclean by the majority Muslim
population) is therefore suspected to be more about religious politics than public health. The political
scientist Mariz Tadros has shown how scientific arguments were used "to legitimize a response largely
grounded in a religious abhorrence of pigs and a deep-seated sectarian antipathy towards the Christian
minority who breed them and eat their meat."4
Whether one looks to the situation in Japan, where those infected had to "apologize" to the majority
uninfected population for bringing the disease into their country, or to the situation in Egypt, where the
differences between the threat of swine flu, pigs, or to the Christian minority garbage collecting
4* Setsuko Kamiya and Natsuko Fukue, "Did media go too far on swine flu?," The Japan Times, June 5, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090605f1.html, (accessed June 15, 2009).
41 Severin Carrell, "First swine flu victims in UK say they caught virus on plane home I World news
guardian.co.uk", May 1, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/01/swine-flu-askhams-plane,
(accessed July 12, 2011).
42 Teppei Imai et al., "SARS risk perceptions in healthcare workers, Japan," Emerging Infectious Diseases 11, no. 3
(March 2005): 404-410.
43 Kamiya and Fukue, "Did media go too far on swine flu?".
44 Mariz Tadros, "Scapepigging: HIN1 Influenza in Egypt," in Epidemics: Science, Governance and Social Justice, ed.
Sarah Dry and Melissa Leach (EarthScan, 2010), 214.
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population were being conflated in an effort to cull pigs, responses to the H1N1 epidemic were tinged
with fear and blame. Sociologists and historians of medicine have for this reason often argued that the
responses that societies mount in response to calamities or other hazards often reveals important
aspects of the complex social and moral universe of those societies. 45 It seems plausible, as Tadros
suggests, that Egyptian authorities in particular emphasized the threat of "swine flu" (even before a
single case had appeared in the country) because it offered a seemingly objective, rational way to justify
discriminatory actions against the Christian ethnic minority. Such scapegoating-also usually aimed at
the disadvantaged, immigrant, foreign, or otherwise already marginalized population-has defined the
human response to epidemic disease for centuries. 46 Following release from the rundown hotel where
he was kept in quarantine for seven days, Metzl felt an element of xenophobia underlined the Chinese
response: "Chinese passengers were allowed to stay in their homes during the quarantine period
instead of being confined to the high-security quarters the rest of us shared. The set-up promoted the
narrative that H1N1 was being spread by 'foreigners."'47 In the US, some dubbed the outbreak "Mexican
flu" and demanded to know why the government was not closing the border.48
In other ways, however, the H1N1 outbreak was breaking with some historical patterns. The US and
Mexico, the first two countries with known H1N1 infections, were freely reporting their cases to WHO.
To international health planners who have long feared the hiding of epidemics, such cooperation was a
major relief, and WHO repeatedly praised countries for their "transparent reporting" new cases.49
Border control measures, believed by many to represent a fear of foreigners more than a credible shield
against influenza, were not widespread but instead limited to just a few countries, and where they had
been instituted, they were being discontinued. In Japan, for instance, where at one point the
government had advised people to postpone travel to Mexico, warnings were relaxed by late May, as
were airplane screenings.50
Skepticism
Government responses grew alongside a tally of cases and deaths which steadily increased in number.
On May 22, the CDC shipped candidate virus strains to vaccine manufacturers, 51 and HHS Secretary
4s Charles E Rosenberg, "What is an epidemic? AIDS in historical perspective," Daedalus 118, no. 2 (1989): 1-17;
Douglas and Wildavsky, Risk and Culture.
46 Howard Markel, Quarantine!: East European Jewish Immigrants and the New York City Epidemics of 1892
(Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
47 Metzl, "China's ill-considered response to the HIN1 virus."
48 Cindy Carcamo, "Swine flu cases prompt calls for closing Mexican border", April 29, 2009,
http://www.ocregister.com/news/immigration-128828-mexico-coe.htm, (accessed July 12, 2011). The powerful
use of language to shape perceptions of the nature of disease and cast blame was especially evidence in the case
of AIDS, where the GRID, "gay plague" and other names proliferated. (See Paula A. Treichler, "AIDS, Homophobia,
and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification," October 43 (December 1, 1987): 31-70; Susan Sontag, Aids
and its metaphors (Penguin Books, 1990).)
49 Margaret Chan, "Influenza A(H1N1): lessons learned and preparedness", July 2, 2009,
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/influenza_hln_lessons_20090702/en/index.html, (accessed July 3,
2009).
so Isabel Reynolds, "Japan relaxes flu guidelines as cases near 300," Reuters (Tokyo, May 22, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/22/us-flu-japan-idUSTRE54J1JJ20090522, (accessed July 12, 2011).
51 Butler, "The virus grower."
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Kathleen Sebelius announced $1 billion towards development of a novel H1N1 vaccine.s2 But as the US
effort expanded, so too did skepticism over the true danger of the disease, revealing major concerns
about a media overreaction and a distinct hesitation to labeling the H1N1 outbreak a "pandemic." The
WHO's well-publicized "Phase 5" declaration of April 29 suggested that, by definition, a pandemic was
"imminent," but weeks later, the world remained in Phase 5-the so-called imminent pandemic had yet
to materialize, and doubts were growing about a disease that remained unremarkable and mild in the
vast majority of people.
"There are two groups of questions that are coming to WHO fairly often, and I think they reflect some
ongoing uncertainty and questions about the Phases and about severity," the WHO's top influenza
expert Keiji Fukuda said during a May 11 press conference.53 WHO tried to explain what to non-experts
in influenza seemed almost contradictory: the possibility of a pandemic of mild disease.
If we do go up to Phase 6 - this question has come a couple of times - what does it
mean? And I think here is where we begin to get into some of the confusion about does
this mean that the pandemic or the spread of disease has become more severe? What it
really indicates again, is that the spread of this virus has continued, has progressed and
that it has become established in other parts of the world. ... Severity is a different
characteristic, it is a different feature.54
Unlike other numerical scales, such as the five "category" Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, the
WHO explained that its six-point pandemic phase determinations were unrelated to clinical severity but
instead reflected the likelihood of occurrence of global spread. 55 Phase 5 reflected "sustained
community transmission, from person-to-person, occurring in two countries in one region, which is
North America -which is one of the WHO Regions," Fukuda said. A declaration of Phase 6 would
indicate that the spread of HIN1 had become "established in another region outside of North America
and is really going on at the community level."S6
To many outside WHO, the idea that the world could be on the verge of a "pandemic" of
overwhelmingly mild disease seemed counterintuitive. "In the past few weeks, we have been
repeatedly asked: 'Is this a mild event?'," Fukuda went on, "And I think that the response we have given
back is that we are not sure right now."
We have said that we know that most people who get infected develop mild illness, but
in fact some people develop serious illness, some of the people die. We know that
52 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Takes Additional Steps Toward Development of Vaccine
for the Novel Influenza A (H1N1)", May 22, 2009, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/05/20090522b.html,
(accessed May 27, 2009).
s3 World Health Organization, "Transcript of virtual press conference with Gregory Hartl, WHO Spokesperson for
Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases,and Dr Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General ad Interim for Health Security and
Environment, World Health Organization", May 11, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAHlN1_prbriefing_20090511.pdf, (accessed July 11, 2011).
54 ibid.
ss Fineberg, "Swine flu of 1976: lessons from the past."
56 World Health Organization, "WHO May 11, 2009 virtual press conference."
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among those people who develop serious illness and who die, we know that many of
them are young and healthy adults, people who don't normally die from an influenza
infection. This picture is changing, and so this is why we have stressed about the
evolving nature of the situation, this is why we have really refrained from jumping to
quickly to say: "this is mild", "this is something", because we know that we are seeing
things change on an almost daily basis. 7
The WHO stressed that accurately characterizing severity was a far more elusive goal. "Severity is one of
those terms and concepts that mean different things to different people," Fukuda said in response to a
USA Today reporter attending the Geneva press briefing. "What is severe to politicians, is different than
from what is severe to epidemiologists or what is severe to clinicians."
But the desire for WHO to provide some concrete statements on severity was clear. "I just want to
understand if there is any plan to sort of change the alert system so that it reflects the actual degree of
concern that should be as well as the geographical spread of it. Even though I understand that severity is
something that is hard to pin down," a German reporter asked. Another, from Canada, commented, "I
wanted to get back to the issue of severity if I could. I understand the notion that this is not what the
Phases are about. But I think it is very confusing to the public that we could be in'this Phase with a
disease that appears at the moment to be mild..."58
The WHO at first remained reluctant to clear up the confusion, because to do so to the satisfaction of
others seemed to require coupling its Pandemic Phase alert system with an evaluation of outbreak
severity, and for a variety of reasons the Organization argued that this was too complicated to do.
Nonetheless, WHO did address the severity issue, focusing on the impact the disease was having on
people-the symptoms, the frequency of severe cases and deaths. In a report it produced the same day
as the conference, "Assessing the severity of an influenza pandemic," WHO described the illness as
"overwhelmingly mild outside Mexico," tending to cause "very mild illness in otherwise healthy
people." 59 Reassuring as that might have been, WHO warned against drawing any firm conclusions
about the pandemic's overall severity, and offered many reasons to remain concerned and wary of first
impressions. First, the virus "appears to be more contagious than seasonal influenza." Second, the
population had an "almost universal vulnerability to infection" and a higher prevalence of chronic
diseases in today's population (of particular concern because of "the tendency of the H1N1 virus to
cause more severe and lethal infections" in such populations). In addition, pandemics were said to
come in waves. "The emergence of an inherently more virulent virus during the course of a pandemic
can never be ruled out," WHO warned. Finally there was concern about poor nations. "The same virus
that causes only mild symptoms in countries with strong health systems can be devastating in other
countries where health systems are weak...."
s7 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59World Health Organization, "Assessing the severity of an influenza pandemic", May 11, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/assess/disease_swinefluassess_20090511/en/index.htm, (accessed
May 12, 2009).
Page 114
2009 H1N1 Influenza: scare, skepticism, and accusation
It was a mixed message, and responses among the public were equally polarized. Emergency rooms
reported being overwhelmed with walk-in visits from healthy people, symptom free, who just wanted to
be checked to make sure they did not have swine flu.60 Others were skeptical, "even mocking," the New
York Times wrote, at the idea that people would alter their daily life in response to a mild disease that
had still affected so few people."
Publicly, governments were loathe to appear as if they were not taking the threat seriously. In
Singapore, which lost 33 of its citizens to SARS in 2003, the government announced that it was ready to
fight a "new war" against H1N1.62 In Japan, cases of the new disease were being reported daily in press
briefings held at the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare-and newspapers gave the matter front
page coverage for weeks. The pattern repeated around the world, as more and more countries
discovered H1N1 cases within their borders. But privately, a number of nations were becoming
increasingly alarmed about the WHO's pandemic alert system. They worried about the proportionality
between the response and the severity of the disease. The chairman of the WHO's special Emergency
Committee later recalled that "several countries made quite an impassioned plea" that WHO did not
prematurely declare Phase 6.63
At an emergency meeting of nations in Bangkok on May 8, Asian ASEAN+3 nations convened to consider
the proper response. They were joined by the WHO's Fukuda and senior officials from CDC, linked by
64video conference . Here, CDC's Schuchat delivered some good news: further investigations of the
Mexico situation had revealed that "severity is not as grave as what was originally reported from
colleagues in Mexico." Schuchat nevertheless argued that responding to the outbreak must remain "our
highest priority. "6 The WHO addressed the pandemic declaration issue, repeating that a Phase 6
declaration "does not mean that the disease is becoming more severe." Although transcripts of this
meeting are not publicly available, it would seem that at least some members of the ASEAN+3 group
were uncomfortable with the WHO's approach to declaring pandemics. Keiji Fukuda later told media
that at this meeting, WHO was encouraged to take "into consideration everything which ought to be
considered"-not just the virus's spread.
The WHO was taking notes. By mid-May, a Phase 6 declaration seemed eminent. "The number of swine
flu cases in Japan soared over the weekend, raising the likelihood that the World Health Organization
will soon have to raise its pandemic alert level to 6," the New York Times reported on May 18. New
60 Madison Park, "'Walking well' flood hospitals with -- or without -- flu symptoms", May 2, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/02/worried.well.hospitals/index.html, (accessed July 3, 2009).
6 Monica Davey, "Thousands Face a Balancing Act Over Flu Fears," The New York Times, May 1, 2009, sec. Health,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/health/01fear.html?_r=1, (accessed July 12, 2011); Park, "'Walking well'
flood hospitals with -- or without -- flu symptoms."
6 Bertha Henson, "S'pore geared up to fight swine flu," Straits Times, April 30, 2009.
6 John Mackenzie, quoted in Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International
Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (HiNi) 2009", May 5, 2011, 78,
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/WHA64/A64_10-en.pdf, (accessed May 5, 2011).
64 Tokyo Development Learning Center, "ASEAN +3 on A/H1N1 Crisis", May 8, 2009,
http://www.jointokyo.org/en/featured_stories/story/asean_3_on_a_hln1_crisis/, (accessed March 30, 2011).
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H1N1 infections were turning up in increasing numbers in Japan and the United Kingdom, both nations
outside of the WHO region initially hit. If the outbreaks in those countries were deemed "community-
level" outbreaks, the HIN1 virus had met the Phase 6 definition. All that remained was the WHO
announcement to make it official.
That very day, however, criticism towards WHO was intensifying over the appropriateness of the
Pandemic Phase Alert system. At the World Health Assembly meeting in Geneva-the WHO's most
important annual meeting-representatives from the UK, Japan, China-even Mexico-urged the WHO
to reconsider its pandemic scale.66 "We need to give you and your team more flexibility as to whether
we move to phase 6," UK health secretary Alan Johnson diplomatically informed the WHO's Director-
General .67
In response, the WHO suggested it would rewrite its Phase 6 definition. Following the World Health
Assembly (WHA), Keiji Fukuda told reporters that the pandemic planning process had been "driven by
concerns about avian influenza," and the pandemic phases were a product of that thinking about what
that disease might look like if it became a pandemic. He continued:
At the WHA, what the countries raised was a concern and they said that currently the
criteria from going to 5 to 6 are based on geographical spread, and this is true. ... These
were the criteria which were developed by the scientists advising and working with
WHO over the past couple of years and in a sense they were developed to provide very
clear criteria about the evolution of a potential pandemic.
But what the countries have said is that we are in a situation that is different than the
spread of H5N1. In fact most of the cases that we are seeing right now are clinically mild
and we are not having the kind of high death rates that we might expect if we were to
see an H5N1 pandemic. Moreover, what the countries said is that we are in this mixed
situation and we are concerned that if we go to Phase 6 the message to our populations
will be: "You should be very afraid", whereas in fact we think that it indicates that the
virus is spreading out but the level of fear should not go up and there should not be an
increase in anxiety. So, in taking these comments in from countries, what we did, what
we thought about and what we discussed, is that right now, when we step back and say
what is most important, the most important things are that, countries are as prepared
as possible. This is a single most important action and this is a single biggest help that
WHO can provide to countries. ...
The large lesson that we have learnt here is that the response to these kinds of
situations really have to be flexible, they cannot be rigid according to pre-made plans
and I think that the comments from the countries reflect their same assessment of the
6 Frank Jordans, "WHO bows to pressure not to declare pandemic", May 19, 2009,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-19/news/17202546_1_pandemic-announcement-swine-flu-new-influenza,
(accessed October 20, 2010).
6 A. O'Dowd, "UK urges more flexibility in criteria for flu pandemic alerts," BMJ 338, no. may21 3 (May 2009):
b2067-b2067.
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situation. We have to have some level of flexibility here. Taking all of this into
consideration at the here and now I cannot tell you what the new criteria for Phase 6
are, but I can tell you that what we are looking for and what we will be looking for is
something which are events which signify a really substantial increase in risk of harm to
people.
This is the sense of what Phase 6 is meant to convey and this is what we will be focusing
on. This has been a very interesting request from countries, it has led to very intense
discussions about what is the appropriate response to pandemic influenza at this stage
and given this evolution. This really reflects where we are, right now, at this time. 8
Indications that the WHO would listen to Member States' concern triggered a mixed set of reactions.
The New York Times read the WHO's response as suggestive that "the swine flu circling the globe will
probably never be declared a full-fledged pandemic."69 The well-known risk communication consultants
Peter Sandman and Jody Sandman (whose clients have included the WHO) posted a "tongue-in-cheek
'modest proposal'." 70
If WHO decides not to call a widespread "mild" swine-origin Influenza A/H1N1 pandemic
a pandemic, then we believe they are obliged to announce that the H2N2 event of 1957
and the H3N2 event of 1968 were also not pandemics.
They should then announce that the last influenza pandemic occurred in 1918, and
there have been no flu pandemics since that time.
WHO should also review the list of pre-1918 "pandemics" and decide which of those
events were also not really pandemics, so we can re-calculate how many times per
century, on average, a pandemic can be expected.
That way, we can be doubly relieved: Not only that swine flu H1N1 isn't a pandemic, but
also that pandemics are very much rarer than previously thought.71
These critiques suggested that the WHO's interest in listening to Member States and rewriting the rules
for a Phase 6 declaration amounted to putting politics ahead of science. "I think it is unnecessary and
even foolish for WHO to change its definition of 'pandemic' in order to avoid frightening people with the
6 World Health Organization, "Transcript of virtual press conference with Gregory Hartl, WHO Spokesperson for
Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases,and Dr Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General ad Interim for Health Security and
Environment, World Health Organization", May 22, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAH1N1_presstranscript_20090522.pdf, (accessed July 11, 2011).
69 Donald G. McNeil Jr, "W.H.O. to Rewrite Its Pandemic Rules," The New York Times, May 23, 2009, sec. Health /
Health Care Policy, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/health/policy/23who.html, (accessed October 9, 2010).
7 Personal correspondence with Peter Sandman, November 17, 2010.
7 Peter Sandman and Jody Lanard, quoted in "Revere" (pseudonym), "When is a pandemic not a pandemic?,"
Effect Measure, May 19, 2009,
http://scienceblogs.com/effectmeasure/2009/05/when_is_a_pandemic-not_apande.php, (accessed May 21,
2009).
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word," Peter Sandman commented. Elsewhere, virologist Vincent Racaniello wrote in an agitated
online post: "According to the virology textbooks (one of which I wrote), the word pandemic means
'global epidemic'. ... WHO redefining pandemic is absurd. Pandemic is an epidemiological definition that
has nothing to do with virulence. ... WHO should leave textbook writing to others. ... a pandemic is a
pandemic."73 Nature magazine's influenza beat reporter Declan Butler editorialized that redefining
Phase 6 would amount to 'moving the goalposts'. "Adding a requirement of severity may sound like
common sense. But it is not, because the severity of a pandemic is unpredictable," he wrote. Using
many of the arguments WHO had previously laid out, Butler argued that:
... what might be deemed a mild disease in a rich country with many doctors, drugs and
intensive-care units might be more severe and cause considerable mortality in a poor
country with little health infrastructure, and where underlying diseases may worsen
outcomes of a flu infection.
So what's the big hang-up with calling a pandemic a pandemic? Those fretting over the
term include news pundits in denial about the scale of the threat, along with politicians
and scientists who fear that using the word may induce public panic.74
"The importance of the phase 6 designation is overrated," Butler declared. "It is time to call a pandemic
a pandemic."
Some notable authorities, however, showed more sympathy for the delicacy of the situation. "The
formalization of an influenza pandemic does have cascading consequences," former champion of
pandemic preparedness, HHS secretary Michael Leavitt told Bloomberg news. Likewise, Alan Kendal, the
former head of the CDC's influenza laboratory, said that "Much of our preparation for a pandemic was
done in anticipation of a more lethal virus ... this is taking us by surprise in that it doesn't appear so
lethal.",7
New York Times veteran health reporter Lawrence K. Altman commented in a column: "After decades of
warnings about the inevitability of another pandemic of influenza, it is astonishing that health officials
have failed to make clear to the public, even to many colleagues, what they mean by the word
pandemic."7 Altman's article was titled, "Is This a Pandemic? Define 'Pandemic'," and was just one of a
number of articles questioning the meaning of a pandemic. Two days later, the Times carried an op-ed
"When is a Pandemic Not a Pandemic?" in which science journalist Laurie Garrett argued that the WHO
needed to include a severity-like measure into its pandemic categorization schema similar to what is
Helen Branswell, "WHO under pressure from member states to rewrite pandemic requirement", May 23, 2009,
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Politics/2009/05/22/pf-9539386.html, (accessed August 14, 2009).
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done for hurricanes: "in the case of the H1N1 swine flu, WHO should declare that the world is now
facing a Phase 6 pandemic influenza spread, caused by a Category 1 organism of low severity."77
All guesses off
The absence of extreme morbidity and mortality was not the only expectation that the H1N1 outbreak
was defying. Not only did the virus usually only cause mild illness, but it had seemed to have emerged
from Mexico. For decades, scientists had considered Southeast Asia to be the epicenter of novel
emerging influenza viruses. As new influenza viruses were believed to be the result of mutation that
takes place in animal hosts, the close proximity between humans, pigs, and birds in Southeast Asia was
believed to increase the likelihood that a pandemic virus would be conceived in this area of the world.
Southern China's wet poultry markets were in particular singled out by both the expert and lay press as
a dangerous "breeding ground" for pandemic viruses. Most cases of H5N1 had also appeared in that
part of the world, giving experts faith in the theory. Some had even suggested a large stockpile of anti-
influenza vaccines, drugs, masks and gloves be established in Hong Kong-"the middle of the ecological
zone that has spawned the bulk of all influenza strains known to have emerged over the last three
decades."08
Nor was the new H1N1 of avian origin. So common was the conception that the next pandemic would
be caused by an avian influenza virus that by mid 2009 "bird flu" had become virtually interchangeable
with "pandemic flu."79 The ubiquity of government pandemic preparedness promotional materials
discussing the difference between pandemic, avian, and seasonal forms of influenza suggests most
people were unaware of the difference." While human infections with swine influenza viruses were
well known to occur-a few cases each year had been consistently discovered for decades81-the
possibility of a human pandemic with a swine influenza origin virus had been little discussed since the
1976 "fiasco." The attention of most experts was rather on tracking the evolution of avian influenza
viruses-and worldwide surveillance of birds had increased to unprecedented levels in response to
pandemic preparedness funding.
Another well established concept toppled by the H1N1 outbreak was the expectation that two doses of
a pandemic influenza vaccine would be necessary to prevent infection. Unlike seasonal influenza
vaccines, which are only administered once except in some cases such as small children, the working
assumption had been that a pandemic influenza vaccine would need to be administered to all
individuals twice before the desired level of antibody response could be achieved. This assumption in
fact lasted well into June, when US officials announced that they were planning for a vaccination
program of 600 million doses-twice the US population-by far, the largest and most costly vaccination
77 Laurie Garrett, "When Is a Pandemic Not a Pandemic?," The New York Times, June 11, 2009, sec. Opinion,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/opinion/11iht-edgarrett.html?ref=global, (accessed June 10, 2009).
78 Laurie Garrett and David P. Fidler, "Sharing H5N1 Viruses to Stop a Global Influenza Pandemic," PLoS Med 4, no.
11 (November 20, 2007): e330.
79 Bonneux and Van Damme, "An iatrogenic pandemic of panic."
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Pandemic Flu Questions and Answers."
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82program ever. But by September, the story had dramatically changed. Two early studies of the novel
H1N1 vaccine indicated that a single dose of the new vaccine was sufficient to produce the desired
antibody response.83
What was more, other data indicated that not everyone even needed the vaccine. At the same time the
WHO was defending its aggressive response to HIN1, repeating the consensus view that there an
"almost universal vulnerability of the world's population to infection,"84 (Table 3.1), evidence from early
studies of blood serum was suggesting a substantial level of pre-existing immunity to the new virus
among the elderly population.85 Days later, on May 29, in a more technical report published in the
WHO's Weekly Epidemiological Record, the WHO reversed its position, and spoke of "pre-existing
immunity" to a novel pandemic virus. "The vulnerability of a population to a pandemic virus is related in
part to the level of pre-existing immunity to the virus," the report stated. "Depending on the pandemic
virus, certain segments of the population (for example, the elderly) might already be partially immune
because of previous infection."86 Indeed, data published four days after Chan's speech to the World
Health Assembly indicated that one-third of Americans aged 60 years and above were immune to the
virus. A report published later suggested that even before the emergence of the 2009 HIN1 virus,
nearly one in five Americans (19%) had pre-existing antibody concentrations considered protective to
prevent infection.8 Data collected in clinical trials in other countries such as Australia confirmed the
presence of high levels of pre-existing antibodies, particularly in the elderly adult population."
Another accepted wisdom prior to the emergence of HINI was that influenza pandemics are caused by
new subtypes of influenza viruses. Prior to 2009, officials suggested that only new subtypes of influenza
were capable of causing a pandemic of influenza (Table 3.2). As the CDC wrote in 2006:
Seasonal outbreaks are caused by subtypes of influenza viruses that already circulate
among people (for example, influenza A (H3N2) and A (HIN1) viruses have circulated
8 Mike Stobbe, "Swine flu shot campaign could involve 600M doses," The Associated Press, June 27, 2009,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hjdCHrP82YTFser5vD6CzTKlaz6wD992K3L01, (accessed
June 29, 2009).
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of Medicine 361, no. 25 (December 2009): 2405-2413; Tristan W. Clark et al., "Trial of 2009 Influenza A (H1N1)
Monovalent MF59-Adjuvanted Vaccine," New England Journal of Medicine 361, no. 25 (December 2009): 2424-
2435.
8 Margaret Chan, "Concern over flu pandemic justified", May 18, 2009,
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58, no. 19 (May 22, 2009): 521-524.
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among people since 1977). In contrast, pandemic outbreaks are caused by new
subtypes, by subtypes that have never circulated among people, or by subtypes that
have not circulated among people for a long time.89
When several human infections of the new influenza virus subtype H1N2 were reported in early 2002,
CDC posted a message addressing questions about the likelihood of a pandemic:
Is this the start of a pandemic?
No. A pandemic virus has to have a new hemagglutinin or a new hemagglutinin and
neuraminidase protein on an influenza A virus that has not circulated among humans
and to which most or all of the population has no protective antibodies. Because the
H1N2 virus has the hemagglutinin of the currently circulating H1N1 virus and the
neuraminidase of the currently circulating H3N2 virus, most people will have been
exposed to and have antibodies against these viruses.90
But since the early days of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, officials were no longer sticking to this conventional
view. In a press conference, the CDC addressed the issue head on, arguing that while the HIN1 virus
found in 2009 was not a new subtype-indeed another H1N1 virus had been continuously circulating
among the human population since 1977-the virus was different enough to render the subtype issue
moot.
... based on the distance, if you want to call it that, of this new H1N1 from the previously
circulating seasonal H1N1, there's a very good distance. It's a long way away. And so
while it may not be a different subtype, it is distant enough for us to be very concerned
about its potential impact. And so, in that sense, the drift versus shift is an ongoing
discussion, but I think the distance between it and its nearest cousins is far enough that
we're going to treat it in a way that we want to make sure that the most people are
protected. 91
The severity issue
Most of the inconsistencies aroused little concern. Influenza was unpredictable, after all. Perhaps in
this light the emergence of a swine and not avian influenza virus is understandable. So, too, is its
emergence in Mexico, not Southeast Asia. The need for only one dose of the vaccine instead of two-
and pre-existing immunity in a good proportion of the elderly population-were also unexpected, but
welcome news. These inconsistencies did not challenge expert credibility. Nor were many concerned
by the fact that the H1N1 outbreak was not simultaneous in all parts of the world as WHO had
predicted.
89 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Pandemic Flu Questions and Answers."
90 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Questions and Answers About Influenza A(H1N2) Viruses",
n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/h1n2qa.htm, (accessed June 25, 2009).
91 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts May 20, 2009", May 20, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t0905 20.htm, (accessed May 21, 2009).
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What did cause concern was the mildness of it all. To be sure, a mild pandemic was better than a severe
pandemic. But years of pandemic preparedness had built the expectation among the public as well as
officials, that pandemics were necessarily catastrophic events. By late May the virus had spread to over
fifty countries around the world with over 15,000 cases reported to the WHO, 92 yet nowhere was the
outbreak causing the economic or social disruption that officials had long predicted.93
"There are some pandemics that look very much like a bad flu season," the CDC's acting director matter-
of-factly explained in an official 'webcast', 94 countering popular assumptions reinforced by years of
official statements about pandemic influenza such as: "rates of illness and death from influenza-related
complications can increase dramatically" (CDC 95), "particularly virulent strains of flu that spread rapidly
from person to person," (HHS 96) "large numbers of deaths will occur," (WH0 97) and "greater magnitude
than even the most severe epidemic of 'ordinary' flu" (UK98).
Pandemic of "moderate" severity declared
H1N1 was not shaping up to be the outbreak experts had predicted, but in the end, the WHO did not
rewrite its pandemic phase definitions, and on June 11, 2009, Margaret Chan declared "the start of the
2009 influenza pandemic." 99
"Worldwide, the number of deaths is small," Chan said, "and we have to brace ourselves to see more."
"On present evidence, the overwhelming majority of patients experience mild symptoms and make a
rapid and full recovery, often in the absence of any form of medical treatment." Despite this, Chan
described the pandemic as one of "moderate severity," a phrase that would get repeated for months in
the world press representing the WHO's official determination of the pandemic severity level.
The "moderate severity" phrase had surfaced at least a week earlier when Keiji-Fukuda used it at a press
conference in Geneva. "In terms of an overall assessment of the severity of what we are seeing, it is
probably fair to call the situation something like 'moderate' right now," Fukuda said. "We do have some
hesitation in calling the situation mild for a couple of reasons." First, Fukuda explained, WHO did not
feel it had "a full handle on the number of people with serious illnesses." Second, "this infection can be
fatal in a number of individuals and this includes both people who have some underlying medical
92 World Health Organization, "Influenza A(H1N1) - update 41", May 29, 2009,
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_29/en/index.html, (accessed July 12, 2011).
9 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza."
94 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "H1N1 Flu Update with HHS Sec. Kathleen Sebelius", April 30,
2009, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/secretarywebcast.html, (accessed May 25, 2009).
95 Carolyn B. Bridges et al., "Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 49, no. 3 (April 14, 2000): 1-38; quiz CEl-
7.
96 National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, "Flu (Influenza) Definitions
and Overview", October 14, 2008,
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/understandingFlu/DefinitionsOverview.htm, (accessed July 17, 2009).
9 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza."
9 UK Department of Health, "Explaining pandemic flu."
99 Margaret Chan, "Transcript of statement by Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization",
June 11, 2009, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAHlNlpresstranscript_2009061l.pdf.
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conditions - it includes women who are pregnant - but it also includes people who are perfectly
healthy, and so we do have some hesitation calling such an infection mild."' 00 Fukuda suggested the
"moderate" determination was made on a three-point scale of mild-moderate-severe.
Chan's pandemic declaration emphasized the unusual epidemiology of the new disease:
We know that the novel H1N1 virus preferentially infects younger people. In nearly all
areas with large and sustained outbreaks, the majority of cases have occurred in people
under the age of 25 years.
In some of these countries, around 2% of cases have developed severe illness, often
with very rapid progression to life-threatening pneumonia.
Most cases of severe and fatal infections have been in adults between the ages of 30
and 50 years.
This pattern is significantly different from that seen during epidemics of seasonal
influenza, when most deaths occur in frail elderly people.
Many, though not all, severe cases have occurred in people with underlying chronic
conditions. Based on limited, preliminary data, conditions most frequently seen include
respiratory diseases, notably asthma, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, autoimmune
disorders, and obesity.
At the same time, it is important to note that around one third to half of the severe and
fatal infections are occurring in previously healthy young and middle-aged people.
The WHO offered advice to countries at different stages in the pandemic:
Although the pandemic appears to have moderate severity in comparatively well-off
countries, it is prudent to anticipate a bleaker picture as the virus spreads to areas with
limited resources, poor health care, and a high prevalence of underlying medical
problems. ...
Countries should prepare to see cases, or the further spread of cases, in the near future.
Countries where outbreaks appear to have peaked should prepare for a second wave of
infection. ... Countries with no or only a few cases should remain vigilant.
Countries with widespread transmission should focus on the appropriate management
of patients. The testing and investigation of patients should be limited, as such
measures are resource intensive and can very quickly strain capacities.'
World Health Organization, "Transcript of virtual press conference with Gregory Hartl, WHO Spokesperson for
Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases, and Dr Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General ad Interim for Health Security
and Environment, World Health Organization", June 2, 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/influenzaAHlNlpresstranscript_20090602.pdf.
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In the US, where a press conference was similarly convened to respond to the WHO declaration, the
CDC's newly sworn in director Dr. Thomas Frieden explained that "really for all intents and purposes, the
U.S. government has been in phase 6 of the pandemic for some time now." But the WHO's declaration
of Phase 6 "is important because it does send the strong message that virus is here, it's in all likelihood
here to stay, and it's important that we continue our aggressive efforts to prepare and respond." 0
"Here in the United States we've been reacting as though we were in a pandemic already in terms of our
intensive efforts to prepare individuals and respond as a nation," echoed Dr. Anne Schuchat, who
advised communities which had not yet responded that it was time to "dust off those pandemic plans."
On the severity question, Schuchat said, "Right now the World Health Organization is characterizing this
as a moderately severe pandemic. They're not saying it is the same thing as that 1918 devastating
pandemic, but it's something we have to take seriously and we need the countries to be paying
attention to." Contrasting the disease against seasonal influenza, Schuchat explained that the CDC was
seeing a disproportionate amount of illness in younger people as compared with the elderly, and "a
disproportionate amount of pregnant women among those who have had infection."
The language of the press conference was dramatic. "This is a shared responsibility -- government,
health care providers, the private sector and the public," Director Frieden announced. "All of us are in
this together to respond to what can be a challenging situation." Frieden noted that "Up until now we
have been fortunate that we have not seen a level of severity that's greater than seasonal flu." Frieden
nonetheless emphasized the uncertainty surrounding the situation. "We wish we could foresee the
future. We wish we could know what course it will take. But what we're doing now is getting
information as effectively as we can so that we can take the steps that are most sensible now to reduce
the number of people severely ill or tragically, who may die from H1N1 influenza."
The rhetoric of H1N1 came to be dominated by a language of extremes-that on one side stressed the
moral gravity of the situation (the "shared responsibility," the need to "dust off" pandemic plans, news
of "tragic" deaths and a disproportionate burden of illness on the youngest members of society) and on
the other, increased public skepticism (messages that H1N1 was no worse than seasonal influenza). As
cases increased in September and October and outbreaks at schools and colleges received wide media
attention, concern rose along with demands for a vaccine that had not yet been produced in large
quantities.
Yet anxieties existed alongside a broad-based questioning of officials' recommendations. "Fewer than
half of Americans say that they are planning to receive the new H1N1 swine flu vaccine, according to
recent polls," NPR reported in October, as the vaccination program in the US was just beginning to
deliver its first doses. "The public's skepticism over the vaccine has persisted despite health experts'
1 Chan, "Transcript of statement by Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization."
1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcripts June 11, 2009", June 11, 2009,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/to9o611.htm, (accessed June 13, 2009).
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warning that the unpredictable H1N1 virus, which can cause very severe complications even in healthy
young adults and children, has reached pandemic proportions."10 3
Many blamed celebrity media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, and Bill Maher for
causing undue public skepticism over the vaccine. 10 4 But polls in the UK, Hong Kong, and Israel indicated
that from one quarter to two-thirds of the public and health care workers were planning to refuse the
novel H1N1 vaccine as well.io In 2006, the WHO had assumed that a production capacity sufficient to
vaccinate all of the world's inhabitants would be required in a pandemic.116 But in 2009, the new
surveys put such assumptions in doubt. In Hong Kong, more than half of 8500 healthcare workers
surveyed indicated they would not be vaccinated because of concerns about the vaccine's safety.10 7 In
Israel, the ministry of health reported 25% of its population was not willing to be vaccinated.108
In Canada, the former chief medical officer of health in Ontario declared: "It's really not causing - and is
not going to cause and nowhere has caused - significant levels of illness or death." Dr. Richard Schabas
told the Canadian CBC News that H1N1 had "ultimately turned out to be, from a pandemic perspective,
a dud."' 09
Disease statistics were also fast becoming the source of considerable scrutiny. As science studies
scholar Steven Epstein has shown in the case of AIDS, statistics are not always the sole domain of
officials or scientists, but can at times be appropriated by lay and activist groups to strengthen claims in
battles over legitimacy, public opinion, and policy." 0 At the beginning of the H1N1 outbreak, each case,
hospitalization and death had garnered immense attention and caused substantial fear, documenting
the spread and impact of the disease. But as the largest mass vaccination program in history kicked off
in countries around the world, the threat itself began to look a lot less threatening. Whereas in past
year, officials had employed statistics like "36,000 deaths" per year to convince the public to get
vaccinated, in 2009, the tables had turned, and public commentators were making use of official
statistics to challenge the need for vaccination. Compared to seasonal influenza, H1N1 deaths seemed
paltry. In September, an article on the NewAmerican website commented:
The current death toll varies depending on the source. A recent WHO report pegged the
number of deaths worldwide at 2,138 since April, although some U.S. government
103 Kevin Whitelaw, "Flu, Me? Public Remains Wary Of H1N1 Vaccine," NPR.org, October 17, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=113873021, (accessed July 12, 2011).
04 ibid.
10s Zosia Kmietowicz, "Opposition to swine flu vaccine seems to be growing worldwide," BMJ 339, no. aug26_1
(August 26, 2009): b3461.
106 Marie Paule Kieny et al., "A global pandemic influenza vaccine action plan," Vaccine 24, no. 40-41 (September
29, 2006): 6367-6370.
J. S Y Chor et al., "Willingness of Hong Kong healthcare workers to accept pre-pandemic influenza vaccination at
different WHO alert levels: two questionnaire surveys," BMJ 339, no. aug25 2 (August 2009): b3391-b3391.
108 Kmietowicz, "Opposition to swine flu vaccine seems to be growing worldwide."
109 CBC News, "HIN1 a 'dud' pandemic, Ont. health official says," CBC News, November 12, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2009/11/12/hlnl-vaccine-costs.html, (accessed November 17, 2009).
110 Steven Epstein, Impure science: AIDS, activism, and the politics of knowledge (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996).
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reports place the number around 3,000. While these deaths are tragic, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control claims that seasonal flu kills 36,000 Americans every year ... one can
see that, taking the high number of 3,000 deaths worldwide in five months, the death
toll of H1N1 pales compared to their [CDC and WHO's] estimate of the death toll of the
seasonal flu.m'
CDC's initial estimates of the US mortality impact of H1N1 were released in November: 3,900. Over
time, this estimate was revised, and eventually incorporated an entire year-from April 2009 to April
2010. But the CDC's full year estimate, 12,470 deaths, still fell far short of the familiar 36,000 figure
from "ordinary" influenza.
* * *
By late November 2009, epidemiological data was indicating a steep decline in cases. The "second
wave" seemed to be nearing its end, and public demand for vaccines was low. 12 But officials
maintained their aggressive approach, realizing that acting too strongly might cost them valuable
credibility. "Privately, federal health officials say they fear that if they concede the flu has peaked,
Americans will become complacent and lose interest in being vaccinated, increasing the chances of
another wave," New York Times health reporter Donald McNeil, Jr. wrote.1 3 But a period of broad-
based reflection and assessment was nonetheless beginning to take hold as cases of HIN1 retreated
with no sign of a "third wave."" 4
Nowhere was this more true than in Europe. There, questions were being asked-what worked and
what did not? Had the responses been appropriate? And had advice been taken on a firm scientific
basis? Many countries health authorities had launched large, and costly responses to combat H1N1. In
the UK, where the total response cost around US $1.8 billion," 5 a National Pandemic Flu Service was set
into action. Antiviral medications were dispensed over the internet, bypassing clinical consultation, with
prescriptions delivered through the web or telephone based on an individual's self-reported symptoms.
Other public health and clinical activity came to "a virtual standstill during the first wave," one doctor in
the UK reported. 11 "Most routine work was put to one side," a Joint Director of Public Health in
Britain's National Health Service recalled. "Sometimes our speed was, in hindsight, perhaps too quick.
For instance, we wrote to all our residents to inform them of their NHS number to use on the National
m John Burns, "Chicken Little and the Swine Flu Scare," NewAmerican, September 16, 2009,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/1899-chicken-little-and-the-swine-flu-scare, (accessed July
17, 2011).
m Council of Europe, "The handling of the HINI pandemic: more transparency needed", June 7, 2010, 15,
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12283.pdf, (accessed June 10, 2010).
m Donald G. McNeil, Jr, "Signs Swine Flu Wave May Have Peaked in U.S.," The New York Times, November 20,
2009, sec. Health, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/health/21flu.html?_r=1, (accessed November 27, 2009).
14 Heath A Kelly, "A Pandemic Response To a Disease of Predominantly Seasonal Intensity," The Medical Journal ofAustralia 192, no. 2 (January 18, 2010): 81-83.
us Jacqui Wise, "UK response to H1N1 pandemic was highly satisfactory, independent review says," BMJ 341, no.jul05 1 (July 2010): c3569-c3569.
Dyfed Wyn Huws, "Flu pandemonium," Public Health Today, March 2010.
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Flu Line. This cost us f80k, and wasn't necessary in the end...."" 7 A report from 2010, compiled via a
Freedom of Information Act request, revealed that to respond to the pandemic, one in six primary care
trusts had been forced to cut other services. 18
As part of their pandemic preparedness activities prior to the 2009 outbreak, various countries had also
established contracts with vaccine manufacturers assuring them a supply of pandemic influenza
vaccines in the event of a pandemic. Some of these contracts, such as GlaxoSmithKline's contracts with
Britain, Belgium, France,1"9 Switzerland, Denmark, and Iceland 20 would be set in motion once WHO
declared a pandemic. These "sleeping contracts," to use the terminology of the UK government, were
"to be triggered by WHO declaring a pandemic."' 2 ' Reports in the media that the committees advising
the WHO on its response to the pandemic were working with the pharmaceutical industry raised
questions about the scientific objectivity of those decisions. 22 In one case, a Finnish vaccine advisor to
WHO, the deputy director general of the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, had received
E5.6 million from GlaxoSmithKline (a vaccine manufacturer) for research on vaccines in 2009. But he did
not disclose this information to WHO before its meeting of the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on
Immunization (SAGE) to discuss H1N1 influenza vaccine in October 2009, a fact which only came to
attention following a freedom of information request by a Danish newspaper. WHO, subsequently
contacted about the matter, said it was satisfied there were no conflicts of interest in this case.'
"WHO is aware of some concerns, expressed in the media, that ties with the pharmaceutical industry
among experts on the Organization's advisory bodies may influence policy decisions, especially those
relating to the influenza pandemic," the WHO wrote on its website. 2 4 "Conflicts of interest: safeguards
in place," "Criticisms: understandable but unfounded" the WHO declared in a briefing note, arguing that
the Organization had robust measures in place to guard against the improper influence of industry on its
decision making.
117 Caron Grainger, "Twitter and blogs helped put Coventry ahead on flu," Public Health Today, March 2010.
118 A. O'Dowd, "Trusts forced to cut services because of costs of swine flu," BMJ 340, no. may07 1 (May 2010):
c2485-c2485.
Maria Cheng and Frank Jordans, "WHO gears to declare swine flu pandemic", June 10, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-10-WHO-flu_N.htm, (accessed June 10, 2010).
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pandemic", July 2010, 21,
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(January 12, 2010): c201.
124 World Health Organization, "WHO use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic", December
3, 2009, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/briefing_20091203/en/index.html, (accessed April 29,
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However, WHO's reassurances did not put the matter to rest. Earlier reporting in the European press
had indicated that the so-called "Emergency Committee" that WHO Director-General Margaret Chan
had assembled to provide advice on Pandemic Phase declarations-the very group that advised Chan to
declare H1N1 a pandemic-was itself secret. Its membership, even size, was undisclosed. About this
group, the WHO statement only said: "All members of the Emergency Committee sign a confidentiality
agreement, provide a declaration of interests, and agree to give their consultative time freely, without
compensation." 125
Accusation: decision making under scrutiny
On December 18, a motion was introduced in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
proposing an investigation into the WHO's handling of the pandemic. Titled "Faked Pandemics - a threat
for health," its fourteen co-signers declared:
In order to promote their patented drugs and vaccines against flu, pharmaceutical
companies have influenced scientists and official agencies, responsible for public health
standards, to alarm governments worldwide. They have made them squander tight
health care resources for inefficient vaccine strategies and needlessly exposed millions
of healthy people to the risk of unknown side-effects of insufficiently tested vaccines. 26
The Council of Europe-a sixty year old body with 47 member nations which works to promote human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law throughout Europe-adopted the motion. At the first of its two
public hearings, held in January, Dr. Wolfgang Wodarg, former German member of parliament and
chairman of the Subcommittee for Health in the Council of Europe, who had introduced the motion, told
the audience:
We were told this was a 'flu which would threaten humanity, and millions would fall ill.
This is why millions of dollars of medications were bought. The WHO basically held the
trigger for the pandemic preparedness plans, they had a key role to play in deciding on
the pandemic. Around 18 billion dollars was spent on this pandemic worldwide.2
Wodarg discussed the role of pandemic vaccine contracts that many countries had entered into with
pharmaceutical companies, the details of which were still largely secret (except in some instances where
1s Six months later, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan explained its reasoning: "Our decision not to make
these names public was motivated by a desire to protect the experts from commercial or other influences. The
members themselves welcomed this decision as a protective measure, and not as an attempt to veil their
deliberations and decisions in secrecy." Margaret Chan, "WHO Director-General's letter to BMJ editors", June 8,
2010, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/letterbmj_20100608/en/index.htm, (accessed
June 15, 2010).
1 Wolfgang Wodarg, "Faked Pandemics - a threat for health", December 18, 2009,
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/eDOC1211O.pdf, (accessed July 11, 2011).
1 Council of Europe, "Extracts of statements made by the leading participants at the public hearing on 'The
handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed?', organised by the Committee on Social, Health and
Family Affairs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg on Tuesday 26 January
2010", January 26, 2010, http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?D=900,
(accessed July 12, 2011).
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the contracts had been leaked by whistleblowers). Not only did contracts exist which would guarantee
countries a priority supply of vaccine upon a WHO declaration of a pandemic, but several of the
contracts shielded companies from any legal liability should side-effects occur following vaccination, as
they did in the 1976 "swine flu" in the United States.
Such was the case in the UK, which had not made details of its contracts public, but was reported to
have granted HIN1 vaccine makers legal immunity from compensation claims. 128 In the US, legal
immunity from lawsuits related to "2009 H1N1 Vaccines and any associated adjuvants" was likewise
granted to both vaccine manufacturers and federal officials by declaration under the Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act.129 The decision was made the previous June, well in advance
of a supply of actual vaccine, and was "intended to encourage manufactures to produce vaccine, and
other entities to participate in distribution, dispensing, administration, and use of the vaccine," the HHS
explained on its website.3
"WHO basically held the trigger for the implementation of the pandemic preparedness plans and with
this for high revenues for the involved producers of pandemic vaccines and some antiviral drugs,"
Wodarg told the Council of Europe.' "The pharmaceutical companies must have been waiting for this
announcement, which was made even though the flu was relatively mild." 32
Dr. Ulrich Keil, a German epidemiologist and director of the WHO Collaborating Centre for epidemiology
and prevention of cardiovascular and other chronic diseases, criticized the "hysterical announcements
and reactions of ministries, scientific bodies and not least the media" despite the evidence of a mild
disease. Keil argued that instead of spending money on the real killers of man-hypertension, smoking,
high cholesterol-money was being squandered on "pandemic scenarios whose evidence base is
weak." 33
The WHO, which was invited to participate at the hearing, defended itself against claims that it
exaggerated the pandemic threat. "Let me state clearly and for the record. The influenza pandemic
policies and responses recommended and taken by WHO were not improperly influenced by the
128Nina Lakhani, "Swine flu in Britain: The guessing game", July 19, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/health-and-families/health-news/swine-flu-in-britain-the-guessing-game-1752302.html, (accessed August 11,
2009).
129 Kathleen Sebelius, "Pandemic Influenza Vaccines--Amendment", June 25, 2009,
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-14948.pdf; Mike Stobbe, "Legal immunity set for swine flu vaccine
makers," Associated Press, July 17, 2009,
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July 26, 2009).
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pharmaceutical industry," influenza chief Keiji Fukuda said in a prepared statement. Cooperation with
the private sector, he argued, "is essential for optimally addressing the public health challenges of today
and tomorrow." In closing, Fukuda struck back at Wodarg's charge: "The labeling of the pandemic as
'fake' is to ignore recent history and science and to trivialize the deaths of over 14,000 people and the
many additional serious illnesses experienced by others."134
Representing the European vaccine manufacturers, the executive director of influenza vaccine
manufacturer Sanofi Pasteur MSD also defended industry's role in the pandemic. Industry was not
making the decisions, he said-that was the role of scientists, international institutions and
governments. Industry just "did what it was asked to do," Dr. Luc Hessel said, which was to produce
safe and effective vaccines.135
At its second public hearing, the Council of Europe heard from the health minister of Poland. In
dramatic contrast to most nations in Europe and around the world, the Polish government had decided
to not seek HIN1 vaccines in response to the HIN1 threat-and by the time of the hearing, the decision
had become the source of considerable pride. Minister Kopacz presented her side of the story: during
the early months of May and June, Poland had paid close attention to the situation in the Southern
Hemisphere which was heading into its winter season. From these data, she said, "we were becoming
very aware of the moderate nature this pandemic." Considering the population at high risk of
complications of influenza, the government nonetheless brought the vaccine manufacturers into
negotiations to discuss a potential acquisition of H1N1 vaccine.
... but the conditions of purchase for vaccines proposed by producers were dubious for
us, vaccines were to be purchased only by governments and not available directly to
individuals, and to units of health care system, the producers of the vaccine expected
that Polish government would take full responsibility for any undesirable side effects
offering sale at the risk and on the responsibility of the purchaser.
In addition, manufacturers set the price at two to three times the seasonal influenza vaccine price.
It is really not acceptable that producers of a medical vaccine thanks to the media
campaign and taken [sic] advantage of fear that they should force government to take
certain decisions; it is not acceptable for producers not to take responsibility for product
for safety of patients and for undesirable side effects. It is not acceptable that
governments should become hostages to interest groups and should take decision in an
atmosphere of panic resulting from alarmist announcements in the media or the
1 Keiji Fukuda, "Statement by Dr Keiji Fukuda on behalf of WHO at the Council of Europe hearing on pandemic
(H1N1) 2009", January 26, 2010, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/coehearing/en/index.html, (accessed
March 24, 2010).
1s European Vaccine Manufacturers, "EVM statement to the Council of Europe hearing 'The handling of pandemic
preparedness: more transparency needed?' On the motion 'Faked pandemics - a threat for health"', January 26,
2010, http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20100126_EVME.pdf, (accessed January 26, 2010).
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opinion of experts who have an interest in the situation themselves and who have not
based their analysis on scientific terms, that is not acceptable at all.
Poland decided to decline the vaccine manufacturers' offer.
A similar criticism of WHO's response, and designation of the H1N1 outbreak as a "Phase 6" event came
from Dr. Klaus St6hr, who until 2007 was the WHO's top influenza expert and responsible for its
pandemic preparedness. (This was the job that Keiji Fukuda took over.) St6hr had penned the well read
Science article in 2004 which projected that even the most mild pandemic would kill 2 million. Now
working for the vaccine manufacturer Novartis, St6hr criticized the WHO for its lack of ability to properly
assess and respond to the threat of H1N1, saying early data from the summer of 2009 had already
indicated the mildness of the virus: "In July and August (the winter season in the southern hemisphere]
the Australia and New Zealand national influenza centres were indicating the southern hemisphere
outbreak was mild," he told the BBC. "Virologists, myself included, thought well, it's not so likely that
this virus will become more severe." But "at the end of August the WHO website was still calling the
virus severe. I personally would have thought there could have been more assessments, and more
advice to governments." Stohr suggested the WHO's decision to declare Phase 6 was wrongheaded:
The pandemic planning I was involved with was always based on a severe public health
event ... Moving to Phase 6 meant that we wanted governments... to kick in their plans
whether they thought it was urgent or not. ... I personally think that moving to Phase 6
that early was, in hindsight, not needed.138
* * *
While most media coverage of the Council of Europe meetings focused on its criticisms of the WHO, its
task was never conceived so narrowly. Rather, rapporteur of the Council inquiry, British Member of
Parliament Paul Flynn was charged with evaluating the response to the pandemic-by not only the
WHO, but the pharmaceutical industry, European Union and European Parliament, and Council of
Europe member states. In his interim report, Flynn said that France's experience illustrates "very well
the extent to which the HiNI pandemic might have been overstated and the consequences for public
health budgets." 139 Only a couple hundred people had died from H1N1 (compared to a seasonal
average of between 4,000 to 6,000), Flynn wrote, and France had successfully managed to cancel orders
for 50 million of the 94 million vaccine doses it ordered. By March 2010, only 5.7 million people had
been vaccinated-at a cost of 365 million Euros-and the French National Assembly and French Senate
Ewa Kopacz, The handling of the HiN1 pandemic: more transparency needed? (Strasbourg, France, 2010),
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20100329_MinisterKopaczAddress.pdf, (accessed July 16, 2011).
1 St6hr and Esveld, "Public health. Will vaccines be available for the next influenza pandemic?".
138 Imogen Foulkes, "WHO faces questions over swine flu policy," BBC, May 20, 2010, sec. Europe,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/10128604.stm, (accessed May 21, 2010).
139 Paul Flynn, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed", March 23, 2010,
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20100329_MemorandumPandemieE.pdf, (accessed March 29,
2010).
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had launched public hearings to review their handling of H1N1. (The Senate investigation in particular
aims to investigate the role of pharmaceutical companies in the official handling of H1N1.)140
Flynn worried that the gap between the relatively mild disease and the responses of public health at the
national and international level had "gambled away" not only money but also the confidence of the
European public in WHO and other "highly reputed organizations," a problem which he said was further
compounded by a lack of transparency in decision making. Titled The handling of the H1N1 pandemic:
more transparency needed, Flynn's interim report criticized WHO's continued refusal to release the
names of the Emergency Committee that advised the Director-General on the pandemic. Should the
privacy of experts "prevail over the right of 800 million citizens to be openly and fully informed about
major decisions that might have an impact on their individual health and well-being?" Flynn asked.14 1
A subsequent fact-finding mission to the World Health Organization did little to rest the Council of
Europe's concerns. To understand how decisions were made, transparency was needed, the Council
argued, but the WHO divulged little more than it had publicly stated, citing a need to protect the
experts' privacy (in Margaret Chan's words, WHO was "motivated by a desire to protect the experts
from commercial or other influences"142 ). But "in a situation where uncertainty is coupled with risks for
human health and lives," Flynn argued in his final report, "there is also a danger that public opinion can
be manipulated in favour of particular commercial interests." Policy makers might tend towards choices
that shield them from accusations rather than the choices "dictated by the search for the optimal
solution." In such a context, Flynn said that transparency was of utmost importance. 143
"[T]he Assembly serious regrets that they [WHO and European health institutions] have not been willing
to share some essential information, in particular to publish the names and declarations of interest of
the members of the Emergency Committee of WHO and relevant European advisory bodies directly
involved in recommendations concerning the handling of the pandemic," the Parliamentary Committee
wrote in its final report adopted June 4, 2010.
The Parliamentary Assembly is alarmed about the way in which the H1N1 influenza
pandemic has been handled, not only by the World Health Organization (WHO) but also
by the competent health authorities at the level of the European Union and at national
level. It is particularly troubled by some of the consequences of decisions taken and
advice given leading to distortion of priorities of public health services across Europe,
waste of large sums of public money and also unjustified scares and fears about health
risks faced by the European public at large.144
40 Council of Europe, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed," 16.
4 Flynn, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed."
142 Chan, "WHO Director-General's letter to BMJ editors."
143 Council of Europe, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed," 10.
144 Ibid., 2.
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Conflicts of Interest
Paul Flynn's final report was necessarily tentative, full of speculation, but lacking definitive proof:
"Amongst the factors leading to the suspicion of undue influence were the early measures taken on
contractual arrangements for vaccine delivery between member states and pharmaceutical companies,
as well as the enormous profits that companies were able to make as a result of the pandemic," he
explained. "The main suspicion, however, arises with regard to the issue of whether members of WHO
advisory bodies have professional links to pharmaceutical groups, bringing into question the neutrality
of their advice. Unfortunately, due to WHO's refusal to release the names and declarations of interest
of persons concerned, any current research on the matter depends entirely on the results of
investigative journalism." 45
Flynn, who was joined in the final Parliamentary session in a public forum with editor-in-chief of the
British medical journal BMJ Fiona Godlee, was likely aware that such investigative journalism was on its
way as he finished drafting his report. The same day the Council of Europe received Flynn's final report,
the BMJ and London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that "Key scientists advising the
World Health Organization on planning for an influenza pandemic had done paid work for
pharmaceutical firms that stood to gain from the guidance they were preparing. These conflicts of
interest have never been publicly disclosed by WHO, and WHO has dismissed inquiries into its handling
of the A/H1N1 pandemic as 'conspiracy theories."1
46
The BMJ/The Bureau investigation suggested that financial conflicts of interest riddled not only WHO's
handling of H1N1, but a decade of WHO's pandemic preparedness efforts. Among the report's findings:
the WHO had failed to disclose that its first pandemic plan, drafted in 1999, was written in collaboration
with the European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), a group that was "funded entirely by
Roche and other influenza drug manufacturers." Furthermore, two members of ESWI (Professor Karl
Nicholson of Leicester University in the UK and Professor Ab Osterhaus of Erasmus University in the
Netherlands) were co-authors of a manufacturer-funded clinical trial of the drug Tamiflu, published in
Lancet147 that was subsequently revealed 48 to have been ghostwritten.
The report also showed that WHO did not disclose any financial conflicts of interest information related
to the authors of its 2004 guidance document, WHO Guidelines on the Use of Vaccines and Antivirals
During Influenza Pandemics. Arnold Monto, listed as a professor of epidemiology at the University of
Michigan, was the author of an annex on the use of vaccines in a pandemic. The BMJ/The Bureau
reported that, "Between 2000 and 2004-and at the time of writing the annexe-Dr Monto has
consistently and openly declared honorariums, consultancy fees, and research support from Roche,
consultancy fees and research support from GlaxoSmithKline; and also research funding from
ViroPharma." Frederick Hayden, author of an annex on antivirals during a pandemic, was at the time
145 Ibid., 11.
46 Cohen and Carter, "WHO and the pandemic flu 'conspiracies'."
4 K G Nicholson et al., "Efficacy and safety of oseltamivir in treatment of acute influenza: a randomised controlled
trial. Neuraminidase Inhibitor Flu Treatment Investigator Group," Lancet 355, no. 9218 (May 27, 2000): 1845-1850.
14 Deborah Cohen, "Complications: tracking down the data on oseltamivir," BMJ 339, no. dec08_3 (December 8,
2009): b5387.
Page 133
2009 HIN1 Influenza: scare, skepticism, and accusation
being paid by Roche for lectures and consultancy work, and had received payments from
GlaxoSmithKline until 2002-but in the WHO guidance document, is only listed as a professor at the
University of Virginia. Finally, a third scientist-Karl Nicholson-who also authored an annex to the
WHO guidance document, had received travel sponsorship, honorariums, and consultancy and speaking
fees from GlaxoSmithKline and Roche, manufacturers of the influenza antivirals Relenza and Tamiflu.
Like the others, Nicholson is only mentioned by his academic affiliation as "Professor of Infectious
Diseases" in Leicester, UK.
All authors, however, told the BMJ/The Bureau that they submitted declaration of interest forms to
WHO, suggesting that WHO was ultimately the party responsible for the non-disclosure. In its defense,
the WHO posted an explanation on its website: "In line with WHO policy, all experts who participated in
this meeting were required to submit a declaration of interest form and all such forms were duly
reviewed by WHO. However, a summary of relevant interests was not issued together with the
publication. WHO regrets this oversight."149
It is unclear, however, to what degree it was a matter of simple oversight. The BMJ/The Bureau article
reports that while being assured by a spokesperson of the Organization that Director-General Margaret
Chan "is very committed personally to transparency," Chan personally denied the BMJ/The Bureau's
request for conflict of interest declarations related to the 2004 guidance document. Consequently,
declarations of interest remain unpublished.
Finally, the investigative report documented that two scientists which feature in Roche marketing
material also presented to the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European equivalent to the FDA,
regarding the licensure of Tamiflu, a drug on which governments would spend billions of dollars
stockpiling. One (Rene Snacken, also a member of ESWI and key author of the WHO's original 1999
pandemic influenza plan 150) gave his presentation to the EMA as a representative of the Belgian Ministry
of Public Health, urging the use of Tamiflu during a pandemic. The second (Annike Linde) appeared as a
representative of the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease. It is unclear what information about
these scientists' relationship with pharmaceutical companies was disclosed to EMA; under the Freedom
of Information Act, the BMJ/The Bureau requested declaration of interest statements submitted to
EMA, but reported the EMA "was unable to provide statements for those particular people at that
time."
The authors of the report commented: "The investigation by the BMJ/The Bureau reveals a system
struggling to manage the inherent conflict between the pharmaceutical industry, WHO, and the global
public health system, which all draw on the same pool of scientific experts."
149 World Health Organization, "The international response to the influenza pandemic: WHO responds to the
critics", June 10, 2010, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/briefing_20100610/en/index.html,
(accessed June 10, 2010).
150 World Health Organization, Influenza Pandemic Plan. The Role of WHO and Guidelines for National and Regional
Planning, April 1999, 33, http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/influenza/whocdscsredc991.pdf,
(accessed April 12, 2010).
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Pandemic over
In August, 2010, the announcement many in Europe were waiting for finally arrived. Declaring that "the
world is no longer in phase 6 of influenza pandemic alert," Margaret Chan said H1N1 was now in a
"post-pandemic period.""'1 With this announcement, WHO also published the membership of the
secretive Emergency Committee, revealed to be composed of sixteen influenza experts with primary
affiliations mostly in government and academia, of which six had declared interests, five of which were
with pharmaceutical companies. The WHO noted that these "interests ... do not give rise to a conflict of
interest such that the experts concerned should be partially or totally excluded from participation in the
Emergency Committee."
Of the six committee members reporting disclosures of interest, some of the specifics had been
elsewhere already documented, such as in the BMJ/The Bureau investigative report or in scientific
publications. But others appeared to have been disclosed for the first time ever, such as the director of
the CDC's Influenza division, Nancy Cox, who reported receiving financial support from the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, "for activities of CDC as a WHO
Collaborating Centre in the field of influenza vaccine research and virus isolation work."1s2
The Emergency Committee declarations were reported on in the press, but amidst the rapidly declining
media interest in H1N1 following the WHO's announcement of the end of the pandemic, they did not
themselves cause much of a stir. Defending the WHO and the general prevalence of academic and
government relationships with industry, the Nature website posted a comment: "In case it needs
spelling out: no member declared anything that might be considered even slightly out of the ordinary for
an expert on influenza." 15 3 Paraphrasing Emergency Committee member Arnold Monto, Nature warned
that "extreme rhetoric about the WHO's connections with the pharmaceutical industry ... may reduce
the willingness of scientists to offer advice when asked." Yet Monto told Nature: "full disclosure is the
appropriate way to go." (WHO reported that Monto disclosed "current and past consultancies in the
field of pandemic and/or seasonal influenza for GSK, Novartis, Roche, Baxter and Sanofi. The
remuneration for each of these consultancies is below US$10 000. In addition, his research unit at the
University of Michigan has received a grant from Sanofi Pasteur for a clinical trial conducted in 2007-
2008 on the comparative efficacy of inactivated and live attenuated influenza vaccines." 154)
The WHO has openly acknowledged how problematic its decision was to keep the names of its
Emergency Committee secret for so long, and has stated that it is reviewing its procedures for revealing
names of members of future Emergency Committees formed in response to public health emergencies
151 Margaret Chan, "HI1N1 in post-pandemic period", August 10, 2010,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2010/hlnlvpc_20100810/en/index.html, (accessed July 17,
2011).
152 World Health Organization, "List of Members of, and Advisor to, the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee concerning Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009", August 10, 2010,
http://www.who.int/ihr/emerg_commmembers_2009/en/index.html, (accessed August 11, 2010).
153 Daniel Cressey, "HI1N1 'emergency committee' members named - August 11, 2010," Nature News Blog, August
11, 2010, http://blogs.nature.com/news/2010/08/h1n1_emergencycommitteemembe.html.
154 World Health Organization, "List of Members of, and Advisor to, the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee concerning Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009."
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of international concern. The agency, however, seems confident in its handling of potential conflicts of
interests among the experts it taps for advice: "Procedures are in place for identifying, investigating and
assessing potential conflicts of interest, disclosing them, and taking appropriate action such as excluding
an expert from participating in a meeting," WHO declared in a briefing last year.155
But while the WHO may be collecting and assessing disclosures of interest, a series of discrepancies and
inconsistent explanations point to systematic problems in WHO's handling and disclosure of potential
conflicts of interest.
Conflicts of Interest and the IHR Review Committee
Conflicts of interest have a special history at WHO. In the late 1970s, the Organization entered into de-
facto battle with multinational corporations by drafting international codes on breast milk substitutes.
Then, in 1977, WHO again challenged industrial interests by designing a system of rational drug selection
through its adoption of a short, "essential medicines list," and encouragement of Member States to
develop a domestic drug production capacity. Though the move was strongly opposed by the
pharmaceutical industry, WHO held its ground. 156 Twenty-two years later, in the summer of 1999, then
WHO Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland received an internal report suggesting that tobacco
companies had made widespread efforts to undermine tobacco control policies within United Nations
agencies. Brundtland responded swiftly, assembling an expert committee to investigate the matter. In
July 2000, the committee reported back with its findings. They wrote that
In the course of this inquiry, the committee of experts has identified many reasons for
concern about the integrity of the process for international decision-making about
tobacco. The evidence shows that tobacco companies have operated for many years
with the deliberate purpose of subverting the efforts of the World Health Organization
(WHO) to address tobacco issues. The attempted subversion has been elaborate, well
financed, sophisticated and usually invisible.157
The WHO's response was to radically strengthen its commitment to avoiding conflicts of interest. It is in
this context that Margaret Chan's assurances ten years later that all of her decisions in response to
H1N1 had been made on the hard evidence only and that "At no time, not for one second, did
commercial interests enter my decision-making" struck some as knee-jerk and perhaps premature.158
Nevertheless, following all the criticisms of its decision-making, in January 2010, WHO announced the
formation of an expert committee to review WHO's handling of the pandemic. In her opening remarks
to the International Health Regulations (IHR) Review Committee's first meeting, Margaret Chan told the
iss World Health Organization, "WHO use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic."
156 Fiona Godlee, "WHO in retreat: is it losing its influence?," BMJ 309, no. 6967 (December 3, 1994): 1491-1495.
is7 Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, "Tobacco Company Strategies to
Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization", July 2000, 228,
http://www.who.int/entity/tobacco/en/whoinquiry.pdf, (accessed June 12, 2011).
iss Godlee, "Conflicts of interest and pandemic flu."
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group, "WHO is not defining or restricting the scope of specific issues that may arise ... we want a frank,
critical, transparent, credible and independent review of our performance." 1 59
The IHR Review Committee began its work in April 2010 and was chaired by US Institute of Medicine
president Harvey Fineberg. Its final report was delivered to the World Health Assembly in Geneva in
May 2011. Fineberg, who is known for his probing analysis of the 1976 experience with Harvard political
scientist Richard Neustadt, The Swine Flu Affair: Decision-Making on a Slippery Disease,160 said that his
committee's report would be "critical" and transparent. 61
However the degree to which the inquiry could independently analyze information is debatable.
Following the IHR Review Committee's third meeting, I had the chance to sit in on a press conference
chaired by Fineberg at WHO headquarters in Geneva. Given the panel's high profile status-in addition
to Fineberg, many of the Committee members are prominent people in their respective fields and
presumably quite busy- asked Fineberg what kind of time was being spent on the review, and what
kind of support staff he had at the Institute of Medicine. Fineberg explained that the committee's
support staff was not from the Institute of Medicine, but WHO itself-an answer that did not sit well
with some members of the press in the audience.
[Harvey Fineberg:] ... on your last question, which I do remember, because it was
reminding me how much time we're spending on this; the committee is putting a great
deal of time into this and indeed I would say for many, if not all members of the
committee it's taking up more time than they might have understood at the very outset
of accepting the obligation. We have a support staff based here in Geneva, who are
dedicated to our work on the committee and have been very helpful to us. And in
answer to your specific question, that's the staff on which I rely for this project. So it's
not an Institute of Medicine activity. I'm here as an individual and working on this in the
capacity as an individual.
Peter Doshi: So that staff that's supporting you is staff at WHO staff [sic]?
HF: They are based at WHO, but dedicated to us.
MF [the press-lit., Member of the Floor]: But they are WHO staff?
HF: They are employed by WHO, yes.
MF: Don't you think you need to have an arm's length relationship with them?
HF: With that staff? Well they're not staff who were involved in the...
159 Chan, "Experts begin their assessment of the response to the H1N1 influenza pandemic."
160 Richard E Neustadt and Harvey V Fineberg, The Swine Flu Affair: Decision-Making on a Slippery Disease
(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 1978).
1 J. Zarocostas, "Head of inquiry into WHO's handling of the H1N1 pandemic says he will present a 'critical'
report," BMJ 342, no. jan20 3 (January 20, 2011): d385-d385.
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MF: But they still work for WHO.
HF: They still work for WHO, that is true. I think that, you know, we're very aware
of that, but this is going to be the committee's report, that I can assure you. As I think
every member of this committee, working on every element of this, would assure you.
Well, if there are no further questions, thank you all very much for being here....162
The Final Report
In its final report following a year of deliberations, subsequently adopted by the World Health
Assembly,163 the Review Committee criticized WHO for a "lack of a sufficiently robust, systematic and
open set of procedures for disclosing, recognizing and managing conflicts of interest among expert
advisers." 164 In particular, it found several shortcomings in the way WHO handled the disclosure and
management of conflicts of interest among the Emergency Committee which advised the WHO Director-
General during the H1N1 outbreak.
Although confidentiality represented an understandable effort to protect the members
from external pressures, this paradoxically fed suspicions that the Organization had
something to hide. While the decision was consistent with WHO practices for other
expert committees, whose identities are normally divulged only at the end of what is
often a one-day consultation, this practice was not well suited to a Committee whose
service would extend over many months. 65
The Review Committee appreciates the desire to protect members of the EC
[Emergency Committee] from external influence by keeping their identities confidential
for the duration of their appointment. The Review Committee also appreciates the
need for expert consultations to be held in confidence so that the Director-General will
have the benefit of candid discussion and advice. At the same time, the lack of
disclosure fosters suspicion about the interests and motivations of members of the EC.
On balance, the Review Committee concluded that, in the interest of transparency, it
would have been better for WHO to have disclosed from the outset the names of EC
members.166
1 World Health Organization, "Transcript of press briefing with Dr Harvey Fineberg, Chair, International Health
Regulations Review Committee", September 29, 2010,
http://www.who.int/entity/mediacentre/multimedia/pctranscript_30_september_10_fineberg.pdf, (accessed
March 27, 2011). (I have made minor edits to the WHO-provided transcription for accuracy, using the WHO's
audio recording at 1hr, 7min, 8 secs. See
http://terrance.who.int/mediacentre/audio/IHR/IHR_PRESS_29SEP2010.mp3.)
163 World Health Assembly, "Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005)", May 20, 2011.
14 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic(H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 16.
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The Review Committee also criticized WHO for a "Failure to acknowledge legitimate reasons for some
criticism, in particular, inconsistent descriptions of a pandemic." 6 7
Nevertheless, the Review Committee's report is overall optimistic, mentioning "that WHO is taking steps
to improve its management of conflicts of interest, even as this review has proceeded." Finding "no
evidence of malfeasance," the Review Committee uses the term "misunderstanding" to describe
concerns that conflicts of interest may have affected decision making, and urged WHO to respond
"professionally and vigorously to unwarranted criticisms" in the future.
The IHR Review Committee's findings were received enthusiastically by WHO. Margaret Chan remarked:
For me, personally, as head of this agency, the assessment of the pandemic response
needed to address two absolutely critical questions and to give everyone a firm answer.
First, did WHO make the right call? Was this a real pandemic or not?
Second, were WHO decisions, advice, and actions shaped in any way by ties with the
pharmaceutical industry?
In other words, did WHO declare a fake pandemic in order to line the pockets of
industry?
The document exonerates WHO on both counts.168
The Review Committee's report also met the approval of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), which wrote that "the R&D pharmaceutical industry fully
welcomes the IHR report's recommendation for countries to immunize their high-risk populations yearly
against seasonal influenza." 6 9 The IHR Review Committee's report urged "countries to immunize their
high-risk populations yearly against seasonal influenza,"' 7 0 echoing longstanding advice of the World
Health Assembly "to establish and implement strategies to increase vaccination coverage of all people at
high risk."m' The IHR Review Committee also called for advancing the production of influenza vaccines
167 Ibid., 16.
168 Margaret Chan, "Director-General responds to assessment of WHO's handling of the influenza pandemic",
March 28, 2011, http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2011/ihr-review_20110328/en/index.html, (accessed July 17,
2011).
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, "R&D Pharmaceutical industry
welcomes main conclusions of 2009 flu pandemic response", May 19, 2011,
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/News/2011/all/FPMANewsReleaseIHR_19May2011.pdf, (accessed
May 21, 2011).
17 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 21.
171 World Health Assembly, "Prevention and control of influenza pandemics and annual epidemics (WHA56.19)",
May 28, 2003, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/wha/2003/WHA56_19.pdf, (accessed September 25, 2010); World Health
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worldwide, 72 initiatives that WHO had already been spearheading through programs such as the Global
Action Plan to Increase Supply of Pandemic Influenza Vaccines (GAP). GAP was born out of a WHO-led
consultation in May 2006 to address the "anticipated gap between potential vaccine demand and supply
during an influenza pandemic,"m7 3 and held as its first goal to "increase seasonal vaccine demand to
stimulate market forces and augment supply."' 7 4
Inconsistencies
Surprisingly, the IHR Review Committee does not discuss conflicts of interest in relation to the arguably
most central WHO pandemic influenza policy document: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response. This document, published in April 2009, took over a year to draft, and was the culmination of
multiple international consultations involving over 139 experts.'75 The document's foreword stated that
"All external experts and contributors for all meetings and consultations, including those in the public
review, have signed a declaration of interest statement in accordance with WHO policy. A small number
of participants indicated a conflict of interest." Under a section titled "Declaration of Interest" it
explained that "three working group members" and "two other participants" reported "some conflicts
of interest." 7 6 But the document did not contain any details, instead stating that "the declarations of
interest are available upon request." 7 7
I requested the declarations from WHO in June 2010, following the BMJ/The Bureau investigation into
conflicts of interest amongst WHO expert advisors as well as comments from several journalists that
WHO was not furnishing the promised declarations. WHO responded to me that "we do not release
individual declaration of interests." '9 I was instead sent "summary" declarations of interest-a list
compiled by WHO-stating that "of the 139 experts who participated in the substantive elaboration of
this guidance document, eight declared interests." Details for the eight individuals were given. But
problems with the list were readily apparent-some minor (two of the eight individuals' names were
misspelt) and some serious (one individual's inclusion was entirely erroneous). During an interview with
WHO communications staff in Geneva in late September, I requested WHO to check the original
172 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(HINI) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 22.
m World Health Organization, "The Global Action Plan (GAP) to Increase Supply of Pandemic Influenza Vaccines:
First Meeting of the Advisory Group (AG)", October 19, 2007, 3,
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/HQ/2008/WHOIVB_08.10_eng.pdf, (accessed December 12, 2009).
m Kieny et al., "A global pandemic influenza vaccine action plan," 6368.
175 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: a WHO guidance document
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009), 4-5,
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m Ibid., 3. The WHO's practice stands in contrast to many medical journals like BMJ and Journal of the American
MedicalAssociation which print a synopsis of disclosures of potential conflicts of interest accompanying any
published article. (New England Journalof Medicine has recently even begun offering direct access on its website
to the disclosure forms provided by authors.)
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disclosure forms and confirm the accuracy of what I was sent.180 WHO later confirmed all of these
errors, and explained the more serious error as "due to a cut-and-paste error and has since been
corrected." WHO did not respond to my question asking for an explanation of why the original report
mentioned that five individuals reported interests, but the list I was sent included eight names.
Then, around January 2011, the WHO released a "reprinted" version of its 2009 guidance document.
Two sections of the new document (the Foreword and the "Declaration of interest") have changed; the
rest of the document is nearly identical to the original, except for occasional typographical changes such
as the capitalization of words.
The reprinted Foreword states that "In accordance with WHO policy, participating experts were
requested to submit a duly completed and signed Declaration of Interest for WHO Experts form.
Representatives of industry ... participated as observers and, in accordance with WHO rules, were not
therefore required to submit a Declaration of Interest."18' (Incidentally, WHO staff participating in
compiling the document also did not have to submit forms.) in the new "declaration of interest"
section, a summary of interests is provided. The declarations are nearly identical to those I previously
received from WHO, but for three of the seven individuals listed, there are some troubling
discrepancies. In two cases (Monto and Phin), additional declarations are shown in the reprinted
guidance document that were not included in the summary I received in July 2010; for another
individual (Van-Tam), some declarations that were on the original list have disappeared and new ones
have appeared (Table 3.3).
To clarify, I asked WHO to confirm the source of the summary declaration of interests. WHO spokesman
Gregory Hsrtl, Team Leader for Communications for Global Alert and Response, said that
WHO uses the standard WHO Declaration of Interest forms to assess whether there is a
conflict of interest. External experts fill in these forms and the secretariat evaluates
them. We do not go to other sources to either seek additional information or to confirm
the declared interests (or lack thereof). 182
Despite such assurances, this does not appear to always be true. In the case of the novel H1N1
influenza Emergency Committee, the declarations of interest (DOI) related to those members were
initially released on August 10, 2010, and then revised on October 1, 2010, based on information that
did not come from previously signed WHO Declaration of Interest forms, but rather from post-
publication information. Explaining the change, WHO stated, "This document has been updated to
reflect revisions in the summary of interests and affiliation information of Professor Neil M. Ferguson
1 Interview with Kristen Kelleher and Gregory Hartl, communications officers, World Health Organization,
September 30, 2010, Geneva, Switzerland.
181 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: a WHO guidance document, 2010,
3, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/97892 4 1547680_eng.pdf, (accessed January 31, 2011).
182 Email correspondence with Gregory HsrtI, Team Leader, Communications for Global Alert and Response (GAR),
World Health Organization, February 22, 2011.
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based upon additional information received from him after initial confirmation and publication of this
List."' 83 Mr. Hartl further explained:
As preparations for the second reprint, the secretariat went back to the DOI forms
received from the experts and prepared a more detailed summary to address the
queries raised from the international community on this issue during the pandemic
2009.184
While WHO's concern for transparency and the handling of potential conflicts of interest was
heightened in response to widespread public concern, it does not appear true that discrepancies in the
summary differences can be attributed to a "more detailed summary" based on the original DOI forms
because what is presented in the reprinted guidance document are not simply additional details beyond
what was included in the list I received the previous July, but true revisions, including not only the
addition but also the deletion of information. For example, in July 2010, Jonathan Nguyen Van-Tam was
reported to have had received "honoraria to speak at meetings sponsored by GSK, Novartis, Solvay and
Roche." But the reprinted guidance, states that he received "honoraria to speak at meetings sponsored
by GSK, Sanofi, Baxter and Roche." The first list includes Novartis and Solvay, but the new list does not.
The second list instead includes Sanofi and Baxter, which were not in the first list.
Further attempts for clarification were unsuccessful. On March 16, 2011 despite an on-and-off
correspondence of over nine months, WHO ended its correspondence with me, noting that "we cannot
devote a substantial amount of our working time in replying to questions for a doctoral dissertation." 85
In its last email, WHO unfortunately did not answer my specific questions about the source of the
summary declarations of interest, or why discrepancies existed between different versions.
When WHO publicly releases summaries of expert disclosures, there is an expectation that this is a
complete and accurate representation of what those experts disclosed to WHO at the time of their
expert advice (in this case, between November 2007 and January 2009, when experts were consulted in
preparing WHO's revised pandemic plan). If this were the case, however, it is hard to understand why
WHO's summary of those declarations would have changed between July 2010 and January 2011, long
after the pandemic plan was finalized. Without publication of the original forms, signed and submitted
by those giving advice to WHO, there is little way to independently verify the accuracy of WHO's
published summaries. If we do not know what was disclosed to WHO at the time, how can observers
trust WHO's determination that the experts' declarations "were not sufficient in conflict with the
recommendations, to exclude them from the guidance development process"?'8 6
183 World Health Organization, "List of Members of, and Advisor to, the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee concerning Influenza Pandemic (HIN1) 2009", October 1, 2010,
http://www.who.int/ihr/emergcomm-members_2009/en/index.htm, (accessed December 3, 2010).
1 Email correspondence with Gregory Hartl, Team Leader, Communications for Global Alert and Response (GAR),
World Health Organization, February 22, 2011.
18s Email correspondence with Gregory Hartl, Team Leader, Communications for Global Alert and Response (GAR),
World Health Organization, March 16, 2011.
1 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response: a WHO guidance document, 9.
Page 142
2009 H1N1 Influenza: scare, skepticism, and accusation
Changing webpages
Casting further doubts on the IHR Review Committee's ability to conduct a thorough and critical
assessment of the WHO's response to H1N1 is its treatment of criticisms towards the WHO. The
Committee's final report notes:
External criticisms
273. Criticisms about WHO's response to the pandemic began to appear in the media in
July 2009. One of the charges against WHO was that it changed the definition of a
pandemic without notice. In the regular content review of web pages related to
influenza pandemics as part of established emergency procedures, WHO's web manager
identified two pages that required modification. The first, related to pandemic
preparedness (63), was changed on 4 May 2009 after the review showed that the terms
"pandemic" and "H5N1 pandemic" were being used interchangeably. These terms
created the impression that a pandemic would be caused only by H5N1.
274. The wording "enormous numbers of deaths and illness" referred to a lethal H5N1
pandemic scenario. The text was edited to be more reflective of the current H1N1
outbreak. The second page was a posting concerning H5N1, with a title that implied that
it described an influenza pandemic in general terms. For clarity, "avian influenza" was
added to the title. WHO followed standard industry practice by not deleting web pages.
However, modifications to page content and versioning were not evident to readers.
These changes, which were made without special notice or explanation, invited
suspicion of a surreptitious shift in definition rather than an effort to make the
descriptions of a pandemic more precise and consistent. From May 2009, all web-page
changes were tracked and each revision was dated.
There appear, however, to be at least four important discrepancies in these paragraphs. First, it appears
to be the media outlet CNN that brought this issue to the attention of WHO, not "WHO's web
manager."' 8 7 Second, the terms "pandemic" and "H5N1 pandemic" could not have been being used
interchangeably, because on an archived version of the referenced webpage, the term "H5N1" does not
appear.18 8 Third, it is difficult to understand how the phrase "enormous numbers of deaths and illness"
could have referred to H5N1. The webpage does not mention H5N1 and the phrase "enormous
1 Elizabeth Cohen, "When a pandemic isn't a pandemic," CNN.com, May 4, 2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/04/swine.flu.pandemic/index.html, (accessed May 5, 2009). This
recounting of events is consistent with WHO's statement: "Some of the confusion may stem from the fact that
there was a document on WHO's website for some months that said a pandemic would include 'enormous
amounts of cases and deaths'. This was removed when it was brought to our attention." See World Health
Organization, "WHO Key Messages - Conflict of Interest Issues", January 11, 2010,
http://www.wpro.who.int/vietnam/mediacentre/pressreleases/hlnl_8jan2010.htm, (accessed April 9, 2010).
188 World Health Organization, "Pandemic preparedness", April 22, 2009,
http://web.archive.org/web/20090422172703/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/,
(accessed July 19, 2011).
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numbers of deaths and illness" dates back to at least February 2003, when only 18 human cases of H5N1
were known, worldwide, dating from 1997.189
Fourth, it is not true that from May 2009 all webpage changes were tracked and dated. For example,
the title of the WHO webpage "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza" was changed to
"Ten concerns if avian influenza becomes a pandemic" sometime between November 11, 2009 and
November 20, 2009, yet the date of the webpage in July 2011-even after I first documented this
problem in April 2010-still shows "14 October 2005."190 By altering the title, WHO changed self-
described must-know information about "pandemic influenza" into "concerns" that were only relevant
to "avian influenza." Of the "ten things" WHO insisted one needs to know were "Widespread illness will
occur," "Medical supplies will be inadequate," "Large numbers of deaths will occur," and "Economic and
social disruption will be great." But while WHO and the IHR Review Committee might argue otherwise,
the webpage was not "a posting concerning H5N1" in particular, but pandemic influenza in general, with
mention of avian influenza H5N1. For example, it gave estimates of future pandemic mortality based on
a "mild" 1957 pandemic scenario:
Large numbers of deaths will occur. ... WHO has used a relatively conservative estimate
- from 2 million to 7.4 million deaths - because it provides a useful and plausible
planning target. This estimate is based on the comparatively mild 1957 pandemic. 91
Where to from here?
In discussions of how to protect against financial conflicts of interest in medicine, disclosure and
disclosure have become the mantra-a fundamental (but not sufficient) first step. 192 Unfortunately,
more than a decade after the World Health Organization (WHO) took major steps to limit undue
industry influence, problems apparently remain.
189 Peter Doshi, "The elusive definition of pandemic influenza," Bulletin of the World Health Organization 89, no. 7
(July 1, 2011): 532-538.
190 For my documentation of the problem in a letter to BMJ, please see Peter Doshi, "More changing webpages at
WHO," BMJ Rapid Response, April 12, 2010, http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/340/apr06_2/c1904#234351,
(accessed April 12, 2010). The "Archive.org" project archives webpages on the Internet, allowing for the tracking
of the web over time. For historical copies of the WHO webpage in question, captured on November 11, 2009 and
November 20, 2009, showing the change in title between these dates, see World Health Organization, "Ten things
you need to know about pandemic influenza", October 14, 2005,
http://web.archive.org/web/20091111222554/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10things/en/i
ndex.html, (accessed July 19, 2011); World Health Organization, "Ten concerns if avian influenza becomes a
pandemic", October 14, 2005,
http://web.archive.org/web/20091120072551/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10things/en/i
ndex.html, (accessed July 19, 2011).
191 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza." Note that this is also
likely in error, as the 2 to 7.4 million deaths estimate appears to be based on a calculation by Martin Meltzer (CDC),
who projected the impact of a modern 1968-like (not 1957-like) pandemic. See Sandman and Lanard, "Pandemic
Influenza Risk Communication: The Teachable Moment."
192 Bernard Lo and Marilyn J. Field, eds., Conflict of interest in medical research, education, and practice
(Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009); Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest.
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If WHO seeks a deeper reflection on its activities and performance, it will need to answer tougher
questions-in particular, about its role in fostering a pandemic that led to heavy criticism over the
proportionality of response. From the earliest days of the H1N1 outbreak, when it was already clear
that the outbreak was far from the outbreak many expected, WHO deflected responsibility for this gap.
In May 2011, the Director-General Margaret Chan declared that highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
"H5N1 has conditioned the public to equate an influenza pandemic with very severe disease and high
mortality. Such a disease pattern is by no means inevitable during a pandemic. On the contrary, it is
exceptional." However, it is not viruses, but rather public health organizations, that have shaped the
public's understanding of pandemic influenza for the last decade. It is their narrative and their guidance
about how to think about those viruses that led to gap between expectation and reality.
[ENDS]
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Source Statement regarding immunity to pandemic virus
Australia "An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus subtype to which there is
2006, little or no immunity emerges, Iis easily spread between humans and is capable of
Japanm199
causing severe disease in humans
Canada 2006 "Influenza viruses spread easily and from time to time, new strains emerge. Humans
may have little or no immunity to these new viruses." 94
Japan 1997 "In the event that a new influenza virus emerges, it will be difficult to quickly determine
whether it is capable of causing a pandemic. However, if it happens to be a completely
new virus for the human population, it is expected that most people will be susceptible
to it (i.e. lack immunity)..."'s
Japan 2007 "In particular, pandemic (new) influenza viruses may cause a serious pandemic, due to
their potential ability to transmit from humans to humans highly efficiently, because
most humans lack immunity against such viruses that have never existed before." 96
UK 2009 "Pandemic flu occurs when a new influenza virus emerges for which people have little
or no immunity, and for which there is no vaccine. The disease spreads easily from
person to person, causes serious illness and can sweep across the country in which it
originates and around the world in a very short time." 97
US 1997 "When antigenic shift occurs, the population does not have antibody protection
against the virus."198
US 2005 "A pandemic occurs when a novel influenza virus emerges that can infect and be
efficiently transmitted among individuals because of a lack of pre-existing immunity in
the population. ... Pandemic planning is based on the following assumptions about
pandemic disease: Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be
universal." 99
US 2005 "Since, by definition, a novel virus is a virus that has never previously infected humans,
or hasn't infected humans for a long time, it's likely that almost no one will have
immunity, or antibody to protect them against the novel virus."200
1 Council of Australian Governments and Working Group on Australian Influenza Pandemic Prevention and
Preparedness, National Action Planfor Human Influenza Pandemic (Commonwealth Government-Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2006), 4.
194 Public Health Agency of Canada., Highlightsfrom the Canadian pandemic influenza plan for the health sector:
preparing for an influenza pandemic, the Canadian health perspective. (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada,
2006), 2, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/hl-ps/pdf/CPIP-highlights-2006_e.pdf.
195 Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Plan, "Report on New Influenza Strain Preparedness Measures", October
24, 1997, 6.
1 Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, "Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Pandemic Influenza
(Phase 4 Onwards)", March 26, 2007, 241.
197 UK Department of Health, "About pandemic flu," Article, May 1, 2009,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Flu/PandemicFlu/DH_065150, (accessed July 26, 2009).
1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Emerging Infections: Influenza Pandemic Facts, Released
12/31/97 by the CDC Office of Communications, Division of Media Relations", December 31, 1997,
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/panfacts.htm, (accessed May 29, 2009).
199 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 4,18.
200 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Influenza Pandemics: How They Start, How They Spread, and
Their Potential Impact", October 18, 2005, http://www.dhhs.gov/nvpo/pandemics/flu2.htm, (accessed June 16,
2009).
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WHO 2003 "When a major change in either 1 or both of their surface proteins occurs
spontaneously, no one will have partial or full immunity against infection because it is
a completely new virus. If this new virus also has the capacity to spread from person-to-
person, then a pandemic is most likely to occur."
WHO 2009 "A defining characteristic of a pandemic is the almost universal vulnerability of the
world's population to infection. Not all people become infected, but nearly all people
are at risk." 202
New York "Compared to seasonal outbreaks, which happen every winter, pandemics can cause
City 2006 more severe illness because most people have never been exposed to the new strains
of flu and therefore have no immunity." 03
Table 3.1. Statements regarding the expected immunity to a pandemic influenza virus (emphasis added)
201 World Health Organization, "Pandemic preparedness", February 2, 2003,
http://web.archive.org/web/20030202145905/http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/.
202 Chan, "Concern over flu pandemic justified."
203 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
Plan", July 2006, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cd/cd-panflu-plan.pdf, (accessed July 3, 2010).
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Table 3.2. Statements concerning the expected type of virus that would be necessary to start a pandemic.
Source Statement regarding the necessity of a novel influenza virus to cause a pandemic
UK DoH 2009 "A pandemic can only start when three conditions have been met:
e a new influenza virus subtype emerges
* it infects humans, causing serious illness
V it spreads easily and sustainably among humans." 204
US HHS 2005 "An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza A virus (a 'pandemic influenza
virus') emerges in the human population, causes serious illness, and then spreads easily
from person to person worldwide."20 s
US HHS 2005 "A pandemic is possible when an influenza A virus makes a dramatic change (i.e.,
"shift") and acquires a new H or H+N"6
CDC207 2009
and WHO208
2009
Requirementsfor a Pandemic
Global outbreak of disease
" New influenza A virus emerges in humans
* Minimal or no population immunity
* Causes serious illness; high
morbidity/mortality
" Spreads easily from person to person
204 UK Department of Health, "About pandemic flu."
20s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 1-12.
206U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Influenza Pandemics: How They Start, How They Spread, and
Their Potential Impact."
207 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "ABCs of
Influenza and Pandemics", 2008, http://influenzatraining.org/collect/whoinfluenza/files/s15473e/s15473e.ppt,
(accessed April 25, 2010).
208 World Health Organization, "Seasonal, Animal and Pandemic Influenza: An Overview", May 18, 2009,
http://influenzatraining.org/collect/whoinfluenza/files/s15546e/s15546e.ppt, (accessed April 25, 2010).
Rt-quiremn h for F l III fl111.n/a
* Sprads nly rld hum
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Table 3.3. Discrepancies in summary declaration of interests statements among WHO Experts, provided by WHO, in July 2010
and those in the reprinted 2009 guidelines (reprinted in December 2010). Underlined companies indicate differences
between the two lists.
""i
Individual
Professor Arnold Monto
Professor Jonathan Nguyen
Van-Tam
Dr Nick Phin
Summary declarations of
interest received from WHO,
July 2010209
"Professor Monto has been an
ad-hoc consultant for Roche,
GSK, Novartis and Aventis
Pasteur."
"Professor van Tam is a former
employee of GSK, Roche and
Sanofi Pasteur."
"... and honoraria to speak at
meetings sponsored by GSK,
Novartis Solvay and Roche."
"Dr Phin has participated in
scientific discussion panels
sponsored by pharmaceutical
companies, including for
example Sanofi Pasteur in
relation to public acceptance of
influenza vaccines."
Reprinted 2009 guidelines
"Professor Monto has been an
ad-hoc consultant for Roche,
GSK, Novartis, Solvay and
Aventis Pasteur."
"Professor van Tam is a former
employee of GSK, Roche, MSD
and Sanofi Pasteur."
"and honoraria to speak at
meetings sponsored by GSK,
Sanofi Baxter and Roche."
"Dr Phin has participated in
scientific discussion panels
sponsored by pharmaceutical
companies, including for
example MSD and Sanofi Pasteur
in relation to public acceptance
of influenza vaccines."
209 Email correspondence with Aphaluck Bhatiasevi, Media Officer, Global Alert and Response Department, World
Health Organization, July 2, 2010.
210 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response (reprinted).
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Chapter 4 False Assumptions: a Shaky Foundation for Consensus
"An appraisal of experience for the past three and a half years indicates little progress in
control of influenza. The basic assumptions of the control program must be reassessed.
There is little evidence that recent vaccines have significantly prevented clinical illness,
as well as equally little evidence to evaluate effects on mortality. How long such a
program should be continued without better scientific evidence is problematic. Sounder
bases are needed for an influenza control program."i
Alexander D. Langmuir, Donald A. Henderson, and Robert E. Serfling
2Communicable Disease Center, 1964
Colds are different than flu. Influenza is a serious disease. 36,000 Americans die each year from
influenza. Flu shots are your best protection. The vaccine saves lives. Pandemics are catastrophes. As
the first two chapters showed, these claims dominate the official discourse on influenza. They are
influenza policy's reason for being. But the H1N1 outbreak of 2009 prompted a serious rethinking of the
accepted wisdom-reason to think the policy may not have been grounded and guided by the most solid
science, and was possibly influenced by commercial interests.
In this chapter, I take the critique further, and argue that the entire public health effort against influenza
is built upon a series of fundamental misconceptions about the problem of influenza, its pandemics, and
the vaccine. In some areas, the science is thin. In other areas, there is sufficient evidence to
demonstrate serious inconsistencies and errors in official claims. The purpose of presenting this
material is to demonstrate that there are numerous fundamental scientific problems in officials'
assessment of the risk posed by influenza and its pandemics, which is important because officials justify
their policies through claims about the risk posed by seasonal and pandemic influenza. If serious
problems exist regarding the validity of risk assessment, as I argue they do, it calls into question the
rationality of the policy.
"A virus or something"
Before Thomas L. Morris, Jr. died on October 22, 2001, he dialed 911 for an ambulance. "My breathing
is labored; my chest feels constricted," Morris said. "I am getting air, but I -- to get up and walk and what
Alexander D. Langmuir, Donald A. Henderson, and Robert E. Serfling, "The Epidemiological Basis for the Control of
influenza," Am J Public Health Nations Health 54, no. 4 (April 1, 1964): 563-571.
2 What is today known as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was, between 1946 and 1967,
known as the Communicable Disease Center. There have been multiple name changes throughout the agency's
history.
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have you -- it just feels like I'm going to pass out if I stay up too long." 3 Morris was a postal worker, and
suspected anthrax. He was employed at the Brentwood mail processing facility which had handled the
letter addressed to Senator Tom Daschle, determined days earlier by federal investigators to have been
laced with anthrax. Morris, however, had not been informed whether his postal facility itself was
contaminated, but reported having worked near a woman who found a letter with powder in it two days
before the infamous Daschle letter.
Morris might have lived if his anthrax had been diagnosed earlier. The first symptoms-aches and
headaches-began on October 16, presumably three days after being exposed to powder in the mail
room. Two days later, Morris saw a doctor, informing the doctor that he thought he had been exposed
to anthrax. Cautious, the doctor took a throat culture4 and called the state health department.5 The
department of health, however, said that mail facility employees were not at risk and that antibiotics
should not be prescribed.
Morris didn't live long enough to hear the results of the throat culture. On the 911 phone call, Morris
told the operator, "I guess there was some hang-up over the weekend. I'm not sure ... The doctor
thought that it was just a virus or something." He was prescribed Tylenol for the aches and pains, and
was sent home. The ambulance arrived, but by then it was too late to save Morris' life.
Sadly, Morris was not the only victim of a late diagnosis. The Wall Street Journal reported:
On Oct. 21 -- one day after the mayor of Washington, D.C., announced that a worker at
the Brentwood postal center possibly had anthrax -- two other Brentwood workers
showed up at hospitals 26 miles apart. Both complained of run-of-the-mill flu
symptoms. Both were actually suffering from inhalation anthrax.
By the end of the day, one of the men was diagnosed with the flu and sent home, where
he died the next day. The other man was put on the antibiotic Cipro -- hours before
tests would confirm that he had anthrax. He's now resting at his home.6
* * *
Almost every federal agency came under harsh criticism for their response to the anthrax investigations,
but the CDC, in particular, was accused of not providing the highest quality scientific advice. Postal
workers wanted to know why CDC officials had in the early days of the investigation, assured them there
was nothing to worry about, and why health officials had not taken precautionary measures and more
3 "Postal worker who died suspected anthrax, according to 911 call," CNN Health, November 7, 2001,
http://articles.cnn.com/2001-11-07/health/911.anthraxl1joseph-curseen-brentwood-facility-anthrax-aced-
letter?_s=PM:HEALTH, (accessed July 18, 2011).
4 Ibid.
s Barbara Martinez, "Anthrax Victims' Fate Varied by What Hospital, Which Doctor They Saw," Wall Street Journal,
November 27, 2001.
6 Ibid.
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liberally advocated for early treatment with antibiotics, as had been done for staffers on Capitol Hill.7 In
its defense, CDC director Jeffrey Koplan explained that it was learning:
The letters we had seen or had described to us ... were described to us as well-taped,
meaning that the seams along that letter were taped in a way that would have
minimized, if not eliminated, the ability of a powder to seep out through openings
around the letter. You would have to open the letter. And, indeed, we were told that
the letter that was sent to Senator Daschle had to be opened by a scissors because of
how well it was sealed.
So through this period of time we were still operating on the assumption that in order
for a letter to convey this-the anthrax, it had to be either opened by someone who was
opening mail, or in some way torn or disrupted in the sorting process, because the
concept of a powder in a sealed letter was one that suggested that it would stay in that
letter. And that was our epidemiologic experience with the cases we had seen so far.
That construct obviously changed markedly with the report of inhalation anthrax in mail
workers in the Brentwood facility...8
A reporter on the CDC telebriefing asked Koplan a pointed question: "How frustrating is it that the two
postal workers who died in the D.C. area, it seemed were-at least their diagnosis was missed and were
sent home, either from a physician's office or an emergency room? And what can be done to prevent
that in the future?"
Dr. Koplan said that clinicians' job was not easy, "the trouble with the early stages of anthrax, as you're
all well aware, is that it mimics lots of illnesses. You know, I can't be critical of whoever saw those
patients 'cause I've been in emergency rooms and seen hundreds of patients with similar illnesses, and
they do fine when treated as those people were treated." The difficulty of identifying true anthrax was
that in the early stages of illness-the very time when patients see their doctor-the symptoms are
remarkably common: fever, fatigue, aches and pains. Director Koplan therefore called on physicians to
more thoroughly evaluate their patients and rule out the possibility of an early anthrax infection by
assessing possible sources of anthrax exposure:
Even somebody comes in with a recent cough and a light headache, and thoughts may
be overwhelming that it's a viral infection, still, people need to say, Where do you work?
What tasks do you do? Do you handle mail in a facility? Do you open the letters?, et
cetera. It's now part of what needs to be part of a medical history.9
7 "CDC, USPS, Criticized Over Anthrax Spread," ABC News, October 23, 2001,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92289&page=l&singlePage=true, (accessed July 18, 2011).
8 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Anthrax update: October 25, 2001, telebriefing transcript",
October 25, 2001, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/t011025.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
9 Ibid.
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In the following days, the CDC would provide more specific guidance to clinicians on how to distinguish
anthrax from other influenza-like illness, or ILI.10
The ILI Conundrum
Every year, tens of millions of patients walk into a doctor's offices complaining of fever, aches and pains.
During the winter, these influenza-like illnesses (or ILI as it is often abbreviated) can become so common
that they will, at their peak, account for up to six to eight percent of all outpatient visits." An even
greater number of people may suffer ILI but not seek professional care. The CDC writes that "yearly,
adults and children can average one to three and three to six ILI, respectively." 2 But for the patients
that do seek care, it is the healthcare provider's responsibility to reach a diagnosis and treat the patient.
In many cases-as Thomas Morris' case tragically made clear-doctors treat patients without
determining the exact cause of the patient's Il. Many doctors see laboratory tests as impractical and
irrelevant: physicians need to make treatment decisions immediately, and lab tests can take days or
even a week or longer to process, by which time most ILI patients have already made a full recovery."
Physicians therefore examine patients' signs and symptoms, attempting to find the right diagnosis out of
a handful of possibilities often encountered in the course of general practice: Is it allergies? A cold? The
flu? Acute bronchitis? Strep throat? Gastroenteritis? Sinusitis?'4
Because many patients do not even seek medical care for ILI, a number of health websites have aimed
to help the public make its own determination. "Follow this chart for information about how to treat
the symptoms of a cold or the flu and how to know when to see a doctor. Other illnesses may also cause
flu- or cold-like symptoms. Self-care is often all that is needed to treat common viral illnesses," says
familydoctor.org.15 A similar article on the Mayo Clinic website coaches readers on how to determine
the difference between a cold and allergies.'6
10 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Considerations for distinguishing influenza-like illness from
inhalational anthrax," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 50, no. 44 (November 9, 2001): 984-986.
u See "Outpatient Illness Surveillance" figure in U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "FluView: 2010-
2011 Influenza Season Week 25 ending June 25, 2011", July 1, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives20lO-2011/weekly25.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Considerations for distinguishing influenza-like illness from
inhalational anthrax."
13 This trend is changing to some degree due to the growing availability of so-called rapid "bed-side" tests which
can provide results in the range of half an hour or less-but the accuracy of these tests remains variable, and
accurate interpretation of results depends on the quality of the test and knowledge about the current prevalence
of influenza in the community, something many doctors would have only a limited sense about. See U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, "Rapid Diagnostic Testing for Influenza", July 6, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/rapidlab.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
14 These conditions are listed on American Academy of Family Physicians' website, familydoctor.org. American
Academy of Family Physicians, "Cold and Flu," FamilyDoctor.org, 2011,
http://familydoctor.org/online/famdocen/home/tools/symptom/517.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
15 Ibid.
1 James M. Steckelberg, "Cold or allergy: Which is it?", n.d., http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/common-
cold/AN01229, (accessed July 18, 2011).
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Picking out anthrax among the many causes of ILI became important in the wake of the anthrax attacks.
After all, the cost of missing a diagnosis of anthrax was the life of a patient. Anthrax, however, remained
an extremely rare disease: only 22 people developed the infection, of which five died. Because the
disease is so uncommon and affects so few, but the symptoms of ILl-fever, fatigue, cough, etc-are by
contrast so common, the chances that any given patient walking into a doctor's office in the United
States with an ILI was actually infected with anthrax was, and remains, extraordinarily low.
The vast majority of ILis, however, fit in the realm of what get colloquially called "cold" and "flu." These
ILI are self-limiting illnesses:17 people make full recoveries, even in the absence of medical care. And it is
for this reason that most patients with ILI are told, just as Thomas Morris was told, that they probably
have "a virus or something," offered some pain killers or other medicine to help alleviate symptoms, and
sent home.
Cold versus flu: what is the difference?
The shelves of any drug store makes clear that selling cold medicine is big business. A search for "cold
medicine" in Google now even offers the following promotional links at the top of the results page:
"Related searches for cold medicine: Brands: Zicam Sudafed NyQuil Tylenol Mucinex." 8 One study
found that Americans spend nearly three billion dollars each year on over-the-counter drugs like these
in treating their symptoms. An additional $400 million is spent on prescription drugs. When considering
the toll on the U.S. economy-including $17 billion in healthcare usage as well as an additional $22.5
billion in "indirect costs" such as the productivity loss due to employees being out sick-the figure rises
to $40 billion per year.19 Despite this, public health officials today do not concentrate much on fighting
colds; their target is influenza.
"Because these two types of illnesses have similar flu-like symptoms, it can be difficult to tell the
difference between them based on symptoms alone," the CDC explains on its "Cold Versus Flu"
webpage. 0 "Colds are usually milder than the flu. ... Colds generally do not result in serious health
problems, such as pneumonia, bacterial infections, or hospitalizations." By contrast to the cold, CDC
promotional material frequently stresses the severity of influenza: "Influenza is a serious disease that
can lead to hospitalization and sometimes even death," one webpage says, and the impact in deaths and
hospitalizations is frequently cited."
It is this measure of seriousness-hospitalizations and deaths-that seems to justify the attention on
influenza. Research on colds, by contrast, is not driven by statistics that convey the sense of an
enormous threat. "Common cold is the most common disease," the Cardiff University based Common
17 Joanne Stockton et al., "Human metapneumovirus as a cause of community-acquired respiratory illness,"
Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 9 (September 2002): 897-901.
18 http://www.google.com/search?q=cold+medicine (search run on December 9, 2010)
19 A Mark Fendrick et al., "The economic burden of non-influenza-related viral respiratory tract infection in the
United States," Archives of Internal Medicine 163, no. 4 (February 24, 2003): 487-494.
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Q & A: Cold Versus Flu", February 8, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/coldflu.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
21 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Q & A: Seasonal Flu Vaccine", July 1, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/fluvaccine.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
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Cold Centre declares, one of the few research centers that studies colds. But can a cold kill? The
Common Cold Centre website answers: "Yes! Babies and the very elderly can develop chest infections
such as bronchiolitis caused by the RSV virus that can be fatal." But no statistics are posted allowing for
the comparison of that threat to the impact of influenza.
Colds may affect us all, and millions of dollars may be made selling remedies to ameliorate symptoms,
but if public health policy accurately represents a disease's true importance, the bottom line is that
colds do not deserve our attention. Influenza does.
However, there are several reasons to seriously question the official dichotomy of "colds versus flu."
First, "colds" are not all mild. The CDC itself writes, "non-flu viruses include rhinovirus (one cause of the
'common cold') and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), which is the most common cause of severe
respiratory illness in young children as well as a leading cause of death from respiratory illness in those
aged 65 years and older."22 Second, influenza is not all serious. In an influential 1982 text, Dr. Gary
Noble, of the CDC's Viral Disease Division, wrote that "... it is important to remember that the spectrum
of symptoms which occurs during influenza virus infections is quite variable, ranging from the classical
febrile respiratory disease with systemic manifestations to a minor respiratory illness."23 As the CDC
states, most cases of influenza "are mild" 24-a self-limiting illness that may not be pleasant, but
nonetheless resolves in the absence of medical attention. (But since not all cases are mild, CDC urges
vaccination of the entire population. 2s)
Third, many cases of influenza are so benign that the person infected does not even notice it. Known as
"asymptomatic illness," the proportion of people infected with influenza who do not develop any
symptoms is sizeable: in past epidemiological studies carried out over several influenza seasons, more
than half of people found to be infected with influenza virus showed no signs of infection. Finally,
there is not simply some overlap in these two disease categories, there is so much overlap that based on
27symptoms alone, the two cannot be distinguished apart, even by doctors.
The conceptual division of ILI into two major subcategories-"colds" and "flu"-in which one is
described as usually mild and the other is said to be "serious"-and further statements that "the flu is a
contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses," is not only inaccurate, but highly
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Q & A: Seasonal Influenza (Flu): The Disease", July 6, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
2 Gary R. Noble, "Epidemiological and clinical aspects of influenza," in Basic and Applied Influenza Research, ed. A.
S. Beare (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, Inc., 1982), 25.
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Questions & Answers: Novel HIN1 Influenza Vaccine", 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/public/vaccinationqapub.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
25 Ibid.
A S Monto, J S Koopman, and I M Longini Jr, "Tecumseh study of illness. XIII. Influenza infection and disease,
1976-1981," American Journal of Epidemiology 121, no. 6 (June 1985): 811-822.
Stephanie A Call et al., "Does this patient have influenza?," Journal of the American MedicalAssociation 293, no.
8 (February 23, 2005): 987-97.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Key facts about influenza and influenza vaccine", August 26,
2008, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/keyfacts.pdf, (accessed May 17, 2009).
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misleading. It is misleading because of a gap between what the public calls "flu" and what influenza
experts call "flu."
"To virologists and influenza experts, 'influenza' means the influenza virus and only the disease
produced by that virus. To members of the public, 'flu' is the disease regardless of viral cause," 29
Richard Neustadt and Harvey Fineberg wrote in their study of the 1976 "swine flu." This means that the
illness that presents to doctors, and what the public has learned to call "the flu" is not influenza, but
most accurately termed ILI, because it describes a non-specific syndrome with unknown etiology. This
"flu"-that is, ILI-has not one cause, but hundreds of causes, of which influenza virus is just one. Other
causes include rhinoviruses, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), adenoviruses, and parainfluenza viruses.30
31Some bacteria can even cause ILI.
Public health policy, however, is focused on controlling influenza, not ILI. Influenza vaccines and
influenza antivirals are the backbone of such policies, but they are ineffective against ILl not caused by
influenza.32 Evaluating the degree to which this public policy addresses the threat of what the public
calls "the flu," then, requires us to know what proportion of ILI is caused by influenza viruses.
Ask the experts
Driven by an interest in the possible use of influenza antivirals in patients, a team of researchers
published a paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 2005 that tried to determine
just how easy or difficult it was to make an accurate influenza diagnosis. Antivirals such as Tamiflu have
been licensed for use against influenza, but the Food and Drug Administration advises that
administration of this class of drugs must commence within 48 hours of symptom onset.33 Even for
patients that seek medical attention early in their illness, many doctors still "struggle with the decision
of whether to test or to empirically treat," the authors explain: rapid tests are not always accurate, and
more accurate lab work can take days to complete.
The researchers did a systematic review of the literature hoping to discover whether certain clinical
signs-perhaps single signs like fever, or in combination such as fever and cough-might reliably confirm
influenza among other causes of ILI. However, their search concluded that while ILI could be
29 Neustadt and Fineberg, The epidemic that never was, 139.
30 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Considerations for distinguishing influenza-like illness from
inhalational anthrax."
31 Tom Jefferson, "How to deal with influenza?: Real time surveillance providing information on circulating agents
is the key," BMJ 329, no. 7467 (September 18, 2004): 633-634; Call et al., "Does this patient have influenza?".
3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Key facts about influenza and influenza vaccine"; James Smith,
Regina Dutkowski, and Penelope Ward, "Antivirals for influenza in healthy adults," Lancet 367, no. 9522 (May 13,
2006): 1571; author reply 1573.
3 Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., "Product label. Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate) capsules and for oral suspension",
February 22, 2010,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs/label/2010/021087s048s049,021246s034s0351bi.pdf, (accessed
September 13, 2010); GlaxoSmithKline, "Product label. RELENZA (zanamivir) Inhalation powder, for oral
inhalation", December 9, 2010, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfdadocs/label/2010/021036s0251bl.pdf,
(accessed July 18, 2011).
3 Call et al., "Does this patient have influenza?".
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determined (an unsurprising finding given that ILI is a clinical diagnosis), clinical findings "are not
particularly useful for confirming or excluding the diagnosis of influenza." In other words, without
employing some kind of laboratory test, influenza cannot be distinguished from ILI.
* * *
Another possible way to assess the question of how much ILI is influenza may be by analyzing viral
surveillance data. During the influenza season, CDC receives voluntary weekly reports from more than
150 laboratories across the country. These labs indicate how many respiratory specimens were tested
at that laboratory and of those tested, how many were positive for influenza virus. The CDC collects
these reports and publishes the collective national statistics in its weekly report, FluView. These data,
published on the web, show that influenza was on average found in 15% of specimens tested each
season (1997-98 to 2010-11, range 10% to 22%; see Table 4.1).
Yet it is difficult to know how to properly apply these results to the question of influenza's contribution
to Il. While the system has grown considerably over the past decade, it is still capturing only an
extremely small proportion of all the cases of ILI that occur each year in the United States. 35
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that all people tested even had ILI as no standardized case definition
is used when accepting specimens. In an email, the CDC informed me that specimens received "are
subjected to testing practices and test methods in use in the local area and are not standardized."36 This
means that while the proportion that tests positive may hover between ten and twenty percent, it is
unclear precisely what this proportion represents.
The lack of standardization in testing practices may partially explain why results vary by lab and location.
In Michigan, for example, the state health department collects reports of influenza testing that record
the source of the report. In data I was sent, the proportion of influenza-positive specimens was 49%,
83%, or 100%, depending on the type of lab doing the testing (Sentinel Provider, "Other," or Sentinel
Lab, respectively). This suggests a strong connection between the way a specimen is procured and
processed and its likelihood that it will test positive for influenza. The influenza positive percentage
therefore may indicate little about the actual prevalence of influenza in the community. In data I
received from the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH), similarly large discrepancies in the
influenza positivity rate could be seen in labs across the state, even between labs that were less than 20
miles apart (Table 4.2). The influenza specialist at NYSDOH suggested that variations in human
behavior-differences in the reasons why certain people get chosen for influenza tests and others do
not-might best explain the range of positivity rates. NYSDOH has noticed large variations in the
tendencies of different doctors to send in tests. For reasons not fully understood, some doctors do far
more testing than others.
3s If ILI is as common as CDC stated in its anthrax advisory, it is only capturing around 250,000 of the hundreds of
millions of ILl episodes each year in the United States.
36 Correspondence with CDC, June 24, 2008.
3 Correspondence with NYSDOH, July 20, 2011.
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To understand just how to interpret all these numbers, and to better understand how surveillance of
influenza works in the United States, beginning in the summer of 2008 I systematically began to contact
all state health departments across the nation. I asked them to tell me how influenza surveillance
worked in their state, and what proportion of ILI could be attributed to influenza. None gave me exact
numbers, and most said they simply don't know. "We don't know ... and that's the honest answer," one
epidemiologist from Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene told me.38 Another told me
that "the amount of ILl that truly is influenza is a black box." 39 The CDC itself told me "We too have
been interested in knowing how much of the ILI is truly influenza and to do that we are piloting a new
system this fall [2008] to try and get at that information." 40 CDC informed me, however, that the pilot
project "was not successful," but a new project-the Influenza Incidence Surveillance Project-was
launched in 2009, and attempts to answer similar questions.41 But as of June 2011, the CDC has not yet
made any of the data public, though it intends to in the future. As it stands, then, the US influenza
surveillance system, despite being the most sophisticated in the world, at present is unable to answer
the key question of what proportion of ILI is caused by influenza.
The majority of ILI is not influenza
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a sense that, as the surveillance data indicate, influenza is a
minority cause of ILI. The Maryland DHMH epidemiologist explained that while there may not be solid
data, "we do look at trends. In the winter, the trend is that between 5% and 30% of people with ILI who
see a healthcare provider and are tested are positive for influenza by rapid antigen test, PCR, culture, or
other means." 42 In 2001, as part of educating clinicians about the similarities between the early stages
of anthrax infection and ILI, the CDC told clinicians that
The majority of ILI cases is not caused by influenza but by other viruses (e.g.,
rhinoviruses and respiratory syncytial virus [RSV]), adenoviruses, and parainfluenza
viruses). Less common causes of ILI include bacteria such as Legionella spp., Chlamydia
pneumoniae, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, and Streptococcus pneumoniae. 43
Others have conducted studies which numerically quantify the proportion of ILI that is influenza.
In a study taking place over four winter seasons in the United Kingdom, researchers analyzed the
respiratory specimens of 408 children suffering "more than a cold" (Figure 4.1). Influenza was found in
one-third of all specimens. RSV and parainfluenza virus together accounted for another third.44
38 Interview with Rene Najera (MDHMH), July 2, 2008.
39 Interview with Stephanie Schauer, Immunization Program, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, June 18,
2008.
40 Email correspondence with Lynnette Brammer (CDC), July 9, 2008.
41 Email correspondence with Ashley Fowlkes (CDC), June 30, 2011.
42 Interview with Rene Najera (MDHMH), June 20, 2011.
43 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Considerations for distinguishing influenza-like illness from
inhalational anthrax."
44 Anthony Harnden et al., "Respiratory infections for which general practitioners consider prescribing an
antibiotic: a prospective study," Archives of Disease in Childhood 92, no. 7 (July 2007): 594-597.
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In a similarly designed study, a different set of researchers considered the cause of upper respiratory
tract infections in the elderly. This time, many of the same agents were found, but in different
proportions. Rhinoviruses has caused a quarter of infections. Coronaviruses were the second most
common agent found, yet only accounted for 12% of the 291 elderly tested. Influenza had caused just
5% of the total. By far, most illnesses were of unknown etiology: no agent could be discovered (Figure
4.2 ) .41
A third study, published in 1998, on the etiology of the common cold in Finland found 44% were caused
by rhinovirus; 7% by coronavirus; and 5% by influenza viruses. 26% were of unknown etiology.46
Finally, a more recent study of ILI in nearly 7000 people of all ages seeking medical care in 13 Peruvian
cities over two years found 55% to be of unknown origin. Influenza was found in 37%. Other viruses
were found, but only rarely.47 (Figure 4.3)
The inconsistencies between each study's results demonstrates the inadequacy of such single studies to
definitively answer the question of what proportion of ILI is caused by influenza. It varies depending on
the season, the population being tested, and location. But the studies, taken together, do tell one story
consistently: that a mixed bag of agents are causing people to develop illnesses with similar symptoms.
If no single study can provide answers, is there any way to measure the proportion of the ILI pie caused
by influenza? The influenza researcher Tom Jefferson from the Cochrane Collaboration has proposed
combining vaccine and epidemiological studies to determine a better estimate of the incidence and
etiology of ILI. (in the interest of full disclosure, I should note that Jefferson is a close colleague, and I
have worked with Jefferson and his colleagues on some of this research.) Influenza vaccine trials in
which one group is vaccinated with influenza vaccine and another group either receives a placebo or "do
nothing" (they are left alone) offer a good chance to figure out just how many people naturally become
ill with influenza. While the group vaccinated with influenza vaccine may not be representative because
of some level of protection from the vaccine, the group which does not receive influenza vaccine can be
expected to develop influenza at the rate that exists in nature. And because subjects enrolled in clinical
trials are expected to be monitored closely during the course of the trial, such vaccine studies may
represent the best evidence currently available to determine the proportion of the population that
develops ILI.
The cause of those ILI, however, may not be distinguished by all vaccine studies. Some studies may
record that the patient developed an ILl, but not do sufficient laboratory testing to determine its
etiology. Jefferson therefore combined these studies with 28 epidemiological studies which
45 K G Nicholson et al., "Acute viral infections of upper respiratory tract in elderly people living in the community:
comparative, prospective, population based study of disease burden," BMJ 315, no. 7115 (October 25, 1997):
1060-1064.
46 M J Makela et al., "Viruses and bacteria in the etiology of the common cold," Journal of Clinical Microbiology 36,
no. 2 (February 1998): 539-542.
47 V. Alberto Laguna-Torres et al., "Influenza-Like Illness Sentinel Surveillance in Peru," PLoS ONE 4, no. 7 (July 1,
2009): e6118.
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investigated the cause of ILL. He published the results in the journal BMJ Clinical Evidence in 2009.48 The
epidemiological studies indicated that influenza virus was a minority cause of ILI: in only around 1 in 10
ILis was influenza detected. But the vaccine studies indicated that ILI itself-of any etiology-was not
especially common, in contrast to CDC statements. In the 274 vaccine studies analyzed, ILI affected an
average seven in one hundred people each "flu season." Taken together, Jefferson found that influenza
virus caused symptoms in about 1 person per 100 people per year (Figure 4.4).
Jefferson's results question what is reported on the CDC website and prominently repeated by the
media-that 5 to 20% of the population "gets the flu" each year. 49 (Note that the CDC's claim, despite
the imprecise choice of words, refers to influenza virus, not "flu" in the colloquial sense of an influenza-
like illness.50)
The 5-20% statistic is five to twenty times higher than what Jefferson's review found. It also diverges
with what the CDC itself said during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. Comparing the H1N1 outbreak to a
"typical" season, Anne Schuchat declared that "In a typical influenza season, about 7% to 10% of the
people in a community may become infected with an influenza virus." The disparity between the 5-20%
and 7-10% statistics is even more pronounced when one considers that the 7-10% "infected"
presumably includes both symptomatic and asymptomatic illness while the 5-20% that "gets the flu"
presumably includes only those developing symptoms.
While on first glance it seems impossible to reconcile the differences in statistics, it might be possible by
considering the underlying methods used to generate the numbers. Unfortunately, the 5-20% statistic is
well publicized but lacks citation. In the most comprehensive US policy document on influenza with
over 500 references, statistics on mortality and hospitalization are given, but annual incidence is not.51
The ambiguity in statistics and lack of documentation is not uncommon, nor is it limited to the United
States. In the most recent 2005 WHO position paper on influenza vaccines, it is stated that "Influenza
occurs all over the world, with an annual global attack rate estimated at 5-10% in adults and 20-30% in
children."5 2 The guidance document however lacks a bibliography or references to support statements
made in the text.
Is influenza a serious disease?
While accurate numbers regarding how many people develop symptomatic influenza each year remain
elusive, it seems reasonable to expect that for an illness affecting humans for centuries, officials' claim
that influenza is a serious disease would be trustworthy. But there is no clear consensus on this basic
point. Officials in the United States would like us to believe that the matter is clear cut. "MYTH 'The flu
isn't a serious disease"' the CDC printed at the top of a promotional poster in 2007. "FACT: Influenza
48 Tom Jefferson, "Mistaken identity: seasonal influenza versus influenza-like illness," BMJ Clinical Evidence
(October 5, 2009), http://clinicalevidence.bmj.com/downloads/05-10-09.pdf.
49 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC -Seasonal Influenza (Flu) - Q& A."
so Correspondence with CDC-INFO Contact Center, November 21, 2006.
51 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010."
52 "influenza vaccines," Weekly Epidemiological Record 80, no. 33 (August 19, 2005): 279-287.
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(flu) is a serious disease of the nose, throat, and lungs, and it can lead to pneumonia," the poster
insisted.53 A newer CDC poster likewise states: "Flu is a serious contagious disease that can lead to
hospitalization and even death" (emphasis in the original). 54
But in the United Kingdom, the public has been targeted with a very different message: "For most
people, flu is nasty but not serious: a short period of chills, aches and pains and then a return to normal
health" 5 (Figure 4.5).
During a recent visit to Atlanta, I shared the contrasting promotional materials with the CDC's Director
of Media relations, and asked him to explain how influenza could be serious in the United States but not
serious in the United Kingdom. Glen Nowak told me that:
The reality is that it can be a serious disease, and one of the challenges with messaging,
when you are giving messages, is that you have to be mindful that it's hard to do one-
size-fit-all messages, but people want one-size-fit-all messages. And so what we're
trying to do at CDC is recognize that it is a serious disease, can be a serious disease, and
if it wasn't a serious disease, we wouldn't be taking it as seriously as we do. ...
Now in terms of course of illness, for most people, it's gonna just be, you know, maybe 5
to 7 days of feeling really awful. And we said that last year during HiN1, that for many
people, for most people, that's what it's gonna look like.
Now the problem with putting too much emphasis on that message, though, is that you
also don't want people to fall into a false sense of security because the reality is that we
can't predict which people-you know, which individuals-are going to experience a
serious course of illness. We have seen healthy people-younger healthy people-with
H1N1 experience very severe outcomes and some of them die. And so if you want
people to take the recommendation to heart, which we do at CDC-get vaccinated-
you have to recognize that we're doing it because this is serious, this is an important
matter. ...
That's different, than I guess what you're saying this one says (Nowak is referring to the
UK NHS promotional material I have brought along to the interview-the right pane of
Figure 4.5], is that if you get influenza, the typical course of influenza is not gonna be
somebody who's going to be hospitalized, suffer pneumonia, or some kind of severe
consequence. Yeah-the typical course of influenza, is gonna be that you're gonna feel
s3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Flu Vaccine Facts & Myths."
s4 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "'Take 3' Actions", 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/freeresources/general/take3_printreverse.pdf, (accessed July 19, 2011).
ss UK National Health Service, "If you knew about flu you'd get the jab", 2008,
http://www.immunisation.nhs.uk/publications/289667_FluLeafletA4.pdf, (accessed August 15, 2009).
Page 162
False Assumptions: a Shaky Foundation for Consensus
awful, really bad for 5 to 7 days, but even there, that warrants your attention and it
seems like getting a flu vaccination is a simple and effective way to avoid that.5 6
Nowak's reference to healthy children dying of H1N1 is a theme that was repeatedly raised throughout
the 2009 HIN1 outbreak. According to a USA Today editorial, Dr. Anthony Fauci, one of the nation's top
infectious disease officials, said: "I've never seen, in seasonal flu, a normal, robust healthy person die
from influenza." 57 Such deaths were, Fauci said, "almost unheard of" in non-pandemic, seasonal
influenza. But with H1N1, the USA Today explained, "almost a third of those who die may be otherwise
healthy and robust."
To be sure, influenza deaths in children are uncommon. However the factual basis for Fauci's statement
is unclear. It is true that for years, little precise information existed regarding influenza-related pediatric
mortality. No formal, mandatory, or other systematic mechanism existed to track such deaths. But that
changed in 2003-04, when the CDC began to collect such data from state health departments.58 Today,
the reporting of influenza-associated pediatric mortality is mandatory.59 What closer inspection of such
deaths has revealed is that a striking number occur among previously healthy children-contrary to
Fauci's statement.
In a prominent article in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2005, CDC researchers reported on the
deaths of 153 children during the 2003-04 influenza season. Of them, nearly half (47%) had been
previously healthy.60 A subsequent study in 2008, also published by the CDC, confirmed the finding:
"the majority of deaths occurred in previously healthy children without an underlying medical
condition."61
What changed in the H1N1 outbreak was the sheer number of pediatric deaths being reported. In the
twelve months since H1N1 was first detected in April 2009, over 300 influenza-associated pediatric
deaths were reported to CDC-more than double than the previous highest season (2003-04).62 (The
CDC argues that their reported numbers, while high, are still a serious undercounting because many
children may die of HIN1 but never be counted, and has estimated the true number to be far higher-or
between 910 and 1,880 deaths in those under the age of 18.63 Others have challenged the likelihood
56 Interview with Glen Nowak (CDC), October 27, 2010.
57 "Benefits of swine flu vaccine greatly exceed the risks," USA Today, October 9, 2009.
58 Niranjan Bhat et al., "Influenza-associated deaths among children in the United States, 2003-2004," The New
England Journal of Medicine 353, no. 24 (December 15, 2005): 2559-67.
59 Lyn Finelli et al., "Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality in the United States: Increase of Staphylococcus
aureus Coinfection," Pediatrics 122, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 805-811.
60 Bhat et al., "Influenza-associated deaths among children in the United States, 2003-2004."
61 Finelli et al., "Influenza-Associated Pediatric Mortality in the United States."
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "FluView: 2009-2010 Influenza Season Week 16 ending April 24,
2010", April 30, 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2009-2010/weeklyl6.htm, (accessed July 18,
2011).
6 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations
and Deaths in the United States, April 2009 -January 16, 2010", March 29, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_hlnl.htm, (accessed April 11, 2010).
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that the cause of a pediatric death due to H1N1 would be so easily missed: 64 when children die, people
want to know why.) But where studies have been done, there was no surprising increase in the
proportion of these children which were previously healthy. There may have actually been a decrease:
in the UK, for example, fifteen of the 70 children who are reported to have died of H1N1, or 21%, were
previously healthy.65
Nowak told me that despite influenza being an unpleasant yet short lived disease for the vast majority of
people, the "serious disease" label was appropriate because, in his words, "we can't predict which
people-you know, which individuals-are going to experience a serious course of illness." Nowak is of
course correct, but by this criterion, almost any disease could be labeled "serious." But despite the lack
of complete predictability, it does not therefore follow that influenza's impact is completely random.
Indeed, the justification for targeting the elderly in vaccination campaigns has always been that they, as
a segment of the population, are more likely than others to suffer serious complications, or even die,
from a bout of influenza. So while CDC may not be able to predict precisely which individual persons will
experience a serious course of illness, the agency can and does predict that particular "high-risk" groups
(such as the elderly and those with chronic medical conditions) are more likely to suffer serious
complications of influenza than others.66
By describing influenza as a "serious" disease in its promotional materials, CDC generalizes what
happens in a minority of mostly predictable populations (namely, the very elderly), and implies that
everybody is at equal risk of infection and death.
Does influenza kill an average 36,000 per year?
That statistics are used to convey the threat of influenza is not surprising. The severity of most diseases
is expressed in the language of statistics. ("In 2006, 631,636 people died of heart disease," the CDC's
67 j klewebsite for diabetes declares. Stroke "killed 137,119 people in 2006," says the American Heart
Association. For motor vehicle traffic deaths, CDC reports that 42,031 died in 2007.6) But with
influenza, no such specificity exists. Rather, since 2003, it is the rounded 36,000 figure that gets used.
The difference in specificity is due to the vastly different ways in which officials arrive at these numbers.
For every one of the 631,636, 137,119, and 42,031 people that were reported to have died of heart
disease, stroke, or motor vehicle traffic deaths, respectively, there exists a death certificate on which the
cause of death fits within these categories. For the approximately 2.4 million Americans that die each
64 Meryl Nass, "Suddenly there are many more deaths from swine flu, per CDC," Anthrax Vaccine, November 13,
2009, http://anthraxvaccine.blogspot.com/2009/11/suddenly-there-are-many-more-deaths.html, (accessed July
18, 2011).
65 Nabihah Sachedina and Liam J Donaldson, "Paediatric mortality related to pandemic influenza A H1N1 infection
in England: an observational population-based study," The Lancet 376, no. 9755 (November 2010): 1846-1852.
Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010."
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Heart Disease Facts", December 21, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/heartdisease/facts.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
68 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Accidents or Unintentional Injuries", May 12, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/acc-inj.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
Page 164
False Assumptions: a Shaky Foundation for Consensus
year, the CDC's National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) receives a copy of the death certificate.
Ranking them by the underlying cause of death arrived at after applying a uniform algorithm, the CDC
tabulates just how many people were recorded to have died from the thousands of possible causes of
death. CDC publishes this info in an annual National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR)-and it is from this
report where many mortality statistics originate.
According to the NVSR, "Influenza and pneumonia" killed 56,326 in 2006, making it the eighth leading
cause of death (Table 4.3). This point has not been lost on groups advocating for vaccination. "Last
year, Lili Estefan became one of nearly 17 million Hispanics who contracted the flu. She didn't know it
was the seventh leading cause of death among Latinos 65+," claims the AARP, an organization with over
40 million members focused on improving the quality of life for the elderly. 69 The American Lung
Association similarly states: "Influenza and Pneumonia are a leading cause of death in the U.S. The sad
part of these diseases is that they can easily be prevented by a vaccination, yet continue to cause
disease and death for thousands each year."70
The reason influenza mortality has been expressed as an average of 36,000-rather than specific
numbers-is in large part because the 36,000 number does not come from a count of death certificates.
When the "Influenza and pneumonia" category is split into its components, the CDC report indicates
that pneumonia claimed 55,477 of the total 56,326; influenza was the cause of death in the remaining
849.
The year 2006 was not an anomaly. In the recorded mortality between 1979 and 2007 (the most recent
year for which finalized mortality data is available), influenza deaths never exceeded even 10% of the
36,000 estimate (Table 4.4).
While CDC seems comfortable to cite the death certificate data to explain how many people died of
heart disease or motor vehicle traffic accidents, with influenza, CDC argues that the numbers appearing
in its underlying causes of death tables represent a significant under-counting of the true impact of
influenza. "Only counting deaths where influenza was included on a death certificate would be a gross
underestimation of seasonal influenza's true impact," the agency says.71 Therefore, CDC employs
statistical modeling techniques to estimate what it feels is a more likely representation of influenza's
real impact. The CDC's statistical model-published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA) in 2003-calculated an annual average of 36,155 deaths during the 1990s. It was here that the
"36,000 deaths" statistic was born.
69 AARP VIVA, "Flu: Latinos at Higher Risk", 2010, http://www.aarp.org/health/conditions-treatments/info-12-
2010/flulatinosathigherrisk.html, (accessed July 18, 2011).
70 American Lung Association, "Influenza and Pneumonia," in State of Lung Disease in Diverse Communities 2010,
2010, 45-53, http://www.lungusa.org/assets/documents/publications/soiddc-chapters/i-p.pdf, (accessed
December 14, 2010).
7 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Questions and Answers: Estimating Deaths from Influenza in
the United States", June 24, 2011, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/usjflu-relateddeaths.htm, (accessed
July 18, 2011).
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William Thompson of the CDC, who led the JAMA study, explained why death certificates-used to tally
statistics on heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and many other causes of death-is not appropriate for
influenza:
For several reasons, the number of influenza-related deaths cannot be determined
solely by reports of influenza-coded deaths. First, most adult patients with symptoms
consistent with influenza infection are not tested for influenza. Those who are generally
receive rapid tests of only modest sensitivity. In addition, many influenza-associated
deaths occur one or two weeks after the initial infection (when viral shedding has
ended), either because of secondary bacterial infections or because the influenza has
exacerbated chronic illnesses (e.g., congestive heart failure or chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease). Even when influenza infection is confirmed by laboratory testing,
those results are rarely reported on death certificates. ... The inability of death
certificates to reliably and consistently attribute death to influenza has been understood
for many decades, and this understanding led to the development of statistical models
to better estimate influenza-associated deaths. 72
Deaths calculated through modeling-termed "influenza-related" or "influenza-associated" deaths-are
"deaths that occur in people for whom seasonal influenza infection was likely a contributor to the cause
of death, but not necessarily the primary cause of death."73 "Based on modelling," Thompson told me,
"we think it's associated. I don't know that we would say that it's the underlying cause of death." 74
Martin Meltzer, a CDC health economist and co-author with Thompson on the JAMA paper, explained it
this way: "Somebody can have flu and go to a hospital and die of a heart attack, but he might not have
had the heart attack if he hadn't had the flu ... The death certificates don't read 'influenza.' ... They read
'heart attack,' 'diabetes' and all the fancy things people write down because they don't know what they
died of."7
The use of statistical models to more accurately guage influenza's impact is not new. The understanding
that more people tend to die in winters with epidemics of influenza gave rise to the concept of "excess
mortality," a phrase coined by the statistician William Farr in the mid nineteenth century.76 The practice
was refined over time, and modern statistical methods have been strongly influenced by a 1963 paper
by Robert E. Serfling, then chief of statistics in the CDC's epidemiology branch. Even in the absence of
influenza, more people die during the colder months of the year than the warmer months, so Serfling
72 William W. Thompson et al., "Estimating Influenza-Associated Deaths in the United States," Am J Public Health
99, no. 2 (October 1, 2009): S225-230.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Questions and Answers: Estimating Deaths from Influenza in
the United States."
Peter Doshi, "Are US flu death figures more PR than science?," BMJ 331, no. 7529 (December 2005): 1412.
7s Anita Manning, "Study: Annual flu death toll could be overstated," USA Today, December 12, 2005.
Alfred S. Evans and Richard A. Kaslow, eds., Viral infections of humans: epidemiology and control (Springer,
1997), 474.
Robert E. Serfling, "Methods for current statistical analysis of excess pneumonia-influenza deaths," Public Health
Reports 78, no. 6 (June 1963): 494-506.
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developed a method for computing this "normal" seasonal variation in mortality data and estimating an
"epidemic threshold" above which the mortality impact of influenza epidemics could be computed. This
basic model was developed further over time, and some modelers still use it, but the CDC's 2003 JAMA
paper modeled influenza-associated deaths in a totally new way, by incorporating virological
surveillance data (the weekly proportion of specimens testing positive for influenza). When the press
reported on the CDC's new model in 2003, most presented a story that was sympathetic to and
accepting of78 the CDC's attempts at developing "more precise estimates."0' However, experts in the
field-some of whom had developed their own models-were less impressed. When JAMA published
three letters in response to the Thompson paper, all were critical.
"We are concerned that their model was inappropriate," wrote Nigel Gay and colleagues from the
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre in London in the first letter.80 They raised the question of
whether the CDC's new model was overstating influenza deaths. "Thompson et al used a Poisson model
in which the number of deaths increased exponentially with the number of laboratory reports and the
effects of each virus (and the seasonal background) on the number of deaths were multiplicative rather
than additive. We do not believe there is plausible justification for fitting such a model to these data."
The second criticism came from authors at the National Institutes of Health who were not excited about
the sudden change in methods. "The authors propose that this model replace Serfling-type models,
which have been used for 40 years ... Although Thompson et al offer their model as superior, they do not
provide graphical or statistical evidence of acceptable fit or model validation. Nor do they compare
their influenza mortality estimates with those based on Serfling models."81 Lone Simonsen and co-
author Thomas Reichert argued against immediate adoption of the Thompson model. "We propose that
rigorous demonstrations of validity and benefit precede adoption of this new modeling approach."
But with no media coverage of the letters, published months after the CDC's original paper, little
pressure existed to compel the CDC to re-think its strategy. Moreover, the CDC argued it was on the
right track. "Mr Gay and colleagues suggest that we used an incorrect statistical model to analyze our
data," the CDC wrote in its response letter. "We compared the effects of using a Poisson regression
model with a log-link vs with a linear-link as suggested by Gay et al and found that the results were
highly correlated (R2>0.95). Furthermore, our models had lower mean square errors."8 2 To Simonsen
and Reichert's concern about abandoning the former Serfling method of estimation, they replied: "We
73 Associated Press, "Flu-Related Deaths Are Up Fourfold Since '70s," The Washington Post, January 8, 2003; "CDC
reports jump in flu-related deaths," CNN Health, January 7, 2003, http://articles.cnn.com/2003-01-
07/health/flu.deaths_1_flu-related-deaths-flu-season-keiji-fukuda?_s=PM:HEALTH, (accessed July 18, 2011).
79 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Telebriefing Transcript: Increase in Influenza-Related
Deaths in the United States."
80 Nigel J Gay et al., "Estimating deaths due to influenza and respiratory syncytial virus," Journal of the American
Medical Association 289, no. 19 (May 21, 2003): 2499; author reply 2500-2.
81 Lone Simonsen et al., "Estimating deaths due to influenza and respiratory syncytial virus," JAMA: The Journal of
the American Medical Association 289, no. 19 (May 21, 2003): 2499-500; author reply 2500-2.
82 William W. Thompson et al., "Estimating Deaths Due to Influenza and Respiratory Syncytial Virus--Reply," Journal
of the American Medical Association 289, no. 19 (May 2003): 2500-2502.
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compared their model and ours ... we suggest that these results highlight the similarities not the
differences, between different model estimates."
Too big, too small, just right
There is also a large degree of arbitrariness in the interpretation of the model. The CDC's JAMA paper
did not present a single estimate of influenza-associated death; it presented ninety-six: the result of
computing estimates of influenza-associated death for each season between 1976 and 1999 across
three different disease categories using two related statistical models. In summary, the estimates were:
* Influenza Model
1. 5,977 influenza-associated underlying pneumonia and influenza deaths (average of
estimates for 23 seasons, 1976-77 to 1998-99)
2. 25,420 influenza-associated underlying respiratory and circulatory deaths (average of
estimates for 23 seasons, 1976-77 to 1998-99)
3. 34,470 influenza-associated underlying all-cause deaths (average of estimates for 23
seasons, 1976-77 to 1998-99)
* Influenza and RSV Model
4. 8,097 influenza-associated underlying pneumonia and influenza deaths (average of
estimates for 9 seasons, 1990-91 to 1998-99)
5. 36,155 influenza-associated underlying respiratory and circulatory deaths (average of
estimates for 9 seasons, 1990-91 to 1998-99)
6. 51,203 influenza-associated underlying all-cause deaths (average of estimates for 9
seasons, 1990-91 to 1998-99)
Differences between the "Influenza Model" and "Influenza and RSV Model" are small and partially
reflect differences in the date range. But why the CDC settled on the middle 36,155 and not 8,097 or
51,203 is explained in the paper:
Influenza-associated all-cause death estimates have been previously used to represent
the full spectrum of deaths associated with influenza infections. However, these
estimates include deaths such as those caused by fires and motor vehicle crashes, which
are not directly associated with respiratory viral infections. Therefore, we also modeled
a third category of deaths, underlying respiratory and circulatory deaths (which includes
pneumonia and influenza deaths), to provide an estimate of deaths that was more
directly associated with viral respiratory infections.
Deciding that the "underlying respiratory and circulatory deaths" category-or people whose deaths
had been recorded as due to a respiratory or circulatory cause but was somehow "associated" with
influenza-was the a better category on which to model influenza-associated mortality is not
straightforward; indeed the CDC broke from convention by going with the new category. W. Paul
Glezen and Robert B. Couch protested in a letter that "we see no reason to abandon total excess
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mortality and substitute 'respiratory and circulatory deaths." 83 Glezen and Couch, two prominent
academic influenza researchers who have consulted for influenza vaccine manufacturers, argued "Even
cases listing burns or trauma as the underlying cause of death may be influenza-related if the virus
infection occurred coincident with the trauma or was nosocomial." It seems that had Glezen and Couch
authored the new model, they would have opted for the even higher 51,203 deaths estimate.
Validating the CDC's mortality model
I first raised doubts about the 36,000 figure in 2005. "Before 2003 CDC said that 20,000 influenza-
associated deaths occurred each year. The new figure of 36,000 reported in the January 2003 JAMA
paper is an estimate of influenza-associated mortality over the 1990s," I wrote in an essay for the BMJ.
Keiji Fukuda, a flu researcher and a co-author of the paper, has been quoted as offering
two possible causes for this 80% increase: "One is that the number of people older than
65 is growing larger...The second possible reason is the type of virus that predominated
in the 1990s [was more virulent]."
However, the 65-plus population grew just 12% between 1990 and 2000. And if flu virus
was truly more virulent over the 1990s, one would expect more deaths. But flu deaths
recorded by the NCHS were on average 30% lower in the 1990s than the 1980s.84
Figure 4.6 provides a graphical representation of the contrast between the increase in estimates of
annual influenza-associated mortality and the corresponding decrease in recorded influenza deaths.
In response to my article, authors from the NIH dismissed my concerns over the reliability of the CDC's
statistical estimates. They assured readers that statistical methods for estimating influenza-related
mortality were "extensively vetted in the scientific literature, and are quite robust." 5 Such a position,
however, is apparently contradicted by what one of the authors had elsewhere written:
Measuring the health burden imposed by influenza is an important, and still
controversial, question. Some authors argue that influenza is directly or indirectly
responsible for the majority of seasonal excess deaths in temperate countries, while
others argue that they trigger only a small minority.86
Indeed, according to others, it is the effects of cold weather alone that triggers epidemic-like peaks in
wintertime mortality, "mainly from thrombotic and respiratory disease," even in the absence of
influenza. 7 One such researcher has argued that traditional methods to assess influenza deaths have
8 W. Paul Glezen and Robert B. Couch, "Estimating deaths due to influenza and respiratory syncytial virus," JAMA:
The Journal of the American Medical Association 289, no. 19 (May 21, 2003): 2500.
84 Doshi, "Are US flu death figures more PR than science?".
85 Lone Simonsen et al., "US Flu Mortality Estimates Are Based on Solid Science" (January 11, 2006),
http://www.bmj.com/content/331/7529/1412.extract/reply#bmj_eL_1257 78, (accessed July 18, 2011).
86 Jonathan Dushoff, "Assessing influenza-related mortality: Comment on Zucs et al.," Emerging Themes in
Epidemiology 2, no. 1 (2005): 7.
87 G C Donaldson and W R Keatinge, "Excess winter mortality: influenza or cold stress? Observational study," BMJ
324, no. 7329 (January 12, 2002): 89-90.
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produced an "exaggerated picture," as they fail to capture the effect of especially cold weather. "If
allowance is made for the cold weather by multiple regression analysis, influenza epidemics account for
less than 5% of the excess winter mortality in Britain over the last ten years."88
Nevertheless, the NIH authors further stated that, despite differences in methods between the classical
Serfling "excess mortality" based models and the CDC's new virological data based model, "All these
approaches yield similar estimates of the average seasonal US influenza mortality burden" when applied
to the same years."9 The CDC has made the same argument. Referencing a journal article it published in
2009 in which the results of multiple statistical models were compared, CDC authors concluded that all
models "produced a similar picture" of influenza-associated mortality. 90 However, despite assurances
that annual estimates were "at least moderately correlated (r > 0.53)," model estimates can at times
differ greatly. For example, the "Linear regression model" calculated 14,116 deaths in the 2001-02
season, while the "Summer-season 15% rate-difference model" calculated 74,808 deaths in the same
season (Figure 4.7).
Nonetheless, the CDC claimed that the old 36,000 figure "was corroborated in 2009," citing their 2009
publication as evidence. "Results from this study showed that during this time period, 36,171 flu-related
deaths occurred per year, on average." 91 However, the similarity here between 36,000 and 36,171 is
somewhat coincidental, as the CDC is no longer comparing the same time period. 36,171 refers to the
1993-94 through the 2002-03 seasons, whereas the 36,000 figure refers to the 1990-91 and 1998-99
period. Had the same time periods been compared, the new paper found the old estimate around 10%
too high. (The 2009 paper shows an average of 32,928 deaths per year between 1990-91 and 1998-99.)
Discrepancies in results became even more pronounced after CDC published a further update of its
influenza mortality statistics, in August 2010. At a press briefing called for the occasion, disease modeler
Dr. David Shay explained in his opening statement that the idea behind the latest publication was to
"really just update previous estimates last made in 2009 using the same methodology, incorporating an
additional four years of data."
The update, however, did more than provide an addition four years of influenza-associated death
estimates. The MMWR publication calculated new estimates for all 31 seasons between 1976-77 and
2006-07. For the 1990-91 and 1998-99 period during which the CDC previously estimated an average of
36,000 deaths per year, the CDC's latest model found just 24,973 (Figure 4.8).
In opening remarks, the CDC however did not place the new statistics in the context of the well-known
36,000 figure. After a season in which much attention had been paid to the fact that the reported and
88 W R Keatinge, "Winter mortality and its causes," International Journalof Circumpolar Health 61, no. 4
(November 2002): 292-299.
89 Simonsen et al., "US Flu Mortality Estimates Are Based on Solid Science."
90 William W. Thompson et al., "Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods,"
Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 3, no. 1 (2009): 37-49.
91 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations
and Deaths in the United States", January 15, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/estimates/AprilDecember_12.htm, (accessed April 11, 2010).
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estimated deaths from "pandemic" influenza H1N1 were dwarfed by the 36,000 deaths estimated to be
caused by "run-of-the-mill" influenza, the CDC abandoned reporting a single number and instead told
reporters it was "relatively meaningless" to report a point average because "when you look at sort of
our data, there are very few of those 31 seasons where you would have an average outcome." CDC said
it was instead "trying to move towards away from a single number, and rather, give a range over a
particular period of time to give a better time text to what flu really means in terms of what it does to
the community." "(A] simple average, I think, fails to give the impact of flu in an understandable
fashion," Shay said.92 Instead of a single mean average, like 36,000, the press was encouraged to report
on influenza as an unpredictable threat with a mortality impact ranging between 3,000 to 49,000 deaths
per year.
Members of media on the telebriefing, however, who had for years printed the 36,000 figure following
CDC's lead, were understandably concerned about the dramatic shift in the CDC's message and
struggled to put the new paper in the context of the old "36,000." Betsy McKay from the Wall Street
Journal pointed out that the text of the CDC's latest paper actually did present an average-23,607-
representing the average over the 31 seasons, 1976-2007. She asked Shay, "is that an average number
we can use and does that compare to the 36,000?"
Shay explained that years which had averaged 36,000 deaths had many "more severe" seasons, and that
over the whole time period of the 2003 paper, the average was "about 25,000." Therefore, "this
average that we're coming up with now, 23,600, is consistent with what we've published in the past"
(Figure 4.9).
Don Sapatkin of the Philadelphia Inquirer was next to probe the 36,000 issue. "I know you don't want us
to use a range ... I mean an average. But what does the 36,000 actually equate to in the new study-
even though you don't want us to use it? I'm trying to understand it."93
Shay repeated that 36,000 "was for 1990 through 1999," but did not explain that mortality over this
time period had been re-estimated in the new paper. Shay did not explain that the CDC's latest
estimate was no longer 36,155 but rather now 24,973 (Figure 4.8). Instead, Shay focused on the theme
that the new study simply confirms the old study, and directed attention away from the 1990s and
towards the full study range: "That 2003 paper actually looked at a broader range of seasons, from '76
through 1999. So, from that whole time period, the average was approximately 23,000-25,000 deaths,
excuse me. And for this time period, this broader 31-season time period that we're looking at, the
average is approximately 23,600. So, they're very similar" (Figure 4.9).
Despite multiple reporters' questions about the 36,000 figure, the CDC did not disclose during the press
briefing that, according to what it knew now, the widely cited and well known 36,000 statistic had been
inaccurate and was 46% too high; that its new estimate of yearly death during the 1990s is 24,973, not
36,155. (Figure 4.8) Instead, it continued to discuss that period as an "outlier of a decade." The CDC
9 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcript: August 26, 2010", August 26,
2010, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2010/t100826.htm, (accessed August 26, 2010).
9 Press Briefing, 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2010/audio/0826.mp3, (accessed August 26, 2010).
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also did not explain why its estimates of annual influenza-associated mortality differ across various
publications, despite assertions that it is using "the same methodology" (Figure 4.10). In the 2004-05
season, for example, there were 14,377 influenza-associated underlying respiratory and circulatory
deaths according to the CDC's 2009 publication-but in the 2010 publication, the re-calculated estimate
showed 47,117 deaths. Instead, the CDC stressed the dangers of influenza and assured the audience
that "this is an update that confirms really what we have seen previously in terms of flu."94
* * *
Although the CDC argues that its models and estimates have been "corroborated," important
discrepancies remain. But even if statistical models all did produce similar estimates, there remains a
fundamental need to validate models. Multiple models could be built upon similar but inaccurate
assumptions. Models may also fail to distinguish between true influenza deaths and those triggered by
other influenza-like illnesses. Similarity in model estimates would not resolve these questions.
Unfortunately, estimation of influenza-associated deaths remains a controversial area because there is
no established or widely accepted way to determine their accuracy. That is, to quote the CDC, "there is
no gold standard currently available for assessing the performance of the different models....". 5 Until
such a gold standard comes to be,96 evaluations of the magnitude of the threat of influenza will remain
nothing more than problematic, self-contradictory, controversial guesswork.
The CDC's Pandemic Severity Index
If quantifying the severity of seasonal influenza is fraught with problems, measuring the magnitude in
deaths and illness of a future pandemic that has not yet occurred poses challenges of a new kind. But
the problem is no less important if the goal is to keep responses to infectious disease in proportion to
the severity of the threat. The CDC therefore developed a method for assigning pandemics a Pandemic
Severity Index.
The background for developing the Pandemic Severity Index was the assumption that at the start of an
influenza pandemic, pandemic influenza vaccine may not be available. In addition, fearing insufficient
supplies of antiviral medications (that may not even work against the novel pandemic virus), pandemic
planners around the world gave serious thought to other means by which they might mitigate the
impact of a pandemic. 97 Much enthusiasm gathered around what came to be called "non-
pharmaceutical interventions," or NPIs, that could be initiated at the beginning of an outbreak. These
included social distancing measures such as isolation of the ill, voluntary home quarantine of those
exposed to the ill, school closures, the cancelation of public gatherings, and alteration of workplace
environments to decrease the density of people.98
94 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Press Briefing Transcript: August 26, 2010."
95 Thompson et al., "Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods."
96 Thompson et al., "Estimating Deaths Due to Influenza and Respiratory Syncytial Virus--Reply."
97 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance," 17-18.
98 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance"; Markel et al.,
"Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic."
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Some researchers, after reviewing the 1918 experience, suggested that such interventions could have a
significant effect in reducing the morbidity and mortality of a pandemic.99 Other researchers challenged
this finding, suggesting that the case was not proven that NPIs impacted the course of the 1918
influenza. 00 The CDC acknowledged the uncertainty: the "hypothesis remains unproven," it wrote in its
hefty, 97-page national guidance document Community Strategyfor Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in
the United States. Nevertheless, "if the experience of the 1918 pandemic is relevant," the document
stated, NPIs "would, in all likelihood, be implemented in most communities at some point during a
pandemic." The question was less about whether to implement NPIs, but how best to implement them.
A primary concern with NPIs was their potential to adversely affect society itself. Having millions of
people simultaneously isolating themselves in their homes in order to avoid infection carried the
potential to disrupt modern life and the economy as much as the disease itself. As witnessed during the
2009 H1N1 outbreak, school closures forced many parents to skip work in order to tend to their
children, something that may have been more difficult for the poor.101 "The U.S. Government
recognizes the significant challenges and social costs that would be imposed" by NPIs, the CDC's 2007
guidance stated. CDC therefore planned on advocating for NPIs "matched to the severity" of a
pandemic. An NPI would only be recommended if the severity of the outbreak suggested the benefits of
the NPI outweighed its costs.
This was to be achieved in two steps. First, the pandemic would be assigned a Pandemic Severity Index
along a 5-point scale of increasing severity (Category 1 to Category 5), driven by the disease's case-
fatality ratio ("the proportion of deaths among clinically ill persons") (Figure 4.11). Then, based on the
pandemic's severity, particular interventions either would-or would not-be recommended (Figure
4.12). "The most controversial elements (e.g., prolonged dismissal of students from schools and closure
of childcare programs) are not likely to be needed in less severe pandemics, but these steps may save
lives during severe pandemics."' 2 School closings would only be "considered" in a Category 2 or 3
pandemic, but "generally not recommended" in a Category 1 pandemic.
While the Pandemic Severity Index appeared to be a reasonable response to the difficulties in balancing
the costs and benefits of NPIs, its scientific merit was questionable from the beginning.
Although graphs and tables in the guidance document (Figure 4.13, Figure 4.14) indicated that pandemic
severity increased along a continuum beginning with "Severe Seasonal Influenza" (Category 1), followed
by the 1968 pandemic (Category 2), 1957 pandemic (Category 2), and finally the 1918 pandemic
(Category 5), such a depiction is inconsistent with historical mortality estimates (see Table 4.5, Table 4.6,
Table 4.7). The 1968 pandemic was in fact inaccurately categorized. With a case fatality ratio of 0.04%,
99 Markel et al., "Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza
Pandemic."
100 John M. Barry, "Comments on the nonpharmaceutical interventions in New York City and Chicago during the
1918 flu pandemic," Journal of Translational Medicine 5 (December 11, 2007): 65-65.
101 Thomas L. Gift, "Household Effects of School Closure during Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Pennsylvania, USA,"
Emerging Infectious Diseases 16, no. 8 (August 2010), http://wwwdev.cdc.gov/eid/content/16/8/1315.htm,
(accessed July 18, 2011).
102 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance," 19.
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its severity is half that of a "severe seasonal influenza," and should have been categorized as a Category
1 pandemic. In addition, the "moderate (1958/68-like)" pandemic influenza scenario described in the
2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan has a CFR of 0.23%, which does not lie somewhere between the 1968
pandemic (0.04%) and 1957 pandemic (0.17%), but is greater than both. Finally, based on CDC
estimates of actual mortality in the United States, the case fatality ratio of "the first influenza pandemic
of the 21st century"10 3 in 2009'was 0.02%, rendering it a Category 1 pandemic with a CFR milder than
the mildest influenza season since 1976.
The reason why these inconsistencies went undetected is unclear, but it may be due to the fact that
CFRs for the three pandemics were not published alongside similar estimates for seasonal influenza. Yet
because the CFR is a measure of the proportion of those infected who die, it can be calculated by the
simple formula:
# deaths
CFR = # infected
The exact numbers of people infected in any given year are unknown, however, because many if not
most people with influenza do not seek medical attention. But smaller studies have attempted to
estimate an Illness Rate by surveying a certain town or other population (as depicted in the X-axis of
Figure 4.14, which appears in the guidance document); multiplying the overall Illness Rate by the total
United States population will yield an estimate of the number infected. Therefore:
#deaths #deaths
CFR= # infected illness rate (%) * total population
Another reason the inconsistencies and miscategorization may have occurred is that the Pandemic
Severity Index was never used in the actual 2009 outbreak. While the 2007 CDC document stated,
"Upon declaration by WHO of having entered the Pandemic Period (Phase 6) and further determination
of U.S. Government Stage 3, 4, or 5, the CDC's Director shall designate the category of the emerging
pandemic based on the Pandemic Severity Index ...," and despite various determinations of CFR that
were made, 0 4 the U.S. government never assigned the H1N1 outbreak a Pandemic Severity Index.
The reason why declared pandemics like 1968 and 2009 are paradoxically less severe than seasonal
influenza is because severity, according to the Pandemic Severity Index, is defined by the CFR, and the
number of deaths in 1968 and 2009 is not substantially larger than seasonal influenza in relation to the
numbers said to have been infected by the new virus. The 1968 H3N2 and 2009 H1N1 viruses are
believed to have spread and infected far more widely and efficiently than seasonal influenza (perhaps
because more people lacked pre-existing immunity), but for most, the clinical course was milder than
seasonal strains of influenza.
Margaret Chan, "Address to the Regional Committee for the Americas (61st session)", September 28, 2009,
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2009/pahocommittee_20090928/en/index.html, (accessed July 18, 2011).
Christophe Fraser et al., "Pandemic Potential of a Strain of Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings," Science 324, no.
5934 (June 19, 2009): 1557-1561; Anne M. Presanis et al., "The Severity of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza in the United
States, from April to July 2009: A Bayesian Analysis," PLoS Med 6, no. 12 (December 8, 2009): e1000207.
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Pandemic versus Non-pandemic influenza
While the distinction of pandemic influenza as a different and far deadlier form of influenza was
emphasized in repeated statements of governments-"Pandemics are different from seasonal
outbreaks or 'epidemics' of influenza," the CDC wrote-numerical estimates and projections of future
pandemic influenza mortality crystallized the assumption that next pandemic would inevitably be far
deadlier than seasonal influenza (Table 4.8). In the United States, for example, officials predicted that
even the mildest future pandemic would kill 209,000, or around four times more than they assert died in
even the worst of the past 31 non-pandemic seasons.
Here, too, the historical record does not support any clear cut distinctions between those seasons that
officials have labeled a pandemic and those said to be non-pandemic.105 Comparing the number of
deaths classified as due to influenza over the twentieth century shows that only one pandemic-the
great influenza of 1918-stands out (Figure 4.15). Peak monthly (Figure 4.16) and overall seasonal
death rates (Figure 4.17) in the 1957 and 1968 pandemics are not higher than-and in some cases are
exceeded by-the death rate in non-pandemic seasons.
The similarity in mortality impact between past pandemics and non-pandemics has seldom been given
serious attention, particularly in the lay press, but it has been acknowledged by Thompson, Simonsen,
and other disease modelers at the CDC and NIH. Thompson and colleagues from the CDC, for example,
wrote that "it cannot be assumed a priori that pandemics will cause more mortality than interpandemic
seasons." 06 Likewise, Simonsen and others from the NIH have written that "mortality caused by the
1968 pandemic virus was unimpressive relative to surrounding severe epidemics" 07 and "the mild 1968
pandemic was actually exceeded by a few more recent severe A(H3N2) seasons." 08 (For additional
statements by notable authorities, see Table 4.9)
Furthermore, while since around 2005, pandemic influenza has been described as inherently deadly, in
older documents, officials did not mention mortality as a key characteristic of influenza pandemics: in
1998, Nancy Cox and Keiji Fukuda (then colleagues at the CDC) wrote of the 1918, 1957 and 1968
pandemics that "Each pandemic was associated with high rates of morbidity, considerable social
disruption, and substantial economic losses." It was only with regard to the 1918 pandemic that the
authors mentioned "a relatively high case-fatality rate in young and previously healthy adults."109 By
contrast, a CDC document, Key Facts About Pandemic Influenza, from 2006, carried a similar sentence,
but added death to the list: "Past influenza pandemics have led to high levels of illness, death, social
105 Peter Doshi, "Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United States, 1900-2004," American Journal of Public
Health 98, no. 5 (May 2008): 939-45.
Thompson et al., "Are estimates of influenza-associated deaths in the US really just PR?".
107 L. Simonsen et al., "Pandemic Influenza and Mortality: Past Evidence and Projections for the Future, S. Knobler,
A. Mack, A. Mahmoud, The Threat of Pandemic Influenza: Are We Ready" (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2005), 89-114.
108 Simonsen et al., "US Flu Mortality Estimates Are Based on Solid Science."
109 Nancy J. Cox and Keiji Fukuda, "Influenza," Infectious Disease Clinics of North America 12, no. 1 (March 1998):
27-38.
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disruption, and economic loss" (emphasis added)." (The CDC subsequently took this webpage down as
most pandemic related information was shifted to the HHS-managed www.pandemicflu.gov, which itself
was later renamed www.flu.gov.)
* * *
While pandemics do not appear to be deadlier than influenza in its nonpandemic forms, either in terms
of the total number killed or the chances of dying if one is infected (the CFR), some have pointed to a
different aspect of mortality as the feature that sets pandemics apart. Simonsen and colleagues have
emphasized that pandemic influenza's mortality signature is an age shift: whereas seasonal influenza
deaths overwhelmingly occur amongst the elderly, in pandemics there is an "age shift" downwards such
that many more deaths occur among the under 65 population.1 The change in age distribution has
even structured part of the WHO's defense of its response to H1N1. Highlighting how H1N1 "differed in
striking ways" in its patterns of illness, the WHO has declared that "H1N1 virus affected a younger age
group in all categories: those most frequently infected, those requiring hospitalization, those requiring
intensive care, and those dying from their infection."112 In the US, the CDC believes 90% of
113hospitalizations and 87% of deaths occurred in those under 65.
Influenza vaccines
The marketing of influenza vaccine in the United States is saturated with the concept that the simple act
of getting vaccinated holds the key to saving lives. "Prevents influenza-related death," a CDC-produced
influenza vaccine promotional poster from 2006 declares as the top reason to get vaccinated (Figure
4.18).114 in a more technical paper, authored by CDC, the message remains explicit: "Vaccination is the
most effective way to prevent influenza-associated morbidity and mortality."" Similarly, in the
introduction to the national influenza vaccination recommendations, the CDC states that "Annual
influenza vaccination is the most effective method for preventing influenza virus infection and its
complications." It is important to consider the evidence base upon which such claims are made.
To substantiate this claim, the national recommendations point to a 1999 paper written by Nancy Cox,
today the CDC's top influenza scientist. Cox's paper, published in the Lancet, is a review paper which
discusses virological, epidemiological, and clinical aspects of influenza, as well as strategies for control
110 Emphasis added. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Pandemic Flu: Key Facts", January 17, 2006,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/pdf/pandemicflufacts.pdf, (accessed October 12, 2010).
i Simonsen et al., "Pandemic Influenza and Mortality"; Ibid.
u2 World Health Organization, "The international response to the influenza pandemic: WHO responds to the
critics."
113 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Estimates of 2009 HINI Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations
and Deaths in the United States, April 2009 -January 16, 2010."
114 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Top 3 reasons to get your flu vaccine", 2006,
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/immunize/Documents/3reasons.pdf, (accessed July 12, 2010).
115 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza vaccination coverage among children aged 6-59
months--eight immunization information system sentinel sites, United States, 2007-08 influenza season," MMWR.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 57, no. 38 (September 26, 2008): 1043-1046.
1 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," 2.
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and prevention. Concerning the matter of how well influenza vaccines work in the elderly population-
importantly, the population in which most influenza-related complications and deaths occurs-Cox
writes, "immunisation was cost effective and associated with reductions in rates of hospital admission
and deaths from influenza-related complications." 17 This statement is supported by a further reference
to a single study published in 1994 in the New England Journal of Medicine. Authors of this study had
done a retrospective study of over 25,000 persons above the age of 65, comparing the rates of influenza
and its complications (including death) between those that had received influenza vaccine versus those
that had not. They concluded that influenza vaccination "produces direct dollar savings," and was
associated with reductions in complications, hospitalizations-even deaths. "Vaccination was also
associated with reductions of 39 to 54 percent in mortality from all causes during the three influenza
seasons (P<0.001)."" 8
This study, which strongly supports the conclusions that influenza vaccines are especially effective at
saving lives, is far from the only study to draw that conclusion. In 2002, researchers published the
results of a meta-analysis, reconfirming the mortality benefits of influenza vaccination. The authors
trawled the medical literature looking for trials that has been conducted which investigated questions
such as the effect of influenza vaccines on outpatient visits for pneumonia, hospitalization, and overall
mortality. They found 15 eligible studies, and concluded that
Influenza vaccine was effective in reducing influenza-like illness by 35% (95% confidence
interval (Cl) 19-47%), hospitalization for pneumonia and influenza by 33% (Cl 27-38%),
mortality following hospitalization for pneumonia and influenza by 47% (Cl 25-62%);
and mortality from all causes by 50% (Cl 45-56%)."'
As a meta-analysis that attempts to synthesize the results of all research, its methodology is considered
by many to lead to higher quality results and conclusions than any single study can offer. The study, led
by Trang Vu of The Royal Melbourne Hospital in Australia, has been cited by the New York City Health
Department in its promotional flyer Flu Shots Save Lives, and is extensively cited in the medical
literature. 20
But do influenza vaccines really save lives?
In 2005, Lone Simonsen and colleagues from the National Institutes of Health published an analysis in
Archives of Internal Medicine that took much of the medical community by surprise, by questioning the
reliability of past studies. Simonsen's study considered over three decades of influenza mortality and
1 Nancy J. Cox and Kanta Subbarao, "Influenza," Lancet 354, no. 9186 (October 9, 1999): 1277-1282.
118 Kristin L. Nichol et al., "The Efficacy and Cost Effectiveness of Vaccination against Influenza among Elderly
Persons Living in the Community," New England Journal of Medicine 331, no. 12 (1994): 778-784.
119 Trang Vu et al., "A meta-analysis of effectiveness of influenza vaccine in persons aged 65 years and over living in
the community," Vaccine 20, no. 13-14 (March 15, 2002): 1831-1836.
P Noyes et al., "Flu Shots Save Lives: Why Aren't More Central Brooklyn Residents Getting Vaccinated?" (New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiend, 2006),
http://www.nyc.gov/htm/doh/downloads/pdf/dpho/dpho-brooklyn-report-flu-2006.pdf, (accessed August 1,
2011). The Vu et al. meta-analysis has been cited 144 times since its publication in 2002, according to "Web of
Science" (August 1, 2011).
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vaccination data. Despite a steep rise in the number of Americans getting vaccinated between 1968 and
2001-from 15% to 65%-they could detect no impact on mortality. "We could not correlate increasing
vaccination coverage after 1980 with declining mortality rates in any age group."121
The Simonsen paper did more than provide a dissenting opinion-it pointed out that previous results
were simply implausible. The authors wrote that
there are not enough influenza-related deaths to support the conclusion that
vaccination can reduce total winter mortality among the US elderly population by as
much as half.
Previously, studies such as the Vu meta-analysis had concluded influenza vaccines could cut the number
of elderly deaths in half. But these conclusions are irreconcilable with Simonsen's calculation that at
most influenza is responsible for just 10% of winter-time deaths. This implied that some kind of serious
methodological flaw was present in previous studies like the Vu meta-analysis.
Simonsen's paper caused considerable controversy. "This is a very important, troubling study," Walter
Orenstein, the former head of the National Immunization Program stated. "It is a paradigm shift."
Some at the CDC were more dismissive. "I think it's extremely weak and overstates the results," CDC
disease modeler William Thompson told Science magazine.2 But the study was hard to ignore,
achieving considerable attention in the national press. The Washington Post told its readers that "the
study challenges government dogma and is bound to confuse the public." 23
The CDC and NIH moved quickly to assure the public that, despite the new study's finding that influenza
vaccination was thus far unable to reduce deaths, there was no need for alarm or a change in policy. In
a joint press release, the CDC and NIH wrote that contrary to the Simonsen study, "Numerous studies
have shown that influenza vaccination works- including to help protect the elderly from serious illness
and hospitalizations- but the degree to which it works varies from year to year and can be difficult to
measure." To address the "confusion" Simonsen's study had supposedly caused over the value of the
vaccine, the CDC and NIH said that "Vaccination remains the best protection from influenza available for
people 65 and older and their loved ones. ... In the current study by Simonsen et al, the authors in no
way imply that the elderly should not receive influenza vaccine." Far from challenging the value of the
vaccine, the press release said that the Simonsen study highlighted the "room for improvement in
prevention efforts," and described the possibility of expanding vaccination recommendations.
... recently published studies raise the possibility that it may be beneficial to vaccinate
larger numbers of healthy persons, including children, to prevent transmission of
influenza viruses to high-risk persons such as the elderly. Expansion of groups for whom
m Simonsen et al., "Impact of Influenza Vaccination on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population."
m Jon Cohen, "INFLUENZA: Study Questions the Benefits of Vaccinating the Elderly," Science 307, no. 5712
(February 2005): 1026-1026.
123 "FINDINGS," The Washington Post, February 15, 2005.
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influenza vaccination is recommended is under discussion by the ACIP and CDC, and is
partly contingent on adequate vaccine supply in the future.124
Meanwhile, Thompson, Cox, Fukuda and others from the CDC wrote a letter to the editor of Archives
challenging Simonsen's paper. They took issue with Simonsen's claim that the 50% mortality reduction
was implausible: "Simonsen et al also suggest that influenza vaccine cannot be 50% effective because
only 10% of all winter excess deaths are influenza related. A 50% reduction in the relative rates of
influenza-associated deaths could occur, however, without a corresponding 50% decline in absolute
death rates." 125
In response, Simonsen pointed out that the CDC authors "misinterpret the claims of the cohort studies."
Studies such as Vu's do not claim that influenza vaccines reduce by 50% just those deaths triggered by
influenza, but half of all wintertime deaths, regardless of cause. To emphasize the point, they offered a
sample calculation:
If we apply the 50% vaccine effectiveness figure from cohort studies to the observation
that about 670 000 elderly die during winter months in the United States in recent
years, we estimate that at 65% vaccination coverage about 323 000 deaths in the elderly
are prevented each winter. It should have been easy to spot such a huge mortality
decline as vaccine coverage increased from 15% to 65%-but it was not there.
Since 2005, additional studies have been published which, like Simonsen's, challenge the previously
assumed benefits of influenza vaccination in the elderly population. A central concern that has emerged
is the possibility of a "healthy user bias" which posits that the elderly who are most healthy-and thus
least likely to die from influenza or any other disease-are more likely to get vaccinated than their less
healthy counterparts. In other words, the vaccinated group and unvaccinated group may not be
comparable, meaning that the cause of differences in outcomes (e.g. less deaths in the vaccinated
group) may not have anything to do with the vaccine. The people might simply be healthier to begin
with.
Lisa Jackson and colleagues from the University of Washington, for example, studied the records of over
70,000 elderly over an eight year period, and found the vaccine reduced hospitalizations from
pneumonia by 18% and deaths from any cause by 44%. In this way, the study results were similar to
many past studies. However, in the period before the influenza season began, the authors found an
even larger benefit: a 61% reduction in the risk of death from any cause. The authors thus argued that
the apparent mortality benefits associated with influenza vaccine were counterintuitive, and cast doubt
on their validity:
24 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. National Institutes of Health, "'Impact of Influenza
Vaccination on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population' by Simonsen et al. (2005): A Statement by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)", February 18, 2005,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/statementeldmortality.pdf, (accessed October 23, 2010).
125 William W. Thompson et al., "Influenza Vaccination Among the Elderly in the United States," Arch Intem Med
165, no. 17 (September 26, 2005): 2038-a-2039.
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We found the greatest reductions in the risk of death and of pneumonia hospitalization
in the period before influenza season, when there should be no true vaccine effect....
The reductions in risk before influenza season suggest the presence of bias due to
preferential receipt of vaccine by relatively healthy seniors on the estimates of influenza
vaccine effectiveness observed during influenza season.
To further test the hypothesis, they undertook a more detailed analysis of 252 elderly who died during
an influenza season, and compared them to 576 age-matched controls. Reviewing the individuals'
medical records, they investigated the effect of "functional status limitations" such as the ability to
independently walk or bathe without help. The researchers found that the functional limitations were
simultaneously associated with an increased risk of death and decreased likelihood of influenza
vaccination. They therefore concluded that "Functional status limitations may confound the association
of influenza vaccination and risk of all cause mortality in seniors, but these factors are not captured in
the administrative data sources used in many of the published evaluations of influenza vaccine
effectiveness." 2 7
A group of researchers in Canada conducted a similar analysis in Canada, and published their results in
2008. (In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I was one of the peer-reviewers for this
paper.) They hypothesized that if influenza vaccine was not the true cause of the seemingly fantastic
mortality benefits that past studies had attributed to influenza vaccine, then the vaccine should look like
it's saving lives even when influenza virus is not in circulation. Their hypothesis was confirmed: even
during the months when influenza was not circulating, the data indicated that "influenza vaccination
was associated with a 51% mortality reduction." The team of researchers, led by Dean Eurich of the
University of Alberta, posited that the so-called "healthy user" effect was likely at play, for after
adjusting for functional and socioeconomic status, the benefits seemed to disappear. They concluded
that "The results of this study suggest that many previous observational studies have overestimated the
mortality benefits of influenza vaccination due to difficult-to-correct confounding attributable to the
'healthy-user' effect."128
In a commentary appearing in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, authors Tom Jefferson and
colleagues from the Cochrane Collaboration who have been reviewing the evidence behind influenza
vaccines for over a decade, complain about the lack of good quality evidence:
Cochrane and other systematic reviews have shown overall poor quality methods of
relevant studies, a lack of randomized controlled trials of sufficient duration, and power
to detect and effect on serious outcomes (such as hospitalization and death) and over-
reliance on nonrandomized studies.129
126 Jackson et al., "Evidence of bias in estimates of influenza vaccine effectiveness in seniors."
127 Jackson et al., "Functional status is a confounder of the association of influenza vaccine and risk of all cause
mortality in seniors."
1 Eurich et al., "Mortality Reduction with Influenza Vaccine in Patients with Pneumonia Outside 'Flu' Season."
129 Tom Jefferson et al., "Inactivated influenza vaccines: Methods, policies, and politics," Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology 62, no. 7 (July 2009): 677-686.
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While popular accounts of vaccine effectiveness speak of vaccines as either interventions that "work" or
"don't work," the details reveal a more complex story, where vaccine protect against some outcomes in
some populations, but not against other outcomes in other populations. The Cochrane team's
systematic reviews of the literature have found that for'small children under 2 years of age, the
vaccine's effects are no different than a placebo-"possibly a reflection of the rarity of the disease and
its complications."130 But for older children, adolescents, and healthy adults, "better quality randomized
studies show an effect against cases of influenza (but not its complications or its transmission)." This
means that if the past is any prediction of the future, healthy adults who receive influenza vaccine can
expect to have a decreased chance of developing the symptoms of influenza. However, while the risk of
coming down with influenza may be reduced, influenza vaccines do not confer a reduced chance of
developing severe complications associated with influenza, like pneumonia, or of dying. While all of this
amounts to a clearly a suboptimal situation, it is reassuring to note that complications and death from
influenza amongst children, adolescents, and healthy adults is rare.
It is in the elderly population where the vast majority of complications, hospitalizations, and deaths from
influenza occur, about which the Cochrane reviewers write that "an implausible sequence of effects"
occurs, whereby influenza vaccine is "apparently effective for the prevention of nonspecific outcomes,
such as death from all causes, but not for the prevention of influenza or death caused by pneumonia
and influenza." The Cochrane group-like Simonsen, Jackson, and others -argues that confounding
biases like the healthy user effect are probably to blame. "This is especially likely because in the general
elderly population, the bulk of evidence (hundreds of thousand observations) comes from poor quality,
large, retrospective, data-linked cohorts in which data had been collected for other purposes."
Unfortunately, so much discussion and debate over these so-called "non-randomized" studies exists
because they are pretty much the only kind of evidence that is available. Far higher quality evidence
could be achieved by studying the results of randomized controlled trials (RCT), but such trials are
extremely rare. In the last four decades, only one RCT "assessed currently available vaccines and
reached satisfactory completion," the Cochrane reviewers wrote. 32 The trial-by Govaert and
colleagues in the Netherlands-was conducted on elderly aged 60 and above not belonging to any
known high risk groups, and suggested that influenza vaccination could halve the incidence of
influenza. 3  Unfortunately, the trial was too small to answer the question of whether influenza vaccines
also have any effect on reducing deaths. The vast majority of elderly participants in the trial were
between 60 and 74 years of age, with only ten percent 75 years of age or greater, and the trial lasted
just one winter in 1991-92. Also of note was that for most endpoints studied, the observed benefits
dropped substantially with advancing age.
130 Ibid.
131 Jennifer Clark Nelson et al., "New strategies are needed to improve the accuracy of influenza vaccine
effectiveness estimates among seniors," Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 62, no. 7 (July 2009): 687-694.
132 Jefferson et al., "Vaccines for preventing influenza in the elderly."
133 Th. M. E. Govaert et al., "The Efficacy of Influenza Vaccination in Elderly Individuals," JAMA: The Journal of the
American Medical Association 272, no. 21 (December 7, 1994): 1661 -1665.
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In a separate analysis, the Cochrane reviewers analyzed 274 influenza vaccine studies, considering
"study concordance" (whether data presented supported the authors' conclusions), study quality, study
take home message, study funding, and journal impact factors. They found serious problems with study
concordance-but overwhelmingly in the direction of attributing undue benefits towards influenza
vaccines not supported by study data. They also found that studies funded by industry had a higher
likelihood of being published in prestigious journals and to be cited more often-a finding that could be
not be explained by study quality or size.
The Cochrane review of influenza vaccines in the elderly concluded that "As our elderly dataset formed
a major part of our overview of influenza vaccines studies, it is likely that that data presented in this
review are so biased as to be virtually uninterpretable." Jefferson and his colleagues have called for the
carrying out of publicly funded, large placebo-controlled clinical trials over multiple influenza seasons in
order to generate higher quality evidence and answer the question of what benefit, exactly, influenza
vaccines have in the elderly population,135 a proposition Simonsen, Jackson and others would seem to
agree with. But health officials have thus far been opposed to such a trial, arguing such a trial would
be unethical, on the grounds that it would mean that some elderly would receive a placebo contrary to
national recommendations that say they should be vaccinated.
"False and misleading" claims
If no convincing evidence exists to suggest that influenza vaccines are saving lives, it calls into question
officials' practice of using influenza mortality statistics as a way to encourage vaccination. Here,
historical precedent exists with a related therapeutic: influenza antivirals.
Within a year of approving Relenza, a novel antiviral for the treatment of influenza, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) sent the drug's manufacturer Glaxo Wellcome a warning letter. The company had
distributed promotional materials which the FDA's Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications had determined were illegal, in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
In its March 2000 letter, the FDA declared that the Glaxo Wellcome material "lacks fair balance, contains
misleading safety and efficacy claims, unsubstantiated comparative claims, misleading drug resistance
claims, and misleading productivity and pharmacoeconomic claims."138 One of the problematic
134 Tom Jefferson et al., "Relation of study quality, concordance, take home message, funding, and impact in
studies of influenza vaccines: systematic review," BMJ 338 (2009): b354.
1s Tom Jefferson and Carlo Di Pietrantonj, "Inactivated influenza vaccines in the elderly--are you sure?," Lancet
370, no. 9594 (October 6, 2007): 1199-1200.
136 Lone Simonsen et al., "Influenza vaccination and mortality benefits: New insights, new opportunities," Vaccine
27, no. 45 (October 2009): 6300-6304.
137 Lone Simonsen et al., "Mortality benefits of influenza vaccination in elderly people: an ongoing controversy,"
The Lancet Infectious Diseases 7, no. 10 (October 2007): 658-66; Shannon Brownlee and Jeanne Lenzer, "Does the
Vaccine Matter?," The Atlantic, November 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/11/does-
the-vaccine-matter/7723/, (accessed October 15, 2009).
1 U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Glaxo Wellcome Inc., "NDA 21-036 Relenza (zanamivir for inhalation)
MACMIS ID#8708", March 13, 2000,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance ComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Enfor cementActivitiesbyFDA/
WarningLettersandNoticeofViolation LetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM165384.pdf, (accessed July 18,
2011).
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statements was a statement about the impact of influenza. (Figure 4.19) The FDA did not challenge the
accuracy of the claim-which in this case was based on statistics drawn from the published scientific
literature-the FDA instead challenged Glaxo Wellcome's use of the statistics.
... the presentation of the statement in promotional materials for Relenza, "Influenza
afflicts 25 to 55 million people annually in the United States, resulting in 20,000 deaths
and 50,000 to 300,000 hospitalizations," would be misleading because this
presentation suggests that Relenza has been shown to impact hospitalizations and
deaths from influenza when such has not been demonstrated by substantial evidence. 39
The company was ordered to "immediately cease publication or dissemination" of such claims. It was
further ordered to describe to FDA its plans to comply. Nearly a decade later, Glaxo Wellcome (now
GlaxoSmithKline) refrains from marketing the benefit of its drug in the context of statistics describing
the deadliness of influenza. On the official website, Relenza.com, a page "About the Flu" describes
influenza, but unlike similar webpages such as those maintained by CDC, it does not offer statistics
regarding influenza mortality or hospitalization impact.140
Tamiflu.com, the official homepage for Roche's blockbuster drug Tamiflu, a competitor influenza
antiviral medication, contains a similar webpage. "What You Need to Know About the Flu" states that
influenza is a "contagious virus" and "can be a serious illness," but here, too, death and other serious
complications like pneumonia are not mentioned. The month after the FDA cited Glaxo Wellcome, it
wrote to Roche, alleging that claims Roche had made in promotional material such as "Tamiflu reduces
incidence of secondary complications (i.e. bacterial infections) by 45%" were "misleading because they
suggest greater efficacy for Tamiflu than has been demonstrated by substantial evidence. Roche,
too, was instructed to immediately cease dissemination of such these and other "false and misleading"
claims, which FDA judged to be in violation of US law. Since then, the Tamiflu product package insert
has contained the following text: "Serious bacterial infections may begin with influenza-like symptoms
or may coexist with or occur as complications during the course of influenza. TAMIFLU has not been
shown to prevent such complications." 42
Without a proven ability-that is, proven to the satisfaction of the FDA-to reduce endpoints like
pneumonia, hospitalization and death, FDA regulations forbid companies like GlaxoSmithKline and
Roche to even discuss the threat of influenza in ways that might imply their medications can reduce
those effects. But the FDA's jurisdiction does not extend to other governmental bodies such as CDC,
139 Emphasis in the original.
140 GlaxoSmithKline, "About the Flu", 2011, http://www.relenza.com/about-the-flu/about-the-flu.html, (accessed
July 18, 2011).
141 U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Roche Laboratories Inc., "NDA 21-087 TAMIFLU (oseltamivir phosphate)
MACMIS ID#8675", April 14, 2000,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorynformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/
WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM166329.pdf, (accessed July 18,
2011).
142 Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., "Product label. Tamiflu."
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leaving CDC free to deploy its own standards of evidence in support of statements about therapeutic
effectiveness.
Official policy
In a 2010 poster carrying the headline "Reason enough to get VACCINATED!" the CDC writes, "Flu-
related complications lead to about 36,000 DEATHS and 200,000 HOSPITALIZATIONS each year in the
U.S."1 43 (Figure 1.4, page 59). The unstated implication of the poster is similar to those in the Relenza
promotional materials-namely, that the promoted intervention (here, influenza vaccines) can reduce
the cited heavy morbidity and mortality burden of influenza.
But here, the CDC is actually aware of that much of the published studies regarding influenza vaccines
may be flawed to the extent that it is meaningless. Citing the work of Simonsen, Jackson, Jefferson, and
others, the national ACIP recommendations state that
... studies demonstrating large reductions in hospitalizations and deaths among the
vaccinated elderly have been conducted using medical record databases and have not
measured reductions in laboratory-confirmed influenza illness. These studies have been
challenged because of concerns that they have not controlled adequately for differences
in the propensity for healthier persons to be more likely than less healthy persons to
receive vaccination. 44
The CDC however does not rebut or in any other way respond to these criticisms. It simply
acknowledges them, and in this as well as promotional material, continues to claim that the shots save
lives. 4 5
[ENDS]
143 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Reason enough to get VACCINATED!".
44 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010."
145 Ibid.
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Table 4.1. Proportion of specimens testing positive for influenza at World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating
Laboratories and 60 National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) laboratories through the United
States. Data are compiled and published by CDC. (Source: CDC'4 6)
Season Specimens Tested Influenza negative Influenza positive Percent positive
for influenza
1997-1998 99072 86143 12929 13%
1998-1999 98582 84340 14242 14%
1999-2000 92403 78630 13773 15%
2000-2001 99497 88991 10506 11%
2001-2002 109139 92737 16402 15%
2002-2003 96871 87030 9841 10%
2003-2004 152262 127158 25104 16%
2004-2005 186590 162020 24570 13%
2005-2006 179772 158362 21410 12%
2006-2007 179268 155515 23753 13%
146 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 1997 - 1998 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions1997-
1998/datafinal/wholaballregion97-98.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 1998 - 1999 Season", n.d.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regionsl998-1999/datafinal/wholaballregion98-99.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011);
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "1999-2000 Influenza Season Summary", October 19, 2002,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/WeeklyArchivesl999-2000/99-00summary2.htm, (accessed July 18,
2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "2000-2001 Laboratory Data Summary for All Regions",
n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/regions2000-2001/wholaballregionOO-01.htm, (accessed July 18,
2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 2001 - 2002 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions2001-
2002/datafinal/wholaballregion01-02.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 2002 - 2003 Season", n.d.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions2002-2003/datafinal/wholaballregionO2-03.htm, (accessed March 10,
2009); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 2003 - 2004 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions2003-
2004/datafinal/wholaballregionO3-04.htm, (accessed March 10, 2009); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 2004-2005 Season", n.d.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions2004-2005/datafinal/wholabalregionO4-05.htm, (accessed March 10,
2009); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 2005 - 2006 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/regions2005-
2006/datafinal/wholaballregion05-06.htm, (accessed March 10, 2009); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, "2006-07 U.S. INFLUENZA SEASON SUMMARY", n.d.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2006-2007/06-07summary.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "2007-08 U.S. INFLUENZA SEASON SUMMARY", October 6, 2008,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2007-2008/07-08summary.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 2008 - 2009 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2008-
2009/data/whoAllregt39.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza
viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 2009 - 2010 Season", n.d.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2009-2010/data/whoAlregt2O.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011); U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Influenza viruses isolated by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating
Laboratories 2010 - 2011 Season", n.d., http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2010-
2011/data/whoAllregt2O.htm, (accessed July 18, 2011).
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2007-2008 225329 185502 39827 18%
2008-2009 519543 412765 106778 21%
2009-2010 456302 366067 90235 20%
2010-2011 246128 191902 54226 22%
Average 15%
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Table 4.2. Proportion of specimens tested that are positive for influenza in New York laboratories, by laboratory and season.
Data provided by New York State Department of Health.
00 0 0 V-4 EN en LA W~I 00
M . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Nq o EN 4 oN EN 4 o C
La 0 bor a r
0% 0 0 0n  0 0 00 0)  0 0 0 0
Laboratory q-4 V- V- C4 EN EN N4 C4N N
Albany 20% 29% 26% 19% 39% 32% 54% 47% 38% 36% 49%
Westchester 31% 28% 12% 8% 11% 13% 14% 7% 5% 14%
Bronx 19% 17% 19% 18% 22% 7% 14% 8% 3% 5% 10%
Brooklyn A 7% 17% 10% 10% 11% 9% 10% 8% 8% 4% 4%
Brooklyn B 8% 7% 4% 5% 5%
Buffalo A 9% 4% 7% 3% 9% 12% 6% 4% 7%
Buffalo B 20% 22% 3% 17% 1% 13% 16% 7% 2% 11%
Long Island A 20% 15% 11% 2% 2% 1% 5% 10% 2% 2% 4%
Long Island B 10% 10% 10% 11% 14%
Manhattan A 9% 7% 1% 6% 5% 3% 9% 7% 4% 3% 5%
Manhattan B 11% 10% 7% 5% 11%
Rochester A 15% 18% 10% 11% 17% 6% 16% 23% 10% 8% 23%
Rochester B 6% 11% 8% 4% 11% 12% 7% 7% 19%
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Table 4.3. Top ten leading causes of death, 2006, United States. Data obtained from CDC's National VitalStatistics Report147
Cause of death (based on the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Rank Number of
Revision, Second Edition, 2004) deaths
All causes -- 2,426,264
Diseases of heart 1 631,636
Malignant neoplasms 2 559,888
Cerebrovascular diseases 3 137,119
Chronic lower respiratory diseases 4 124,583
Accidents (unintentional injuries) 5 121,599
Diabetes mellitus 6 72,449
Alzheimer's disease 7 72,432
Influenza and pneumonia 8 56,326
Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis 9 45,344
Septicemia 10 34,234
147 Melonie Heron, Deaths: Leading Causesfor 2006, vol. 58, National vital statistics reports 14 (Hyattsville, MD:
National Center for Health Statistics, 2010), 6, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_14.pdf,
(accessed July 25, 2011).
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Table 4.4. Recorded influenza deaths, 1979-2007. Source: vital statistics obtained from CDC Wonder
Year Deaths
1979 604
1980 2702
1981 3006
1982 727
1983 1431
1984 1096
1985 2054
1986 1838
1987 632
1988 1943
1989 1593
1990 2098
1991 1137
1992 1006
1993 1044
1994 1229
1995 606
1996 745
1997 720
1999 1665
2000 1765
2001 257
2002 727
2003 1792
2004 1100
2005 1812
2006 849
2007 411
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Wonder Query for ICD-9 code 487 (influenza)", 2010,
http://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D16;jsessionid=E21114D9D6889ABAB2C2AE6B1D80FCF,
(accessed December 14, 2010); U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Wonder Query for ICD-10
codes J10 and J11 (influenza)", 2010,
http://wonder.cdc.gov/controler/datarequest/D53;jsessionid=EF15DD0676D5AB8880798B5DB30 4A8,
(accessed December 14, 2010).
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Table 4.5. Case fatality ratio (CFR) calculations for historical "low," mean, and "high" CFR non-pandemic influenza seasons
low (1986/87-like) mean (1976-2007) high (2003/04-like)
US population 240,132,887 254,897,975 290,326,418
Illness rate 0.05 0.13 0.20
Number of deaths 3,349 23,607 48,614
Number infected 12,006,644 31,862,247 58,065,284
Case fatality ratio 0.03% 0.07% 0.08%
Table 4.6. Case fatality ratio calculations for historical pandemic influenza seasons
Pandemic year 1918 1957 1968 2009
US population 103,208,000 171,984,130 200,706,052 307,006,550
Illness rate 0.29 0.24 0.39 0.20
Number of deaths 675,000 69,800 33,800 12,470
Number infected 29,930,320 41,276,191 78,275,360 61,000,000
Case fatality ratio 2.26% 0.17% 0.04% 0.02%
Table 4.7. HHS projections of future pandemic influenza scenarios
Season Moderate (1958/68-like) Severe (1918-like)
US population 300,000,000 300,000,000
Illness rate 0.30 0.30
Number of deaths 209,000 1,903,000
Number infected 90,000,000 90,000,000
Case fatality ratio 0.23% 2.11%
Sources for Table 4.5, Table 4.6, Table 4.7: US Census Bureau (seasonal and pandemic population
estimates)149; HHS (population, illness rate, and number of deaths in future "moderate" and "severe"
scenarios)'50; HHS (number of deaths in 1918, 1957, 1968)1si; CDC (number of infections and deaths in
H1N1 2009)12; CDC (number of deaths in 'low', 'mean', and 'high' seasonal influenza). The illness rates
in "low, "mean," and "high" seasonal influenza (Table 4.5) are assumptions based on the CDC assertion
149 U.S. Census Bureau, "Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999", June 28, 2000,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt, (accessed December 14, 2010); U.S. Census
Bureau, "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April
1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 (NST-EST2009-01)", December 2009, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-
EST2009-01.xis, (accessed December 14, 2010).
1so U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan."
1s1 U.S. Health and Human Services, "Pandemics and Pandemic Threats since 1900", n.d.,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/historicaloverview.html, (accessed July 26, 2009).
152 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations
and Deaths in the United States, April 2009 -January 16, 2010."
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that between 5% and 20% of the US population "gets the flu" each year.1s3 Deaths in Table 4.5 are
based on CDC's annual estimates of influenza-associated mortality, published in 2010.154
1s3 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC - Seasonal Influenza (Flu) -Q & A."
154 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza --
United States, 1976-2007," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 59, no. 33 (August 27, 2010): 1057-
1062.
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Table 4.8. Pre-2009 estimates of mortality in a future pandemic compared with official estimates of seasonal influenza
mortality.
Area Estimates of seasonal influenza Pre-2009 estimates of future
mortality pandemic mortality
Canada 2,000-8,00011, 11,000-58,000156
United Kingdom 600-13,000' 50,000-750,000 158
United States 3,349-48,614 59 209,000-1,903,000160
World 250,000-500,000161 2-7.4 million162
155 Public Health Agency of Canada, "Influenza", March 3, 2011, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/influenza/index-
eng.php, (accessed July 18, 2011).
1s6 Public Health Agency of Canada., Highlightsfrom the Canadian pandemic influenza plan for the health sector:
preparing for an influenza pandemic, the Canadian health perspective., 9.
1s7 UK NHS Choices, "Seasonal Flu", February 15, 2011,
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Flu/Pages/Introduction.aspx, (accessed July 18, 2011).
iss UK Department of Health, "Pandemic flu - frequently asked questions," FAQ, n.d.,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Flu/PandemicFlu/FAQonly/DH_065088, (accessed September 14, 2009).
1s9 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza ---
United States, 1976-2007."
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 18.
1 World Health Organization, "Influenza (Seasonal)", April 2009,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs211/en/, (accessed June 9, 2009).
1 World Health Organization, "Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza."
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Table 4.9. Additional statements on the similarity of pandemic and non-pandemic influenza
CDC Director Julie
Gerberding on the
comparability of
the 1957 pandemic
with seasonal
influenza
NIAID Director
Anthony Fauci on
the comparability
of the 1968
pandemic with
seasonal influenza
John Barry, best-
selling author of
The Great
Influenza, on the
1968 pandemic
Senator SPECTER. Dr. Gerberding, let me interrupt you there where you say it is
inevitable. That is pretty stark. That means it's going to happen.
Dr. GERBERDING. It will happen, I believe. I don't know when, and I don't know
what virus will be the culprit. H5 is one possibility, but there are many other
possibilities.
Senator SPECTER. All right. When you talk about inevitability, that's a good
warning. That's not a shot across the bow; that's a shot into the ship. How serious
will it be? Will it be like 1918? What's your professional judgment on that?
Dr. GERBERDING. My professional judgment is that I can't tell you, and I don't
know, and I don't think anyone does. We've had a 1918 pandemic. That's
probably not as bad as it could get. But we've also had very mild pandemics. For
example, in 1957 it was not much different than a regular seasonal flu year, which
is bad enough. Thirty-six thousand people die every year from regular flu. 63
"If you look historically, pandemic flu isn't necessarily all gloom and doom. There
is an enormous spectrum of severity of pandemic flu. Pandemic means it's
widespread, and it's a brand new virus to which you have had no contact. In 1918,
which is the worst-case scenario, more than 50 million people died. On the other
end of the spectrum was 1968, which was a pandemic because it was the first
time we had seen H3N2 (virus). The 1968 pandemic was not substantially more
severe than the normal, run-of-the-mill seasonal flu.",l14
"The last time a new influenza virus reached pandemic levels was in 1968, but the
episode was not significantly deadlier than a typical bad flu season. Few people
who lived through it even knew it occurred."165
163 Pandemic Influenza: Progress Made and Challenges Ahead (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2007), 40.
164 Anthony S. Fauci, "Bird flu: Things to know, not fear," USA Today, April 12, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-0 4-11-bird-flux.htm, (accessed February 12, 2011).
165 Barry, "Lessons from the 1918 Flu."
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Figure 4.1. Cause of "more than a cold" in 408 children aged 6 months to 12 years, United Kingdom, over 4 winters. Source:
Harnden (2007)'f"
166 Harnden et al., "Respiratory infections for which general practitioners consider prescribing an antibiotic."
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Figure 4.2. Causes of acute upper respiratory tract infections in 291 elderly, United Kingdom. Source Nicholson (1997)
167 Nicholson et al., "Acute viral infections of upper respiratory tract in elderly people living in the community."
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Figure 4.3. Influenza-like illness in 6835 people, of all ages, seeking medical care in 13 Peru cities, over 2 years. Source:
Laguna-Torres (2009)1r8
Laguna-Torres et al., "Influenza-Like Illness Sentinel Surveillance in Peru."
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Figure 4.4. Incidence of influenza-like illnesses (ILI) per 10,000 people (calculated from prospective studies), with breakdown
by agent, based on information in pie studies. Source: Jefferson (2009)169
169 Jefferson, "Mistaken identity: seasonal influenza versus influenza-like illness."
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Flu is a serious
contagious disease.
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Figure 4.5. Contradictory positions on influenza's seriousness between the US CDC (left) and UK NHS (right)." In contrast to
the United States, where officials recommend annual influenza vaccination to the majority of the US population, UK officials
only recommend the vaccine to much smaller high risk groups, in particular individuals 65 years and greater. 1
170 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "'Take 3' Actions"; UK National Health Service, "If you knew
about flu you'd get the jab."
171 UK National Health Service, "Seasonal Flu Vaccination: Who Should Have It and Why", 2010, 6-7,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prodconsum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalasset/dh_11
9314.pdf, (accessed July 18, 2011).
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of total recorded influenza deaths and CDC estimates (2003) of influenza-associated mortality for the
seasons 1976-1977 to 1998-1999, in the United States. (Reproduced with permission from Peter Doshi, "Trends in recorded
influenza mortality: United States, 1900-2004," American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 5 (May 2008): 939-45. Copyright
held by American Public Health Association.) Sources: CDC influenza-associated mortality estimates are from Table 2 in
Thompson et al.;172 recorded deaths are from CDC Wonder.173
172 Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States."
173 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Wonder Query for ICD-9 code 487 (influenza)."
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Figure 4.7. Comparison of CDC estimates of influenza-associated mortality using multiple statistical models for the seasons
1972-1973 to 2002-2003. Graph has been reconstructed from data presented in Table 6 in a 2009 paper by CDC. 74
174 Thompson et al., "Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods."
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Figure 4.8. Estimates of influenza-associated underlying respiratory and circulatory deaths for 1990-91 to 1998-99, according
to data presented in three CDC publications
175 Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States";
Thompson et al., "Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods"; U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza --- United States,
1976-2007."
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Figure 4.9. Minimum, maximum, and mean values of influenza-associated death over the entire study period, as calculated
by the CDC's 2003 model' 76 with updates in 2009177 and 2010178
Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States."
Thompson et al., "Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods."
178 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza --
United States, 1976-2007."
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Figure 4.10. Reportedly using the same methods, CDC estimates of annual influenza-associated mortality differ across
various publications. Reconstructed graph based on CDC data."'
179 Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States";
Thompson et al., "Estimating Influenza-Associated Deaths in the United States"; U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza - United States, 1976-2007."
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Figure 4.11. CDC's Pandemic Severity Index. Source: CDC' 80
no U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance," 34.
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Figure 4.12. Community mitigation strategy by pandemic severity. Source: CDC
181 Ibid., 36.
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Figure 4.13. Seasonal influenza was said to be of Pandemic Severity Category 1. By contrast, the 1968 and 1957 pandemics
were Category 2. Source: CDC.18 2
182 Ibid., 32.
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Figure 4.14. CDC graph indicating the projected impact of a pandemic with past pandemics (1918, 1957, 1968) and "Severe
Seasonal influenza" Source: CDC.1 3
183 Ibid., 33.
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Figure 4.15. Crude mortality per 100 000 population, by influenza season (July to June of the following year), for seasons
1900-1901 to 2003-2004, United States. Note. International Classification of Diseases (ICD) revision 1 was used from 1900 to
1909, revision 2 from 1910 to 1920, revision 3 from 1921 to 1929. Comparability ratios are unavailable for revisions 1 to 3.
Beginning in 1930, influenza mortality rates have been adjusted for changes in ICD revisions to reflect conditions in the
current ICD revision 10. (Reproduced with permission from Peter Doshi, "Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United
States, 1900-2004," American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 5 (May 2008): 939-45. Copyright held by American Public
Health Association.)
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Figure 4.16. Crude influenza-classed mortality per 100 000 population, by month for 1930-2004, United States. (Reproduced
with permission from Peter Doshi, "Trends in recorded influenza mortality: United States, 1900-2004," American Journal of
Public Health 98, no. 5 (May 2008): 939-45. Copyright held by American Public Health Association.)
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Figure 4.17. Crude mortality per 100 000 population, by influenza season (July to June of the following year), for seasons
1930-1931 to 2003-2004, United States. Note. Influenza mortality rates have been adjusted for changes in ICD revisions to
reflect conditions in the current ICD revision 10. (Reproduced with permission from Peter Doshi, "Trends in recorded
influenza mortality: United States, 1900-2004," American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 5 (May 2008): 939-45. Copyright
held by American Public Health Association.)
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reasonsto get your
Iu vaccine
Prevents
influenza-related death.
Each year over 36,000 people in the U.S. die because of the flu-
most are 65 or older. More people die from flu than from any other
vaccine-preventable disease.
Prevents severe illness.
In the U.S. Influenza puts about 200,000 people in the hospital
each year, Children younger than 2 years old are as likely to be
hospitalized as adults who are 65 or older.
Protects other people.
You should get vaccinated if you live with or care for others who
are at high risk of complcations from the flu. Getting a flu
vaccination yourself can help protect your family members,
including seniors and young children.
rt ua ie as meu es wu es soo0DC-MFO (00-232-436) Webs*e www.edc.gov/ffu
Figure 4.18. CDC promotional materials have often emphasized the morbidity and mortality burden of influenza the
disease. 84
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Top 3 reasons to get your flu vaccine."
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Slide 2
Influenza:
A sigilicant public health issue
- Apptoximately 314.000 hospitalizations annually due
to infuera and its cornpications'
& 20.000 to 40.000 influenza-reIated deaths each year
* Annual direct and indirect coss totaling over
$12 bftlhon2
e 75 million lost workdays per year3
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The burden of influenza:
sgnflcant morbidity and
mortality
Influenza is a serious disease affecting
108 million Americans in a given year-
with 20,000 to 40,000 influenza-related
deaths.'-2
Figure 4.19. Clipping from one of several Glaxo Wellcome promotional materials for Relenza
by the FDA as in violation of the law.'85
(October 1999) that was cited
18s Glaxo Wellcome Inc., "Want to get over the flu sooner?", October 1999,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryinformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/
WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM165381.pdf, (accessed July 25,
2011).
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Chapter 5 Viral Essentialism and the Logic of VPDs
Save a patient's life
(Get your flu vaccine)
Poster displayed at University of Virginia'
For over a decade, Tom Jefferson has led efforts at the Cochrane Collaboration, conducting systematic
reviews of the safety and effectiveness of influenza vaccines and antivirals. Since 2007, he began doing
the same for interventions such as hand washing, face masks, gowns, and other "physical
interventions."2 At the Council of Europe hearings in 2010, Jefferson cited his research, declaring that
"public health interventions such as hygiene measures and barriers have a much better evidence base
than vaccines. They are also cheaper and socially acceptable, as well as being life savers in poor
countries, yet they are almost ignored."3 Jefferson argued that World Health Organization (WHO) had
its priorities wrong, and had become an agency preoccupied with vaccines and antivirals. He pointed
out that in the WHO's 62-page guidance document on pandemic influenza, "handwashing and masks
were mentioned only twice ... but vaccines and antivirals appeared 24 and 18 times, respectively."
Emphasizing that the problem is the syndrome influenza-like illness, not any particular virus over
another, Jefferson cited evidence from the SARS experience to impress upon people the power of non-
pharmacological interventions like hand washing. "To give some idea of how they compare with
influenza vaccines as a public health measure," he said, citing a systematic review4 he had recently
updated, "six studies carried out in the Far East during the 2003 SARS epidemic shows that just 3-4
people have to wash hands, and wear masks to prevent one case of SARS." 5
In the United States, I had previously criticized the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for
a similar lack of attention to the effectiveness of hand washing, citing Jefferson's findings. In a letter to
the British medical journal BMJ in 2008, I commented that while the United States' policy
recommendations for the prevention and control of influenza are over 25,000 words long, "only one
sentence of that document mentions non-pharmaceutical interventions, only to brush them off as
having 'not been studied adequately.' 6 Since this letter, successive editions of national
recommendations have given more attention to hand washing, but US officials' mood remains
overwhelmingly pessimistic (Table 5.1). The most recent recommendations state that "the impact of
hygiene interventions such as handwashing on influenza virus transmission is not well understood, and
1 Cassandra D Salgado et al., "Influenza in the acute hospital setting," The Lancet Infectious Diseases 2, no. 3
(March 2002): 145-155.
2 Tom Jefferson et al., "Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses," Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews (Online), no. 1 (2010): CD006207.
3 Tom Jefferson, The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed? (Strasbourg, France, 2010), 12,
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/Jeffersonstatement.pdf, (accessed March 30, 2010).
4 Jefferson et al., "Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses."
s Jefferson, The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed?, 12.
6 Peter Doshi, "Preventing flu-like illness: Reason for optimism," BMJ 336, no. 7637 (January 26, 2008): 172.
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hygiene measures should not be advocated as a replacement or alternative to specific prevention
measures such as vaccination."
However in 2009, in the first few months of the HIN1 outbreak, the US government made an enormous
investment promoting good hand hygiene" -Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius
co-starred in public service commercials with Sesame Street characters, urging people to regularly and
thoroughly wash their hands and cough into their elbows,9 a message repeated all the way up to the
president.' 0 But even here, officials apparently did not do so out of any firm conviction in the strength
of the evidence. "We don't have solid data on the effect that hand washing has on the transmission of
HIN1," a spokesman for the CDC explained. But, the spokesman added, "There are studies that show
hand washing was effective in reducing transmission of other respiratory diseases.""
Based on sound science
The CDC's statement-in defense of its promotion of hand washing while simultaneously acknowledging
the lack of data to support its efficacy-is emblematic of the agency's interest in being known as a
fundamentally scientific agency. Part of the "CDC Pledge" states that the agency shall "base all public
health decisions on the highest quality scientific data, openly and objectively derived."" Yet as the
previous chapter detailed, there are a series of fundamental problems with contemporary influenza
policy.
First, the emphasis on influenza vaccines and antivirals is myopic, as these interventions only fight one
virus (influenza) and not the broader syndrome the public knows as the "flu" (but is better termed
influenza-like illness), a fact the public is unaware of because it is continually misled into believing "flu"
is influenza. Second, the efficacy of pharmacological interventions-even against true influenza-is
overstated. Finally, there are major problems with risk assessment: no ongoing surveillance systems
exist today that are capable of accurately estimating the degree to which influenza is responsible for the
morbidity and mortality attributable to influenza-like illness, and official model-derived estimates for
influenza-associated deaths are inconsistent.
All of these problems are well known within the specialist community of experts that study influenza.
Nevertheless, the problems have done little to slow the enthusiasm around influenza and vaccines.
Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," 9-10.
8 Anne Schuchat, Beth P Bell, and Stephen C Redd, "The science behind preparing and responding to pandemic
influenza: the lessons and limits of science," Clinical Infectious Diseases 52 Suppl 1 (January 1, 2011): S10.
9 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, Sesame Workshop, and the Ad
Council Launch National Campaign to Protect Families from HINI Virus and Stay Healthy", May 22, 2009,
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/05/20090522a.html, (accessed April 27, 2011).
Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on 2009-H1N1 National Preparedness and Response", September 1,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-2009-H1N1-National-
Preparedness-and-Response/, (accessed April 27, 2011).
1 Elizabeth Cohen, "Some doubt hand washing stops H1N1," CNN Health, September 24, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/09/24/hand.washing.helpful/index.html, (accessed April 20, 2011).
1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Vision, Mission, Core Values, and Pledge", January 11, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm, (accessed June 17, 2011).
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Initiatives like the annual National Influenza Vaccine Summit, led by the CDC and the American Medical
Association (AMA), have helped align and increase coordination amongst a growing list of organizations
from the public and private sector dedicated to increasing the number of people who get influenza
vaccine each year. Following the CDC's expansion of its annual influenza vaccination recommendation
in 2010 to all Americans, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),13 the Society for Healthcare
Epidemiology of America (SHEA),14 the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), 1 5 and Association
for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC)16 all called for the mandatory vaccination
of healthcare practitioners, suggesting that receipt of influenza vaccine should be a condition of
employment. More recently, in April 2011, the US Joint Commission-the accreditation body of over
18,000 US healthcare organizations-released "proposed requirements addressing influenza vaccination
of staff and licensed independent practitioners" which, if enacted, will tie institutional accreditation with
a responsibility to intensify efforts to increase influenza vaccine uptake.17 The situation is much the
same at the international level. The WHO-appointed International Health Regulations committee to
review WHO's response to H1N1 recommended that "in so far as it is consistent with national priorities,
risk assessments and resources, the Review Committee urges countries to immunize their high-risk
populations yearly against seasonal influenza."18 All of these policymakers emphasize the burden of the
disease influenza-its complications and impact on society-and all advocate influenza vaccine,
reinforcing the notion that vaccines will substantially reduce that disease burden.
For those who see the gap between evidence and policy as the result of industrial interests trumping
sound science, there is a considerable amount of evidence to argue the case. The perhaps most well
publicized case is that of former Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was once chairman of Gilead
Sciences, the company that invented Tamiflu.19 When governments began stockpiling the drug in
anticipation of a pandemic-the United States is reported to have stockpiled somewhere around $12.5
billion worth2 0-Rumsfeld's stock holdings were reported to have turned profits in the millions.21
1 Bernstein, Starke, and Committee on Infectious Diseases, "Recommendation for Mandatory Influenza
immunization of All Health Care Personnel."
14 Talbot et al., "Revised SHEA Position Paper."
15 Infectious Diseases Society of America, "IDSA call for mandatory influenza vaccination of HCW."
16 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, "APIC Position Paper: Influenza Vaccination
Should Be a Condition of Employment for Healthcare Personnel, Unless Medically Contraindicated."
17 The Joint Commission, "Influenza Vaccination of Staff and Licensed Independent Practitioners", 2011,
http://www.jointcommission.org/standardsinformation/fieldreviews.aspx?StandardsFieldReviewld=KUB%2fsbN
gRkNRMRqj62GdO2RnacCewOVZR6%2bknlVlplY%3d, (accessed April 18, 2011).
1 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(HIN1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 21.
19 Gilead Sciences, "Donald H. Rumsfeld Named Chairman of Gilead Sciences", January 3, 1997,
http://www.gilead.com/wt/sec/pr_933190157/, (accessed June 4, 2011).
20 New York Times, "Tamiflu (Drug)", April 28, 2009,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/tamiflu-drug/index.html,
(accessed August 1, 2011).
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But numerous other cases exist at the domestic and international policy levels. Dr. Gregory Poland, for
example, was a voting member of the federal Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (and
remains on the ACIP Influenza Work Group), which sets influenza policy in the United States. Poland,
who is editor-in-chief of the journal Vaccine and a professor of medicine at the Mayo Clinic College of
22Medicine, has long urged ACIP to make a universal influenza vaccination recommendation. He is also
well connected to pharmaceutical companies, and has reported chairing a Merck Data Monitoring and
Safety Board, serving on the DVC scientific advisory board and conducting clinical trials for Chiron,
Merck, and Vaxgen.23 More recently, he has reported offering "consultative advice on novel influenza
vaccine development to Merck & Co., Inc., Avianax, Theraclone Sciences (formally Spaltudaq
Corporation), MedImmune LLC, Liquidia Technologies, Inc., Novavax, EMD Serono, Inc., Novartis
Vaccines and Therapeutics and PAXVAX, Inc."24 Similarly, Dr. John Treanor, professor of medicine at the
University of Rochester Medical Center, and also a member of ACIP in 2006 when the committee made
its first clear statement of intent to move to a universal vaccination policy, 2s reported "conducting
influenza vaccine clinical trials for Merck, GlaxoSmithKline (ID Biomedical); Protein Sciences Corporation,
and conducting laboratory studies for AlphaVax."
The many key architects of European and global influenza policy over the last decade who recent
investigations have shown were likewise simultaneously working for companies that manufactured
influenza vaccines and antivirals has brought attention to the way in which industrial interests have
shaped influenza policy.2 Most recently, five individuals on the formerly secret 16-member committee
that advised the WHO Director-General to declare a pandemic disclosed financial relationships with the
pharmaceutical industry, including the director of CDC's Influenza Division.28
More than money
Yet as important as industrial relationships are to understanding the formation of global and domestic
influenza policy, it seems unlikely to fully explain the gap between evidence and practice. Considerable
conflicts of interest certainly exist among those that advise government and set policy, but what about
the other many individuals who have not received money from industry yet still largely agree with and
carry out current policy? When ACIP discussed the possibility of an evolving strategy towards universal
influenza vaccination in February 2006, Drs. Poland and Treanor may have voted in favor of the
21 Geoffrey Lean and Jonathan Owen, "Donald Rumsfeld makes $5m killing on bird flu drug," The Independent,
March 12, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-rumsfeld-makes-5m-killing-on-
bird-flu-drug-469599.html, (accessed July 18, 2011).
Gregory A. Poland, "The Long Road to a Universal Influenza Immunization Recommendation: What Took So
Long?", May 19, 2010, http://www.preventinfluenza.org/NIVS_2010/4_Poland.pdf, (accessed May 21, 2010).
23 "Record of the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices", February 21, 2006, 42,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downloads/min-archive/min-feb06.pdf, (accessed June 16, 2011).
Gregory A. Poland, "Mandating influenza vaccination for health care workers: Putting patients and professional
ethics over personal preference," Vaccine 28, no. 36 (August 2010): 5759.
2s Smith et al., "Prevention and Control of Influenza," 42.
26 "Record of the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices," 6.
2 Cohen, "Complications"; Cohen and Carter, "WHO and the pandemic flu 'conspiracies'."
2 World Health Organization, "List of Members of, and Advisor to, the International Health Regulations (2005)
Emergency Committee concerning Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009."
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initiative-which would clearly carry huge benefits to vaccine manufacturers-but so too did five others
on the committee, none of whom declared conflicts of interest. A fuller understanding of influenza
policy making therefore must seek to explain why these individuals appear convinced of the threat of
influenza and the promise of influenza vaccines despite the fragility of the scientific evidence base. In
Geneva, the WHO's response to H1N1 in 2009 was heavily guided by its 2009 pandemic plan, a
document that had been shaped and reviewed by over 100 outside experts. But only seven of these
individuals declared potential conflicts of interest-the great majority had nothing to declare, yet were
presumably comfortable with the Organization's advice.29 Similarly, while it is true that many of WHO's
decisions during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak were of great benefit to industry, the majority of those
advising the Director-General had no potential conflicts of interest to declare. Yet they, too, felt
confident that the H1N1 outbreak qualified as a pandemic-and all seem to stand by their decisions.
Understanding the reason why so many official bodies-and the individuals who comprise them-
endorse and perpetuate problematic science despite having no financial ties to industry is the aim of this
chapter. I want to propose an explanation for why officials simultaneously embraced and advocated
measures like hand washing in 2009, yet distanced themselves from that same advice when asked to
speak in their scientific role. I will seek to explain the enthusiasm behind influenza vaccines, despite the
well-known limitations in the strength of evidence in their favor-and the zeal to which pandemic
preparedness has been pursued as a strategy to mitigate against a future worst-case, 1918-like
catastrophic event with little attention to other pandemics, which were no more deadly than ordinary
influenza.
In a nutshell, my argument is that the simplicity of conceiving influenza as an infectious disease caused
by a single pathogen (influenza virus) has conferred a definitiveness and stability that has the
appearance of being value neutral and objective, enabling certain mindsets and approaches to influenza,
while disabling others. I will focus on how, in particular, by using the label of influenza as a "vaccine
preventable disease," or VPD as it is often abbreviated, public health experts defend the sensibility of
the entire policy-from surveillance policies and vaccination policies to pandemic preparedness, thereby
attaching more certainty about the natural world than has ever been supported by the empirical
evidence. Thinking of influenza as a VPD has pushed responses in a "one disease - one cause - one
drug" (or in this case vaccine) framework that is emblematic of what I call virus-centric thinking. This
kind of essentialist thinking has become so commonplace and ingrained in the logics of public health
that it prevents most practitioners from even seeing and addressing fundamental gaps in their effort.
* * *
Fixated on technology
In the summer of 2010, Dr. Kathleen Gensheimer agreed to sit down with me and discuss influenza
control policy. Gensheimer is a friend and equally passionate about influenza, but more often than not,
we disagree about the right headedness of official policies, many of which she was responsible for
29 World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response (reprinted).
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during her 28-year career as the state epidemiologist of Maine. I asked Gensheimer to describe the
reason why most experts seem relatively unenthusiastic about measures like handwashing.
Gensheimer lumped hand washing with other nonpharmaceutical interventions like isolation (staying
home when sick) and getting lots of rest, one of many "humdrum recommendations" out there.30 She
explained that of course experts could implore people to "Wash your hands like your mother always told
you to." But she doubted the public would take it seriously. Most people would reason that "because
your mother told you to do it, it must not be worth that much." Moreover, she reasoned, it's not
technical.
Kathleen Gensheimer: You know people are looking for these technological fixes.
Peter Doshi: Who are the people you're talking about?
Gensheimer: I think the public even... I think the public wants a prescription to go to the
doctor. They don't want to be told to wash their hands. They want something fancier
than that, something that's going to make them feel more assured. And washing your
hands and telling you to stay home when you're sick and covering your cough... I mean,
we've done a lot done a lot to promote that and it's being done more and more...
But they are not technological fixes whereas vaccines are-and a spectacular one at that. There is rarely
a list of public health achievements that does not include vaccination. At the turn of the millennium,
CDC director Jeffrey Koplan called on the agency31 to publish a celebratory list of the "Ten Great Public
Health Achievements" over the twentieth century.32 The CDC's list included the "recognition of tobacco
use as a health hazard," "safer workplaces," the "control of infectious diseases" (from clean water and
improved sanitation), and "healthier mothers and babies." The list, however, also included-and began
with-vaccination. "Vaccines are one of the greatest achievements of biomedical science and public
health," the CDC declared, recalling the history of smallpox eradication and announcing the United
States' plans to eradicate polio worldwide through vaccination by the end of the year 2000. 3
"The impact of vaccination on the health of the world's people is hard to exaggerate. With the
exception of safe water, no other modality, not even antibiotics, has had such a major effect on
mortality reduction and population growth," wrote Susan Plotkin and Stanley Plotkin in their
introduction to the second edition of the definitive textbook Vaccines.34 In a separate publication, two
historians of medicine from the University of Michigan fully agreed:
30 Interview with Kathleen Gensheimer, August 16, 2010.
31 J. P Koplan, "I've got a little list," BMJ 334, no. 1 (January 2007): s20-s20.
32 "Ten great public health achievements--United States, 1900-1999," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 48, no. 12 (April 2, 1999): 241-243.
3 "Impact of vaccines universally recommended for children--United States, 1990-1998," MMWR. Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 48, no. 12 (April 2, 1999): 243-248.
34 Susan L. Plotkin and Stanley A. Plotkin, "A short history of vaccination," in Vaccines, ed. Stanley A. Plotkin and
Edward A. Mortimer, 2nd ed. (W B Saunders Co, 1994), 1.
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[I]f you asked a public health professional to draw up a top-ten list of the achievements
of the past century, he or she would be hard pressed not to rank immunization first.
Millions of lives have been saved and microbes stopped in their tracks before they could
have a chance to wreak havoc. In short, the vaccine represents the single greatest
promise of biomedicine: disease prevention.3 s
In an online poll conducted by the medical journal BMJ in 2007, doctors, academic researchers, medical
students and other readers of the BMJ voted among 15 choices for "the most important medical
advance since 1840.""36 While the list included basic scientific discoveries (such as the structure of DNA),
theories (germ theory), technologies (computers), and specific interventions (oral contraceptive pill,
chlorpromazine), vaccines came in fourth-trailing sanitation, antibiotics, and anesthesia.37
Vaccines as "miracles"
Microsoft co-founder turned philanthropist billionaire Bill Gates has been particularly struck by the
power of vaccines. "Vaccines are a miracle," he declared in his Annual Letterfrom Bill Gates, arguing
that rich countries have a moral imperative to secure the welfare of the poor. The business mogul
focused his argument on the necessity of ending polio, writing that vaccines are "the most effective and
cost-effective health tool ever invented. I like to say vaccines are a miracle."38 "They're miracles
because giving children a couple of drops or a shot in the arm can prevent some of the worst childhood
diseases for a lifetime. And that, to me, is a miracle."
Gates is far from the only one to speak of vaccines as a form of "magic," a "modern miracle" so
transformative and effective as to wipe diseases from the face of the planet.40 Enthusiasm about
vaccines is not hard to understand: today, the success story of vaccines is often told through the story of
smallpox. In 1966, when the World Health Assembly resolved to intensify its efforts in a global
campaign to eradicate the disease, smallpox virus was estimated to be causing 10 to 15 million cases
annually, with two million deaths. A decade later, following a massive, worldwide vaccination campaign,
those numbers dropped to zero.41
While the global eradication of smallpox is today the most commonly portrayed example of vaccines as
miracles, it is not the first. A particularly American drama unfolded during the 1950s in the race to
develop a vaccine as the cure for polio. At its height in the 1940s and 1950s, polio epidemics terrorized
3s Alexandra Minna Stern and Howard Markel, "The History Of Vaccines And Immunization: Familiar Patterns, New
Challenges," Health Affairs 24, no. 3 (May 1, 2005): 611 -621.
36
"Medical Milestones," BMJ, 2007, http://www.bmj.com/content/334/suppl_1/rel-
suppl/e2c7f6624909d7b0/suppl/DC3, (accessed July 18, 2011).
3 Koplan, "I've got a little list"; "Medical Milestones."
3 Bill Gates, "2011 Annual Letter from Bill Gates", 2011, 9, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-
letter/2011/Documents/2011-annual-letter.pdf, (accessed May 4, 2011).
39 Bill Gates: Vaccines Save Lives, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZvpF6gaGH4, (accessed July 18, 2011).
40 UK NHS Choices, "The power of vaccines", November 12, 2010,
http://www.nhs.uk/Planners/vaccinations/Pages/miracles.aspx, (accessed May 4, 2011); D A Henderson, "The
miracle of vaccination," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 51, no. 2 (July 1997): 244; Michael
Gerson, "A shot at hope," The Washington Post, January 18, 2011.
41 Henderson, "The miracle of vaccination," 238.
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families across the country. The disease most commonly struck society's most vulnerable-children-
and did so in seemingly random patterns, and without warning. If contracted, polio could kill. For
others, infection would lead to deformations of the body, particularly the limbs, leading many to a life of
wheelchairs, leg braces, or crutches. Some even needed help breathing. Although polio was, even at its
height, an uncommon disease, organized efforts to fund raise, advertise and promote the disease and its
potential cure in vaccination, helped ensure that polio become one of America's most feared diseases,
and that the vaccine, once developed, would be welcomed by a public desperate for a long-awaited
cure.42
* * *
Many histories identify the year 1796 as the birth of the vaccine miracle. Edward Anthony Jenner is the
hero of this story, credited with the discovery of smallpox vaccine after demonstrating the ability to
induce protective immunity against smallpox following inoculation of material from coxpox blisters.
While other methods of inducing protective immunity against smallpox preceded Jenner's smallpox
vaccine by perhaps a thousand or more years-notably variolation (the deliberate inoculation of
infectious material to produce an attenuated form of the disease and thereafter confer immunity,
practiced in North Africa, India, China, and other parts of the world 4 3) and in addition Jenner appears to
have had been aware of cowpox vaccinations prior to his own vaccination-Jenner's "vaccination"
generated a huge amount of interest among the general public, intellectual circles, and royalty, likely
because he was the first person to confer scientific status to the method.4 In the United Kingdom,
Jenner's home, Jenner received numerous honors, and was appointed Physician Extraordinary to King
George IV. Another measure of the degree to which Jenner's vaccine was considered a major advance:
the Vaccination Act of 1840 made variolation illegal and enabled anyone to be vaccinated at public
expense.45 Then, in 1853, the United Kingdom made smallpox vaccination compulsory for all infants
three months and younger.
For decades, different investigators experimented in the production and application of vaccines, but for
87 years, the scope of vaccines did not expand beyond vaccines for smallpox. It is for this reason that
some consider Jenner's smallpox vaccine to be a "one-off" success, a technique that did not translate to
other contagious diseases and therefore cannot be considered the real birth of the modern vaccine
miracle.46 Fundamental principles on which modern vaccination are based, such as attenuation of the
infectious agent, did not really develop until Louis Pasteur administered the first rabies vaccines to a
young boy in 1885, a practice he had been earlier performed on animals. When first introduced,
Pasteur's activities were controversial-while Pasteur claimed success, some of Pasteur's closest
colleagues objected. The ancient technique of variolation had been made illegal on the grounds that it
42 David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005), 5.
43 William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, Updated. (Anchor, 1998), 259.
44 Robert M Wolfe and Lisa K Sharp, "Anti-vaccinationists past and present," BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 325, no.
7361 (August 24, 2002): 430-432.
4s Colin R. Howard, "The impact on public health of the 19th century anti-vaccinationmovement," Microbiology
Today, February 2003, 23.
46 M. Worboys, "Vaccines: conquering untreatable diseases," BMJ 334, no. 1 (January 2007): s19-s19.
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used the actual disease to induce immunity, and Pasteur's methods were, in that respect, no different.4 7
Nevertheless, Pasteur's discoveries were occurring simultaneous to the ascendance of the germ theory
and nascent field of bacteriology, and within the year, vaccines for two more diseases were developed:
typhoid and cholera. In the new age of germs, "the most glamorous of these vistas of progress was the
potential for discovering new vaccines and drugs," the historian Nancy Tomes observed in her book The
Gospel of Germs.4 8 "Inspired by the known value of the smallpox vaccination, converts to the germ
theory dreamed of devising concoctions of tamed germs that would confer similar protection against
other deadly diseases."
In 1938, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched the National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis hoping to end polio-likely the most public and successful campaigns to find the cure for an
infectious disease-vaccines had already been developed for tuberculosis, pertussis, diphtheria,
influenza, tetanus, and yellow fever. Seventeen years later, the world's appetite for Jonas Salk's polio
vaccine was enormous. By this point in the mid twentieth century, the public had certainly become well
accustomed to a host of personal hygiene measures to keep germs at bay-boiling water, avoiding fecal
contamination, and practicing isolation when taking care of sick family members-but the hope for
combating intractable diseases like polio came through a miracle of medicine, the vaccine. Unlike drugs
and therapies, vaccines promised to prevent a disease from occurring. The belief that a vaccine was
synonymous with a preventative cure had become firmly entrenched.
* * *
The astounding success that vaccination programs against infectious disease such as smallpox, polio,
rubella, and measles have had in reducing the number of cases of these diseases was a triumph with far
reaching effects. For parents and doctors wishing to protect children, it offered a straightforward means
to protect a child from unpleasant, potentially debilitating, and even deadly diseases. For those charged
with improving and protecting the public's health, vaccines offered a straightforward approach to
population based disease control strategy. But on a more subtle level, the efficacy of vaccination
programs helped solidify the victory of the germ theory of disease.
Germ theory, a theory which has no unambiguous and specific date or place of birth but rather came
into the fore over a period of decades in the nineteenth century, posited that human illness resulted
from a process that begins with a microorganism. For each microbe, a different disease would result.
But before the spate of laboratory discoveries of the late 1800s, various theories competed to explain
the cause of diseases. Wherever boards of health instituted campaigns to rid cities of "filth,"
improvements in health were noted and gave credence and support to a belief in miasmatism-a
centuries old concept that decaying matter caused ill health through the spread of foul odors.
Miasmatists and others who opposed the competing "contagionist" theory pointed out that while some
contagious diseases clearly did exist, such as smallpox or syphilis, it was difficult to see how other
epidemic diseases like yellow fever, plague, and cholera could be seen as contagious. For example, how
4' Plotkin and Plotkin, "A short history of vaccination," 3.
48 Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1998), 45.
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could it be explained that people who came in close contact with the sick did not always get sick, despite
the fact that these diseases had the ability to attack a single person multiple times? Furthermore,
quarantines-a key measure advocated by contagionists-were often unable to stop diseases from
spreading. If these diseases were contagious, quarantines ought to work. Observations such as these
made non-contagious explanations for the etiology of epidemic diseases attractive.49
To a significant extent, the mid nineteenth century debate between so-called contagionists and
anticontagionists was sustained because the evidence available at the time was inconclusive. Empirical
observations could be used to support both theories, but gave neither a decisive victory. It was in this
space, lacking conclusive evidence, that the late historian of medicine Erwin Ackerknecht argues that
non-scientific reasons-namely political and social leanings-proved to be the factor that led scientists
to favor one theory over another. In particular, Ackerknecht argues that anti-contagionists rallied
against quarantines as antiquated and ugly "engines of despotism," considering the restrictions on
liberty that they entailed.
But around 1855, various understandings derived from the rapid new worlds of bacteriology and
microscopy-the notion of the asymptomatic (healthy) carrier, and animal vectors-began to tip the
evidential balance in favor of contagion. Over the next decade, some of anti-contagionism's most
famous champions, such as Rudolf Virchow who had stressed the need to understand the social
conditions of people in order to understand and respond to disease, changed their minds. 50
Contagionism had triumphed over anticontagionism. Aided by the laboratory, bacteriologists could do
what the anti-contagionists could not: produce visible evidence of the previously hidden world of
microbes.51 Germs were not just a theory, but a hard reality the microscope could reveal. Here, the
new vaccines in the bacteriological era provided an even stronger argument in favor of germ theory
because, modeled off an understanding of the germ-host interaction, they were effective in preventing
illness. The success of some early vaccines helped transform a simple concept into a truism: that there
exists a clean causal chain from a specific microbe to a specific disease, and that this causal chain can be
interrupted with a specific vaccine, or terminated with a specific medicine.
Whether it takes form as a vaccine or a drug, germ theory provides what contemporary epidemiologist
Philip Alcabes calls a "simple certainty" that the response to epidemic diseases is straightforward: Kill or
block the bug, and you have the cure. While discovery of any particular magic bullet remains a
formidable task, once a vaccine or drug is developed, society will have its technological fix, and the
disease will soon be a thing of the past.5 2
49 Erwin H Ackerknecht, "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 22
(September 1948): 562-593.
50 Ibid.
s1 Philip Alcabes, Dread: How Fear and Fantasy have Fueled Epidemicsfrom the Block Death to the Avian Flu, 1st
ed. (PublicAffairs, 2009), 90.
52 Ibid., 138.
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The optimism of vaccination
Germ theory's tight conceptual linkage between cause, effect, and cure helps shape the way in which
many infectious diseases, including influenza, are conceptualized. Until the early 1930s, influenza was a
term applied to any seasonal outbreaks of epidemic disease with certain characteristics-fever, malaise,
and the many symptoms we still today label "flu-like symptoms." The discovery of influenza virus in
1933, however, began to cast influenza in a new, technology-dependent light: influenza could be
suspected based on its symptoms, but only confirmed by testing for the presence of the newly
discovered influenza virus. The further development of the first influenza vaccine, in 1936, helped fulfill
the promise of germ theory: a method for eliminating the problem.
Optimism ran high in the first years following development of an influenza vaccine. With a long-
standing realization that the conditions of war, especially crowding, helped exacerbate the impact of
influenza, the Army was the earliest adopter-and for many years, the only major adopter-of influenza
vaccination for the reduction of influenza-related morbidity. Dr. Thomas Francis, who would later
become central to the success story of polio vaccine, led the influenza Commission of the Army
Epidemiological Board to field test influenza vaccine. The results showed influenza vaccine to be a
success, reducing the incidence of influenza from 7.1 per cent to 2.2 per cent. But in 1947, there was a
substantial outbreak against which the vaccine provide no protection. Investigations revealed that the
causative agent was a previously unknown influenza virus, underscoring a growing awareness of the
virus's mutability. Some researchers feared that a protective vaccine against influenza was an
impossibility given the virus's propensity for constant and unpredictable viral change. Others were
more optimistic, particularly the American researchers Thomas Francis and his protege Jonas Salk, who
felt that with proper laboratory surveillance, the threat of influenza could be better understood, and a
universal vaccine could be created.s3
The rhetoric of unnecessary suffering
That optimism has never left. The very fact that influenza vaccines exist and are available drives major
transformations in the way in which the disease is conceived and attitudes about technology's ability to
respond to the threat. With a vaccine available, influenza is no longer one of many infectious diseases,
but at onc? a vaccine preventable disease, joining diseases like smallpox, typhoid, and rabies. The CDC
often appears to be at pains to convince people that their understanding of influenza is flawed: at the
top of the agency's poster, Flu Vaccine Facts & Myths, they write that it is a "myth" to think that
influenza isn't a serious disease (see Figure 1.1, page 56).54 It is "not just a bad cold," but "a serious
illness," the CDC's webpage for diabetics likewise states.55 So strong is this conviction, it appears, that in
a paper co-authored by CDC, Pan American Health Organization, academic physicians, and others on the
topic of improving influenza surveillance systems worldwide, the authors seem to express
disappointment over a "primary limitation of most existing influenza sentinel-site networks" that "are
s3 John M. Eyler, "Influenza and the Remaking of Epidemiology, 1918-1960," in Influenza and Public Health:
Learningfrom Past Pandemics, ed. Tamara Giles-Vernick, Susan Craddock, and Jennifer Gunn (EarthScan, 2010),
174-175.
s4 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Flu Vaccine Facts & Myths."
ss U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Take Charge of Your Diabetes: 11. Vaccinations."
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focused on mild disease, which supports the notion that influenza is a benign disease." 6 They propose
the target of surveillance shift and "collect clinical data and laboratory specimens from persons with a
prevalent and severe infectious disease."
Part of this framing and focus on influenza as a serious disease may be attributable to what I discussed
in Chapter 1: public health's focus on mortality as a way of understanding the true impact of disease.
But attitudes about how best to describe influenza are simultaneously being shaped by public health
experts' attitudes toward the availability of vaccine.
With a vaccine available, any suffering-no matter how mild-becomes "needless," "unnecessary," and
"tragic." In an announcement, the Sanofi Pasteur funded American Lung Association's Faces of Influenza
campaign stated that "Any death is a tragedy, especially one that could have been prevented. Annual
vaccination is the simplest and best protection against seasonal influenza." 57 Because a vaccine exists,
the implicit argument is that a life lost to influenza is a death that could have been prevented.
"Tragically, influenza and flu related complications take American lives each year," President Barack
Obama declared in an official Proclamation. "During National Influenza Vaccination Week, we remind all
Americans that the flu vaccine is safe and effective in preventing the spread of flu viruses."58
The rhetoric of "unnecessary suffering" and "tragedy" is by no means specific to influenza; it is applied
to all diseases against which a vaccine exists. A decade ago, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee
commented that "Vaccines are among the nation's most important public health tools: they save lives
and money, protect people (particularly infants and young children) from unnecessary suffering caused
by vaccine-preventable diseases, and improve the quality of life for infants, children, adolescents, and
adults."5 9 It is in the mission statement of The Sabin Vaccine Institute-"to reduce needless human
suffering from vaccine preventable and neglected tropical diseases through innovative vaccine research
and development"60--a non-profit advocacy organization primarily funded by The Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, but also the US government, numerous pharmaceutical companies, and other philanthropic
organizations.
In a CDC issued press release announcing National Infant Immunization Week in 2008, Dr. Anne
Schuchat, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases and a primary
56 Justin R Ortiz et al., "Strategy to enhance influenza surveillance worldwide," Emerging Infectious Diseases 15, no.
8 (August 2009): 1272.
s7 American Lung Association, "American Lung Association Urges 'Faces' of Influenza to Help Prevent Seasonal Flu
by Getting Vaccinated", November 4, 2009, http://www.lungusa.org/about-us/our-impact/top-stories/faces-of-
influenza-vaccination.html, (accessed May 19, 2011).
s8 Barack Obama, "Proclamation 8615 of December 7, 2010: National Influenza Vaccination Week, 2010," Federal
Register 75, no. 237 (December 10, 2010): 77519-77520.
59 National Vaccine Advisory Committee, "Development of Community- and State-Based Immunization Registries",
January 12, 1999, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/iis/pubs/nvac.htm, (accessed July 25, 2011).
Sabin Vaccine Institute, "Mission", 2011, http://www.sabin.org/about-us/mission-vision, (accessed July 25,
2011).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "IV. Fact Sheet: Pandemic Flu Basics", 2007,
www.pandemicflu.gov/takethelead/factsheetbasics.pdf, (accessed October 12, 2010).
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public official in charge of the 2009 H1N1 response, declared: "The suffering or death of even one child
from a vaccine-preventable disease is an unnecessary human tragedy. Let us renew our efforts to
ensure that no child, adolescent, or adult will have to needlessly suffer from a vaccine-preventable
disease."6 2
Despite achieving historical highs in vaccination coverage, the logic of vaccine preventable diseases (or
"VPDs"), is such that anything less than near-universal coverage is inadequate. "A substantial number of
children in the United States still aren't adequately protected from vaccine-preventable diseases,"
Schuchat stated. A former CDC director commented: "A quarter century ago, the objective of 90%
school-age immunization coverage with common childhood vaccines was regarded by many as too
ambitious. That objective proved achievable but still insufficient...."63
Intervention defines disease
A powerful outgrowth of the rhetoric of "unnecessary suffering" from "vaccine preventable diseases" is
the concrete manifestation of the overly-simplistic "pathogen-disease-vaccine" model. Seeing
influenza through this model obscures questions over the vaccine's actual efficacy. Are all cases and
deaths from influenza truly vaccine preventable? The question does not logically arise when the phrase
"vaccine preventable disease" confidently assures us they are. Are influenza epidemics and pandemics
even caused by influenza-as opposed to a host of respiratory agents including, but not limited to,
influenza? This question seldom arises, too, as some hospitals in the Philadelphia area found out in
October 2009. Authorities there had, like the rest of the country, been preparing for waves of HIN1
swine influenza-but later realized that many of those cases were being triggered by a different virus.
"When this began happening, we all believed what we were seeing was influenza," one doctor
remarked, whose 16 year old son got sick the previous month. "I went around telling my friends, 'I'm
positive she had flu.' And now, looking back, I think she probably had rhinovirus.,64 Locations with
fewer laboratory resources, however, may not do the testing, and incorrectly assume that all that looks
like influenza is indeed influenza. In 2009, laboratories with the ability to do the testing were
overwhelmed, and testing for H1N1 detracted from their ability to carry out tests for other diseases,
with little clinical benefit derived from such testing. This was in part the reason that CDC issued
guidance to states to stop testing suspected cases of H1N 1.65 The lack of testing, however, contributes
to the incorrect assumption that all influenza-like illness is influenza, and therefore should be prevented
through vaccination.
6 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Press Release: More Than Twenty Percent of Children Not Fully
Protected Against Vaccine-Preventable Disease", April 14, 2008,
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r080424.htm, (accessed May 19, 2011).
6 William H. Foege, "CDC's 60th anniversary. Director's perspective--William H. Foege, M.D., M.P.H., 1977-1983,"
MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 55, no. 39 (October 6, 2006): 1071-1074.
64 Don Sapatkin, "Ill this fall? Maybe it wasn't swine flu after all," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 12, 2009,
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/health_science/daily/2009111 2 _Testsshowfalloutbreakisrhinovirusnot_s
wine_flu.html?viewAll=y, (accessed November 19, 2009).
65 Sharyl Attkisson, "Swine Flu Cases Overestimated?", October 21, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/21/cbsnews-investigates/main54048 29 .shtml, (accessed October 22,
2009).
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The pathogen-disease-vaccine model may also partially explain why influenza pandemics were
assumed to be catastrophic in their basic nature. Believing that pandemics result from evolutionarily
changed influenza viruses, many assumed that humans would lack any immunity to the new virus.
Lacking immunity, it seemed reasonable to assume that people would suffer a more severe bout of
disease than seasonal counterparts. (The 2005 HHS pandemic plan stated: "when a pandemic virus
strain emerges, 25% to 35% of the population could develop clinical disease, and a substantial fraction
of these individuals could die."66) Conceptual simplicity however does not equate with empirical
validity, as the pandemic-labeled 1957, 1968, and 2009 influenza seasons have shown, with morbidity
and mortality impact registering within the range of non-pandemic labeled influenza seasons, despite
the overall unavailability of specific therapeutics. Nevertheless, seeing influenza pandemics as
fundamentally about the circulation of novel influenza viruses, influenza vaccination is unsurprisingly
heralded as the key prophylactic countermeasure.
Transforming risk assessment
With vaccines available, fighting influenza becomes not about whether to use vaccines, but how to use
vaccines. Perhaps the most symbolic representation of this disposition is the fact that for decades, the
federal US policy document on the "Prevention and Control of Influenza" has been written by the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (italics mine). With ACIP appointed a leadership role in
guiding the nation on the control of influenza, that its advice would take the form of vaccine
recommendations seems, from the start, to be structurally guaranteed. As ACIP's homepage on the CDC
website states: "the role of the ACIP is to provide advice that will lead to ... an increase in the safe use of
vaccines and related biological products."6 (The title of ACIP's recommendations was changed and
incidentally made more accurate in 2009 with the new name Prevention and Control of Seasonal
Influenza with Vaccines, but the name change was only done to reflect the separation of
recommendations for vaccines and antivirals into two publications.68 )
There are further implications of conceiving influenza as, at a fundamental level, a "vaccine preventable
disease" (VPD). At an influenza conference celebrating the life and career of influenza epidemiologist
Arnold Monto of the University of Michigan last November, Canadian hospital epidemiologist Alison
McGeer spoke about the obviousness of the problem of influenza, on the one hand, and the difficulties
she experiences in trying to convince doctors to take the disease seriously.
"Influenza Is the #1 Cause of Death Due to Vaccine-Preventable Diseases," a bold headline on her
PowerPoint presentation declared, citing data from three CDC studies, with statistics showing greater
than 500,000 deaths from influenza in the US between 1989 and 1998, more than four times the second
leading VPD, pneumococcal pneumonia.
* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 16.
67 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)", July
25, 2011, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/, (accessed July 25, 2011).
68 Correspondence with Joseph Bresee, CDC Influenza Division, March 9, 2011.
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McGeer said, "I want you to think about why it is that it is so hard to get healthcare workers vaccinated.
And it's particularly difficult to understand when you look at data like these, which are summary data
looking at the impact and burden of influenza." She continued:
It is very clear that influenza carries by far the largest burden of mortality and morbidity
of any infectious disease in the developed world. Wide margin. It should be obvious
that we should be paying attention to it, right? But the truth of the matter is, that the
problem out there is, that clinicians don't think so. OK?
The difficulty we've got with clinicians is that they think influenza makes you sick for a
couple of days, and then you get better-that's a quote from a cardiologist friend of
mine, ok? And the reason for that is that the data that we have on influenza mortality
and morbidity are complicated. They come from public health studies. They're ecologic
studies. They're based on excess mortality during winter seasons and influenza season,
and if you've done any study of influenza at all, they're perfectly reasonable and logical
and they must be true.
What McGeer claims "must be true" refers to the CDC modeling study of influenza-associated mortality,
published in 2003, 6 which argued an annual average of 36,000 deaths each year. However by the time
of McGeer's talk, CDC had released revised figures suggesting its prior 36,000 deaths estimate was
overstated by around 45%.70 Nevertheless, McGeer continued to explain why clinicians' understanding
of influenza is flawed.
But if you haven't done any study of influenza-and that of course includes most
people, including most people in medicine and nursing-then these just look like
ecologic data, and in clinical medicine we don't much believe in ecologic data, OK? And
if they don't match our clinical opinion, we just kind of assume they're fundamentally
flawed. And I would put it to you that this is our big issue with getting all sorts of people
to deal with influenza, OK? The federal government in Canada to fund influenza vaccine
development for new influenza vaccines ... our willingness to get vaccinated a's
healthcare professionals. Many things that happen in influenza [sic] are much harder to
do because we haven't yet persuaded clinicians that influenza is a problem.
McGeer is convinced that influenza is a vaccine preventable problem. As #1 VPD killer, McGeer and her
colleagues set out to conduct studies aimed at generating data that would convince others that
influenza was the major threat McGeer claimed it was.
So we started surveillance for influenza associated with hospitalization in south central
Ontario in the 2004-5 influenza season, and the underlying goal of this surveillance,
Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States."
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Estimates of deaths associated with seasonal influenza ---
United States, 1976-2007."
71 Allison McGeer, "Clinical Influenza -- three challenges", November 12, 2010, http://inst-
tech.engin.umich.edu/leccap/view/clOsphinf-anygwnn4 2/10434, (accessed July 18, 2011).
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truthfully, is to demonstrate to people that influenza really does kill you. OK? That's its
sole purpose in life. 12
McGeer's approach reveals the stakes in the risk assessment of influenza. What gets performed and
publicized are studies that demonstrate the number of deaths and hospitalizations from the alleged
vaccine preventable disease. What gets much less attention are the results of studies that test the
pathogens in circulation during so-called "influenza" seasons, studies that have shown influenza viruses
as comprising just a proportion of the influenza-like illnesses (ILI) labeled "flu." Vaccines for non-
influenza ILI are almost non-existent: the military employed adenovirus vaccine for 25 years, but its one
manufacturer ceased production which stopped administration of the vaccine in 1996." (Adenovirus
vaccination however is expected to resume in military recruits following FDA approval, in March 2011, of
a new live, oral adenovirus vaccine.) Rhinovirus, coronavirus, and respiratory syncytial virus vaccines
are in various stages of research and development, but are still commercially unavailable.75 Attention
thus falls on the only ILI considered vaccine preventable. Risk assessment focused on the burden of
influenza may not tell us the magnitude of suffering attributable to what people think of as the "flu," but
it does provide statistics that can and are leveraged in marketing campaigns about this "#1 VPD,"
identifying the margin of potential opportunity to reduce morbidity and mortality.
In this setting, there are few incentives to reduce scientific errors in risk assessment. Errors in the
assessment of morbidity and mortality become forgivable because correcting the record does little to
change what is relevant at the level of policy: whether influenza kills 25,000 per year or 36,000 per year,
deaths attributed to this disease will be framed as "unnecessary suffering" due to a vaccine preventable
disease.
Policy gets focused on what is "under the lamppost"-that is, what is targetable with available
interventions-namely, influenza vaccine. I asked Professor Ronald Eccles, director of the UK Common
Cold Centre, whose life work is focused on non-influenza respiratory viruses, why he thought policy was
focused so much on influenza, not influenza-like illnesses.
72 Ibid.
7 Kevin L. Russell et al., "Vaccine-preventable adenoviral respiratory illness in US military recruits, 1999-2004,"
Vaccine 24, no. 15 (April 5, 2006): 2835-2842; Institute of Medicine, Urgent Attention Needed to Restore Lapsed
Adenovirus Vaccine Availability: A Letter Report (Institute of Medicine, 2000),
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9993&page=R1, (accessed July 19, 2011).
7 U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Teva Women's Health, Inc., "March 16, 2011 Approval Letter - Adenovirus
Type 4 and Type 7 Vaccine, Live, Oral," WebContent, March 16, 2011,
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/ucm247511.htm, (accessed July 19,
2011); Military Vaccine (MILVAX) Agency, "Adenovirus Questions & Answers", 2011,
http://www.vaccines.mil/default.aspx?cnt=resource/qaAll&dlD=50&cID=397, (accessed July 19, 2011).
7s National Network for Immunization Information, "Respiratory Syncytial Virus", December 21, 2006,
http://www.immunizationinfo.org/issues/vaccines-development/respiratory-syncytial-virus, (accessed July 19,
2011); J. Craig Venter Institute, "Complete Genomes of All Known Human Rhinoviruses Are Published", February
12, 2009, http://www.jcvi.org/cms/nc/press/press-releases/full-text/article/complete-genomes-of-alI-known-
human-rhinoviruses-are-published/?tx-ttnewsbackPid]=67, (accessed July 19, 2011).
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You are right in that the greatest morbidity and economic burden comes from other
viruses than influenza. I think that the focus on influenza prevention and research by
government is related to two factors: firstly there are effective vaccines so something
can be done to prevent influenza in the community and the burden of seasonal illness:
secondly influenza grabs the headlines because of the pandemics that occur when a
new virus circulates around the world and a large percentage of the population is ill at
the same time. The other respiratory viruses do not exhibit the same pandemic
behaviour as they do not exhibit the genetic shift that generates new influenza viruses,
hence the other viruses such as RSV and parainfluenza etc. are present every year and
cause a lot of morbidity over a prolonged period which in sum is greater than that
caused by influenza but the influenza viruses have the potential to cause peaks of
morbidity that grab the headlines and create public anxiety and responses from
government to do something to allay this anxiety.76
Disease mongering and bioevangelism77
Influenza is far from the only disease for which enormous efforts are made in the attempt to change the
public's opinion from general apathy to concern and alarm. "Erectile Dysfunction" (ED) and "Female
Sexual Dysfunction," (FSD) for example, are two examples of conditions that, like influenza, the majority
of people were generally unconcerned about but for which concern has risen alongside media based
awareness campaigns.78 In the case of ED and FSD, however, these efforts have been spearheaded and
paid for by pharmaceutical companies, which not coincidentally sell their therapeutics to treat the
advertised condition, a practice that many academics have labeled "disease mongering."79
In contrast to these other conditions, in the case of influenza, it is public health agencies that play a
major role in getting the message out. Drug companies of course still play a role, but governments are
central to the story of influenza, active in their marketing of the disease and the vaccine, and it is
perhaps for this reason that influenza vaccines have thus far avoided being brought into the disease
mongering debate. The disease mongering storyline claims that Big Pharma creates markets for its
therapeutics by enlarging the definition of illness, and convincing the public that relatively rare and
little-known conditions are larger problems than they really are. For other conditions, disease
mongering entails medicalizing the ordinary vagaries of life, such as sadness, doubt, or shyness, tagging
them with sophisticated and medical sounding terms like Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD), and selling pills
claimed to treat these diseases.
Although awareness of disease mongering only surfaced in the last decade or so, the connections
between marketing diseases and marketing therapeutics has a longer history. Historian of medicine
Jeremy Greene has described how the pharmaceutical company Merck played a major role in the 1950s
and 1960s, in redefining the threshold for hypertension, thus enlarging the potential market for its
76 Correspondence with Ronald Eccles, December 10, 2010.
77 thank John Richardson for bringing this term to my attention, which I believe he coined.
7 Lexchin, "Bigger and Better"; Moynihan and Mintzes, Sex, Lies, and Pharmaceuticals.
79 Payer, Disease-Mongers; Healy, The Antidepressant Era; Moynihan and Cassels, Selling Sickness.
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diuretic medication, Diuril. 80 The same has occurred with cholesterol guidelines. In 2001, the official
National Cholesterol Education Program released updated guidelines that tripled the number of patients
who, based on the new risk profile, would be expected to qualify for drug treatment.8' Financial
disclosures from 2004 showed that many members of the guideline drafting panel had ties to companies
which stood to gain from the increased market of patients. 82 Examples like this show that the selling of
sickness is not limited to psychiatric diseases, but a host of chronic conditions, and industry has a major
interest in defining illness.
While financial ties between industry and those individuals who set influenza policy do exist, the
marketing of influenza vaccine may have avoided the degree of skepticism associated with disease
mongering because many of these marketers do not stand to gain financially from vaccination
campaigns. The theory of disease mongering urges us to frame our understanding in terms of simple
markets, but doing so misses what occurs in the story of influenza: the way in which virologists find
satisfaction in being "germ hunters" (Virus Hunting, Virus Hunter, and Germ Hunter being the title of at
least six books83), and the way public health experts find satisfaction in the prospect of saving lives by
urging vaccination. Far from a desire to financially profit, saving lives is basic to the ethos of public
health. At Johns Hopkins University, the nation's oldest school of public health has given itself the
motto "Protecting Health, Saving Lives - Millions at a Time" (italics in the original). 84 The CDC's motto,
visible on every page of its website, is "CDC 24/7: Saving lives, protecting people, reducing health
costs.""s Vaccines, touted as one of medicine's greatest inventions, offer experts a clear way to feel they
are reducing unnecessary suffering, and saving lives.
Vaccination politics
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Hunters. The Lives and Triumphs of Great Modern Medical Pioneers. (Hutchinson 1960., 1960); Elaine Marie Alphin,
Germ Hunter: A Story about Louis Pasteur (Carolrhoda Books, 2003).
84 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, "School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins - Home", 2011,
http://www.jhsph.edu/, (accessed July 25, 2011).
8s U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Centers for Disease Control and Prevention", July 25, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/, (accessed July 25, 2011).
86 World Health Organization, "Prof. Peter Collignon", n.d.,
http://www.who.int/foodbornedisease/resistance/Collignon/en/index.htm, (accessed July 25, 2011).
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not be as bad as they had feared. Collignon contacted me in August 2009 after finding my 2008 article
in the American Journal of Public Health, 7 which challenged the assumption that pandemics were
extraordinarily deadly events. Collignon, too, had been expressing the opinion that the 2009 H1N1 virus
was far from extraordinary. His early commentary predicted that "this fear is out of proportion to the
risk this virus represents, not only now but what is likely in the future." 8
Peter Collignon, we now know in retrospect, was right. But his continued outspokenness about the risks
of influenza vaccine, and concern that policies of universal influenza vaccination may do more harm
than good has not won him friends. In June 2010, Collignon, Tom Jefferson and I penned a letter to the
89
BMJ expressing concern about influenza vaccination policy following Australia's tragic experience.
Data released by the Australian government showed that 1 in every 110 young children vaccinated with
the vaccine manufacturer CSL's seasonal influenza vaccination suffered a febrile seizure. 90 Our letter
pointed out that in trials conducted by the same manufacturer during the previous year, between 30%
and 60% of young children under 3 years of age had developed a fever following vaccination-a result
made all the more alarming by the fact that these data were placed in online-only appendices of the
trial, not the body of the paper. Despite knowledge that fever is the most important risk factor for
febrile seizures, these vaccines were allowed to go to market, and were recommended for all children.
In response to our letter, three doctors from Children's Hospital at Westmead wrote that our criticism
was unfounded and dangerous: "When doctors are prepared to be cavalier with data, the anti-
immunisation lobby needs look no further for ammunition." Even after the vaccine was suspended by
the Australian government for children under five following realization of the large number of febrile
convulsions, these authors claimed that their "analysis of benefits and risks continues to strongly favour
influenza immunisation for children aged under 5 years." 9
As Collignon has pressed on with his critique of policy, expressing dismay over Australia's lack of active
surveillance mechanisms to rapidly detect potential harms associated with vaccination, so, too, have his
detractors. Pediatric and Child Health specialist Professor Robert Booy of the University of Sydney 92
87 Doshi, "Trends in recorded influenza mortality."
88 Peter Collignon, "Take a deep breath--Swine flu is not that bad," Australasian Emergency Nursing Journal 12, no.
3 (August 2009): 71.
89 Peter Collignon, Peter Doshi, and Tom Jefferson, "Ramifications of adverse events in children in Australia," BMJ
340, no. jun09_3 (June 9, 2010): c2994.
90 Jim Bishop, "Seasonal Flu Vaccine Remains Suspended for young children without risk factors - Advice from the
Chief Medical Officer" (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing, June 1, 2010),
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/mr-yrl0-dept-deptOlO 6lO.htm, (accessed July
19, 2011).
91 David Isaacs, Kristine Macartney, and Peter McIntyre, "Benefits and risks of childhood influenza vaccination,"
BMJ Rapid Response (June 28, 2010), http://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c2994.full/reply#bmj_el_237918,
(accessed July 25, 2011).
92 Robert Booy reports having "received funding from CSL, Roche, Sanofi, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Wyeth to
attend and present at scientific meetings," according to a recent article. See Robert Booy et al., "Cross-reacting
antibodies against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus in older Australians," The MedicalJournal of Australia
194, no. 1 (January 3, 2011): 19-23.
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claims that "if parents are told by a reputable, responsible professor not to immunise," referring to
Collignon, "they might be very disappointed to find their children very ill, in intensive care or dying."93
Professor Jim Bishop, who was Australia's chief medical officer during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak and
responsible for the decision to suspend the seasonal influenza vaccine in children under five years, is
also upset with Collignon. He fears that when Collignon voices concerns about influenza vaccine, he will
turn the public off vaccines altogether. Bishop even telephoned Collignon to "discuss the fact it's up to
all of us to realise the huge gains that have occurred through vaccination." "When I was a child ... my
classmates were dropping off with polio. Vaccination has made a huge impact on our ability to look
after diseases. Things that damage people's trust in vaccines are problematic." 94
Collignon feels caught in a bind. "There's been a lot of pressure on me. Like a lot of medical people, I
believe vaccines are terrific - but it has come to the situation where it's almost like motherhood, that
you cannot question it, especially in the public arena, for fear you'll undermine the vaccination
program."9'
If the particular medical intervention Collignon had concerns about came in the form of a pill, it is
unlikely Collignon would be so disparaged by his colleagues. Criticism of the drug industry has gone
mainstream, with books such as On the Take and The Truth About the Drug Companies, penned by some
96of the most powerful names in academic medicine. Numerous video documentaries have detailed the
power of the pharmaceutical industry to game the patent system, sell useless drugs, influence
policymakers, and forcefully market pills to doctors and consumers-altogether painting a portrait of an
industry little different than Big Tobacco.97
Collignon's criticism did not find a natural home in the larger critique of the pharmaceutical industry for
the simple reason that vaccines figure little into the debate on Big Pharma. Vaccines have their own
debate, a debate with roots that go back to the time of Jenner's coxpox derived smallpox vaccine.
Today, like then, much of this debate hinges on questions of free choice and autonomy, on the one
hand, versus compulsion, duty, and obligation on the other.98 While a more critical discourse on drugs
9 Natasha Bita, "Free flu vaccine eyed for children," The Australian, March 21, 2011,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/free-flu-vaccine-eyed-for-children/story-e6frg8y6-
1226025034551, (accessed July 19, 2011).
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Jerome P. Kassirer, On the Take: How Medicine's Complicity with Big Business Can Endanger Your Health (Oxford
University Press, USA, 2005); Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What
to Do About It, 1st ed. (Random House, 2004).
97 Catherine Scott, Selling Sickness (Icarus Films, 2004); Andrew Liebman, "Dangerous Prescription," Frontline,
2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/prescription/, (accessed July 25, 2011); Big Bucks, Big
Pharma: Marketing Disease & Pushing Drugs (Media Education Foundation, 2006); Jon Palfreman and Barbara
Moran, "The Other Drug War," Frontline, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/other/,
(accessed July 25, 2011).
98 Daniel A Salmon et al., "Compulsory vaccination and conscientious or philosophical exemptions: past, present,
and future," The Lancet 367, no. 9508 (February 2006): 436; Wolfe and Sharp, "Anti-vaccinationists past and
present."
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has reached a substantial level of general scientific and professional acceptability, as witnessed by the
number of academics who publicly critique the pharmaceutical industry, criticism of vaccine-related
policies largely emanates from members of the lay.public.99 There are some academics and other
medical researchers who are openly critical of vaccine policy, but their numbers are small, and lay and
scientific media portrayals of the vaccination debate frame the issue as one of two neatly divided
groups: a scientific consensus surrounding the importance and overall safety of vaccination versus a
small but vocal group of parents, usually of sick, injured, or deceased children, with ill-founded fears of
vaccines. 00
PBS Frontline's 2010 documentary, Vaccine Wars, captured much of the heated controversy with in-
depth interviews with many of the battle's protagonists. Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, enthusiastically defended vaccine policy and spoke of the
benefit of vaccines.
I don't think there's any question that vaccines are among the very short list of
beneficial health interventions literally in history, if you look at everything from the
number of lives that have been saved over decades and decades since we began actively
vaccinating people for diseases that sometime ago were devastating and frightening,
particularly for children, that are now essentially either completely suppressed, to the
point where there are only rare cases, or in many cases actually eliminated. So when
you look at the cost-benefit -- cost both in economic cost as well as cost in suffering and
death, and the benefit of the vaccine -- it's an absolutely striking and stunning, in a
positive way, beneficial intervention....
In some respects, vaccines are the victims of their own success, because first of all,
they're still, as they were in the beginning, highly effective and very safe, when you look
at risk-benefit ratio of a disease versus the very, very, very small risk of any adverse
event that you would have with a vaccine. However, the motivation to get vaccinated is
crystal clear and sharp when you look around you and you see people getting serious
disease.'01
By talking about the "cost in suffering and death," Fauci suggests that all of the diseases vaccines aim to
prevent are severe. The same messages were on display at the October 2010 ACIP meeting in Atlanta,
Georgia. It was here, on a table outside the meeting hall, that I found two bumper stickers and a
99 Howard, "The impact on public health of the 19th century anti-vaccinationmovement," 22.
100 Jason Fagone, "Will this Doctor Hurt Your Baby?," Philadelphia Magazine, June 4, 2009,
http://www.phillymag.com/scripts/print/article.php?asset_idx=252013, (accessed June 4, 2009); Gardiner Harris,
"British Journal Retracts Paper Linking Autism and Vaccines," The New York Times, February 2, 2010, sec. Health /
Research, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/health/research/031ancet.html, (accessed July 25, 2011); Amesh
A. Adalja, "Deadly Choices: How the Anti-Vaccine Movement Threatens Us All," Journal of the American Medical
Association 305, no. 23 (June 2011): 2469-2469.
101 Anthony S. Fauci, "Interview: Anthony S. Fauci, M.D.," interview by Frontline, March 22, 2010,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/vaccines/interviews/fauci.html, (accessed July 25, 2011).
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postcard, one of which contained just three words, plus a period: "VACCINES SAVE LIVES." 102 Another
carried the picture of four infants in diapers with the headline, "Get the Facts. Vaccines Save Lives," plus
a link to the organization's website (www.VaccinateYourBaby.org). The postcard-from the
Immunization Action Coalition, a group funded by CDC, philanthropic institutions, and industry-
featured a number of website links and the slogan "Save Lives. Immunize!"
What these materials and Fauci's statements have in common is an argument that is not about any
particular vaccine, but all vaccines. When Fauci speaks of "the benefit of the vaccine," and vaccines
being "highly effective and very safe," he uses language that suggests that all vaccines can be discussed
in the same breath. The "Vaccines Save Lives." bumper sticker does not claim what any particular
vaccine might do (e.g. the benefits of polio vaccine)-it makes a claim about what all vaccines do.
Perhaps because vaccines have been heralded as one of public health's greatest achievements, it seems
unsurprising to speak of vaccines as all highly effective, all very safe, and all lifesaving.
But the sweeping language in discussions of vaccines seems paradoxical when considered in contrast to
pharmaceutical drugs. The development and application of many drugs, such as antibiotics, have saved
countless lives, yet few make broad claims about all drugs like "DRUGS SAVE LIVES." After all, despite
the centrality of pharmaceutical drugs in biomedicine, everyone knows that drugs can help and hurt. It
depends on the drug, the patient, and the setting. Many drugs end up being ineffective for patients and
do not cure. Most drugs treat non-life threatening conditions. And almost all carry the risk of causing
side-effects. While it's hard to predict ahead of time, some well-known estimates suggest that upwards
of 100,000 deaths per year in the United States are caused by "nonerror, adverse effects of
medication."' 03 Few doubt that drugs can save lives, but we know that the story is far more
complicated.
Physicians like Peter Collignon and Tom Jefferson, who have challenged the effectiveness and safety of
some vaccines but not allvaccines, have found out that most of their colleagues in the medical
profession have little tolerance for public discussions about weighing the benefits and harms of any
particular vaccine. Lisa Jackson has also witnessed the personal cost of challenging orthodox views.
After finishing her epidemiological study which found that the widely assumed ability of influenza
vaccine to reduce elderly deaths was actually an artifact of messy data and therefore not real, her
results were not welcomed. "People told me, 'No good can come of [asking] this,"' she recalled.
"'Potentially a lot of bad could happen' for me professionally by raising any criticism that might dissuade
people from getting vaccinated, because of course, 'We know that vaccine works.' This was the
prevailing wisdom." 0 4
Unlike drugs, vaccines are not about individual medicine but population-based public health-and the
public health strategy is straightforward. The assumption of all VPDs is the same: the disease is caused
102 "Bumper stickers," AAP News 31, no. 3 (March 1, 2010): 24-d.
103 Barbara Starfield, "Is US health really the best in the world?," Journal of the American Medical Association 284,
no. 4 (July 26, 2000): 483-485.
Recounted in Brownlee and Lenzer, "Does the Vaccine Matter?".
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by a certain microbe, approved vaccines are necessarily safe and effective, suffering is therefore
unnecessary and tragic, and vaccines promise to save lives.
These are not empirically validated claims. First, vaccines may be believed to be safe and effective, but
they are biological products grown in non-sterile environments, and risks of contamination run much
higher than in pharmaceutical manufacturing. Reducing unwanted bacterial growth, for example, is part
of the manufacturing process in most vaccines, as the US Congress learned when investigating the
Chiron influenza vaccine debacle of 2004. Second, for unknown reasons, vaccines sometimes cause
unexpected side-effects. In the past two years, influenza vaccines have been associated with febrile
seizures in Australia0 5 and narcolepsy in Finland, Sweden, and other countries, leading to suspensions of
influenza vaccination programs.1 06
With the theoretical certainty of the "vaccine preventable disease" concept applied to any infectious
disease for which a vaccine exists, such as influenza, failure in policy will be explained in ways that do
not cause a rethinking of basic assumptions. The NIH study in 2005, which concluded that influenza
vaccines could not be shown to have reduced death in any age group, 07 was not interpreted as a
repudiation of the vaccine, but rather as a sign that not enough people were being vaccinated. The
study's lead author Lone Simonsen herself remarked: "In a way, this study is good news: It says there's
room for improvement."108 She argued that the "investigation of other options for influenza control,
including ... vaccination of children, becomes much more urgent."109
A similarly optimistic outlook is evident in officials' response to safety concerns. In July 2011, the
European Medicines Agency's investigation into the association between Pandemrix H1N1 influenza
vaccine' and narcolepsy in children in Finland and Sweden reported:
10s Bishop, "Seasonal Flu Vaccine Remains Suspended for young children without risk factors -Advice from the
Chief Medical Officer."
1 In Finland, a government appointed panel investigated the association between receipt of influenza vaccination
and narcolepsy following reports of dozens of children falling ill with narcolepsy following receipt of influenza
vaccine in 2009-2010. In an interim report, the panel reported finding the incidence of narcolepsy in vaccinated
children to be a statistically significant 9.2-fold higher than those not vaccinated. See National Institute for Health
and Welfare (THL), National Narcolepsy Task Force Interim Report, January 31, 2011, 14, http://www.thI.fi/thl-
client/pdfs/dcel82fb-651e-48a1-bOl8-3f774d6d1875, (accessed July 29, 2011). Similar reports were investigated
in Sweden, where the problem could also not be attributed to faculty vaccine lots alone. See European Medicines
Agency, "Questions and answers on the review of Pandemrix Influenza vaccine (H1N1) (split virion, inactivated,
adjuvanted) A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)v like strain (X-179A)", July 27, 2011, 2,
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/medicines/human/publichealthalerts/2011/07/human_
phadetail_000034.jsp&murl=menus/medicines/medicines.jsp&mid=WCObOlacO58 00 1d1 26#, (accessed July 29,
2011); World Health Organization, "Statement on narcolepsy and vaccination", April 21, 2011,
http://www.who.int/vaccinesafety/topics/influenza/pandemic/hin1_safetyassessing/narcolepsy-statement/en
/index.html, (accessed July 29, 2011).
107 Simonsen et al., "Impact of Influenza Vaccination on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population."
108 Cohen, "INFLUENZA: Study Questions the Benefits of Vaccinating the Elderly."
109 Lone Simonsen, Cecile Viboud, and Robert Taylor, "Influenza vaccination in elderly people," Lancet 366, no.
9503 (December 17, 2005): 2086.
110 Pandemrix is an adjuvanted influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline.
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... that the epidemiological studies relating to Pandemrix in Finland and Sweden were
well designed and show an association between Pandemrix vaccination and narcolepsy
in children and adolescents in those countries. The results indicate a six to 13-fold
increased risk of narcolepsy in vaccinated as compared with unvaccinated children and
adolescents, corresponding to about three to seven additional cases in every 100,000
vaccinated subjects.m'
Despite this, EMA investigators stopped short of blaming the manufacturer or the vaccine, and "noted
that the vaccine is likely to have interacted with genetic or environmental factors which might raise the
risk of narcolepsy, and that other factors may have contributed to the results."112
Nonetheless, the safety issues stand in contrast to US agencies' assurances that the many decades of
successful use of influenza vaccine in the general population ensures that the process is safe. In a video
"How Safe are Flu Vaccines?" posted to the HHS'sflu.gov website, Director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases Anthony Fauci states: "the track record for serious adverse events is very
good. It's very, very, very rare that you ever see anything that's associated with the vaccine that's a
serious event." 13 In the words of Australian epidemiologist Heath Kelly, who calculated that the now
suspended seasonal influenza vaccine there might have caused 2-3 hospital admissions for every
hospital admission prevented, "a good past benefit-risk profile for a vaccine may not guarantee a
favourable profile in future years."11 4
Why do major errors go uncorrected?
For more than two decades, national US guidelines have consistently stated that influenza vaccines are
the "most effective" means for reducing the impact of influenza." 5 For agencies like CDC which clearly
advocate the need to base policy on good scientific evidence-current guidelines contain a bibliography
with over 500 entries-how do officials reach such certainty about matters they deem major public
health problems?
In its visit to Geneva, the Council of Europe posed a question to WHO (which likewise claims influenza
vaccine as the "best protection"116) that offers some insight: "Has WHO done any head-to-head studies
European Medicines Agency, "Questions and answers on the review of Pandemrix Influenza vaccine (HINI)
(split virion, inactivated, adjuvanted) A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)v like strain (X-179A)."
m The WHO has also speculated about the role of "still unknown, genetic and/or environmental factors." See
World Health Organization, "Statement on narcolepsy and vaccination."
How Safe is the Flu Vaccine?, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TE4cNqcBCEQ, (accessed May 8, 2010).
14 Heath Kelly et al., "Quantifying benefits and risks of vaccinating Australian children aged six months to four
years with trivalent inactivated seasonal influenza vaccine in 2010," Euro Surveillance 15, no. 37 (September 16,
2010), http://www.ncbi.nIm.nih.gov/pubmed/20929647, (accessed July 29, 2011).
115 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Prevention and control of influenza: Part I, Vaccines.
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and
Reports 42, no. 6 (May 14, 1993): 2; Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," 9-10.
1 World Health Organization, "What is post-pandemic?", August 10, 2010,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequentlyaskedquestions/postpandemic/en/index.html, (accessed
July 25, 2011).
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to compare behavioural interventions such as hand washing versus vaccines?"' 17 Such studies would
provide evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of hand washing versus influenza vaccines, and in
a world of limited resources, ideally help guide public health decision makers prioritize their efforts.
However, in a written response, WHO explained that it had not carried out any such studies. The agency
downplayed the idea that there was even a need for such research, arguing that behavioral
interventions and vaccines "are complementary rather than competitive options."1 18
* * *
In this chapter, I have tried to explore the question of why public health officials can endorse and
perpetuate problematic science-why the bad news tends to get emphasized when it comes to the
threat of influenza and its pandemics, and the good news tends to get emphasized when it comes to the
potential of vaccines. And why questions such as "is all 'flu' influenza?" "How well does the vaccine
really work?" and "Is public money best spent on vaccines-or something else?" do not get sufficient
attention. Admittedly, "why" questions are inherently difficult to answer. They are often inseparable
from questions of motivation, for which answers typically suffer from lack of empirical validation. Given
these limitations, my argument of viral essentialism and the logic of VPDs is an unavoidably speculative
answer to these questions, but one that I believe reveals important elements of the social, political, and
linguistic factors which foster false assumptions. Characterizing influenza as a VPD helps render invisible
many key analytical questions that could potentially identify red flags in current science and policy.
To be sure, the role of industry remains important. Conflicts of interest are a powerful explanatory
mechanism for understanding mismatches between evidence and policy, policies not in the public's best
interest, and policies that show evidence of corporate bias. In the field of influenza, investigations over
the last year have shown that numerous experts have ties to industry.119 But conflict of interest appears
insufficient to understand the dynamics of influenza policy in light of the substantial degree of
agreement between experts with and without financial relationships with industry. Even if the
government took over vaccine manufacturing and private industry had no stakes in influenza policy,
approaches to managing influenza would likely remain focused on vaccines and pharmacological
measures because they support most public health practitioners' preconceived notions of vaccination as
the best response to epidemic disease. This, I argue, is the power of virus-centric thinking, the logic of
"vaccine preventable diseases." Unlike disease mongering, in which Big Pharma spends enormous
amounts of resources convincing the public, doctors, and decision makers about the value of a new
medication, VPDs have a logic of their own that is well established in biomedicine and requires little
117 Council of Europe, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed," 24.
118 ibid.
119 Cohen and Carter, "WHO and the pandemic flu 'conspiracies'; Epstein, "Flu Warning"; Fiona Macrae and
Sophie Borland, "Swine flu taskforce's links to vaccine giant: More than half the experts fighting the 'pandemic'
have ties to drug firms I Mail Online", January 14, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1243034/Swine-
flu-taskforces-links-vaccine-giant-More-half-experts-fighting-pandemic-ties-drug-firms.html, (accessed March 28,
2010); CBC News, "CBC Tamiflu probe sparks drug policy review", May 24, 2011,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/05/22/tamiflu-documentary-conflict.html, (accessed July 29, 2011);
"The ghost of the pandemic [11 fantasma della pandemia]," Falo, February 7, 2010,
http://lal.rsi.ch/_dossiers/player.cfm?uuid=18d78f7c-c2a8-4422-acd0-17f9d56clfOa.
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persuasion. So long as biomedical thinking approaches epidemic diseases in a simplistic "one disease -
one cause - one drug" manner, the problem will be framed as a "vaccine preventable disease," in which
a vaccine will be understood as the obvious answer.
[ENDS]
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Table 5.1. CDC ACIP statements concerning physical interventions to interrupt influenza, 2005 to 2010
Year Guidance Number of ACIP statement on non-pharmaceutical interventions
document references
word count
2005-
2006
2007
20,428;
20,191
26,172
2008- 30,285;
2009 26,912
2010 33,360
120 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2007," 8.
121 Anthony E Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of seasonal influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2009," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 58, no. 8
(July 31, 2009): 7; Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008," 8.
349; 375 Hand hygiene, masks, school closures not mentioned in
guidelines.
473 Nonpharmacologic interventions (e.g., advising frequent
handwashing and improved respiratory hygiene) are reasonable
and inexpensive; these strategies have been demonstrated to
reduce respiratory diseases (86) but have not been studied
adequately to determine if they reduce transmission of influenza
virus. Similarly, few data are available to assess the effects of
community-level respiratory disease mitigation strategies (e.g.,
closing schools, avoiding mass gatherings, or using masks) on
reducing influenza virus transmission during typical seasonal
influenza epidemics (87,88)."'
502; 455 Nonpharmacologic interventions (e.g., advising frequent
handwashing and improved respiratory hygiene) are reasonable
and inexpensive; these strategies have been demonstrated to
reduce respiratory diseases; reductions in detectable influenza A
viruses on hands after handwashing also have been
demonstrated (76-78). Few data are available to assess the
effects of community-level respiratory disease mitigation
strategies (e.g., closing schools, avoiding mass gatherings, or
using respiratory protection) on reducing influenza virus
transmission during typical seasonal influenza epidemics
('79,180).m2
552 Reductions in detectable influenza A viruses on hands after
handwashing have been demonstrated, and handwashing has
been demonstrated to reduce the overall incidence of
respiratory diseases (122-124). Nonpharmacologic interventions
(e.g., frequent handwashing and improved respiratory hygiene)
are reasonable and inexpensive. However, the impact of hygiene
interventions such as handwashing on influenza virus
transmission is not well understood, and hygiene measures
should not be advocated as a replacement or alternative to
specific prevention measures such as vaccination. Few data are
available to assess the effects of community-level respiratory
disease mitigation strategies (e.g., closing schools, avoiding mass
gatherings, or using respiratory protection) on reducing
influenza virus transmission during typical seasonal influenza
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epidemics (125-127). An interventional trial among university
students indicated that students living in dormitories who were
asked to use surgical face masks, given an alcohol-based hand
sanitizer, and provided with education about mask use and hand
hygiene during influenza season had substantially lower rates of
ILI compared with students in dormitories for whom no
intervention was recommended. However, neither face mask
nor hand sanitizer use alone was associated with statistically
significant reduction in ILI (128). During the 2009 pandemic, one
study indicated that having members of households in which an
influenza case was identified discuss ways to avoid transmission
was associated with a significant reduction in the frequency of
additional cases after one household member became ill,
suggesting that education measures might be an effective way
to reduce secondary transmission (129). Limited data suggest
that transmission of seasonal influenza or ILI among household
members can be reduced if household contacts use a surgical
face mask or implement hand washing early in the course of an
ill index case patient's illness (130,131). However, these
interventions might supplement use of vaccine as a means to
reduce influenza transmission or provide some protection when
vaccine is not available (130-132).
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Table 5.2. Historical development of vaccines122
Disease
Cholera
Diphtheria
influenza
Measles
Mumps
Pertussis
Plague
Polio
Rabies
Rubella
Smallpox
Tetanus
Tuberculosis
Typhoid
Yellow fever
Note: sources of error in the tat include the imprecision associated
inventions which usually do not occur at a single point in time, but as
with many discoveries and
a process over time. 23 The dates
should therefore be treated as approximate.
122 Sources referenced include: Plotkin and Plotkin, "A short history of vaccination," 3; Kenrad E. Nelson and
Carolyn F. Masters Williams, "Early history of infectious disease: epidemiology and control of infectious diseases,"
in Infectious disease epidemiology: theory and practice (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2007), 11; Washer, Emerging
Infectious Diseases and Society, 35; C Kemper and J P Atkinson, "Measles virus and CD46," Current Topics in
Microbiology and Immunology 329 (2009): 31-57; Military Vaccine (MILVAX) Agency, "Mumps", 2011,
http://www.vaccines.mil/default.aspx?cnt=disease/minidv&dlD=37, (accessed July 29, 2011); U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, ed. William
Atkinson, Charles Wolfe, and Jennifer Hamborsky, 12th ed. (Public Health Foundation, 2011). Pink book page 205;
123 For a critique of the process of "discovery," see Theodore Arabatzis, Representing Electrons: A Biographical
Approach to Theoretical Entities (University Of Chicago Press, 2005).
Year etiology determined
1883
1884
1933
1954
1934-
1906
1894
1908
1938
1884
1882
1884
1927
Year vaccine developed
1896
1923
1936
1961
1948
1926
1897
1952
1885
1965
1796
1927
1927
1896
1935
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Figure 5.1. Presentation slides indicating that influenza is the leading "vaccine preventable disease" (VPD). The slide above
was presented by Alison McGeer in 2010.2 The nearly identical slide below was presented by Kristin Nichol to the National
influenza Vaccine Summit in 2004.25
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YMWR 20: 4S (RR-5j3); I hNnpezn e XaMA 2003; 289. 1?9;
%kin DR, et al. Am 4 (bbc Health 2000;1: 9 23-9.
14 Allison McGeer, "Clinical Influenza - Three Challenges" (presented at the Influenza as a Global Concern: Where
Do We Go From Here? A symposium in honor of Professor Arnold Monto, University of Michigan, November 12,
2010), 3, http://inst-tech.engin.umich.edu/leccap/view/closphinf-anygwnn42/10434, (accessed June 21, 2011).
us Kristin L. Nichol, "Universal Influenza Vaccination: Issues for Conisderation", April 2004, 12, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/36/2004_flu_nichol.pdf, (accessed June 21, 2011).
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Chapter 6 Implications for Policy
By the middle of the year 2011, influenza policy has come to be discussed in two considerably divergent
frames. One framing, promoted by officials and by far the dominant perspective, suggests that nearly
eighty years after the discovery of influenza virus, influenza remains a major threat, in large part due to
the virus's propensity to keep mutating. Influenza is a serious disease, and illness and deaths from it are
especially tragic because it is not just any disease, but a vaccine-preventable disease. Luckily, a science
driven policy based on influenza vaccines-the best way to prevent influenza-has however shown
great signs of progress in controlling the disease: more people are recommended to get vaccinated than
ever, and more do. While notable gaps in coverage still exist, such as the low proportion of healthcare
workers receiving the vaccine, stronger recommendations-and in an increasing number of cases,
mandates-promise to fill these gaps in the near future. Pandemic policy and planning has also
succeeded. The long predicted influenza pandemic arrived in 2009, and with some caveats about room
for improvement, health authorities have declared their response an overall model of success,1 saving
over a thousand lives in the United States2 alone. This optimistic assessment suggests that the billions
spent on influenza control are worth the cost.
The second framing, which I have forwarded in this dissertation, does not present a parallel or
alternative way of seeing influenza so much as it is a sustained critique of policy, in which the validity of
most scientific aspects of the official policy are questioned. These critiques first came to major public
attention in 2009 with the emergence of novel H1N1 influenza virus, when health authorities mounted
massive campaigns to fight a virus of ordinary and non-spectacular severity. Almost all the predictions
about what was to occur in the next influenza pandemic were wrong, as H1N1 began and remained far
milder than even the most optimistic, "best case" scenarios had envisioned. Compounding these
discrepancies between expectation and reality were the voices of many in public health which
vigorously defended its decisions. Suspicions only ran deeper after investigations, particularly in Europe,
revealed that numerous pandemic influenza policy advisors were also being paid by pharmaceutical
companies.
I have argued that the problems in influenza policy run far deeper than a poor ability to predict the
future. The entire public health effort has been based on flawed and internally inconsistent risk
assessment, coupled with improbable, overly-optimistic expectations about the benefit of the vaccine-
problems that were all documented well before the emergence of H1N1 in 2009. Rather than
understanding influenza as a serious disease (which it is in the minority of cases), influenza should be
seen for what it is in the vast majority of cases: an unpleasant, but self-limiting disease from which
people recover on their own without intervention. Even when it does kill, the degree to which it is a
killer is unclear because credible risk assessment does not exist. Moreover, current influenza policies
1D. J. Sencer, "Perspective: Swine-Origin Influenza: 1976 and 2009," Clinical Infectious Diseases 52, no. 1
(December 2010): S4-S7; Schuchat, Bell, and Redd, "The science behind preparing and responding to pandemic
influenza."
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Ten great public health achievements --- United States, 2001--
2010," MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 60, no. 19 (May 20, 2011): 619-623.
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are narrowly focused on the wrong problem-infections caused by influenza A and B viruses-rather
than influenza-like illness (ILI), the set of symptoms that officials, doctors, and the public alike label "flu,"
caused by a variety of agents such as coronaviruses, rhinoviruses, adenoviruses, and respiratory
syncytial virus. And if influenza is indeed only a minority cause of ILI-perhaps around 10% of ILI as one
large analysis showed3-the public is being misled when it is told that the influenza vaccine prevents flu
"most of the time." Even for true influenza, evidence suggests that the potential benefits have been
overstated. Pandemic planning efforts have likewise been misdirected, based almost entirely on worst
case scenarios, with massive investments into drugs and vaccines of questionable effectiveness.4
Although financial conflicts of interest are an important element of understanding how all this came to
happen, I argue that it cannot be the whole story because the public health effort is enormous, involving
a great many practitioners who do not have financial relationships with industry. Understanding how
these individuals do not detect serious problems in the policy they deploy, I believe, requires
understanding something about the ethos of public health and the persuasiveness of viral essentialism.
My argument is that for the simple reason that influenza vaccine exists, influenza becomes seen as a
"vaccine preventable disease," and policies targeting the disease become, in their essential features,
uncontroversial and simple: vaccinate. It is only as a "vaccine preventable disease" that influenza cases
and deaths become "tragic" and "needless" because it is assumed that all suffering is unnecessary and
avoidable through vaccination. But, as Chapter 4 showed, these assumptions are inaccurate. The
relationship between disease, virus, and vaccine is not as tight as many expect. Not all flu is influenza,
and the vaccine does not always prevent the disease. Perhaps the most problematic of all is that the
goal of reducing the number of elderly who die from influenza-long the implicit (and sometimes
explicit) goal of influenza vaccination policy 5-has been a complete failure, with no evidence the vaccine
3 Jefferson, "Mistaken identity: seasonal influenza versus influenza-like illness."
4 Peter Doshi, "Neuraminidase inhibitors--the story behind the Cochrane review," BMJ 339, no. dec07_2
(December 8, 2009): b5164; Luc Bonneux and Wim Van Damme, "Health is more than influenza," Bulletin of the
World Health Organization 89, no. 7 (July 1, 2011): 539-540.
5 There are few instances of unambiguous statements of objectives of influenza vaccination policy. However, since
annual influenza vaccination policies were instituted in 1960, the disproportionate burden influenza places on the
elderly has always been stressed as a key rationale for the policy. In 1964, CDC influenza branch Chief Alexander
Langmuir and colleagues wrote that the original 1960 recommendation for annual vaccination "was based on
three broad assumptions: 1. That excess mortality was the most important consequence of epidemic influenza. 2.
That polyvalent virus vaccines had been at least partially effective in preventing clinical illness during most
epidemics and therefore presumably would reduce the risk of death among the aged and chronically ill. 3. That
epidemics cannot be predicted with sufficient accuracy to permit confident planning of control measures on a year
to year basis." (Langmuir, Henderson, and Serfling, "The Epidemiological Basis for the Control of Influenza.")
Twenty years later, ACIP recommendations stated: "Because of the increasing proportion of elderly persons in the
United States and because age and its associated chronic diseases are risk factors for severe influenza illness, the
future toll from influenza may increase, unless control measures are used more vigorously than in the past. ... For
about 20 years, efforts to reduce the impact of influenza in the United States have been aimed primarily at
immunoprophylaxis (vaccination] of persons at greatest risk of serious illness or death." (U.S. Centers for Disease
Control, "Recommendation of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP) Prevention and Control of
Influenza.") Today, the recommendation-aimed at the entire population-state: "Annual influenza vaccination is
the most effective method for preventing influenza virus infection and its complications." (Fiore et al., "Prevention
and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP), 2010.")
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has saved lives.6 But none of this has caused any rethinking of policy because for many, the problems
are difficult to reconcile with the assumptions of a "vaccine preventable disease."
This final chapter attempts to move from diagnosis to prescription, offering thoughts on what kind of
changes might help improve influenza policy making, strengthen the scientific evidence base that
informs it, and ultimately result in better health outcomes for the public that pays for it all.
Planned Adaptation
It might be best to begin by taking a step back. The notion that policies are not in line with the latest,
most comprehensive reviews of the scientific evidence base are by no means limited to the case of
influenza. Rather than the exception, in situations where policy decisions are made on uncertain or
changing evidence, it is common. When regulators create rules governing environmental risks-air or
water safety standards, for example-data may be incomplete, uncertain, and subject to change. Some
risks, in particular, may interact with each other, such that the degree to which each is a hazard depends
on another, and may vary in ways that are unpredictable at the time regulation is passed. Decision
making under uncertainty in these situations is less a shortcoming of science policy than it is a
predictable inevitability. Sound policy, some analysts have argued, does not result from getting it right
up front, so much as it is about a commitment to reviewing and revising existing policies over time as
new or improved scientific information is generated, priorities, sensitivities, and situations change, and
new technology emerges.
In 1994, legal scholar Daniel Farber put forward, with reference to environmental regulation, a vision of
a new kind of policy:
Rather than viewing policy making as a one-shot exercise, in which the goal is to adopt
the optimum solution, we might do better to think of a continuous process of learning
and experimentation. "What is the optimum decision today?" may be less important
6 See Simonsen et al., "Impact of Influenza Vaccination on Seasonal Mortality in the US Elderly Population";
Jackson et al., "Evidence of bias in estimates of influenza vaccine effectiveness in seniors"; Jackson et al.,
"Functional status is a confounder of the association of influenza vaccine and risk of all cause mortality in seniors";
Jefferson et al., "Vaccines for preventing influenza in the elderly"; Eurich et al., "Mortality Reduction with Influenza
Vaccine in Patients with Pneumonia Outside 'Flu' Season." For a more detailed discussion of these papers, see
Chapter 4.
Daniel A Farber, "Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience," Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 27 (1994
1993): 791; Lawrence E. McCray, Kenneth A. Oye, and Arthur C. Petersen, "Planned adaptation in risk regulation:
An initial survey of US environmental, health, and safety regulation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change
77, no. 6 (July 2010): 951-959; Arthur Petersen et al., "Anticipation and Adaptation in Particulate Matter Policy:
The European Union, the Netherlands, and United States" (presented at the Trans-Atlantic Uncertainty
Colloquium, Washington, D.C., 2006),
http://www.modeling.uga.edu/tauc/background_material/Anticipation%20and%2OAdaptationPM%20Policies_E
U&US.pdf, (accessed June 16, 2011); James Lloyd Foster, "The Dead Hand of Environmental Regulation",
September 1999, http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/16 79, (accessed June 21, 2011); W Walker, "Adaptive
policies, policy analysis, and policy-making," European Journal of Operational Research 128, no. 2 (January 2001):
282-289.
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than "What is the best strategy for developing and responding to new information
about the problem?" 8
More recently, Lawrence McCray and Kenneth Oye asked "whether practical means can be devised to
keep policy yoked to an evolving knowledge base, once decisions are put on the books."9 In their
judgment, implementing these "practical means" is the essential feature of what they call "Planned
Adaptation." The drawbacks to not employing Planned Adaptation can be enormous. Dutch and
American analysts of science policy have similarly argued for the need for adaptive policies, and warned
when "adaptation does not occur, policies remain designed around initial, unavoidably incorrect,
anticipation of outcomes. This can carry high social costs, either in the form of excessive cost burdens ...
or in the form of forgone health benefits...."10
For a variety of reasons, infectious disease control policies would seem to have much to gain from
Planned Adaptation. Today's measures to reduce burden of disease may over time become unnecessary
if they are so successful as to eradicate the disease, as in the case of smallpox, and policy would need to
change. Even in cases where complete eradication of an infectious disease is not possible, measures
that begin aggressive in order to address a disease epidemic throughout society may need to be scaled
back once the disease has been reduced to endemic levels. Conversely, vaccination efforts may need to
be intensified against a disease for which a new technology has enabled the manufacture of a far
cheaper and safer vaccine, changing the cost-effectiveness of a vaccination program.
McCray and Oye suggest that there are two essential elements required to operationalize genuine
Planned Adaptation in policy: first, a prior commitment to periodic "de novo re-evaluation"; second, a
systematic effort to incorporate new factual information into those re-evaluations. Both seasonal
influenza policy and pandemic influenza policy have many of the markings of policies with a firm
commitment to Planned Adaptation.
Seasonal influenza policy
Following a decade which saw the development of new vaccines, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) was established by order of the Surgeon General in 1964 to advise the
federal government on the control of diseases for which a vaccine is licensed for use in the civilian
population. The birth of ACIP marked the beginning of a formal national vaccine policy in the United
States," and in 1972, it became a Federal Advisory Committee under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA).1 Although ACIP formally only makes "recommendations," which do not carry legal
mandate, these recommendations carry enormous weight as "they are generally regarded as national
8 Farber, "Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience," 791.
9 McCray, Oye, and Petersen, "Planned adaptation in risk regulation," 952.
10 Petersen et al., "Anticipation and Adaptation in Particulate Matter Policy," 6-7.
" Jean Clare Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP)," Vaccine 28 (April 2010): A68-A75.
1 Hajime Kamiya and Nobuhiko Okabe, "Leadership in Immunization: The relevance to Japan of the U.S.A.
experience of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP)," Vaccine 27, no. 11 (March 10, 2009): 1724-8.
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policy and are respected and adopted by most private insurers."13 ACIP recommendations furthermore
trigger large government and private programs aimed to raise vaccination rates of targeted populations,
such as the Vaccines for Children Program.' Although the Director of CDC, who is delegated to adopt
vaccine policy on behalf of HHS, may revise or reject ACIP recommendations, "in practice, due to the
lengthy process of data presentation and review that typically goes on overall several months and years
before an ACIP vote is ever taken, virtually all ACIP recommendations are adopted by CDC/HHS." There
has only been one exception in ACIP's history where its recommendations were overridden (on smallpox
vaccine).15
Subjecting existing policy to constant review and update, ACIP holds regular meetings three times a
year, and additional meetings as circumstances dictate. In accordance with FACA, meetings of the ACIP
must be announced at least 15 days in advance, and the public may register and attend almost all
meetings,16 where some time is allotted for public comment. Meeting minutes and presentations are
made available within 90 days of the meeting on the CDC's website.'7 The Committee's commitment to
Planned Adaptation seems enshrined in its Charter, which states: "The committee may alter or withdraw
their recommendation(s) regarding a particular vaccine as new information becomes available or the
risk of disease changes." 8 Recently, the ACIP Secretariat has even launched an initiative to ensure that
every ACIP recommendation is reviewed every 3-5 years, and "revised, renewed, or retired as
needed."' 9 Such corrections have already occurred, as in the case of rotavirus vaccine policy. Originally
licensed and recommended for use in 1998, concerns soon arose that the vaccine was triggering
20intussusception of the intestine, and in 1999 ACIP withdrew its recommendation. (Following the
development of a new vaccine, recommendations for rotavirus vaccine were reinstated in 2006.)
Examples like these provide evidence that US vaccine policy is built around a model that allows for self-
correction.
In addition, ACIP recommendations are aimed to be based on the highest quality scientific evidence. As
the CDC explains:
13 Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
A71.
14 Alexandra Stewart, "Childhood vaccine and school entry laws: the case of HPV vaccine," Public Health Reports
123, no. 6 (December 2008): 801-803.
is Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
A73.
1 Larry K Pickering and Walter A Orenstein, "Development of pediatric vaccine recommendations and policies,"
Seminars in Pediatric Infectious Diseases 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 148-154.
1 Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
A70.
1 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "ACIP Charter", April 2010, 2,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downIoads/charter.pdf.
1 Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
A71.
2 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Withdrawal of rotavirus vaccine recommendation," MMWR.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48, no. 43 (November 5, 1999): 1007.
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To formulate policy recommendations, the ACIP reviews data on morbidity and
mortality associated with the disease in the general US population and in specific risk
groups along with available scientific literature (both published and unpublished) on the
safety, efficacy, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and acceptability of the immunizing
agent, with consideration of the relevant quality and quantity of data."
The ACIP Influenza Work Group, one of ACIP's four permanent working groups, holds meetings every 2-4
weeks throughout the year, and considers a range of issues including disease risk data, vaccine safety
and effectiveness, current vaccine coverage levels, cost-effectiveness, and vaccine supply levels. In its
annual influenza vaccine recommendations, the Influenza Work Group explains its methodology:
Published, peer-reviewed studies are the primary source of data used by ACIP in making
recommendations for the prevention and control of influenza, but unpublished data
that are relevant to issues under discussion also are considered. Among studies
discussed or cited, those of greatest scientific quality and those that measure influenza-
specific outcomes are the most influential.22
Another way ACIP tries to ensure its recommendations are consistent with evidence is to keep vested
interests out of decision making, something especially important given the financial implications that
recommendations can have on the private and public sectors. Individuals nominated for membership in
ACIP undergo screening for potential conflicts of interest before name are submitted for final
consideration.23 "If potential members have certain conflicts, they have a choice: they can either
relinquish those conflicts, or they can be nominated to serve on ACIP," Dr. Larry Pickering, executive
secretary of ACIP, explained to me in 2010, but acknowledged that there are certain financial
relationships in which members may be involved for which they can receive a waiver. Pickering
however assured me that ACIP was composed of "very high quality people who are critical thinkers" in
scrutinizing the scientific evidence they review.
While ACIP appears to be an exemplary model of Planned Adaptation, I have argued in this dissertation
that policy is misconceived, lacking a proper assessment of risk and evaluation of therapeutics like
vaccines. While aspects of Planned Adaptation are evident in official statements and positions of ACIP,
McCray and Oye suggest that a rulemaking agency's efforts to advance the production of new
knowledge are as important as an agency's commitment to analyze new information. On this count,
ACIP's efforts have been minimal. The influenza guidelines do not treat CDC's estimates of mortality and
hospitalization attributable to influenza as one estimate among competing estimates, nor even as an
estimate, but as a fact. ("Influenza epidemics were associated with estimated annual averages of
21 Smith, "The structure, role, and procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
A72.
2 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," 3.
2 Jean C Smith, Dixie E Snider, and Larry K Pickering, "Immunization policy development in the United States: the
role of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices," Annals of Internal Medicine 150, no. 1 (January 6,
2009): 46.
2 Larry Pickering, interview by Peter Doshi, July 28, 2010.
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approximately 36,000 deaths during 1990-1999 and approximately 226,000 hospitalizations during
1979-2001."25) Furthermore, despite ACIP's awareness that randomized controlled trial evidence is
lacking regarding the vaccine's ability reduce deaths among the elderly, ACIP states that the creation of
such "best evidence" would be unethical. "[Riandomized controlled trials cannot be performed ethically
in populations for which vaccination already is recommended,"2 6 ACIP wrote, suggesting that it will
instead rely on observational cohort studies2 which support its current recommendations but have
been shown to suffer from overwhelming bias. 28
There are other reasons why influenza control policies are problematic. First, even the best policies in
which Planned Adaptation is well implemented do not guarantee that policies will be error-free, even
after many years and revisions. Although pharmaceuticals are approved as "safe and effective" by the
Food and Drug Administration, there is widespread recognition by professionals and the public alike that
most medications carry a host of potential side effects. Although few may realize the magnitude of the
harms from drugs,29 the point is that expert systems such as clinical trials and drug regulation do not
guarantee the absence of error.
Second, peer-review is far from perfect. Despite the fact that influenza control recommendations refer
to hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific articles, the inference that guidelines referring to peer-reviewed
articles must be robust and evidence based is questionable. While the practice of peer review far
predates the entrance of industry into science, modern conceptions of peer review have maintained it
as a robust mechanism for scientists to self-regulate and produce the highest quality knowledge.3 0 It
was the "professional standards of science," some argued, which generated and coordinated an
environment in which scientists could exercise their authority over each other in a form of self-rule."
But beginning principally in the 1980s, serious skepticism emerged over the ability of peer-review and
other mechanisms of self-regulation to remedy error in science. The notion of fraud in science gained
widespread awareness with high profile cases such as that of Margaret O'Toole, Thereza Imanishi-Kari,
and Nobel laureate David Baltimore, which involved Secret Service investigations and congressional
hearings, helping reframe science as an enterprise gone corrupt, with its actors driven by greed, vanity,
2s Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010," 2.
26 Ibid., 3.
27 J Nordin et al., "Influenza vaccine effectiveness in preventing hospitalizations and deaths in persons 65 years or
older in Minnesota, New York, and Oregon: data from 3 health plans," The Journal of Infectious Diseases 184, no. 6
(September 15, 2001): 665-670; Kristin L. Nichol et al., "Effectiveness of influenza vaccine in the community-
dwelling elderly," The New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 14 (October 4, 2007): 1373-1381; J P Mullooly et
al., "Influenza vaccination programs for elderly persons: cost-effectiveness in a health maintenance organization,"
Annals of Internal Medicine 121, no. 12 (December 15, 1994): 947-952.
2 Simonsen et al., "Influenza vaccination and mortality benefits"; Jackson et al., "Evidence of bias in estimates of
influenza vaccine effectiveness in seniors"; Jefferson et al., "Vaccines for preventing influenza in the elderly"; Lone
Simonsen, Cecile Viboud, and Robert J Taylor, "Effectiveness of influenza vaccination," The New England Journal of
Medicine 357, no. 26 (December 27, 2007): 2729-2730; author reply 2730-2731.
29 Starfield, "Is US health really the best in the world?".
30 Sheila Jasanoff, "Technologies of humility: citizen participation in governing science," Minerva 41, no. 3 (2003):
223-244.
31 Michael Polanyi, "The republic of science: its political and economic theory," Minerva 1 (1962): 54-73.
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jealousy, and careerism.32 However, as other ways of valuing knowledge claims in science are still
largely lacking, skepticism over the objectivity of science at large has done relatively little to change the
hierarchy of knowledge within medical science, and results published in peer-reviewed journals remain
to be seen as the most credible and trustworthy source of information.
Nevertheless, an additional reason to question the validity of peer-review has come through analysis of
the ways in which peer-review can and has been used as a mechanism for suppressing dissent. Brian
Martin and Gordon Moran have both documented the difficulties that scholars and other scientists with
unpopular theories have had in getting their articles published in refereed journals. 33 In the field of
influenza, Lisa Jackson had originally tried to publish her findings-overturning the long-assumed
benefits of influenza vaccine to reduce the risk of death in the elderly-in the prestigious Journal of the
American Medical Association. One peer-reviewer for JAMA however wrote that "to accept these
[Jackson's] results would be to say that the earth is flat!"34 JAMA rejected the paper, and Jackson
ultimately published her paper in the less prestigious and more specialized but peer-reviewed journal
International Journal of Epidemiology.5
Conversely, just as the system of peer-review can function in such a way as to keep important research
from gaining prominence, it can give problematic, faulty, or even fraudulent research a veneer of
certitude and respectability. Such was the case in two blockbuster COX-2 inhibitor anti-arthritis drugs,
Vioxx (manufactured by Merck) and Celebrex (manufactured by Pfizer). The two key clinical trials of
these drugs were the "VIGOR" and "CLASS" studies, respectively, both carried out by the drugs'
manufacturers. In these studies, neither Vioxx nor Celebrex provided any better relief of arthritis
symptoms or pain than over-the-counter nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) which cost one
seventh to one twentieth of the price of the new drugs.3 ' The new drugs also showed little to no safety
advantage over cheaper and older medications. Those taking Vioxx, in fact, had significantly more
serious complications. All of these data were shared with the Food and Drug Administration. Despite
this, the drugs were not only approved, but went on to become blockbusters, with around $20 billion in
sales. How this happened, John Abramson and Barbara Starfield argue, "lies in the process by which raw
data becomes medical 'knowledge'-through publication in respected medical journals and
incorporation into clinical practice guidelines." They explain:
3 Lang, Challenges; Daniel Kevles, The Baltimore case: a trial of politics, science, and character (New York; London:
W. W. Norton, 2000); Jasanoff, "Technologies of humility"; Robert Bell, Impure Science: Fraud, Compromise and
Political Influence in Scientific Research (Wiley, 1992); William J. Broad and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the truth
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
33 Brian Martin, Suppression Stories (Wollongong: Fund for Intellectual Dissent, 1997); Gordon Moran, Silencing
Scientists and Scholars in Other Fields: Power, Paradigm Controls, Peer Review, and Scholarly Communication,
Contemporary studies in information management, policy, and services (Greenwich, Ct: Ablex Publishing, 1998).
34 Brownlee and Lenzer, "Does the Vaccine Matter?".
3s Jackson et al., "Evidence of bias in estimates of influenza vaccine effectiveness in seniors."
3 John Abramson and Barbara Starfield, "The effect of conflict of interest on biomedical research and clinical
practice guidelines: can we trust the evidence in evidence-based medicine?," The Journal of the American Board of
Family Practice 18, no. 5 (October 2005): 415.
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The JAMA published the results of the CLASS study in September of 2000. The article
concluded that Celebrex "when used for 6 months ... is associated with a lower
incidence" of GI complications. But CLASS was a 12-month study, and all 12 months had
been completed at the time the manuscript reporting the results of only the first half of
the study was submitted to JAMA. In the unreported second 6 months of the study, all
but one of the 7 serious GI complications occurred in people taking Celebrex, not older
NSAIDs. All 16 of the authors of this article had financial ties to or were employed by the
manufacturer of Celebrex.
When the editor of JAMA learned that data from only the first half of the study had
been included in the article, she told the Washington Post, "I am disheartened to hear
that they had those data at the time that they submitted [the manuscript] to us... We
are functioning on a level of trust that was, perhaps, broken." Reprints of this article
distributed by drug reps for marketing purposes were stamped with a disclaimer stating
that it contains "Comparative results that are not supported by substantial clinical
evidence" (presumedly based on the FDA's rejection of the manufacturer's analysis of
the data from only the first half of the study). Nonetheless, the article was never
retracted by the journal.
The NEJM published the results of the VIGOR study in November of 2000. This article
concluded that Vioxx causes fewer serious GI complications than naproxen [a generic
NSAID] and left even diligent readers with the impression that for most patients, Vioxx is
safer than naproxen. Although the NEJM article reported that patients taking Vioxx who
had a previous history of cardiovascular disease were at greater risk of suffering a
myocardial infarction, it failed to report that patients who took Vioxx developed
significantly more serious thrombotic cardiovascular complications in toto (the
prespecified cardiovascular outcome, not myocardial infarction alone) whether or not
they had a previous history of cardiovascular problems. The article also failed to report
that patients who took Vioxx developed overall significantly more serious illnesses than
those who took naproxen. All 13 of the authors of this article had financial ties to or
were employed by Merck. (The NEJM article did report that those who took Vioxx were
more likely to suffer myocardial infarction but that this risk was not statistically
significant in those without a previous history of cardiovascular disease.)37
Far from providing the highest quality of scientific information, in the case of Vioxx and Celebrex, the
publication of research in peer-reviewed medical journals38 helped buttress inaccurate understandings
3 Ibid.
38 Claire Bombardier et al., "Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients
with Rheumatoid Arthritis," New England Journal of Medicine 343, no. 21 (2000): 1520-1528; F E Silverstein et al.,
"Gastrointestinal toxicity with celecoxib vs nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs for osteoarthritis and rheumatoid
arthritis: the CLASS study: A randomized controlled trial. Celecoxib Long-term Arthritis Safety Study," Journal of the
American Medical Association 284, no. 10 (September 13, 2000): 1247-1255.
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of the benefits and harms of certain drugs, and swayed clinical practice in ways that were largely to the
detriment of patient care.
The Vioxx and Celebrex cases also highlight another element of modern medical research: the role of
industry. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, biomedical research has become increasingly
funded by the pharmaceutical industry, and influenza science is no exception. Sheldon Krimsky argues
that it is not only public confidence in science which has eroded as a result. The ethical norm of
disinterestedness (one of the four key institutional imperatives identified by sociologist Robert Merton
as necessary for science to operate in its most enlightened forms39) is altered by the influx of corporate
money into academic science, and introduces bias. While scientific knowledge may eventually converge
on the truth, a "science driven by private interests" will take longer to get there, Krimsky notes.
Furthermore, industrial sponsorship redirects scientists away from their proper public orientation such
that academic scientists end up "pursuing knowledge in certain fields for selected problems where there
are commercial interests," such that science of "little commercial but of great public interest" gets
comparatively less attention.4 0
Other observers are equally pessimistic about the effects of science driven by private interests.
Sociologist John Abraham argues that "corporate bias" alters the conduct of science to such a degree
that Mertonian norms of science are of limited relevance in industrial science.41 After detailed study of
five non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), Abraham concludes that scientists working for
industry "have put forward self-contradictory arguments or made claims that were logically inconsistent
with the established scientific standards of drug testing and medication at the time."42
While government funding has propelled a considerable amount of influenza research-a recent
systematic review of 274 studies comparing influenza vaccines against placebo or no intervention found
48% were government financed 43-industry still finances much research in the field, including crucial
clinical trials of vaccines and antivirals which form the basis of regulatory approval. In the last decade,
research on the effects of industry funding of medical science has shown that funding, publication, and
peer review interact in consistent patterns: industry sponsorship is significantly correlated with pro-
industry conclusions, 44 meta-analyses with financial ties to drug companies are more likely to report
favorable conclusions (but not favorable results), 45 and "systematic bias favours products which are
made by the company funding the research." 41 In the field of influenza vaccine studies, Jefferson and
39 Robert King Merton, Social theory and social structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
4 Krimsky, Science in the Private Interest, 73-81.
41 Abraham, Science, Politics And The Pharmaceutical Industry, 241.
42 Ibid., 242.
43 Jefferson et al., "Relation of study quality, concordance, take home message, funding, and impact in studies of
influenza vaccines."
44 Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li, and Cary P. Gross, "Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical
Research: A Systematic Review," Journal of the American Medical Association 289, no. 4 (January 2003): 454-465.
4s Veronica Yank, Drummond Rennie, and Lisa A. Bero, "Financial ties and concordance between results and
conclusions in meta-analyses: retrospective cohort study," BMJ 335, no. 7631 (November 2007): 1202-1205.
46 Joel Lexchin et al., "Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review,"
BMJ 326, no. 7400 (May 2003): 1167-1170.
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colleagues found that "publication in prestigious journals is associated with partial or total industry
funding, and this association is not explained by study quality or size." 47 What these issues point to is
the difficulty in assessing clinical trials and other information that appears in the peer-reviewed
literature, even in prestigious journals which are still considered the best source of objective
information. A clear first step would be the setting of pre-defined, transparent, reproducible methods
for analyzing and synthesizing all information, as advocated by groups such as the Cochrane
Collaboration. While ACIP does not currently present details regarding its strategy for selecting and
synthesizing data it incorporates into its recommendations, there are initiatives underway to
incorporate evidence-based medicine in a more deliberate and obvious way. 48
A final reason for why Planned Adaptation is only superficially being applied to ACIP policy
recommendations may be that there has never been a true commitment to an adaptive policy, but
rather a policy of continual expansion of influenza vaccine recommendations. Since at least 2006, ACIP's
interest in moving towards a policy of universal influenza vaccination has been readily apparent in its
guidance documents, despite knowledge that the scientific data was lacking. In minutes from the
meeting when the first formal commitment to the possibility of universal vaccination was made, it is
noted that "ultimately, the meeting participants reached consensus to move toward a universal
recommendation, but recommended that implementation occur in stages over time to avoid
unintended consequences and to have time to fill the information gaps."49 But even before this, Alan
Hinman, the former director of what is now the National Immunization Program, recalled that one of
the lessons of the 1976 swine flu debacle was "a realization that expansion to pandemic level
vaccination of the entire population would be much easier if there was an effective, stable, ongoing
[influenza] vaccination program." 50
Pandemic influenza policy
As major public health policies, pandemic influenza plans are another area that could stand to benefit
greatly from Planned Adaptation. As planning for a pandemic is fundamentally about preparing for a
future and therefore unknown event, there is a high level of uncertainty inherent to the process. Efforts
to get the policy right will therefore need to review and revise planning policies in light of new evidence
and greater knowledge of pandemics. This might happen both before a pandemic (by making sure that
policies are consistent with up to date understandings of pandemics), during a pandemic (by reviewing
and adjusting policies as the outbreak situation evolves), and after a pandemic (by revising overarching
planning guidelines in light of the "lessons learned" during the pandemic).
As with seasonal influenza policy, pandemic planners seem to have been tuned into the virtues of
Planned Adaptation, mostly saliently acknowledged in the emphasis planning documents placed on the
4 Jefferson et al., "Relation of study quality, concordance, take home message, funding, and impact in studies of
influenza vaccines."
48 Pickering, interview; "Record of the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices", February
10, 2005, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/downloads/mi n-archive/min-feb05.rtf, (accessed June 16, 2011).
49 "Record of the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices," 64/111.
50 Update: Preparing for the Next Influenza Pandemic, 2000,
http://video.cdc.gov/ramgen/phppo/PublicAccess/NIP/influenza/influenzapandemic.rm.
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need for flexibility and adaptation during an evolving outbreak response. For example, HHS's pandemic
influenza plan stated:
An effective local response will depend on pre-established partnerships and
collaborative planning by public health officials, hospital administrators, and community
leaders, who have considered a range of best-case and worst-case scenarios. It will
require flexibility and real-time decision-making, guided by epidemiologic information
on the pandemic virus.".
Given some uncertainty about the characteristics of a new pandemic strain, all aspects
of preparedness planning for pandemic influenza must allow for flexibility and real-time
decision-making that take new information into account as the situation unfolds.s2
Likewise, guidelines for vaccine allocation took into account not only a variable supply of vaccines in the
event of a pandemic, but the need to allocate vaccine in different ways depending on the severity of the
outbreak. The guidance document, co-published by HHS and Department of Homeland Security, stated:
... it is important that plans are flexible as the guidance may be modified based on the
status of vaccine technology, the characteristics of pandemic illness, and risk groups for
severe disease - factors that will remain unknown until a pandemic actually occurs.s3
In the United States, the CDC-led community mitigation guidance document, which introduced the
"Pandemic Severity Index" tool for measuring pandemics in real-time, divided pandemics into five
"categories" primarily based on the case fatality ratio which could be measured fairly easily and early in
an evolving pandemic outbreak. It is perhaps the most lucid example of a policy firmly written with a
built-in notion of Planned Adaptation. Nonpharmaceutical interventions such as voluntary isolation,
school closures, and the cancellation of public gatherings were to be recommended in accordance with
the severity of the pandemic such that they remained calibrated to the threat. The Introduction to the
planning document stated:
Response guidance will need to remain flexible and likely will require modification
during a pandemic as information becomes available and it can be determined if
ongoing pandemic mitigation measures are useful for mitigating the impact of the
pandemic. Pandemic planners need to develop requirements for community-level data
collection during a pandemic and develop and test a tool or process for accurate real-
time and post-wave evaluation of pandemic mitigation measures, with guidelines for
modifications. 54
si U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan," 1-2.
2 bid., 1-7.
s3 U.S. Health and Human Services, "Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine", July 23,
2008, 1, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/vaccine/allocationguidance.pdf.
s4 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance," 20.
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Elsewhere, pandemic plans placed similar attention on the need for flexibility as an adaptive strategy for
handling uncertainty:
The plan is also intended to be flexible so that our response can be adapted as a
pandemic evolves and knowledge about the new virus, its impact and the effectiveness
of available countermeasures emerges. 55
"Introduction," UK Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan (2005)
Response arrangements must be flexible enough to deal with a range of possibilities and
be capable of adjustment as they are implemented.56
"Key planning assumptions," UK Department of Health, Pandemic Flu: a national
framework for responding to an influenza pandemic (2007)
The proposed measures are based upon current knowledge of outbreaks of seasonal
influenza and past pandemics. Recommendations may be adjusted based on new
evidence and experience.57
"Overarching goals, objectives and actions for each phase," WHO global influenza
preparedness plan (2005)
Even when flexibility and adaptation are not explicitly mentioned, the very fact that pandemic planning
documents were continually updated-the WHO's original plan was published in 1999 and updated in
2005 and 2009, for example-is evidence that public health experts were aware of the need to
constantly adapt to new information. The SARS and avian influenza H5N1 experiences had a major
effect in probing governments to rethink and revise their plans should an influenza pandemic emerge.
In the United States, it was a disaster from a source completely unrelated to disease-Hurricane
Katrina-that prompted the Bush administration to significantly overhaul its pandemic influenza
response plan.
But for all the signs of Planned Adaptation, the 2009 HiN1 outbreak has shown that the commitment to
adjusting plans based on new information and changing circumstances was limited. As information
emerged over the summer of 2009 suggesting that H1N1's impact may be far less than even the best-
case scenarios envisioned in any national plan, 58 response efforts largely stayed within the range
identified by pandemic plans. During the outbreak, public health officials continually stressed a
ss UK Department of Health, "UK Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan", October 20, 2005, 11,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod -cons u m-dh/groups/d h_d igita lassets/@ dh/@ en/d ocu ments/d igitalIasset/d h_41 2174
4.pdf, (accessed June 16, 2011).
s6 UK Department of Health, "Pandemic flu: a national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic," 23.
* World Health Organization, "WHO global influenza preparedness plan", 2005, 10,
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHOCDSCSRGIP_2005_5.pdf.
58 Peter Doshi, "Pandemic Influenza: Severity Must Be Taken into Account," The Journal of Infectious Diseases 201,
no. 9 (May 2010): 1444-1445.
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precautionary approach of preparing for the worst, and spoke of a general uncertainty about the
disease, with frequent reference to the seemingly severe situation in Mexico and the always unknown
future.59 Data from the southern hemisphere, indicating an outbreak of intensity in many ways
60
comparable or even less severe than seasonal influenza, was not as readily acted upon.
Some responses certainly were scaled back in line with an evolving evidence base which early in the
H1N1 outbreak suggested that the problem may be less severe than expected-Japan, for instance,
terminated its strict border control screening measures and other countries did not repeat Mexico's
decision to virtually shut down its capital city-but overarching assumptions, such as the necessity of a
universal vaccination program and the prudence of using pandemic plans (which were based on the
assumption of an outbreak of extraordinary severity) to respond to a disease of seasonal intensity, were
not seriously questioned by public health leaders themselves, only by outside critics.
In the United Kingdom, one of the earliest countries to be affected by H1Ni-and where there was
much criticism of officials for "overreacting"61 to H1NI-an independent review was commissioned. Its
first recommendation is for a more flexible response: "Ministers should determine early in a pandemic
how they will ensure that the response is proportionate to the perceived level of risk and how this will
guide decision-making."62 This theme-for flexibility and proportionality-is a fundamental conclusion
of the Council of Europe investigation 3 as well as the independent review panel set up by WHO, which
declared that there is a need for plans that "emphasize a risk-based approach to enable a more flexible
response to different scenarios."64
The CDC, which had the most sophisticated and detailed guidelines for a flexible, risk-based response in
place before H1N1 2009 emerged, in the end did not employ its Pandemic Severity Index; and HINI was
never classified as a Category 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 pandemic. Emergency measures such as the more liberal
use of influenza antivirals-to children under one year of age, and using these drugs past their
expiration dates-were kept in place for over a year on the basis that HINI constituted a public health
emergency.65 The United States has not commissioned an external review of its handling of the HIN1
outbreak, nor has it announced plans to do so.
Revisiting conflicts of interest
The critique that influenza policy is unduly shaped by industrial interests is a compelling framework that
has been offered to explain the problems identified during the HINI outbreak of 2009, particularly
s9 Council of Europe, "The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency needed."
60 Foulkes, "WHO faces questions over swine flu policy."
61 Eleanor Bradford, "Did the authrotities overreact to swine flu?," BBC, April 27, 2010, sec. Scotland,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/scotland/8646754.stm, (accessed June 17, 2011).
6 Hine, "The 2009 Influenza Pandemic," 5.
63 Council of Europe, "The handling of the HIN1 pandemic: more transparency needed," 10.
64 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 19.
6s Margaret A. Hamburg to Thomas R. Frieden, "Termination of Declarations of Emergency Justifying Emergency
Use Authorization (EUA) of Certain Antiviral Drugs--Zanamivir, Oseltamivir Phosphate, Peramivir", June 21, 2010,
http://www.cdc.gov/HlNlflu/EUA/pdf/Antivirals.pdf, (accessed June 17, 2011).
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concerning claims that public health institutions overreacted to HINI, not only misusing public money,
but also injuring the public trust in public health guidance.66 Perhaps the divergences between what
should have happened and what did happen were the effects of money. Many details have emerged
that point in the direction of the conclusion that a profit-driven industry has indeed been able to use the
state for its own (private) purposes: documented examples of influenza policy makers who also have
financial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry, governments' outlay of enormous sums of
money stockpiling antiviral medications and purchasing influenza vaccines of questionable effectiveness,
and the general trend within academia and government to work with industry as a "partner." If true, it
would hardly be the first instance. Forty years ago, the political scientist George Stigler, in fact, said
such a relationship was fundamental to the nature of regulation. Stigler wrote that no matter whether
industry seeks out regulation or is bound to it by law, "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."67 While admitting that some regulations would
indeed put onerous demands on industry, Stigler nonetheless argued that in the main, regulation was in
industry's benefit.
Stigler's "theory of economic regulation" was not focused on examples such as vaccine policy-which
strictly speaking are not matters of regulation but of official advice-but rather in the effects of
governmental regulation on controlling market entry in certain industries, or setting prices.
Nevertheless, ACIP recommendations on vaccines carry enormous implications, privileging certain
modes of medical care over others. In the case of influenza, ACIP's focus on vaccines as a way to
prevent and control the disease helps ensure that alternative or competing approaches, such as hand
washing, remain peripheral. The influenza vaccine industry, quite unsurprisingly, advocates for ACIP to
continue and expand its support of its product-efforts that get amplified at annual meetings such as
the National Influenza Vaccine Summit.
Following the BMJ/The Bureau investigation by Cohen and Carter which revealed that a World Health
Organization pandemic planning guidance document had not disclosed that some of its authors had
been paid for work by the pharmaceutical industry, a number of scientists and some public health
agencies objected to the suggestion that decision making at WHO might have been compromised by
industry. Two major arguments were voiced: first, drawing on the best influenza experts inevitably
means tapping people who have at some point worked with industry, because all bodies, including
industry, want to use the best experts; second, the insinuation that experts who had not had
relationships with pharmaceutical companies would have provided different advice is false.68
Considering how policy making might improve in the future requires a thorough examination of both of
these claims.
In an interview, WHO spokesperson Gregory Hsrtl explained the Organization's position regarding the
scarcity of high quality expertise:
6 Epstein, "Flu Warning."
67 George J. Stigler, "The economic theory of regulation," BellJournal of Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3.
68 Declan Butler, "Flu experts rebut conflict claims," Nature 465, no. 7299 (June 10, 2010): 672-673; Elizabeth
Sukkar, "WHO reveals H1N1 committee's links with big pharma", August 11, 2010, http://www.ghwatch.org/who-
watch/h1n1, (accessed June 16, 2011).
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If you are the best footballer, everyone wants that footballer ... The influenza
community is quite small and we can understand the experience [these experts] have
accumulated before working with us. Also, [the experts] have more to lose without
declaring their interests. The quality of [members in] the emergency committee was
very high. You want those types of people advising on monumental decisions [such as
H1N1 pandemic].69
There is an unstated assumption in Hartl's comment that the best quality advice on decision making
necessarily comes from the influenza experts. There are several reasons to question the soundness of
this judgment. First, as epidemiologists Luc Bonneux and Wim Van Damme have argued, there may be
adverse effects when policy is largely driven by disease experts whose professional identity is tied to a
single disease. They argue that such experts are not necessarily competent to judge a disease's relative
importance against competing health priorities, and given the reality that in public health, as other areas
of public spending, budgets are limited, they argue that "final evidence-based policy advice should be
drafted by independent scientists trained in evaluation and priority setting."70 Harvey Fineberg and
Richard Neustadt came to similar conclusions in their study of the abortive 1976 "swine flu" epidemic in
the United States:
The best of expert panels should be supplemented by separate scientific advice. In a
swine flu case when evidence is thin-with unobserved phenomena vastly outweighing
observations from the three pandemic years of 1918, 1957, 1968-it is not only the
assumptions but appraisal of their scientific quality that top decision-makers need.
Panels tend toward "group think" and over-selling, tendencies nurtured by long-
standing inter-changes and intimacy, as in the influenza fraternity. Other competent
scientists, who do not share their group identity or vested interests, should be able to
appraise the scientific logic applied to available evidence. In medicine, as in law, there
are rules of evidence by which argument can be tested. A [Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare] Califano needs an assured source of such review to do for him
what a good science adviser does for the President. The Secretary may not need one
designated "adviser." In medical fields his Department has plenty of scientists. The
problem is to make them scrutinize and check each other's logic for his benefit.
In the "highly competitive market of health governance," Bonneux and Wim Van Damme write, "the
struggle for attention, budgets and grants is fierce."7 Disease experts therefore have a vested interest
to keep the spotlight on their particular area of expertise.
Hartl's claim about the limited availability of influenza experts who are free of financial conflicts of
interest is hard to verify empirically, as surveys have not been carried out and will inevitably struggle
with defining who is and is not an "expert," but nonetheless raises a more fundamental question about
69 Sukkar, "WHO reveals H1N1 committee's links with big pharma."
Luc Bonneux and Wim Van Damme, "Preventing iatrogenic pandemics of panic. Do it in a NICE way," BMJ 340,
no. jun09_3 (June 9, 2010): c3065.
Neustadt and Fineberg, The Swine Flu Affair, 89-90.
Bonneux and Van Damme, "Health is more than influenza," 539-540.
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whether industry involvement in the conduct of public interest science is inherently corrupting. Does it
change the ethos of science such that industry relationships are now seen as "inevitable" rather than
"unacceptable," a fact of life to be "managed" rather than "avoided"? Given the documented biasing
effects of commercial interests in medicine, public health agencies would seem to have an imperative to
create the circumstances and incentives for truly commercial-free advice.
The second rebuttal to those concerned over conflicts of interest has been the argument that advice
from scientists free of industry funding was no different than the advice of those with industry funding,
and therefore conflicts of interest are not as problematic as some critics have suggested. To a great
extent, it is true that public health practitioners have been in agreement over fundamental aspects of
influenza-its epidemiology and proper methods of control. But this general agreement does not
dismiss the power of money to bias scientific research and policy. At the same time, it points to the
need to locate additional factors which may account for the general consensus about influenza, and
conviction that while imperfect, the decisions that were made in response to H1N1 in 2009, were the
fully justified.
In its report, the IHR Review Committee stressed the role of the "ethos of public health":
The core values of public health shaped the response of public-health leaders around
the world to the pandemic. The main ethos of public health is one of prevention: to
prevent disease and avert avoidable deaths. The response of WHO and many countries
to the pandemic was a reflection of this mindset. This was affirmed in the sentiments
expressed by many Member States to the Review Committee: in the face of uncertainty
and potentially serious harm, it is better to err on the side of safety. Public-health
officials believe and act on this conviction. It is incumbent upon political leaders and
policy-makers to understand this core value of public health and how it pervades
thinking in the field.
In 1976, President Ford made a similar argument. Knowing that the mass vaccination program could
end up a massive waste of public money if the anticipated virus did not appear, it was nonetheless
declared better to "gamble with dollars, not lives."7 5 Four decades later, the IHR Review Committee
suggested that this same ethos-not financial interests-accounted for WHO's behavior during the 2009
H1N1 outbreak:
Some commentators accused WHO of rushing to announce Phase 6 and suggested the
reason was to enrich vaccine manufacturers, some of whose advance-purchase
agreements would be triggered by the declaration of Phase 6. Far from accelerating the
73 Butler, "Flu experts rebut conflict claims."
7 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (HINI) 2009," 10.
7s Walter Dowdle, "Lessons from 1976" (presented at the Commitee on Implementation of Antiviral Medication
Strategies for an Influenza Pandemic, Washington, DC, January 7, 2008), 3,
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Disease/FluAntiviralStrat/Dowdle.ashx, (accessed June 17,
2011).
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declaration of Phase 6, WHO delayed declaration until evidence of sustained community
spread in multiple regions of the world was undeniably occurring. As far as the Review
Committee can determine, no critic of WHO has produced any direct evidence of
commercial influence on decision-making. In its interviews with staff and advisory
committee members, including the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts and the
Emergency Committee, and with representatives of industry, and through its review of
internal and external documents, the Review Committee found no evidence of
attempted or actual influence by commercial interests on advice given to or decisions
made by WHO. In the Committee's view, the inference by some critics that invisible
commercial influences must account for WHO's actions ignores the power of the core
public-health ethos to prevent disease and save lives.
This explanation suggests that two basic intertwined positions ruled the response to H1N1: that putting
something into action is always preferable to inaction, and that vaccines and antivirals were better
interventions than no intervention. The implication is that even if vaccines arrived after the peak of the
epidemic (as they did in the case of H1N1), using them would be better than nothing. This position is
similar to that voiced by the epidemiologist Lone Simonsen, in response to more research showing
influenza vaccines had lower efficacy than advertised: "The vaccine is still important. Thirty percent
protection is better than zero percent."77
The "public health ethos" is an admittedly strong and powerful explanatory mechanism for
understanding public health decision making, particularly under situations of high uncertainty and high
risk, but it leaves unanswered questions such as:
* Why did public health officials assume that H1N1 vaccination programs would do more good
than harm?
" Why were contradictory conclusions between FDA and CDC on the effects of the stockpiled
antiviral Tamiflu not treated as problematic?
It also leaves unexplained a host of observations relevant to the handling of seasonal influenza:
* The continual expansion of who is "at risk" from influenza, and therefore in need of annual
vaccination
" The lack of interest in educating the public about the difference between influenza versus "flu"
(ILI, influenza-like illness) despite emphasis in educating people about the dangers of influenza
* The response to data showing influenza vaccines have not reduced deaths was a call for
expanding the groups of people said to need annual influenza vaccination
76 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, "Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005)
in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009," 17.
7 Brenda Goodman, "Doubts Grow Over Flu Vaccine in Elderly," The New York Times, September 2, 2008, sec.
Health, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/02/health/02flu.html, (accessed June 17, 2011).
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" The lack of interest in randomized controlled trials of influenza vaccine despite
acknowledgement that current policy is not based on high quality data and uncertainty over
ability of influenza vaccine to reduce the risk of death
* The lack of interest (until recently) to determine what proportion of influenza-like illness (ILI) is
caused by influenza and other agents
" The lack of interest in sponsoring head-to-head trials of influenza vaccine versus other non-
pharmaceutical interventions but simultaneous conviction that influenza vaccine is the "best"
protection against "flu"
" Belief that a severe, 1918-like pandemic has the same probability of repeating as an relatively
uneventful, 1968-like pandemic
" The advocacy of policy which sets as its goal the vaccination of certain percentages of the
population without any guarantee that this will result in less morbidity or mortality
While any one of these questions may be answered by pointing to the possible effects of industry, it
must be recalled that these observations apply to not only influenza experts, but many other public
health practitioners at the federal, state, and local level, most of whom do not have relationships with
industry. Implementing influenza control activities such as vaccination programs involves a large
number of public health practitioners, and it is only an extreme minority of those individuals who are
influenza experts and aware of problems in the evidence base.
My argument is that virus-centric thinking dominates the logic of public health, and by influenza's mere
status as a "vaccine preventable disease," the vast majority of officials will find vaccines and other virus-
specific interventions to be the obvious answer to influenza even without having done any research of
their own, or perhaps even feeling the need to do independent research. It is a policy that is easy to get
behind and defend. Consider the case of the state health departments of California, Arizona, Texas, and
New York-the four largest states of the Pacific, Mountain, Central, and Eastern regions, respectively.
There is almost no variation among statements the four state health departments make about who
should get influenza vaccine, and how safe and effective the vaccine is (Table 6.1; Table 6.2). The reason
for this uniformity is that the information all points back to CDC. State health departments, despite
their independence from CDC, evidently trust CDC's conclusions about the science and policy of
influenza. These chains of trust, embedded in a shared logic of virus-centric thinking, perpetuate error,
impeding the adaptation and improvement of influenza policy.
Doing reliable knowledge assessment
Making public policy consistent with the best syntheses of evidence requires adopting methods to
ensure that high quality assessments of knowledge get incorporated into policy. A first step may be to
ensure that credible knowledge assessment can even occur.
In the case of influenza policy, current institutional arrangements would seem to provide disincentives
for "getting the science right" because of built-in conflicts of interest. In the same way that
pharmaceutical money can bias academic researchers by imparting a dual responsibility-both to the
integrity of science and to advancing industry's interest in profit-bias may also occur without the
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presence of money, and may be equally powerful. Whenever an individual or group of people have
multiple responsibilities in which successfully accomplishing one responsibility may impede the ability to
successfully accomplish another responsibility, a non-financial conflict of interest (i.e., conflict of
commitment) exists.
In the United States, the same group of people who calculate the risk from influenza also make
recommendations on what to do about it., These same individuals likewise have official capacity to
report on the effectiveness of those recommendations and conduct public awareness campaigns to raise
vaccination levels.78 This quadruple responsibility-to risk assessment, risk management, effectiveness
assessment, and risk communication-creates disincentives to correct error. Providing unbiased
knowledge assessments is compromised by these multiple responsibilities.
Political scientist Katherine Martin has written that "in most cases, there are incentives for policymakers
to exaggerate certainty in support of their attempts to anticipate the impacts of policies. If they then
acknowledge that original policies were wrong, they will be undercutting their own credibility."79 While
officials always describe influenza as a mutating and inherent unpredictable virus, they project certainty
regarding the threat that influenza poses and the importance of pharmacological approaches. Public
health, like many governmental institutions, renders itself accountable by being able to justify its actions
on quantifiable measures of morbidity, mortality, and therapeutic efficacy. The CDC's now superseded
estimate of an average of 36,000 annual deaths from influenza that was published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association80 was one such way the agency could demonstrate that it was fulfilling its
mission of basing decisions on "the highest quality scientific data."81 In what some anthropologists have
termed our "audit cultures,"8 2 the mere existence of these figures-published and citable-can be seen
as more important than their accuracy. To acknowledge basic problems in the assessment of influenza's
impact or the effectiveness of vaccines would potentially cast doubt on the scientific competence of
those experts, risk the public trust, and possibly lead to the reprioritization of governmental funding
away from influenza.
Likewise, for policymakers responsible for both recommending interventions and evaluating how well
those interventions work, there are incentives to ensure the evidence for vaccine effectiveness is
consistent with recommendations, projecting an image that prior policy decisions are validated by the
latest evidence. The fact that a single agency-CDC-is responsible for so many aspects of policy
formation and review may be considered a kind of knowledge monopoly. Doing reliable knowledge
78 My critique about conflicts in responsibilities builds on a critique that has been voiced numerous times by those
who oppose the CDC's responsibility for both recommending vaccines and conducting vaccine safety research, not
limited to the case of influenza. See, for example, Arthur Allen, Vaccine: The Controversial Story of Medicine's
Greatest Lifesaver (W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 403; SafeMinds, "Federal Vaccine Court Rules Against Autism
Families", March 12, 2010,
http://www.safeminds.org/news/pressroom/press-releases/SafeMinds%20VICA%2OThimerosal%20rulings%20FIN
AL3-12-09.pdf, (accessed June 14, 2011).
79 Petersen et al., "Anticipation and Adaptation in Particulate Matter Policy," 58.
8o Thompson et al., "Mortality associated with influenza and respiratory syncytial virus in the United States."
8 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Vision, Mission, Core Values, and Pledge."
8 Marilyn Strathern, Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy, 1st ed.
(Routledge, 2000).
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assessments may require that this knowledge monopoly be broken. The way in which the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) helps ensure aviation safety may provide a useful example of
institutional arrangements which improve the quality of knowledge assessment.
Lessons from aviation safety
According to its mission statement, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), housed within the
Department of Transportation, strives to make America the safest and most efficient system aerospace
system in the world. "Safety is our passion," their website reads.83 To that end, the FAA has been
vested with the powers to regulate all aspects of civil and commercial aviation in this country. FAA
promotes safety in part by setting rules for licensure-from the pilots who fly the planes to the aircraft
itself, all must meet FAA standards to legally fly. But accidents happen, and it is here where the National
Transportation Safety Board helps the FAA (and ultimately the public) strengthen the commitment to
safety by conducting thorough independent investigations of transportation accidents.
The work of the NTSB has a high degree of public visibility, which helps ensure that its investigations and
safety recommendations are implemented by other government agencies, in particular the FAA. What
however perhaps gives the Board the most leverage is its congressional mandate to be independent of
the other federal agencies. In 1974, Congress established the NTSB as an independent agency, noting
that
Proper conduct of the responsibilities assigned to this Board requires vigorous
investigation of accidents involving transportation modes regulated by other agencies of
Government: demands continual review; appraisal, and assessment of the operating
practices and regulations of all such agencies; and calls for the making of conclusions
and recommendations that may be critical of or adverse to any such agency or its
officials. No Federal agency can properly perform such functions unless it is totally
separate and independent from any other department, bureau, commission, or agency
of the United States.8 4
Until 1974, the NTSB had been housed in the same Department of Transportation (DOT) with FAA. It
was only after several aircraft accidents that pressure mounted to give the NTSB greater authority by
making it independent of DOT. A design defect in cargo doors on some aircraft had resulted in the crash
of a DC-10 aircraft. Subsequent investigations revealed a design flaw that NTSB had already made
recommendations to fix-recommendations that the airlines, FAA, and the White House had not
implemented. 85 The establishment of NTSB as an agency operating independently of the agencies which
it must necessarily critique helps ensure the proper oversight of transportation security.
Improving decision making in public health may not require introducing any institutional separation as in
the case of transportation safety, but it does highlight the benefit of clearly identifying who has
responsibility for the various aspects of public health priority setting and response. In the case of
83 Federal Aviation Administration, "Mission", 2011, http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/, (accessed June 17, 2011).
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, 1975.
8s McCray, Oye, and Petersen, "Planned adaptation in risk regulation," 955.
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influenza, the same general group of people pose and answer virtually all critical questions regarding
problem identification and risk assessment (Is influenza a problem? What is the nature of the problem?
How big of a problem is it? To whom? Why?), priority setting and risk management (Should anything be
done about it? What are the options for prevention and treatment? What are the costs? Is it worth it?),
program execution (awareness campaigns to increase vaccination rates), and program evaluation (Are
risk management strategies working?)
It seems structurally incongruous to expect the Advisory Committee on immunization Practices, whose
stated mission is to help increase vaccination rates, can dispassionately and fairly consider alternative
approaches to controlling influenza other than vaccination. There are no formalized outside checks,
either on the science of risk assessment, or on the far more subjective questions of proper risk
management. Policy is thus little affected by the concerns of others who may have competing
judgments about the soundness and appropriateness of public health guidance.
It is not clear that public health needs a FAA/NTSB like arrangement. In the early 1980s, the National
Research Council (NRC) deliberated on the question of whether it is beneficial to separate "the analytic
functions of developing risk assessments from the regulatory functions of making policy decisions."86
Bitter controversies, particularly over the regulation of chemicals in the environment, had grown
between members of the public and regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). These federal agencies became increasingly accused of risking the public's health through
overly lax regulation of potentially risky chemicals and industries. Identifying the inherent conflict of
interest when the same agency conducted both risk assessment and risk management, some called for a
clear separation of those functions. The NRC was asked to deliberate on what might be done to improve
policy making.
While the NRC admitted that "organizational separation may help to ensure that risk management
considerations do not influence the conduct of risk assessment,"87 it cautioned that organizational
separation also carried several disadvantages, chiefly that it would reduce "the responsiveness of the
risk assessment process to the needs of the regulatory agencies for timely reports."88 The NRC argued
that "other approaches are more likely to maintain the distinction between science and policy in risk
assessment,"89 a distinction it felt important because in the NRC's view, risk assessment was a
fundamentally scientific synthesis of factual knowledge while risk management was inherently a
question of social and political calculus. The NRC therefore did not advocate for clear institutional
separation-as is witnessed in the FAA/NTSB relationship-but did conclude that a "conceptual
distinction" must be maintained:
8 Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Research Council, Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government, 2.
87 Ibid., 141.
88 Ibid., 6.
89 Ibid., 143.
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Regulatory agencies should take steps to establish and maintain a clear conceptual
distinction between assessment of risks and the consideration of risk management
alternatives; that is, the scientific findings and policy judgments embodied in risk
assessments should be explicitly distinguished from the political, economic, and
technical considerations that influence the design and choice of regulatory strategies.90
A refocus on patients
In an ideal world, the knowledge monopolies in influenza policy would be broken, industry influence
would be eliminated, and public health officials would become more self-critical about the many false
assumptions of virus-centric thinking. But until that day comes, there may be some actions that can
help reveal the many problems in influenza policy and eventually bring officials closer to achieving their
fundamental goal of ensuring the health of the public.9'
First, we must achieve transparency about the goals, and performance, of the policy. At present, the
goals of influenza policy are vague and implied: is it to save elderly lives? reduce cases of influenza-like
illness? workplace absenteeism? school absenteeism? hospital infections? All of the above? Some of
the above? None of the above? Explicit and unambiguous goals-goals identified as goals with
quantifiable targets-would allow a benchmark against which the policy can be judged. While a
reduction in elderly mortality may be the assumed or implicit goal, the lack of clear specification may be
the reason why no formal mechanisms exist to evaluate whether and how well the policy is achieving its
goals.
One exception to this is the HHS publication Healthy Americans 2020, which sets national objectives and
a framework for improving the health of Americans. Like its predecessors, Healthy Americans 2020
emphasized the continued threat of infectious diseases-including from influenza-and stresses the
importance of vaccination. But the benchmark by which the document measures success is the
achievement of certain levels of vaccination coverage (e.g. 80% of all healthy adults receiving annual
influenza vaccination by 2020), not a measured reduction in morbidity or mortality.92 This might be the
biggest reason that the failure in influenza vaccines to reduce the estimated mortality burden of
influenza has caused little controversy or broad questioning over the soundness of policy: the goals of
the policy are set such that those implementing the policy can declare success despite a failure to save
lives-or even reduce cases of "flu" (ILI), the disease ordinary people are led to believe they can avoid
with a "flu shot."
Incorporating general, primary care physicians and other non-disease experts in policy making may be
one way to tie policy goals to endpoints relevant to patients (not disease experts). To not do so risks the
protraction of a policy that misses the point. In 2006, the family practice journal American Family
90 ibid., 151.
91 James F Childress et al., "Public health ethics: mapping the terrain," The Journalof Law, Medicine & Ethics: A
Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 30, no. 2 (2002): 170-178.
9 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Immunization and Infectious Diseases", December 2, 2010,
http://healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/pdfs/Immunization.pdf, (accessed June 17, 2011).
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Physician posed the following question in its "Cochrane for Clinicians: Putting Evidence into Practice"
section:
A healthy one-year-old girl presents in the fall for well-child care and an immunization
update. The girl's mother asks you whether her child should have an influenza
vaccination. ... Would an influenza vaccination prevent illness in this patient, and would
it be safe?93
The journal's answer was not clear cut: while keeping in mind ACIP's recommendation to vaccinate,
American Family Physician noted that the most recent Cochrane systematic review on the subject had
found the evidence base left much to be desired. While vaccines appeared to reduce absenteeism in
schools, "Effectiveness (i.e., prevention of influenza-like illness, perhaps a clinically more important
measure) is poor for all influenza vaccines in healthy children" and safety data were lacking. For
children less than two, the vaccine was "no better than placebo and there are no good-quality safety
data." The journal recommended that physicians explain to parents that CDC recommended the
vaccine, that the evidence base was lacking, and then leave it to the parent to decide.
The article provoked a letter from Carol Baker and William Schaffner, of the National Foundation of
Infectious Diseases, and Richard Zimmerman. 94 The authors rebuffed the journal's focus on influenza-
like illness as a meaningful outcome:
93 Steven E Roskos, "Vaccines for preventing influenza in healthy children," American Family Physician 74, no. 7(October 1, 2006): 1123-1125.
94In a statement of disclosures accompanying their letter, neither Baker nor Schaffner mentioned that they were
both Liaison Representatives to the ACIP at the time. Schaffner was a member of ACIP in 1993 and 1994, liaison
representative from 1995-2010, and has been on the ACIP Influenza Working Group since 1999. Zimmerman was a
Liaison Representative from 1994-2002, Member of ACIP from 2002-2004, on the ACIP Influenza Working Group
from 1999-2004, and its chair in 2004. What the authors did mention was: "Dr. Baker has served as a consultant to
Novartis Pharmaceuticals and Inhibitex, as a member of a Safety Evaluation Committee for Merck & Co., and as a
speaker for Sanofi-Pasteur. Dr. Schaffner has served as an ad hoc consultant for Medimmune and GlaxoSmithKline,
and as a member of a Safety Evaluation Committee for Merck & Co. Dr. Zimmerman has received research and
educational grants via nonprofit foundations with original funding from Merck & Co." For references, see U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Prevention and control of influenza"; "Prevention and control of
influenza: Part I, Vaccines. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),"
MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 43, no. 9 (May 27, 1994): 1-13; "Prevention and control of influenza
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 44, no. 3 (April 21, 1995): 1-22; U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, "Prevention and control of influenza"; "Prevention and control of influenza:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and
Reports 46, no. 9 (April 25, 1997): 1-25; "Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention," MMWR.
Recommendations and Reports 47, no. 6 (May 1, 1998): 1-26; "Prevention and control of influenza:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and
Reports 48, no. 4 (April 30, 1999): 1-28; Bridges et al., "Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)"; Carolyn B. Bridges, Keiji Fukuda, Nancy J. Cox, et al.,
"Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices(ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 50, no. 4 (April 20, 2001): 1-44; Carolyn B Bridges, Keiji Fukuda,
Timothy M Uyeki, et al., "Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
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The article characterizes "prevention of influenza-like illness" as a clinically more
important measure of vaccination effectiveness than prevention of influenza. But
influenza-like illness is a surrogate marker of effectiveness, measured only to reduce
expense and time associated with measuring the more specific laboratory-confirmed
infection. Influenza vaccine protects against the influenza virus, not the many other
viruses that co-circulate during winter months and cause "influenza-like" illnesses. It is
unreasonable to expect any vaccine to protect against infections other than those for
which it was designed.9
Steven Roskos, author of the original American Family Physician article, 6 responded:
Actually, influenza-like illness is a more patient-oriented outcome, whereas influenza
infection is a disease-oriented outcome. In other words, patients and their parents are
concerned about avoiding illness, missing school or work, and being hospitalized. They
are much less concerned about which virus caused their illness.
The debate once again highlights the divergence between the views of disease experts and general
physicians, and how policy suffers when it stays in the hands of disease experts. (In 2009, Baker became
the chair of ACIP, and national influenza control recommendations continue to privilege influenza-
specific outcomes over influenza-like illness.97) While disease experts are essential for certain technical
advice, decision making would be better placed in the hands of general scientists and clinicians,98 who
may usefully refocus the spotlight on patient-centered outcomes (such as influenza-like illness), not
disease-centered outcomes (only those influenza-like illnesses caused by influenza virus).
By refocusing the policy on patients and setting transparent goals to clinically meaningful endpoints (not
surrogate markers like vaccination coverage levels), failure to achieve policy goals may help reveal the
problems with influenza science to broader public scrutiny, and compel change.
[ENDS]
Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 51, no. 3 (April 12, 2002): 1-31; Carolyn B.
Bridges, Scott A. Harper, et al., "Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP)," MMWR. Recommendations and Reports 52, no. 8 (April 25, 2003): 1-34; quiz
CE1-4; Harper et al., "Prevention and control of influenza"; Harper et al., "Prevention and control of influenza.
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)"; Smith et al., "Prevention and
Control of Influenza"; Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2007"; Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008"; Fiore et al., "Prevention
and control of seasonal influenza with vaccines"; Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines:
recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010."
95 Carol J Baker, William Schaffner, and Richard K Zimmerman, "Importance of influenza vaccination for children,"
American Family Physician 76, no. 3 (August 1, 2007): 343-344; author reply 344, 347.
96 Regarding potential conflicts of interest, Roskos declared: "Nothing to disclose."
97 Fiore et al., "Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010."
98 Bonneux and Van Damme, "Health is more than influenza."
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Table 6.1. Who should get vaccinated, according to state health departments
Agency Who should get vaccinated? Rationale/evidence cited (if any)
Pacific state Not explicitly stated.99  N/A
(CA)
Mountain state "... everyone six months or older is encouraged Link to CDC website'0 '
(AZ) to get a vaccine at this time." 00
Central state "Everyone 6 months and older should get None given.
-(TX) vaccinated now."102
Eastern state "Everyone 6 months and older should get a flu None given.
(NY) vaccine." 103
99 California Department of Public Health, "Influenza (Flu)", 2010,
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Healthlnfo/discond/Pages/influenza%28Fu%29.aspx, (accessed June 17, 2011).
100 Arizona Department of Health Services, "Influenza (Flu) in Arizona", April 4, 2011, http://www.azdhs.gov/flu/,
(accessed June 17, 2011).
101 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "CDC Says 'Take 3' Actions To Fight The Flu", March 7, 2011,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm, (accessed June 17, 2011).
Texas Department of State Health Services, TexasFlu.org, 2011, http://www.texasflu.org/, (accessed June 17,
2011).
New York State Department of Health, "Seasonal Influenza (Flu)", November 2010,
http://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/influenza/seasonal/, (accessed June 17, 2011).
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Table 6.2. How safe and effective is influenza vaccine, according to state health departments
Agency How safe and effective is influenza Rationale/evidence cited (if any)
vaccine?
Pacific "The best way to prevent influenza is by Nom. However the inflenza'tbomepage
state (CA) gstting a flu vaccination each year." states, "'For moflWinformation visit
'lww.fii ov." 0
Mountain "The best way to prevent the flu is to get a None. However wording is similar to the
state (AZ) flu vaccination."106  CDC claim, "The best way to prevent the flu
is by getting a flu vaccination each year."
Central "About the Vaccine" webpage does not N/A
make claims about safety and
effectiveness. It however, links to
numerous CDC influenza webpages.
"The flu vaccine takes about two weeks
after vaccination for the antibodies to
provide protection against influenza virus
infection. Until then, you are still at risk for
getting the flu."108
Specific safety claims are not made on the
main pages of the influenza website,
however numerous links to CDC's influenza
website are provided.
10 California Departnient of Public Health, "Influenza (Flu)."
105 Ibid.
1 Arizona Department of Health Services, "Influenza (Flu) in Arizona."
107 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Key facts about influenza and influenza vaccine."
108 New York State Department of Health, "What Everyone Should Know About Seasonal Flu and the Seasonal Flu
Vaccine", March 2011,
http://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/influenza/seasonal/what_everyone_should-know.htm,
(accessed June 17, 2011).
state (TX)
Eastern
state (NY)
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